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ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY (INDIA) LIMITED v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK

Bombay High Court
Feb 21, 2025
Smart Summary (Beta)

High Court of Judicature at Bombay — Writ Petition No. 763 of 2020 (Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited v. Punjab National Bank & Anr.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited (ARCL), which claims assignment from State Bank of India (SBI) by an Assignment Deed dated 30 March 2005. The underlying borrower in the ARCL proceedings was M/s. Aggarwal Silk & Synthetics Pvt. Ltd., with personal guarantees given by Mr. Rameshchandra Aggarwal and Ms. Shashi Aggarwal. Mr. Rameshchandra Aggarwal executed a mortgage by deposit of title deeds in respect of a parcel of land (described in the opinion as the "suit property") in favour of the then-assignor SBI.

ARCL filed Original Application No. 131 of 2006 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Mumbai on 12 April 2006 to recover a sum claimed to be due from the borrower and guarantors. The DRT passed a recovery certificate on 5 March 2007 in favour of ARCL (erstwhile SBI) in O.A. No. 131/2006 for a specified sum.

Separately, Punjab National Bank (PNB) granted credit facilities on 21 April 2006 to M/s. Atex Worldwide; PNB's facilities were secured by a mortgage by deposit of title deeds purportedly created by Mr. Rameshchandra Aggarwal in favour of PNB. PNB filed Original Application No. 29 of 2007 before the DRT to recover amounts and to enforce mortgage over the suit property. The DRT, by an order dated 6 November 2008 in O.A. No. 29/2007, recorded that PNB had a charge over the suit property.

ARCL became aware that PNB was seeking to attach the suit property and filed Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 2010 under Section 19(25) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy (RDDB) Act seeking modification of the DRT's 6 November 2008 order to the extent of PNB's charge. On 9 January 2012 the DRT allowed ARCL's Misc. Application No. 31/2010, holding that the mortgage created in favour of SBI (ARCL's predecessor) was prior in time and cancelling PNB's mortgage declaration.

PNB appealed to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) by Miscellaneous Appeal No. 229 of 2012. By judgment and order dated 6 November 2019 the DRAT set aside the DRT's order of 9 January 2012, holding that SBI (the erstwhile assignor) had been negligent in not insisting on production of original title deeds when creating the mortgage, and thereby cancelling ARCL's mortgage priority. ARCL challenged the DRAT decision by filing the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. The High Court heard argument and pronounced judgment on 21 February 2025 dismissing the writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the DRAT was correct in setting aside the DRT's order dated 9 January 2012 and in holding that the prior mortgage (erstwhile SBI / ARCL) should be postponed for want of due diligence (i.e., whether gross negligence under Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act defeats prior mortgagee's priority).
  2. Whether ARCL (as successor to SBI) possessed and exercised sufficient diligence in obtaining original title deeds and whether absence of originals demonstrates gross neglect enabling the mortgagor to defraud the subsequent mortgagee (PNB).
  3. Whether the writ petition under Articles 226/227 is maintainable for resolving this inter se dispute between competing secured creditors (raised by Respondent No.2 as a point of contention).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (ARCL) Arguments

  • ARCL contended it had a valid equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds over the suit property and relied upon lodgment receipts, conveyance deed (lodged for registration), and related Sub-Registrar notings to show proper documentation and priority.
  • ARCL relied on a series of judicial decisions (several High Court authorities and the single-judge decision in Suresh Gyanchand Kumar) that considered circumstances where originals were missing, lost or not forthcoming and supported creation of mortgage on the basis of lodgment/registration receipts and industry practice.
  • ARCL argued there was no fraud or gross negligence on its part (or that of SBI); Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act applies only where fraud, misrepresentation or gross neglect is proved; ARCL had taken relevant documents and had registered a charge with the Registrar of Companies to show due diligence.
  • ARCL submitted the DRT had considered documents and earlier orders (including 5 March 2007 and 14 November 2008 orders) and reached conclusions which were not challenged by PNB and had attained finality.
  • ARCL asked that the DRAT order be quashed and the DRT order be restored/confirmed by the High Court.

