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UNION OF INDIA TH CH... v. M/S DES RAJ NAGPAL E...

Jammu and Kashmir High Court
Jan 3, 2025
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under Section 37 of the Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 ("the Act of 1997") arises from an order dated 19 April 2022 of a learned Single Judge in AA No.31/2012 (Union of India and another v. M/s Des Raj Nagpal) which dismissed an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997. The arbitration award challenged was published on 21 June 2012 by the Sole Arbitrator, Baljit Singh (Chief Engineer (QS&C)), in a reference titled M/s Des Raj Nagpal v. Union of India and others.

The underlying contract was executed between the Union of India (through the Chief Engineer, Pathankot Zone) and the respondent, M/s Des Raj Nagpal, for works with Phase-I completion by 19 March 2002 and Phase-II by 19 January 2003; the respondent completed both phases within an extended period on 30 March 2005. Disputes arose and the sole arbitrator issued an award against the appellants. The appellants filed an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 to set aside the award; that application was signed by the Garrison Engineer, Satwari Jammu Cantt., on behalf of the Union of India.

Before the Single Judge, the respondent objected that the Garrison Engineer was not a party to the arbitration agreement and therefore not competent to file under Section 34; on that basis the Single Judge dismissed the application. The Union of India appealed that dismissal to this Bench under Section 37 of the Act of 1997.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 challenging an arbitral award, filed on behalf of the Union of India, could be signed and presented by the Garrison Engineer (an officer other than the Chief Engineer who executed the contract).
  2. Whether the fact that the arbitration agreement/contract was executed by the Chief Engineer on behalf of the Union of India means that only the Chief Engineer (and not another authorized officer) can file an application under Section 34.
  3. Whether Article 299 of the Constitution and the Government of India's notification GSR No.167 (dated 14 February 1990) enable officers like the Garrison Engineer to sign and file pleadings or applications on behalf of the Union of India in such proceedings.
  4. Whether the absence of the Chief Engineer's signature (when the Garrison Engineer signs) is a fatal defect to the maintainability of an application under Section 34, or merely an irregularity/curable defect.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Union of India)

  • The contract was between the Union of India and the respondent; the Union can file an application under Section 34 through any authorized officer, including the Garrison Engineer.
  • The arbitration agreement/contract being signed by the Chief Engineer does not make the Chief Engineer personally a party; the party is the Union of India.
  • Article 299 of the Constitution mandates contracts be made by the President through an authorized signatory; that authorized signatory does not become a party to the contract by signing.
  • Notification GSR No.167 dated 14 February 1990 (under Order XXVII, CPC) lists officers, including the Garrison Engineer, as authorized to sign pleadings on behalf of the Central Government.
  • Clause 69 of the General Conditions of Contract (IAFW-2249) authorizes the Garrison Engineer or the officer entrusted with his functions to take actions required on behalf of the President in respect of the contract.

Respondent's Arguments (M/s Des Raj Nagpal)

  • An application under Section 34 can be made by a "party" as defined; the term "party" in Section 34 must be read with Section 2(g) and means a party to the arbitration agreement — here, the Chief Engineer (who executed the arbitration agreement) and not the Garrison Engineer.
  • There was no privity of contract between the Garrison Engineer (who signed the Section 34 application) and the respondent-contractor; therefore the Garrison Engineer was not competent to sign and present the application.
  • The respondent supported the Single Judge's decision and relied on authorities including Benarsi Krishna Committee v. Karamyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd. (2012 SC 727), S.N. Prasad v. Monnet Finance Ltd. ((2011) 1 SCC 320), a Bombay High Court decision in Mukesh Nanji Gala v. Heritage Enterprises (Arbitration Petition No.515/2013), and decisions of the Delhi High Court (Union of India v. Microwave Communication Ltd.; Mukesh Udeshi v. Jindal Steel Power Ltd.).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Benarsi Krishna Committee and others v. Karamyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd. (AIR Online 2012 SC 727) Discussed in the opinion as addressing service of notice under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 — specifically that service of the arbitral award on counsel appearing in the arbitration may not be sufficient service. The Court held this judgment concerned a different context (service of award) and was not applicable to the question whether an authorized Government officer may file under Section 34.
S.N. Prasad v. Monnet Finance Ltd. and others ((2011) 1 SCC 320) The opinion records that this judgment was relied upon by the respondent; the specific principle relied upon is not summarized in the provided text. The Court observed that the judgments relied upon (including this one) do not hold that an authorized Government officer is incompetent to file under Section 34; therefore they do not support the respondent's position.
Mukesh Nanji Gala and others v. Heritage Enterprises (Bombay High Court, Arbitration Petition No.515/2013, decided 8 December 2014) Cited by respondent; the opinion does not summarize the specific rule from this decision. The Court concluded this decision was in a different context and did not decide that an authorized officer of the Government cannot file under Section 34.
Union of India v. M/s Microwave Communication Ltd. (Delhi High Court, FAO(OS) No.503/2007 decided 01.12.2010) Referenced by respondent; the opinion does not set out a specific principle from this decision in the provided text. The Court treated this decision as not determinative of the present issue and not holding that only the officer who signed the arbitration agreement can file under Section 34.
Mukesh Udeshi v. Jindal Steel Power Ltd. (2024: DHC 4886) Cited by respondent; the opinion does not summarize the specific rule relied upon from this decision. The Court found this authority did not support the proposition that an authorized Government officer is precluded from filing an application under Section 34.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded on undisputed facts that the contract containing the arbitration clause was made between the Union of India (expressed to be made by the President, per Article 299) and the respondent-contractor, and that the Chief Engineer had executed the contract on behalf of the President as a duly authorized officer.

