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WELHAM BOYS SCHOOL SOCIETY THROUGH ITS SECRETARY v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
2025:UHC:20-DB Judgm ent reserved on 1 1 .1 2 .2 0 2 4 Judgm ent delivered on 0 2 .0 1 .2 0 2 5
I N THE HI GH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAI NI TAL
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTI CE MANOJ KUMAR TI W ARI ,
AND
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTI CE PANKAJ PUROHI T W rit Pet it ion ( M/ S) No. 1 6 5 6 of 2 0 2 1
Welham Boys' School Society & others .. . Pet it ioners Versus
State of Ut tarakhand & another ...Respondents With
W rit Pet it ion ( M/ S) No. 1 6 6 4 of 2 0 2 1 Present :-
Mr. Kanwaljeet Singh, Mr. Akshay Singh, Ms. Anjali Rana, Advocates for the pet it ioners.
Mr. P.C. Bisht , learned Addit ional C.S.C. for the State of Ut tarakhand
Dated: 0 2 .0 1 .2 0 2 5 The Court m ade the follow ing:
JUDGMENT: (per Hon'ble Manoj Kum ar Tiw ari, J.)
JUDGMENT
1. Pet it ioners are Private Unaided Resident ial Schools. They have challenged Governm ent Orders dated 15.01.2021 and 22.03.2021 issued by Ut tarakhand Government .
2. Since com m on quest ion of law and fact are involved in these pet it ions, therefore, they are being heard and decided together. However, for brevity, facts
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of Writ Pet it ion (M/ S) No.1656 of 2021 alone are being considered and discussed.
3. I n Writ Pet it ion (M/ S) No.1656 of 2021, pet it ioners have sought the following relief: - a. I ssue writ of Cert iorar i quashing the government order dated 15.01.2021 (Annexure
1) & Government Order dated 22.03.2021 (Annexure 2) with the writ pet it ion and may further be pleased to order that the Respondents have no author ity or power to issue any order relat ing to school fees of pr ivate unaided resident ial schools.
4. The impugned Government Orders are enclosed as Annexure Nos.1 & 2 to the writ pet it ion, which were issued in the backdrop of Pandemic caused by Covid-19 and the lockdown imposed in consequence thereof. The Governm ent Order dated 15.01.2021 refers to order passed by this Court in Writ Pet it ion (M/ S) No. 1627 of 2020 and goes on to state that perm ission for resuming classes for students of 10 th and 12 thstandard in physical m ode has now been granted and full Fee shall be chargeable from students of these two classes from the date classes are opened in physical m ode, however, for the period of Lockdown, when physical classes were not running, students would be liable to pay Tuit ion Fee only. I n paragraph no.2 of said Government Order, it is provided that , for students other than those studying in 10 thand 12 th standard, perm ission for physical classes is not given and educat ion is to be im parted through online m ode, therefore, Schools shall charge only Tuit ion Fee from students, who are get t ing inst ruct ions through online m ode.
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5. Subsequent Government Order issued on 22.03.2021, also challenged in these writ pet it ions, refers to direct ions issued by this Court in Writ Pet it ion (M/ S) No.1627 of 2020 and Writ Pet it ion (M/ S) No. 1824 of 2020 and provides that since perm ission for running physical classes for students of 6 th, 7 th, 8 th, 9 th & 11 thstandard is granted vide Government Order dated 08.02.2021, therefore, students studying in these classes will be liable to pay full Fee only from the date classes are resum ed in physical m ode and, for the period, when inst ruct ions were im parted through online m ode, students would be liable to pay Tuit ion Fee only.
6. According to pet it ioners, the im pugned orders are unsustainable, as State Governm ent cannot determ ine the am ount which a Private Unaided Resident ial School can charge as Fee from its students and interference m ade by the State Government is not only unwarranted; but , also without any authority of law. According to pet it ioners, there is no power available to State Government under Disaster Managem ent Act , 2005 and Epidemic Diseases Act , 1897 to regulate the Fee st ructure of Private Unaided Educat ional I nst itut ions.