Respondent No.1 (PNB) Arguments

  • PNB asserted ARCL (and SBI previously) were guilty of gross negligence under Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act for not insisting on production of original title deeds or taking effective steps to secure them, thereby enabling the mortgagor to obtain a subsequent loan from PNB by producing the original title deeds to PNB.
  • PNB relied on the equity principle (cited in Shan Maun Mulla & Anr. v. Madras Building Company and similar authorities) that a person whose gross neglect enables another to commit a fraud should suffer for that fraud.
  • PNB pointed to absence of ARCL's production of the original lodgment receipt and argued ARCL gave no satisfactory explanation for loss or surrender of originals and therefore should not be entitled to priority.
  • PNB urged dismissal of the writ petition and costs in its favour.

Respondent No.2 Arguments

  • Respondent No.2 submitted that the dispute between ARCL and PNB is an inter se dispute between creditors and the writ petition under Articles 226/227 is not a proper forum to decide ownership/possessory or inter se priority rights between the parties; he relied upon Supreme Court precedents (Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T., Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria and Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B.D. Agarwal) to support the non-maintainability contention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (per the opinion)
Kanigalla Prakasa Rao vs. Nanduri Ramakrishna Rao & Ors. (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Cited by ARCL as an authority where courts considered circumstances when originals are missing/lost for purposes of creating/dealing with deposit of title deeds. The Court noted this and similar High Court authorities were cited by ARCL but later observed that judgments of different High Courts were fact-specific and distinguishable on the facts of the present case.
Ch. Sambasiva Rao vs. Bank of Baroda (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Cited by ARCL as an example where absence of originals / lodgment receipts were considered. Marked as among authorities relied upon by ARCL; the High Court regarded such judgments as distinguishable on facts.
Assiamma vs. State of Mysore (Kerala High Court) Cited by ARCL among cases addressing missing originals and related issues. Included in ARCL's list; the Court treated these High Court decisions as fact-specific and distinguishable.
M/s. M.A.V.R. Nataraja nadar & Sons & Ors. vs. State Bank of India & Anr. (Madras High Court) Cited by ARCL concerning creation of mortgage by deposit of title deeds and circumstances of missing originals. Referred to by ARCL; the Court noted High Court authorities but found them distinguishable on their facts.
M/s. Ride Master Rims Pvt. Ltd. vs. ING Vysya Bank Ltd. (Madras High Court) Cited by ARCL in support of creating mortgages on basis of lodgment/registration receipts when originals were not produced. Placed among authorities relied upon by ARCL; the Court observed such authorities are dependent on their facts and are distinguishable.
Suresh Gyanchand Kumar vs. M/s. Nitul Textiles & Ors. (Bombay High Court) Cited by ARCL for consideration of industry practice and the effect of delay in registration in the 1990s (paragraphs 13 and 18 of that judgment were specifically relied on). The Court acknowledged the judgment and the paragraphs cited but treated the factual matrix as distinguishable for present purposes.
A.L.R.M. Chettiar Firm vs. L.P.R. Chettiar Firm Cited by ARCL among older authorities relevant to deposit-of-title-deeds issues. Placed on the list of authorities cited by ARCL; the Court did not adopt these authorities as controlling and observed differing facts.
Ratan Lal vs. Mukandi Lal & Anr. (Allahabad High Court) Cited by ARCL as an authority in the context of missing originals / deposit of title deeds issues. Noted as cited by ARCL; Court found High Court decisions fact-specific and distinguishable.
Shan Maun Mulla & Anr. vs. Madras Building Company Invoked by PNB for the equity principle that gross neglect enabling another to commit fraud results in the negligent party suffering for that fraud. The principle was relied upon by PNB and the Court recognized the equitable rule as material when determining whether gross negligence existed under Section 78.
Indian Bank vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (Madras High Court) Cited for the proposition that failure to take minimum precautions in creation of an equitable mortgage can amount to negligence (and may justify postponement of prior mortgagee); the Court quoted paras 12–13. The High Court adopted and reproduced paragraphs from Indian Bank and used that reasoning to illustrate lack of diligence by SBI/ARCL in the present case; it held the Appellate Court had rightly applied that law.
Madras Building Company v. Rowlandson & Anr. (referred in discussion of Sham / Madras authorities) Referenced in the exposition of decisions where first mortgagee's negligence in keeping title deeds with mortgagor led to postponement to a subsequent mortgagee. The Court cited the decision as confirming that gross neglect alone (even absent actual fraud by the prior mortgagee) can result in loss of priority; the Court treated this principle as supportive of DRAT's approach where facts justified it.
Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T. (Supreme Court) Invoked by Respondent No.2 to support the submission that inter se disputes between creditors may not be appropriately resolved by exercise of writ jurisdiction. Relied upon by Respondent No.2; the High Court recorded the reliance as part of the maintainability argument.
Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria (Supreme Court) Also cited by Respondent No.2 for the proposition that certain inter se property disputes are not suitable for exercise of writ jurisdiction. Recorded as relied upon for the non-maintainability argument; the Court noted the contention in the pleadings/arguments.
Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B. D. Agarwal (Supreme Court) Cited by Respondent No.2 in support of the submission on non-maintainability of the writ petition for inter se disputes. Recorded as part of Respondent No.2's maintainability contention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by outlining the nature of an equitable mortgage (created by deposit of title deeds) and noting that registration is not compulsory for equitable mortgages. It then examined the documentary position in the present case and the sequence of orders:

