- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
K. VALARMATHI v. KUMARESAN
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants—wife and daughters of the late Kathiresan—claim title and possession over certain nanja agricultural land that Kathiresan had purchased in the respondent-nephew’s name on astrological advice. Following Kathiresan’s death, intra-family disputes arose. When the respondent began negotiations to sell the land, the appellants filed O.S. No. 1087 of 2018 (“the present suit”) seeking a declaration of title and an injunction restraining encumbrance. A related property dispute was brought in O.S. No. 201 of 2018 (“the other suit”).
The respondent invoked Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court, requesting rejection of the plaints in both suits. By the impugned order dated 11-07-2024, the High Court rejected the plaint in the present suit as barred by the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 (“Benami Act”) but declined similar relief in the other suit. The appellants sought Supreme Court intervention, challenging the High Court’s jurisdiction to reject a plaint under its supervisory powers.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a High Court, while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, can reject a plaint filed in a civil suit.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The High Court exceeded its supervisory mandate under Article 227 by usurping the trial court’s original jurisdiction to determine an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (“the Code”).
- Such intervention deprived the appellants of the statutory right of appeal that would have been available had the trial court rejected the plaint.
Respondent’s Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society, (2019) 9 SCC 538 | Existence of an appellate remedy under Section 96 CPC is a near-total bar to invoking Article 227. | Cited to emphasise that supervisory jurisdiction should not replace statutory appellate mechanisms. |
| Frost (International) Ltd. v. Milan Developers, (2022) 8 SCC 633 | Distinction between rejection of plaint by trial court (appealable) and by revisional court (writ under Article 227 maintainable). | Distinguished; Court noted that unlike in Frost, the High Court here was not correcting a trial-court error but assuming original jurisdiction. |
| Jacky v. Tiny @ Antony, (2014) 6 SCC 508 | Powers under Articles 226/227 cannot be invoked merely to question a plaint in ordinary civil disputes. | Relied upon to deprecate use of constitutional powers to short-circuit civil procedure in landlord-tenant (and analogous) matters. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reiterated that Article 227 confers a supervisory, not substitutive, jurisdiction. Its purpose is to ensure that subordinate courts act within the bounds of their lawful authority and to correct jurisdictional errors that are apparent on the face of the record. The Court reasoned as follows:
- The Civil Procedure Code is a self-contained code. Order VII Rule 11 specifies grounds on which a plaint may be rejected, and such an order constitutes a “deemed decree” appealable under Section 96.
- By directly rejecting the plaint, the High Court supplanted the trial court’s role and nullified the appellants’ statutory right of appeal, thereby contravening the procedural framework.
- Supervisory jurisdiction cannot be invoked to circumvent or “upend” statutory remedies; doing so would erode procedural safeguards and legal certainty.
- Precedents like Virudhunagar and Jacky support the principle that Article 227 should not be used to short-cut civil procedure. The observation in Frost was inapplicable because the High Court here was not acting to correct, but to assume, original jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment dated 11-07-2024 set aside.
Consequences: The plaint in O.S. No. 1087 of 2018 stands restored to the trial court, and the respondent may pursue rejection of the plaint before that court in accordance with Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The decision reinforces that High Courts cannot, under Article 227, bypass the procedural regime of the CPC to decide matters that lie within the original jurisdiction of subordinate courts. No new substantive precedent was created, but the judgment underscores adherence to procedural discipline.
2025 INSC 606
Page 1 of 6 Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.21466 of 2024)
K. Valarmathi & Ors. …..Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Kumaresan …..Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Joymalya Bagchi, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Can the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 reject a plaint?
3. Short factual compass giving rise to the issue is as follows:
Appellants are the legal heirs i.e. wife and daughters of one Kathiresan (since deceased). Kathiresan purchased the nanja suit land from his own funds in the name of the respondent i.e. his nephew. He had done so on astrological advice. During his lifetime, Kathiresan was in possession of the suit land and thereafter appellants claim to be in possession of the said land. After the death of Kathiresan, disputes broke out between the
1
appellants on one hand and sisters of Kathiresan on the other, in respect of ownership of the suit land and other businesses. The respondent, who is the son of one of the sisters of late Kathiresan, initiated negotiations for sale of the suit land. This prompted the appellants to file O.S. No. 1087 of 20181seeking a declaration regarding title and consequential injunction against the respondent from encumbering the suit land. Other lands purchased by Kathiresan from his own funds in the name/joint name with other family members, were the subject matter of another O.S. No. 201 of 20182instituted by the appellants.
