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ABHISHEK SINGH v. AJAY KUMAR
Factual and Procedural Background
Abhishek Singh, a businessman, pledged 254 grams of 22-carat gold ornaments and obtained a loan of ₹7,70,000 from the Bank of India, Motijhil Branch, on 22 July 2020. When the bank issued a recall notice dated 7 October 2022 demanding ₹8,01,383.59, the appellant claims he cleared the dues by 31 March 2023.
The bank subsequently re-valued the pledged ornaments through a different valuer, allegedly discovering that they were counterfeit. It deducted ₹1,500 as re-valuation fees, treated the gold as bank property, and lodged an FIR against the appellant on 22 May 2023 under Sections 420 and 379 IPC.
Invoking Section 156(3) CrPC, the appellant filed a complaint that led to Mithanpura P.S. Case No. 393/2023 under Sections 420, 406 and 34 IPC against the Branch and Credit Manager (respondent No. 1) and others. While investigation was pending—eventually resulting in Charge-sheet No. 371/24 dated 30 September 2024—the respondents moved the Patna High Court under Section 482 CrPC. By judgment dated 12 November 2024, the High Court quashed the FIR, prompting the present appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Patna High Court correctly exercised its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash FIR No. 393/2023 filed by the appellant.
- Whether, at the quashing stage, the High Court could rely on materials beyond the FIR and treat the complaint as malicious without a trial.
- Whether non-filing (or alleged non-filing) of an affidavit under Priyanka Srivastava v. State of UP rendered the FIR unsustainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The loan stood fully repaid on 31 March 2023; therefore, recovery or re-valuation was unwarranted.
- The High Court relied on documents outside the FIR, contrary to settled law on quashing.
- Re-valuation was conducted behind the appellant’s back, raising the possibility of tampering or substitution of ornaments.
- An affidavit had in fact been annexed to the Section 156(3) application, making the High Court’s reliance on Priyanka Srivastava misplaced.
- Deducting charges and non-return of pledged gold without notice amounted to cheating and fraud by bank officials.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The gold-loan account was repeatedly declared a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) because of the appellant’s defaults.
- The sum paid after the recall notice was insufficient to regularise the account, warranting re-valuation of the collateral.
- The first valuer was de-empanelled for possible fraud; respondents were posted only at the time of re-valuation and bore no role in loan sanction.
- The appellant intentionally allowed the account to turn NPA, knowing the ornaments were fake, and used the FIR as a counter-blast.
- Recall notices warned that pledged gold would be auctioned if dues were unpaid, evidencing appellant’s intent to cheat.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Priyanka Srivastava v. State of UP, (2015) 6 SCC 287 | An affidavit must accompany an application under Section 156(3) CrPC. | High Court relied on the absence of an affidavit to quash the FIR; the Supreme Court noted the appellant’s assertion that an affidavit was filed and found the High Court’s reliance misplaced. |
| Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 | Courts should not evaluate defence evidence when deciding quashing petitions; only prima facie allegations matter. | Supreme Court quoted the decision to emphasise that the High Court wrongly assessed merits and defence materials. |
| Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604 | Section 482 review is confined to seeing whether prima facie offences are made out; no “mini-trial” is permitted. | Supreme Court invoked this ruling to fault the High Court for undertaking a merits-based inquiry rather than the limited prima facie test. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reiterated that the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC is limited to situations where the FIR, on its face, fails to disclose an offence or amounts to an abuse of process. Citing Rajeev Kourav and Naresh Aneja, the Court underscored that defence materials or detailed merit assessments are impermissible at the threshold stage.
The High Court had:
- Relied on the bank’s internal fraud-risk policy and the removal of the first valuer to infer good faith on the bank’s part, effectively weighing evidence.
- Concluded, without trial, that the appellant acted with an “ulterior motive” and the ornaments were spurious.
- Treated the FIR as a “counter-blast,” ignoring that once the loan was settled, the rationale behind re-valuation and non-return of gold needed factual examination.
- Invoked Priyanka Srivastava without verifying the appellant’s claim that an affidavit accompanied the Section 156(3) application.
The Supreme Court found these conclusions speculative and premature. It stressed that custody of the ornaments remained with the bank throughout; whether fraud occurred during initial valuation or later could be ascertained only through trial. Consequently, a prima facie case existed, and the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction in quashing the FIR.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; FIR Revived. The quashing order dated 12 November 2024 of the Patna High Court is set aside, and Mithanpura P.S. Case No. 393/2023 is restored for trial before the competent court.
Implications: The decision reinstates criminal proceedings without creating new substantive law. It reinforces established limits on High Court powers under Section 482 CrPC, cautioning against merit-based evaluations at the quashing stage. The matter will now proceed to trial, where guilt or innocence of the bank officials will be determined on evidence.