  1. The Court noted that in the transaction involving SBI/ARCL the original title deed itself was not deposited with SBI/ARCL; ARCL relied primarily on a lodgment receipt.
  2. The DRAT reversed the DRT's decree because it found (a) discrepancies in the properties described in the respective proceedings of PNB and ARCL and (b) negligence on the part of SBI/ARCL for not insisting on production or taking effective steps to collect the original title deeds from the Sub-Registrar.
  3. The Court observed that SBI had filed a review application to amend the property description after the Tribunal's 5 March 2007 order; that amendment (and the subsequent recovery certificate dated 14 November 2008 referring to different land particulars) raised questions about how the amendment was allowed when PNB was not a party and the borrower did not appear.
  4. The Court emphasised that nothing on record showed what steps SBI took to obtain original title deeds from the Sub-Registrar despite being authorised by the borrower to collect them; the absence of such steps indicated lack of diligence on the part of SBI/ARCL.
  5. The Court relied on and quoted the Indian Bank decision (paras 12–13) to underscore the standard of prudence expected of a bank/financial institution in dealing with equitable mortgages and to show that an initial failure to enquire or secure originals can support a finding of negligence leading to loss of priority.
  6. The Court further cited the Madras decisions (including Madras Building Company v. Rowlandson and related discussion) to explain the accepted interpretation of Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act — namely, that gross neglect alone (even absent deliberate fraud by the prior mortgagee) can justify postponement of a prior charge.
  7. The Court noted that the High Court decisions cited by ARCL from various High Courts were fact-specific and distinguishable on the facts of the present proceedings, and therefore could not prevail over the factual conclusion reached by the appellate tribunal.
  8. On this factual and legal matrix, the Court concluded that the DRAT had applied the law rightly in setting aside the DRT order because of apparent lack of due diligence by the prior mortgagee (SBI/ARCL) in securing original title deeds and thereby enabling the later charge taken by PNB.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is DISMISSED. The High Court held that the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) had rightly set aside the Debts Recovery Tribunal's order dated 9 January 2012 in Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 2010.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The DRAT's judgment and order dated 6 November 2019 stands; ARCL's claim to priority in respect of the mortgage was not restored by the High Court.
  • The writ petition being dismissed means ARCL's challenge to the DRAT decision has failed; the High Court awarded no costs.
  • The Court clarified that ARCL is free to take such steps as are permissible by law for recovering its dues from the borrowers/guarantors (i.e., the decision does not preclude ARCL from pursuing other remedies available under law).
  • The opinion states that the various High Court judgments relied upon by ARCL are distinguishable on their facts; the Court did not pronounce the present decision as creating or announcing a new broad precedent beyond applying established principles regarding negligence/gross neglect and equitable mortgages.

Bench: A.S. Chandurkar & Rajesh S. Patil, JJ. Judgment delivered 21 February 2025.