The Court analyzed Article 299 of the Constitution, noting that contracts made in the exercise of executive power of the Union are to be expressed as made by the President and are to be executed on behalf of the President by such persons as he may direct or authorize. The Court also considered Rule 1 of Order XXVII, Code of Civil Procedure, and the Government of India's notification No. GSR 167 dated 14 February 1990 (issued under the said rule), which authorizes specified officers — including the Garrison Engineer — to sign pleadings on behalf of the Government of India in suits by or against the Government.

From these provisions the Court concluded that the Garrison Engineer who signed the Section 34 application was an officer authorized to sign pleadings on behalf of the Government of India. The Single Judge had erred in treating the Chief Engineer (who executed the contract) as a party to the arbitration agreement; the Court emphasized that neither the President nor the authorized officer who executes the contract becomes a party to the contract — the party is the Union of India itself.

The Court reviewed the precedents relied upon by the respondent and found them to be in different contexts (for example, Benarsi Krishna Committee concerned service of an award under Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act) and none to have held that an authorized officer of the Government is incompetent to file an application under Section 34 or that only the officer who signed the arbitration agreement can file such an application.

The Court further observed from the application filed that the Union of India through the Chief Engineer was clearly identified as a party, even though the pleading was signed by the Garrison Engineer. Consequently, any failure of the Chief Engineer to sign was characterized as an irregularity or curable defect rather than a fatal one that would justify dismissal without an opportunity to cure.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Single Judge for disposal on merits and in accordance with law.

Implications for the parties:

  • The Court held that the Garrison Engineer, being an officer authorized under the Government notification and Article 299 framework, was competent to sign and present the Section 34 application on behalf of the Union of India.
  • The absence of the Chief Engineer's signature was held to be an irregularity or curable defect and not a ground for outright dismissal of the application; the matter is to be considered on merits by the Single Judge after affording opportunity to cure any defect.

The opinion does not state that a new legal precedent was established beyond its conclusions in this appeal; it remanded the matter for merits adjudication after finding the authorizing framework (Article 299 and GSR No.167 of 1990) permissible for the Garrison Engineer to act.

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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH

AT JAMMU

Reserved on: 01.01.2025 Pronounced on: 03.01.2025

Arb App No.1/2022

1. Union of India Through Chief Engineer, Pathankot Zone C/o 56 APO

2. Garrison Engineer, Satwari Jammu Cantt. ...Appellant(s) Through:- Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI V/s

M/s Des Raj Nagpal Engineers & Contractors 401, Shastri Nagar, Jammu (J&K)-180004 ...Respondent(s) Through:- Ms. Zoya Bhardwaj, Advocate

Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PUNEET GUPTA, JUDGE

JUDGMENT

Sanjeev Kumar J

1. Instant appeal filed by the Union of India under Section 37 of the Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 ["the Act of 1997"] arises out of an order dated 19thApril, 2022 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in AA No.31/2012 titled Union of India and another v. M/s Des Raj Nagpal, whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the application of the appellants filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 to challenge an award dated 21stJune, 2012 published by the Sole Arbitrator, namely Baljit Singh Chief

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Engineer (QS&C) in case titled M/s Des Raj Nagpal v. Union of India and others. The application of the appellants has been rejected by the learned Single Judge primarily on the ground that the Garrison Engineer, who has signed the application on behalf of Union of India was not party to the arbitration agreement and, therefore, was not an authorized person to file application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 for and on behalf of the Union of India.

2. The impugned order and judgment of the learned Single Judge is assailed by the Union of India on multiple grounds. However, before we advert to the grounds of challenge urged by Mr. Vishal Sharma, learned DSGI appearing for the appellants, we deem it appropriate and necessary to notice few facts which are germane to the disposal of the controversy raised in this appeal.

3. Pursuant to a contract agreement executed between Union of India through Chief Engineer, Pathankot Zone, appellant No.1 herein and the respondent M/s Des Raj Nagpal, the work, subject matter of contract agreement, was handed over to the respondent for execution. As per the contract agreement, Phase-I of the work was required to be completed by 19thMarch, 2002 and Phase-II by 19thJanuary, 2003. The respondent completed both the phases within the extended period i.e. 30thMarch, 2005. Certain disputes arose between the parties out of the said contract and for resolution of these disputes, Sh. Baljit Singh (QS&C) was appointed as sole arbitrator. The arbitrator passed an

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award against the appellants, which was published on 21stJune, 2012. Feeling dissatisfied and aggrieved of the award dated 21stJune, 2012, the appellants filed an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997. The application was filed on behalf of Union of India through Chief Engineer, Pathankote Zone and Garrison Engineer, Satwari Jammu Cant. and was signed by appellant No.2-Garrison Engineer.