7. Learned counsel for the pet it ioners submits that , in the absence of any source of power, State Government cannot im pose rest rict ions, as are imposed by the im pugned Governm ent Orders. He further submits that the am ount payable as Fee for educat ion of a child is determ ined by cont ract between the School and the parents of the child and State Governm ent is not a party to the contract , therefore, State
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Government cannot decide the am ount chargeable as Fee from the students.
8. Per cont ra, learned State Counsel submits that our Const itut ion has envisioned concept of Welfare State, in which a Governm ent plays key role in the protect ion and prom ot ion of the economic and social well being of its cit izens. He further submits that Covid-19 Pandem ic posed not only existent ial crises for m ankind; but , also unprecedented situat ion, in which m ajority of households were left with lit t le or no income. He subm its that econom ic act ivity in m any sect ions of the econom y came to a standst ill during Lockdown; while, in other sectors, it was reduced to fragm ent of what it was earlier, consequent ly, paying capacity of m ajor ity of households suffered a m ajor jolt . He submits that , during those difficult t imes, State Government had to step- in in keeping with its role as custodian of public good. He submits that concern of the State Governm ent was that educat ion of children is not disrupted, due to reduct ion in paying capacity of their guardians/ parents. He subm its that Art icle 162 of the Const itut ion of I ndia provides that execut ive power of a State shall extend to the m at ters in respect of which State Legislature has power to m ake laws. He further submits that Educat ion is covered by Entry 25 of List I I I of Seventh Schedule and by virtue of Art icle 246(2) of the Const itut ion; State can also m ake law with respect to any m at ter enumerated in List I I I of the Const itut ion. He submits that the im pugned Government Order is not in conflict with any law or policy m ade by the Union Government . Thus, he submits that State Government was well within its r ight
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to take policy decision in respect of m at ters on which State Legislature can m ake law. He submits that powers available to the State Government under Art icle 162 of Const itut ion are plenary in nature and the only lim itat ion is that a policy decision taken by the State Government should not be in breach of a Const itut ional or Statutory provision.
9. Regarding the content ion that State Government cannot interfere when fee is determ ined by contract between student / parent and the school, learned State Counsel submits that im part ing educat ion is a public funct ion and held to be a charitable act ivity, as held in the case of State of Bom bay v. R.M.D. Cham arbaugwala (AI R 1957 SC 699) and due to this reason, a num ber of benefits, concessions and exempt ions are m ade available to schools under different legislat ions. He subm its that Right to Educat ion has now been elevated to the status of fundamental r ight and Union Parliament enacted Right of Children to Free and Com pulsory Educat ion Act , 2009 to ensure that every child between the ages of 6 to 14 years gets quality educat ion. Thus, learned State Counsel submits that , during difficult t im es, when the ent ire count ry was reeling under the impact of Covid-
19 Pandemic and Educat ional I nst itut ions were shut , Private Unaided Resident ial Schools were charging from students not only Tuit ion Fee, but Fee under various other heads like Hostel Fee, Mess and Laundry Charges, Fee for Horse Riding, Developm ent Charges, Swimming Charges etc. He submits that , in keeping within its role as custodian of public good, State Government had to interfere so that Private Resident ial
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Schools, due to their dominant posit ion, are not able to fleece the parents/ guardians of students. Thus, he submits that State Governm ent was under const itut ional duty to intervene for ensuring that educat ion of children do not suffer a setback due to the financial crisis suffered by their parents during the Pandemic. Learned State Counsel has referred to the order passed by this Court in different writ pet it ions and he submits that this Hon'ble Court had also asked the State Governm ent to take necessary steps in view of the situat ion prevailing at that t ime.