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1/22 WP 763 OF 2020.doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 763 OF 2020

Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited ….. Petitioner

VERSUS

Punjab National Bank & Anr. ….. Respondents

Mr. Viraj Parikh a/w. Mr. Vinod Kothari, Mr. Kshitij Parekh i/b. Apex Law Partners for the Petitioner.

Mr. Sarosh Bharucha a/w. Ms. Payal Upadhyay i/b. ANP Chambers for the Respondent No.1.

Mr. Rohit Agarwal i/b. Mr. Girish Thanvi for the Respondent No.2.

Coram : A.S. Chandurkar & Rajesh S. Patil, JJ. Date on which the arguments were heard : 18thDecember 2024 Date on which the judgment is pronounced : 21stFebruary 2025

KANCHAN

VINOD

MAYEKAR

Digitally signed by KANCHAN

VINOD

MAYEKAR

Date: 2025.02.21 20:06:26 +0530

2025:BHC-OS:2894-DB

1

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JUDGMENT ( PER - RAJESH S.PATIL, J.) :-

1. The petitioner seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated 6thNovember 2019 passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (for short 'DRAT'), which has quashed and set aside the judgment and order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (for short DRT) dated 9thJanuary 2012.

FACTS

2. The petitioner - Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited (for short 'ARCL') claims to be the securitisation and reconstruction company under the Companies Act 1956, and also a financial institution under Section 2(h) (ia) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act 1993 (for short 'RDDB Act'). ARCL claims to have power to recover dues from the borrower pursuant to Assignment Deed executed by the State Bank of India (for short 'SBI'), dated 30thMarch 2005. It is further case of ARCL that the erstwhile assignor, SBI had granted various credit facilities to the borrower M/s. Aggarwal Silk & Synthetics Pvt. Ltd., to which Mr. Rameshchandra Aggarwal and Ms.Shashi

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Aggarwal executed a personal guarantee. Mr. Rameshchandra Aggarwal mortgaged his immovable property being land admeasuring Survey No. 44, Hissa No. 5/1, land admeasuring 31 gunthas and Survey No.44, Hissa No. 10/1, land admeasuring 6 ½ gunthas, total land admeasuring 37 ½ gunthas situated at Village Valiv, Taluka Vasai, District Palghar (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit property') in favour of the then assignor, SBI.

3. According to the ARCL since the borrower company failed to pay the loan amount, they on 12thApril 2006 filed the Original Application No. 131 of 2006 before the DRT, Mumbai to recover a sum of Rs.2,12,55,129/- from the borrower company and its guarantors.

4. Subsequently, on 21stApril 2006, the respondent no.1 - Punjab National Bank (for short 'PNB') granted various credit facilities to the borrower M/s. Atex Worldwide. It appears that these facilities were secured by way of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds created by Mr. Rameshchandra Aggarwal in favour of

PNB.

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5. In the meanwhile, on 5thMarch 2007 the DRT, Mumbai passed an order issuing a recovery certificate against borrower M/s. Aggarwal Silk & Synthetics Pvt. Ltd., in favour of the ARCL for a sum of Rs.1,73,92,129/- in O. A. No.131/2006. Thereafter, PNB filed Original Application No. 29 of 2007 before the DRT, Mumbai, seeking recovery of Rs.6,20,74,490/- against M/s.Atex Worldwide and the guarantors, thereby seeking enforcement of the mortgage over the suit property.

6. The DRT on 6thNovember 2008 passed an order in the O.A. No. 29 of 2007 mentioning therein that the PNB has charge over the suit property.

7. According to the ARCL, on 10thMarch 2009, they became aware that the PNB was seeking to attach the suit property. ARCL hence on 13thJuly 2009 filed Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 2010 under Section 19(25) of the RDDB Act, thereby seeking a modification to the order passed on 6thNovember 2008 by the DRT to the extent that the PNB had charge over the suit property.

8. The DRT on 9thJanuary 2012 allowed the ARCL's

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Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 2010, and held that the mortgage which was created in favour of the erstwhile assignor SBI was valid and prior in time to the mortgage created in favour of PNB and the declaration of mortgage in favour of the PNB as cancelled.

9. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the DRT, the PNB filed Miscellaneous Appeal No. 229 of 2012 before the DRAT. Thereafter, the DRAT heard both the parties and by its judgment and order dated 6thNovember 2019, set aside the order dated 9th January 2012 passed by the DRT, and held that the erstwhile assignor SBI, was negligent at the time of creation of mortgage by not insisting on the original title deeds, as a result, the mortgage in favour of the ARCL was cancelled.

10. Being aggrieved with the judgment and order dated 6th November 2019 passed by the DRAT, the ARCL being the assignee of SBI has filed the present writ petition.

11. On behalf of the petitioner Mr. Viraj Parikh appeared and made his submissions :-

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11.1 He submitted that ARCL had a valid mortgage by way of deposit of title deeds in the suit property. He submitted that Mr. Ramchandra Aggarwal had executed a mortgage by deposit of title deeds for the purpose of availing credit facilities, which included the certified copy of the Conveyance Deed dated 22ndDecember 1993 and the original lodgment receipt issued by the Sub-Registrar of Assurances, Vasai bearing Sr. No. 3306 of 1993 dated 22nd December 1993 and letter dated 17thAugust 2000 addressed by the Sub-Registrar of Assurances, Vasai requesting to send the indenture to SBI after registration. He submitted that it is settled law that the mortgage by the deposit of title deed can be created based on the title along with original registration receipt. He submitted that in the following judgments, the Court has considered the circumstances where the originals are missing/lost or not forthcoming for any reason whatsoever :-

(a) The judgment of Andhra Pradesh High

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Court in case of Kanigalla Prakasa Rao vs. Nanduri Ramakrishna Rao & Ors. 1

(b) The judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Ch. Sambasiva Rao vs. Bank of Baroda reptd. By Branch Manager, Gontur

2

(c) The judgment of Kerala High Court in case of Assiamma vs. State of Mysore 3

(d) The judgment of Madras High Court in case of M/s. M.A.V.R. Nataraja nadar & Sons & Ors. vs. State Bank of India & Anr. 4

(e) The judgment of Madras High Court in case of M/s. Ride Master Rims Private Ltd. Vs. ING Vysya Bank Ltd. Chennai 5

(f) The judgment of this Court in case of Suresh Gyanchand Kumar vs. M/s. Nitul Textiles & Ors.6

(g) The judgment in case of A.L.R.M. Chettiar Firm vs. L.P.R. Chettiar Firm 7

(h) The judgment of Allahabad High Court in case of Ratan Lal vs. Mukandi Lal & Anr. 8

11.2 He further submitted that ARCL's mortgage in the subject property was examined and declared by the DRT in its order dated 5thMarch 2007 read with 14thNovember 2008. The said orders were never challenged by PNB and 1 1981 SCC OnLine AP 154

2 1988 SCC OnLine AP 346

3 1990 (2) ILR Ker 44

4 1993 1 LW 456

5 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 683 6 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 4010 7 1926 ILR 4 Rang 238 8 1932 SCC OnLine All 251

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hence the orders have attained finality. He submitted that there were no fraud or gross negligence on the part of the petitioner. He submitted that Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act applies if fraud, misrepresentation or gross neglect is committed on the part of the prior mortgagee is proved in the fact of a matter.

11.3 He further submitted that in the present proceedings, there is no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation. Therefore, the only issue would be whether the ARCL was in gross neglect while granting loan to the borrower. He submitted that the ARCL had taken all care and all the relevant documents from the borrower/guarantors at the time of granting financial credit facilities. He submitted that the facts demonstrates that although the Conveyance Deed is lodged for registration on 22ndDecember 1993, but it was only actually registered after 5thMay 2005 which is evident from the noting by the Sub Registrar of Assurances on the registered Conveyance Deed. Therefore, it is

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incorrect to state that the erstwhile assignor of SBI ought to have asked for the original registered Conveyance Deed as the same was still lying with the Sub-Registrar of Assurances at the time of creating the mortgage by deposit of title deed on 17thAugust 2000.