2025 INSC 807
Crl.A@ SLP(Crl) No. 480/2025 Page 1 of 11 NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.480/2025)
ABHISHEK SINGH … APPELLANT(S) Versus
AJAY KUMAR & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave Granted.
2. The appellant, Abhishek Singh, is the complainant and has approached this Court aggrieved by the judgment and order
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dated 12thNovember, 2024, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.67884 of 2023, whereby the respondents' application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731was allowed and the First Information Report dated 7thSeptember 2023 filed by him under Sections 420, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602, being Mithanpura P.S. Case No.393 of 2023, was quashed.
3. The brief facts that gave rise to this appeal, as set out by the Courts below, are that the appellant, being a businessman by vocation, was in need of certain funds which he secured by way of a loan from the Bank of India, Motijhil Branch. Having pledged 254 grams of 22 carat gold ornaments by way of security, a loan of ₹ 7,70,000 was made in his favour, on 22nd July, 2020. The dispute arises when it comes to the repayment of this loan. According to the appellant, upon receipt of notice dated 7thOctober, 2022 from the bank asking him to pay a sum of ₹ 8,01,383.59, which included interest, he repaid the same as on 31stMarch, 2023. Unbeknownst to him, the bank conducted a revaluation of the gold pledged by him and, to that end, deducted ₹ 1500 towards fees. His applications for returning the pledged gold fell on deaf years. On the other hand, according to
1 Cr.P.C.
2 IPC
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the bank, he did not pay the loan, because of which the gold became an asset of the bank. In order to realise the money involved in the transaction, the said gold was revalued and found to be counterfeit when it was allegedly reported by a valuer, different from the one who had originally valued the appellant's gold when the loan was made, that the material pledged was not gold in actuality but gold plated on top of other metals. One FIR was registered under sections 420 and 379 IPC against the appellant on 22ndMay, 2023. Another FIR, subject matter of this appeal, was registered subsequently after an application was made by the appellant to the competent authority under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Respondent No.1, the Accused therein, was the Branch and Credit Manager at the time of the revaluation of the appellant's gold.
4. Having completed its investigation into the appellant's allegations, the investigating authorities filed a chargesheet before the Judicial Magistrate, 1stClass (East) Mithanpura, having the particulars as Final Report/Chargesheet No.371/24, dated 30thSeptember, 2024. While the investigation was still underway, the respondents filed an application seeking quashing of the FIR on 5thOctober, 2023. It is in this application that the impugned judgment came to be passed.
5. The High Court, having perused the material on record, came to the following conclusions :
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a) this FIR is "a mere counterblast" to the FIR lodged by the bank;
b) the same has been lodged with the intention of causing wrongful loss to the bank and wrongful gain to himself;
c) to this end, the respondent before the High Court, the appellant herein, had obtained a loan from the bank for pledging spurious gold ornaments;
d) the institution of the FIR was "with an ulterior motive and also as an afterthought";
e) even if the contents of the complaint are taken at face value, no offence is made out.
f) The Court relied upon paragraphs 29 to 31 of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of UP3 to hold that since the appellant had not affixed any affidavit as mandated by this judgment, the FIR was unsustainable;
g) Continuation of criminal proceedings against the respondents herein would amount to an abuse of process of the Court, given that the complaint made by the appellant herein was "malicious".
6. In that view of the matter, the FIR was quashed, and the appellant carried the matter to this Court.
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7. We have heard the learned Senior counsel appearing for the parties and have gone through the record in detail. It is sought to be contended by the appellant, inter alia, that :
a) the High Court failed to appreciate that as on 31st March, 2023, there was no outstanding loan, against which the process of recovery could have been initiated;
b) in the impugned judgment, reliance was placed on documents other than the FIR/complaint which would be outside its scope. Other documents, which may be of the nature of defence of the party against whom allegations have been made in the FIR, cannot be looked into;
c) the revaluation of the appellant's pledged gold was done behind his back and contrary to the terms of the loan agreement. The possibility of tampering with or replacing the ornaments with those of questionable quality cannot be ruled out;
d) the complaint made under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. dated 24thMay, 2023 did have an affidavit attached to it, and therefore, the findings made in Paras 33 to 35, are erroneous;
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e) the non-lodging of FIR against the 1stvaluer, which, according to the respondents, was entirely incorrect, raises suspicion;
f) the charge on the appellant's account without consent or prior notice amounts to fraud and cheating. Per contra, the respondents canvassed, amongst others, the following aspects :
a) the gold loan account of the appellant had been declared a non-performing asset firstly on 1stof May, 2021 but then upon payment, the same was again upgraded to standard. Subsequent non-payment led to its declaration as an NPA once again on 30thApril,
2022.
b) The amount deposited by the appellant on issuance of a recall notice was not sufficient for the account to be upgraded again and, as such, the gold pledged by the appellant was revalued.
c) Upon finding that the 1stgold valuer had possibly committed fraud, his de-empanelment was made.
d) At the time of granting of loan to the appellant the respondents herein were not posted at the relevant location but were only present at the time of revaluation.