10. There can be no quarrel with the proposit ion that execut ive power of the State extends to m at ters in respect to which the State Legislature has the power to m ake laws, however, that power is not unfet tered. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian Vs. P. Veldurai" , reported in (2011)
5 SCC 214, has considered and discussed contours of execut ive power of State as provided in Art icle 162 of the Const itut ion. Paragraph nos.47 & 48 of the said judgment are extracted below:
"4 7 . Once a law occupies the field, it will not be open to the State Government in exercise of its execut ive power under Art icle 162 of the Const itut ion to prescr ibe in the same field by an execut ive order. However, it is well recognised that in mat ters relat ing to a part icular subject in absence of any par liamentary legislat ion on the said subject , the State Government has the jur isdict ion to act and to make execut ive orders. The execut ive power of the State would, in the absence of legislat ion, extend to making rules or orders regulat ing the act ion of the execut ive. But , such orders cannot offend the provisions of the Const itut ion and should not be repugnant to any enactment of the appropriate legislature. Subject to these lim itat ions, such rules or orders may relate to mat ters of policy, may make classificat ion and
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may determ ine the condit ions of eligibility for receiving any advantage, pr iv ilege or aid from the State.
4 8 . The powers of the execut ive are not lim ited merely to the carrying out of the laws. I n a welfare State the funct ions of the execut ive are ever widening, which cover within their ambit var ious aspects of social and econom ic act iv it ies. Therefore, the execut ive exercises power to fill gaps by issuing var ious departmental orders. The execut ive power of the State is coterm inous with the legislat ive power of the State Legislature. I n other words, if the State Legislature has jur isdict ion to make law with respect to a subject , the State execut ive can make regulat ions and issue government orders with respect to it , subject , however, to the const itut ional lim itat ions. Such adm inist rat ive rules and/ or orders shall be inoperat ive if the legislature has enacted a law with respect to the subject . Thus, the High Court was not j ust ified in brushing aside the Government Order dated 16-11-1951 on the ground that it contained adm inist rat ive inst ruct ions."
11. A Const itut ion Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & others Vs. State of Punjab" , reported in AI R 1955 SC 549, while considering the scope of execut ive power under Art icle 162 of the Const itut ion, has observed as under:
"1 3 . The lim its within which the execut ive Government can funct ion under the I ndian Const itut ion can be ascertained without much diff iculty by reference to the form of the execut ive which our Const itut ion has set up. Our Const itut ion, though federal in its st ructure, is m odelled on the Brit ish par liamentary system where the execut ive is deemed to have the pr imary responsibility for the formulat ion of governmental policy and its t ransm ission into law though the condit ion precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislat ive branch of the State.
The execut ive funct ion com prises both the determ inat ion of the policy as well as carrying it into execut ion. This evident ly includes the init iat ion of legislat ion, the maintenance of order, the promot ion of social and econom ic
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welfare, the direct ion of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision of the general adm inist rat ion of the State."
12. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Unni Krishnan, J.P. & others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1993) 1 SCC 645, held that com mercializat ion of educat ion is not perm issible and is opposed to public policy and I ndian t radit ion.
13. I n the case of "T.M.A. Pai Foundat ion & others Vs. State of Karnataka & others, reported in (2002) 8 SCC 481, a Eleven Judges Bench of Hon'ble Suprem e Court considered & discussed the view taken by Hon'ble Suprem e Court in the case of Unni Krishnan, J.P. & others (Supra) and reiterated the principle that there should be no capitat ion fee or profiteering by pr ivate educat ional inst itut ions.
14. I n the case of " I slam ic Academ y of Educat ion & another Vs. State of Karnataka & others" , reported in (2003) 6 SCC 697, another Const itut ion Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that with a view to ensure that educat ional inst itut ions do not indulge in profiteering or otherwise exploit ing its students financially; it shall be open to the statutory authorit ies and, in their absence by the State to const itute an appropriate body, t ill appropriate statutory regulat ions are m ade in that behalf. Paragraph nos.158 & 159 of the said judgment are reproduced below:
"1 5 8 . Profiteer ing has been defined in Black's Law Dict ionary, 5th Edn. as:
"Taking advantage of unusual or except ional circum stances to make excessive profits; "
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1 5 9 . With a view to ensure that an educat ional inst itut ion is kept within its bounds and does not indulge in profiteer ing or otherwise exploit ing its students financially, it will be open to the statutory author it ies and in their absence by the State to const itute an appropriate body, t ill appropriate statutory regulat ions are made in that behalf."