11.4 He further submitted that the issue about the delay caused in the registration of the documents, in 1990's and the standard industry practice of creating mortgages by deposit of title deeds on the basis of lodgment of original registration receipt, was considered by the Single Judge of this Court in the judgment of Suresh Gyanchand Kumar (supra) and more particularly in paragraph nos. 13 and 18.

11.5 He further submitted that the erstwhile assignor of SBI had registered a charge with the Registrar of Companies, with regard to the financial credit facilities granted to the borrower, hence due caution and diligence at the time of creation of the mortgage was shown by the erstwhile assignor.

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11.6. He further submitted that PNB had accepted the mortgage by deposit of title deeds on 12thApril 2006 from Mr. Rameshchandra Aggarwal when PNB had sufficient notice that there was an existing mortgage on the subject property for which detailed scrutiny is required. He submitted that PNB should have considered that the memorandum of deposit of title deeds in favour of PNB records that the original registration receipt is deposited with PNB. When in fact the original registration receipt was deposited with the SBI. Further the memorandum of deposit of title deeds records that the conveyance is dated 22ndSeptember 1993 which is incorrect, hence a bare perusal of the Conveyance Deed and Index II, demonstrates that the Conveyance Deed is dated 22ndDecember 1993. Further in the records of Registrar of Companies, it reflected that the subject property was mortgaged to the

SBI.

11.7 The DRT Mumbai's judgment dated 6thNovember

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2008 had considered all the documents on record and had come to the finding that ARCL had the valid documents pursuant to which they granted financial facilities to the borrower. He submitted that the present writ petition be allowed and the order passed by the DRAT be quashed and set aside and the order passed by the DRT be confirmed.

12. In contrast, Mr. Sarosh Bharucha, learned counsel appeared on behalf of PNB and made his submissions :-

12.1 He submitted that the petitioner's case is that the loan was granted to the borrower on the basis of deposit of the original lodgment receipt and on the basis of authority letter to collect the original title deed. He submitted that the order dated 9thJanuary 2012 passed by the DRT was incorrect in as much as the same proceeded on the basis that the mortgage in favour of ARCL was by way of title deed. He submitted that ARCL is guilty of gross negligence as contemplated under Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. He relied upon the judgment passed in case of Shan Maun Mulla & Anr. vs. Madras Building Company 9. He 9 (1892) ILR 15 Mad 268

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submitted that in the said judgment, it is mentioned that the principles of equity that a person whose gross neglect enables another to commit a fraud shall suffer for that fraud.

12.2 He submitted that similar kind of finding was arrived by the Madras High Court in the judgment of Indian Bank vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors ., 10

12.3 He further submitted that the mortgage of the subject property in favour of ARCL's predecessor in interest was purportedly created on 7thAugust 2000. He submitted that even on that day, the original title deed had been lying in the office of the Sub-Registrar for seven years as per the case of the petitioner. ARCL has entered into the shoes of the SBI in the year 2005 by way of Deed of Assignment dated 30thMarch 2005. However, ARCL did not take any steps in order to secure the original title deed. The mortgage deposit of the original title deed in favour of the PNB was created on 21stApril 2006. He submitted that there is no explanation on the part of ARCL as to what steps they had taken to secure the original title deed. So also, there is no 10 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 1150

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explanation as to the steps taken by ARCL when according to them they became aware about the mortgage of the subject property in favour of PNB. He submitted that it is this gross neglect on the part of ARCL and its predecessor in interest, which enabled the mortgagor to commit fraud which induced the PNB to advance money to the mortgagor on the security of the subject property. Hence, for such fraud it must be ARCL who should suffer and not PNB.

12.4 He submitted that ARCL has not produced the original copy of the lodgment receipt. He submitted that the question of the PNB being negligent does not arise, since the loan facilities was granted by PNB after the original title deed was deposited with them. He further submitted that there is no explanation from ARCL, as to how the mortgagor acquired the original title deed from the Office of the Sub-Registrar, prior to depositing them with the PNB, if infact the original lodgment receipt was with

ARCL.

12.5 This means that one of the following two things must have

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happened :-

(a) the petitioner's case of being in possession of the original lodgment receipt is false or

(b) the petitioner has suppressed how it gave up/lost possession of the original lodgment receipt.