4. Respondent took out petitions3under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court praying for rejection of plaint in both the suits.
5. High Court by the impugned order, inter alia, rejected the plaint in the present suit, holding the suit is barred by law i.e. Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 19884. With regard to the other suit the High Court was of the view the suit was not barred under the Benami Act and declined the relief.
1 Hereinafter, 'the present suit'.
2 Hereinafter, 'the other suit'.
3 CRP (MD) 125 of 2019 in O.S. No. 201 of 2018 and CRP (MD) 210 of 2019 in O.S. No. 1087 of 2018.
4 In short, Benami Act.
2
6. Appellants have challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court to reject the plaint in exercise of its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution.
7. Heard Mr. M. Gireesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. R. Baskaran, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent. Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned Senior Counsel also assisted the Court as Amicus Curiae. Mr. Prabhakar contends the High Court erred in law invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to reject the plaint.
8. Power of the High Court under Article 227 is supervisory and is exercised to ensure courts and tribunals under its supervision act within the limits of their jurisdiction conferred by law. This power is to be sparingly exercised in cases where errors are apparent on the face of record, occasioning grave injustice by the court or tribunal assuming jurisdiction which it does not have, failing to exercise jurisdiction which it does have, or exercising its jurisdiction in a perverse manner.
9. Essence of the power under Article 227 being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a
3
statutory legal remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, 19085. For example, existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the Code operates as a near total bar to exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 2276.
10. Civil Procedure Code is a self-contained Code and Order VII Rule 11 therein enumerates the circumstances in which the trial court may reject a plaint. Such rejection amounts to a deemed decree which is appealable before the High Court under Section 96 of the Code. This statutory scheme cannot be upended by invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 to entertain a prayer for rejection of plaint.
11. In the present case, High Court has supervened the provisions of the Code when it rejected the plaint on the ground it was barred by law. In doing so, the High Court not only substituted itself as the court of first instance but also rendered nugatory a valuable right to appeal available to the appellant had the issue been adjudicated by the trial court in the first place.
12. We are conscious appellate remedy against rejection of plaint is not available if the High Court had in its revisional jurisdiction
5 In short, 'the Code'
6 Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society, (2019) 9 SCC 538
4
reversed the order of trial court and rejected the plaint. In Frost (International) Ltd. v. Milan Developers7, this Court observed as follows:-
"31. No doubt rejection of a plaint is a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2)CPC and an appeal lies from every decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the court authorised to hear appeals from a decision of such court. However, it must be borne in mind that when a Revisional Court rejects a plaint, in substance, an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 is being allowed. Under such circumstances, the remedy by way of a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution could be availed and Respondent 1/the plaintiff has resorted to the said remedy in the instant case; although if the plaint had been rejected by the trial court i.e. court of original jurisdiction, it would have resulted in a right of appeal under Section 96 CPC."
13. These observations in Frost (supra) are not relevant for the matter in issue as the High Court in the present case had not exercised its supervisory power to correct a jurisdictional error of the trial court but usurped its original jurisdiction to reject the plaint.
14. Procedural law provides the necessary legal infrastructure on which edifice of rule of law is built. Short-circuiting of procedure to reach hasty outcomes is an undesirable propensity of an overburdened judiciary. Such impulses rendering procedural safeguards and substantive rights otiose, subvert certainty and consistency in law and need to be discouraged.
5
15. Similar issue fell for decision in Jacky v. Tiny @ Antony & Ors.8 when a tenant (non-party to the suit) prayed for rejection of an alleged collusive suit between the legal heirs of his erstwhile landlord and the new purchaser under Article 226/227. Deprecating invocation of constitutional powers in a landlord- tenant dispute, the Court observed: -
"15. …If a suit is not maintainable it was well within the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the same in appropriate proceedings but in no case power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised to question a plaint."
16. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 11.07.2024 passed by the High Court and allow the appeal. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion regarding merits of the plea of the respondent for rejection of plaint and give liberty to seek necessary relief before the trial court in accordance with law, if so advised.
….……..…..……...……………………….J.
(PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA)
….……..…..……...……………………….J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
New Delhi,
April 29, 2025
6
Alert