15. I n the case of "Modern Dental College & Research Cent re & others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & others, reported in (2016) 7 SCC 353, Hon'ble Suprem e Court reiterated the earlier view that profiteering and com mercializat ion of educat ion is imperm issible. Paragraph nos.71, 72, 78 & 86 of the said judgm ent are ext racted below:
"7 1 . We may again rem ind ourselves that though r ight to establish and manage educat ional inst itut ion is t reated as a r ight to carry on "occupat ion" , which is the fundamental r ight under Art icle 19(1) (g) , the Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundat ion [ T.M.A. Pai Foundat ion v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2 SCEC 1] had also caut ioned such educat ional inst itut ion not to indulge in profiteer ing or commercialisat ion. That judgment also completely bars these
educat ional inst itut ions from charging capitat ion fee. This is considered by the appellants themselves that commercialisat ion and exploitat ion is not perm issible and the educat ional inst itut ions are supposed to run on
"no profit , no loss basis" . No doubt , it was also recognised that the cost of educat ion may vary from inst itut ion to inst itut ion and in this respect many var iable factors may have to be taken into account while fixing the fee. I t is also recognised that the educat ional inst itut ions may charge the fee that would take care of var ious expenses incurred by these educat ional inst itut ions plus provision for the expansion of educat ion for future generat ion. At the same t ime, unreasonable demand cannot be made from the present students and their parents. For this purpose, only a " reasonable surplus"
can be generated.
7 2 . Thus, in T.M.A. Pai Foundat ion [ T.M.A. Pai Foundat ion v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2 SCEC 1] , P.A. I nam dar [ P.A. I namdar v. State of Maharasht ra, (2005) 6 SCC
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537 : 2 SCEC 745] and Unni Kr ishnan [ Unni Kr ishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] , profiteer ing and commercialisat ion of educat ion has been abhorred. The basic thread of reasoning in the above judgments is that educat ional act iv ity is essent ially charitable in nature and that commercialisat ion or profiteer ing through it is imperm issible. The said act iv it y subserves the loom ing larger public interest of ensuring that the nat ion develops and progresses on the st rength of its highly educated cit izenry. As such, this Court has been of the view that while balancing the fundamental r ights of both m inority and non-m inority inst itut ions, it is imperat ive that high standard of educat ion is available to all meritor ious candidates. I t has also been felt that the only way to achieve this goal, recognising the pr ivate part icipat ion in this welfare goal, is to ensure that there is no commercialisat ion or profiteering by educat ional inst itut ions.
7 8 . As can be seen in T.M.A. Pai Foundat ion case [ T.M.A. Pai Foundat ion v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2 SCEC 1] itself, this Court has observed that the Government can provide regulat ions to cont rol the charging of capitat ion fee and profiteer ing. Quest ion 3 before the Court was as to whether there can be government regulat ions, and if so, to what extent in case of pr ivate inst itut ions?
What the Court has observed in para 57 of the judgment is inst ruct ive for our purposes and the same is reproduced below: (SCC p. 545)
"57. We, however, wish to emphasise one point , and that is that inasmuch as the occupat ion of educat ion is, in a sense, regarded as charitable, the Government can provide regulat ions that will ensure excellence in educat ion, while forbidding the charging of capitat ion fee and profiteer ing by the inst itut ion. Since the object of set t ing up an educat ional inst itut ion is by definit ion
"charitable" , it is clear that an educat ional inst itut ion cannot charge such a fee as is not required for the purpose of fulf illing that object . To put it different ly, in the establishment of an educat ional inst itut ion, the object should not be to make a profit , inasmuch as educat ion is essent ially charitable in nature. There can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus, which m ay be generated by the educat ional inst itut ion for the purpose of development of educat ion and expansion of the inst itut ion."
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I n para 69 of the judgment , while dealing with this issue, this Court again observed that an appropriate machinery can be devised by the State or university to ensure that no capitat ion fee is charged and that there is no profiteer ing, though a reasonable surplus for the furtherance of educat ion is perm issible. Although the Court overruled the ear lier judgment in Unni Kr ishnan [ Unni Kr ishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] , which was to the extent of the scheme framed therein and the direct ions to impose the same, part of the judgment holding that pr imary educat ion is a fundamental r ight was held to be valid. Sim ilar ly, the pr inciple that there should not be capitat ion fee or profiteer ing was also held to be correct .