12.6 He submitted that ARCL and its predecessor in interest are guilty of gross neglect under Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act. He submitted that there is no merit in the writ petition and the same should be dismissed with cost.

13. Mr. Rohit Agarwal, learned counsel appeared on behalf of the Respondent No.2 and submitted that the subject of the present writ petition is a inter se dispute between the petitioner and the respondent no.1. Hence, the writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. He submitted that the respondent no.2's ownership and the possessory rights qua the property cannot be decided in the writ petition arising out of DRAT proceedings in which the respondent no.2 was never a party. He relied upon the judgment

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of Supreme Court in case of Roshina T. vs. Abdul Azeez K.T. 11. He also relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court delivered in Mohan Pandey vs. Usha Rani Rajgaria 12 and in case of Dwarka Prasad Agarwal vs. B. D. Agarwal 13.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION :-

14. In an equitable mortgage, the borrower can sell the mortgage property to the third party without knowledge of the lender as in an equitable mortgage, the mortgage is created by depositing the title deed with the lender as a security for the loan amount. Registration is not compulsory for an equitable mortgage.

15. In the present proceedings, in the first transaction the SBI had collateral security by way of equitable mortgage by depositing title deed. However, admittedly, the title deed of the property was not deposited with the SBI or ARCL being the assignee. The only document referred by the ARCL was that of lodgment receipt.

11 (2019) 2 SCC 329

12 (1992) 4 SCC 61

13 (2003) 6 SCC 230

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16. The DRAT has reversed the decree of the DRT based on the fact that the properties mentioned in the proceedings of PNB and in the proceedings of ARCL are different. So also, the Court held that the recovery certificate passed in O.A. No. 29 of 2007 for recovery of money dated 6thNovember 2008 passed in proceedings of PNB recognizing mortgage in favour of PNB. ARCL challenged the same by way of Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 2010 invoking the provisions of Section 19(25) of the RDDB Act, 1993, thereby seeking modification of the judgment dated 6thNovember 2008 contending that the SBI had a prior mortgage in respect of the same property. The DRT after considering the arguments of both the sides, accepted the submissions of ARCL and allowed the Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 2010 thereby cancelling the mortgage decree granted in favour of PNB.

17. It is a matter of record that against the decree passed by the Tribunal in Original Application No. 29 of 2007, no appeal was preferred.

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18. So also, it is not in dispute that in ARCL (erstwhile SBI) while granting loan, the original title deed was not deposited. So also, it is not disputed that in the said mortgage proceedings, the title deeds were never submitted only on the basis of lodgment receipt, the loan was sanctioned and disbursed. So also, it is the case of PNB that even the original lodgment receipt has not been tendered in this Court, and the only argument in that regard is that the original lodgment receipt has been lost. As regards the loan sanctioned by PNB, the original title deeds was submitted to them and on the basis of the original title deed, an equitable mortgage was created.

19. PNB has also raised the issue about the properties being different as mentioned in the loan sanctioned by the PNB and in the loan sanctioned by ARCL (erstwhile SBI). It has been stated that in the proceedings filed by the SBI, being Original Application No. 131 of 2006 in the order dated 5thMarch 2007 passed by the Tribunal, the properties described is that "NA Land" admeasuring 6422 sq.yards being Survey No. 39/2(P) and

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land admeasuring 5078 sq. yards both being in 39/2(P).

20. The SBI after passing of the judgment and order dated 5th March, 2007 by the Tribunal filed a review application being Application No. 7 of 2009 seeking the amendment to the description of the property. The said amendment was allowed on the same day of the filing. By a subsequent order dated 14th November 2008, recovery certificate was passed pertaining to land bearing no.44, Hissa No. 5/1 and Survey No. 44, Hissa No. 10/1, admeasuring 31 acre and 6 ½ acre respectively. There is no reference under which provisions of law such an amendment was allowed, when the PNB was not a party, and the borrower therein has not appeared.

21. The borrower had authorized SBI to collect the original title deed from the Sub-Registrar's office. However, it has not come on record what steps were taken by the SBI in order to obtain the original title deeds. Nothing has come on record what steps were taken for collecting the documents from the Sub- Registrar's office. This according to us appears to be a clear case

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of lack of diligence.