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e) The appellant deliberately allowed the loan to become an NPA, since he knew that the ornaments alleged were fake.
f) In the 1strecall notice dated 30thJuly, 2022 issued to the appellant, it had been clearly stated that if he failed to deposit the dues within 15 days, the bank would take steps to auction the gold jewellery. The appellant did not respond. This shows the clear intention on the part of the appellant to cheat.
8. We have given our consideration to the multifarious arguments advanced at the bar.
9. The scope of the Court's power to quash and set aside proceedings is well-settled to warrant any restatement. While the arguments advanced have the potential to raise many issues for consideration, we must first satisfy ourselves as to the propriety of the exercise of such power by the High Court. The task of the High Court, when called upon to adjudicate an application seeking to quash the proceedings, is to see whether, prima facie, an offence is made out or not. It is not to examine whether the charges may hold up in the Court. In doing so, the area of action is circumscribed. In Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab4, it was held :
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"8. It is no more res integra that exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an allegation made in the FIR or the charge-sheet constitutes the ingredients of the offence/offences alleged. Interference by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding."
10. A reference may also be made to the recent decision of this Court in Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P.5, where it was held that :
"18. It is well settled that when considering an application under Section 482CrPC, the court cannot conduct a mini-trial but instead is to be satisfied that prima facie the offences as alleged are made out. To put it differently, it is to be seen, without undertaking a minute examination of the record, that there is some substance in the allegations made which could meet the threshold of statutory language."
5 (2025 ) 2 SCC 604
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11. In the present case, the Court has not only taken note of the fraud (prevention and detection) risk management policy of the bank but has also factored in the removal of the 1stvaluer to come to the conclusion that there is an absence of malafides on the part of the bank. It has also come to the findings on merits that the appellant undertook the entire process of securing a loan from the bank with ill intention. We are at a loss to understand as to how such a conclusion was arrived at, for the settled position is that for determining intention, evidence has to be taken into account. In a similar vein, how the Court concluded that the appellant had an ulterior motive, is unclear.
12. That apart, even though the account of the appellant was declared as NPA in April and despite the deposition of some amount it could not be upgraded to a standard account, the path available to the bank to auction off the gold was admittedly not taken. The first recall notice was not answered. The second recall notice was issued. The time granted was 15 days, but the payment was made much thereafter, on 22ndNovember. The revaluation report is of February, 2023, i.e., much after the payment had been made and the loan stood settled. Both letters addressed by the appellant to the officials of the bank seeking return of the pledged gold were subsequent to the full and final payment, i.e., on 3rdApril, 2023 and 25thApril, 2023.
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13. It is true that the appellant repaid the amount, but with substantial delay. However, once the loan is settled, it is difficult to understand as to why the gold was revalued and auctioned.
14. Still further, the discussion made by the High Court in quashing the FIR in no way addresses the possibility of the respondents' possible involvement in the misappropriation of the gold pledged. There was no third-party verification undertaken by the bank to corroborate the findings returned by the 2ndvaluer, so it cannot be positively ruled out, without appreciating the evidence, that all the persons involved from the bank or outside (valuers) did not commit any act affecting appellant's pledged gold. In any event, at all times the appellant had no access to the gold which, after its initial valuation, was always kept in the safe custody of the bankers. Fraud, if any, whether perpetrated at the first instance of valuation, or later, is a matter which could be unearthed only after a trial based on the evidence led by the parties. But, as of now, in no circumstances, it can be said that no prima facie case regarding commission of an offence, as alleged in the FIR, is made out from its perusal.
15. In that view of the matter, we hold that the High Court had improperly quashed the proceedings initiated by the appellant. It stands clarified that we have not expressed any
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opinion on the matter, and the guilt or innocence of the respondents has to be established in the trial, in accordance with the law. The proceedings out of the subject FIR, mentioned in paragraph 2 are revived and restored to the file of the concerned Court.
16. The appeal is allowed. The Registry is directed to communicate a copy of this order to the learned Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Patna, who shall send forthwith a copy of this order to the concerned Court for necessary action.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.
……………….J. (Sanjay Karol) ……………….J.
(Manoj Misra) 5th June, 2025; New Delhi.
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