8 6 . I t is, therefore, to be borne in m ind that the occupat ion of educat ion cannot be t reated on a par with other econom ic act ivit ies. I n this field, the State cannot remain a m ute spectator and has to necessarily step in in order to prevent exploitat ion, pr ivat isat ion and commercialisat ion by the pr ivate sector. I t would be pert inent to ment ion that even in respect of those econom ic act ivit ies which are undertaken by the pr ivate sector essent ially with the object ive of profit -making (and there is nothing bad about it ) , while throwing open such kind of business act ivit ies in the hands of pr ivate sector, the State has int roduced regulatory regime as well by providing regulat ions under the relevant statutes."
16. From the judgments referred to above, more part icularly para 86 of the judgm ent in Modern Dental College (supra) , it is apparent that profiteering and com mercialisat ion of educat ion by private educat ional inst itut ions is im perm issible and State has been assigned the task of prevent ing exploitat ion of students/ parents for com m ercial gain by private educat ional inst itut ions. Thus, the content ion raised on behalf of pet it ioners that State has no authority to intermeddle in the internal affairs of pet it ioner-schools, cannot be accepted. The source of power for issuing impugned Governm ent Orders can be t raced to Art icle 162 of the Const itut ion. During Lockdown, when
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Schools were com pletely closed or during the period, when inst ruct ions were imparted vir tually to students residing at their hom es with parents or guardian, as the case m ay be, and no facilit y was provided to them by the schools, yet fee was charged from them under various heads, State Governm ent intervened by providing that Schools can dem and Tuit ion Fee and no other Fee from the students. The interference by the State Government cannot be said to be unjust or illegal. Schools can charge Fee/ charges only in lieu of services like Hostel, Catering, Laundry etc. provided to the students. Without providing these services, School Managem ent was not just ified in dem anding Fee for services, which are provided only when the School runs in physical m ode and students reside in the hostel. The execut ive power of the State under Art icle 162 of the Const itut ion extends to fram ing policy and issuing direct ions in public interest . The im pugned Government Orders are referable to Art icle 162 of the Const itut ion, which is the source of power, therefore, the content ion raised that these Governm ent Orders are without any authority of law, cannot be accepted.
17. Learned counsel for the pet it ioners placed heavy reliance upon the judgm ent rendered by Hon'ble Suprem e Court in the case of " I ndian Schools, Jodhpur & another Vs. State of Rajasthan & others" , reported in (2021) 10 SCC 517. I n the said case, private unaided schools of State of Rajasthan had challenged the interference m ade by Rajasthan Governm ent in their fee st ructure. State of Rajasthan had enacted a Law, nam ely, Rajasthan School (Regulat ion of Fee) Act , 2016, which enabled the State Governm ent to regulate
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fee st ructure of pr ivate unaided schools. Validity of the said Act was unsuccessfully challenged by certain schools before High Court of Rajasthan and the m at ter was then taken up before Hon'ble Supreme Court . Hon'ble Supreme Court held that High Court r ight ly concluded that provisions of 2016 Act as well as 2017 Rules are int ra vires the Const itut ion of I ndia and not violat ive of Art icle 13 to 19(1) (g) of the Const itut ion.