22. In the Indian Bank (Supra) the Court held that the Indian Bank in its apparent hurry to enter into the transaction had omitted to take precautions and because of such negligence, the owner of the property induced Punjab National Bank to advanced loan by creating equitable mortgage by deposite of original title deeds. Therefore, Appellate court has rightly applied law to derive conclusion that time the Indian Bank had not taken a proper care. Paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 of the said judgment reads as under :-

"12. In the present case, there is no dispute that the owner claims title by virtue of a sale deed of the year 1935 and a subsequent registered Will. However, at the time of creation of the equitable mortgage, dated 10.5.1989, the Indian Bank does not appear to have acted in a manner expected of a man of ordinary prudence. It is no doubt true that about two months after creation of such equitable mortgage, the Indian Bank had obtained an affidavit from the original owner that the original title deeds were lost. This, however, instead of fortifying the case of the Indian Bank on the question of negligence, in our opinion, it would only be a circumstance to prove that at the time of creation of equitable mortgage, the Indian Bank had not acted prudently as would have been expected from a Nationalised Bank.

13. If the original owner had stated at the beginning that original title deeds were lost, in normal circumstances, a Bank would be expected to make certain verification or even require the intending borrower to publish adequate notice.

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Moreover, the fact that the affidavit was taken two months after would only indicate that at the initial stage no query was made regarding the absence of original title deeds. Otherwise, under such normal circumstances, one would have expected that the Bank would obtain an affidavit on the date of transaction itself. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it is apparent that the Indian Bank in its apparent hurry to enter into the transaction, had omitted to take minimum precaution and because of such negligence on the part of the Indian Bank, the owner of the property was subsequently able to induce Punjab National Bank to advance loan by creating equitable mortgage by deposit of original title deeds. This is precisely the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal. Whether there was gross negligence on the part of the Indian Bank was essentially a mixed question of fact and law. It cannot be said that the Appellate Tribunal has misapplied the law. If the Appellate Tribunal, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case, has come to a factual conclusion can it be said that there was an error of law apparent on the face of record requiring interference by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India."

23. In the case of Sham (supra) that facts where First mortgagee (second defendant) allowed title deeds to remain with mortgagor - Mortgagor used these deeds to obtain subsequent loan from plaintiff company - Second defendant's explanation for not possessing title deeds deemed incredible by court. The main issue was whether a first mortgagee (second defendant) should be postponed to a second mortgagee (plaintiff company) due to gross negligence in allowing the title deeds to remain in the

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possession of the mortgagor, which enabled the mortgagor to obtain a subsequent loan from the plaintiff company? The Madras High Court confirmed the lower court's decision in Madras Building company v. Rowlandson & Anr. and dismissed the appeal, ruling in favour of the plaintiff company. The Court held that the second defendant (first mortgagee) should be postponed to the plaintiff company's mortgage due to gross negligence in allowing the title deeds to be out of his possession, thereby enabling the mortgagor to fraudulently obtain a loan from the plaintiff company. The Court based its decision on several key points. Firstly, it interpreted Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act to mean that gross neglect alone, apart from fraud, could be a reason for postponement of the prior mortgagee. The Court found the second defendant's explanation for not possessing the title deeds for 4 years lost his priority by reason of his gross neglect under S. 78, given his experience as a sowcar. The Court rejected the argument that registration of the first mortgage amounted to legal notice, holding that registration

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is not of itself notice to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. The court also considered but ultimately rejected the argument that the plaintiff company was guilty of gross negligence in not searching the registration office.

24. The judgments/orders referred of different High Courts are based upon the facts of those cases and they are distinguishable on facts of the present proceedings.

25. In view of the above facts, the Appellate Court had rightly allowed the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 9thJanuary, 2012 passed in Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 2010.

26. We find no merit in the present writ petition and the same requires to be dismissed.

27. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

28. It is further clarified that ARCL is free to take such steps for recovering its dues from the borrowers/guarantors, as per law.

[ RAJESH S. PATIL, J. ] [ A.S. CHANDURKAR, J. ]