18. Since the execut ive power available to a State extends to the field of Legislat ion provided to the State Legislature by I ndian Const itut ion, therefore, view taken in the case of I ndian School Jodhpur (supra) is a complete answer to the challenge thrown by pet it ioner to the competence of State Government to issue the im pugned governm ent orders. I n paragraph no. 20 of the aforesaid judgm ent rendered in the case of I ndian School Jodhpur (supra) , Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the view expressed in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundat ion (supra) has held that though the fee can be fixed by educat ional inst itut ions and it m ay vary from inst itut ion to inst itut ion, depending upon the quality of educat ion provided, however, com mercialisat ion is not perm issible; and in order to ensure that the educat ional inst itut ions are not indulging in com mercialisat ion and exploitat ion, the Government is equipped with necessary powers to take regulatory measures and to ensure that the pr ivate unaided schools play vital and pivotal role in spreading educat ion and not in m aking m oney. I t was further held that when it com es to the not ice of the Governm ent that the inst itut ion was charging fee or other charges which are excessive, it has com plete authority coupled
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with a duty to issue direct ions to such an inst itut ion to reduce the sam e so as to avoid profiteering and com mercialisat ion. Paragraph no.137 of the judgm ent rendered in the case of I ndian School Jodhpur (supra) is ext racted below: -
"1 3 7 . I n law, the school management cannot be heard to collect fees in respect of act ivit ies and facilit ies which are, in fact , not provided to or availed by its students due to circumstances beyond their cont rol. Demanding fees even in respect of overheads on such act ivit ies would be nothing short of indulging in profiteer ing and commercialisat ion. I t is a well-known fact and judicial not ice can also be taken that , due to complete lockdown the schools were not allowed to open for substant ially long period dur ing the academ ic year 2020-21. Resultant ly, the school management must have saved overheads and recurr ing cost on var ious items such as pet rol/ diesel, elect r icit y, m aintenance cost , water charges, stat ionery charges, etc. I ndeed, overheads and operat ional cost so saved would be nothing, but an amount undeservedly earned by the school without offer ing such facilit ies to the students dur ing the relevant per iod. Being fee, the pr inciple of quid pro quo must come into play. However, no accurate ( factual) empir ical data has been furnished by either side about the extent to which such saving has been or could have been made or benefit der ived by the school
management . Without insist ing for m athemat ical exact itude approach, we would assume that the school management(s) must have saved around 15% of the annual school fees fixed by the school/ adjudicated by the statutory regulatory author it ies for the relevant per iod."
19. The reliance by pet it ioner on the judgment rendered in the case of I ndian School Jodhpur (supra) is m isplaced for yet another reason, nam ely, in the said case Hon'ble Suprem e Court was dealing with the orders issued by State of Rajasthan regarding deferm ent of collect ion of school fee, including reduct ion of fee. The observat ions m ade by Hon'ble Suprem e Court in paragraph no. 117 are in the facts and circum stances of that case, as is apparent from
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paragraph nos. 99 and 104 of the said judgm ent , which are reproduced below: -
"9 9 . Another writ ten subm ission filed for the intervener, Mr Charanpal Singh Bagri, claim ing to be parent in a pr ivate school in the State of Punjab. He has raised several issues including the quest ions pertaining to the mat ters concerning the schools in the State of Punjab which are sub judice. I n our opinion, it is not necessary to dilate on this writ ten subm ission as the present appeals pertain to the issues concerning the pr ivate unaided schools in the State of Rajasthan governed by the 2016 Act and the Rules framed thereunder. I t will be open to the intervener to pursue all the points raised in the writ ten subm ission in the proceedings pending in the High Court or this Court concerning the pr ivate schools in the State of Punjab. We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion in that regard.
1 0 4 . At the outset , in this judgment we consciously opt to lim it our analysis to the challenge/ grounds concerning the legalit y and justness of the order dated 28-10-2020 issued by the Director, Secondary Educat ion concerning pr ivate unaided schools in the State of Rajasthan and as applicable to the academ ic year 2020-21 only. We do not wish to advert to or analyse any other issue raised by the part ies and we may not be understood to have expressed any opinion either way in that regard."
20. From the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that challenge by pet it ioners to the Government Orders dated 15.01.2021 and 23.03.2021 is without any force. State Government was well within its r ight to issue the orders, in exercise of its power under Art icle 162 of the Const itut ion. I n view of the emergent situat ion, which had arisen due to Covid-19 Pandemic and the lockdown imposed consequent thereto, State Governm ent was just ified in issuing necessary direct ions to the pr ivate unaided resident ial schools not to charge fee for services, which were not availed of by the students during the period when the school/ hostel were closed and classes were conducted online.
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21. I n such view of the m at ter, the writ pet it ions fail and are dism issed. No order as to costs.
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MANOJ KUMAR TI W ARI , J.
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PANKAJ PUROHI T, J.
Aswal
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