4. Before the learned Single Judge, an objection was taken by the respondent that appellant No.2-Garrison Engineer was not party to the contract agreement and, therefore, was not competent to challenge the award by filing an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997. Objection, as it seems from the impugned order, prevailed and the learned Single Judge vide impugned order dismissed the application filed by the appellants.

5. It is in the aforesaid backdrop and feeling aggrieved, the appellants are before us in this appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act of 1997. The impugned order is challenged primarily on the following grounds:-

a) That the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the contract in question was between Union of India and the respondent and that the Union of India was entitled to file an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 through any authorized officer including the Garrison Engineer.

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b) That the learned Single Judge committed an error in holding that since the arbitration agreement/contract was signed by the Chief Engineer on behalf of Union of India, as such, the application could have been filed only by the Chief Engineer ignoring the fact that party to the contract agreement/arbitration agreement was neither Chief Engineer nor Garrison Engineer but Union of India.

c) That the learned Single Judge has also not taken note of the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India, which mandates that all contracts for and on behalf of Union of India shall be made by the President through authorized signatory and that the authorized signatory, who may have power and authority to sign agreement on behalf of the President of India does not himself become party to the contract.

d) That the learned Single Judge also did not appreciate the notification GSR No.167 dated 14thFebruary, 1990 issued by the Government of India in the exercise of powers conferred by Rule 1 of Order XXVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, whereby certain officers including Garrison Engineer are specified in the Schedule annexed thereto as officers authorized to file plaints/written statements in suits in any court of Civil jurisdiction or in writ proceedings filed by or against the Central Government.

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e) That the learned Single Judge also did not appreciate that in terms of Clause 69 of the General Conditions of Contract (IAFW-2249), the Garrison Engineer or any officer for the time being entrusted with the functions, duties and powers of the Garrison Engineer is authorized to take all actions, which are required to be taken on behalf of the President of India in respect of the contract in question.

6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Ms. Zoya Bhardwaj would submit that an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 for setting aside an arbitral award can be made by a party to the contract and the term „party" used in Section 34 of the Act of 1997 as defined in Section 2(g) would mean a party to an arbitration agreement. She would, therefore, argue that it was Chief Engineer and not the Garrison Engineer, who was party to the arbitration agreement and, therefore, alone competent to file application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997. She would further submit that there was no privity of contract between the Garrison Engineer, who signed the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 and the respondent-contractor. She, therefore, supports the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Garrison Engineer not being a party to the arbitration agreement was not authorized to sign the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 for and on behalf of the Union of India. She places reliance upon the judgments of Hon"ble Supreme Court in Benarsi Krishna Committee and others v. Karamyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd, AIR Online

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2012 SC 727 and S.N. Prasad v. Monnet Finance Ltd. and others, (2011) 1 SCC 320. Besides aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court, learned counsel would also place reliance upon a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Mukesh Nanji Gala and others v. M/s Heritage Enterprises (Arbitration Petition No.515/2013 decided on 8th December, 2014), two judgments of High Court of Delhi in the cases of Union of India v. M/s Microwave Communication ltd. (FAO(OS) No.503/2007 decided on 01.12.2010) and Mukesh Udeshi

v. Jindal Steel Power Ltd. (2024: DHC 4886).

7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record, we find that the parties are not at variance in respect of facts of the case. Admittedly, the contract agreement which contains arbitration clause was executed between Union of India through Chief Engineer, Pathankote Zone and M/s Des Raj Nagpal, the respondent herein. There would be, therefore, no dispute that one of the parties to the contract agreement is Union of India. As mandated by Article 299 of the Constitution of India, all contracts made in the exercise of executive powers of the Union shall be expressed to be made by the President and executed on behalf of the President by such person(s) and in such manner, as he may direct or authorize.

8. Indisputably, the contract in question was made in the exercise of executive powers of the Union and, therefore, was rightly expressed to be made by the President. The Chief Engineer executed the contract

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on behalf of the President being a person duly authorized to do so. Article 299 of the Constitution reads thus:-

"299. Contracts

(1) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise. (2)Neither the President nor the Governor shall be personally liable in respect of any contract or assurance made or executed for the purposes of this Constitution, or for the purposes of any enactment relating to the Government of India heretofore in force, nor shall any person making or executing any such contract or assurance on behalf of any of them be personally liable in respect thereof."

9. Order XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with suits by or against the Government. Rule 1 provides clearly that in any suit by or against the Government, the plaint or written statement shall be signed by such person as the Government may by general or special order appoint in this behalf. The Government of India has, in the exercise of powers conferred by Rule 1 of Order XXVII aforesaid, issued notification No.GSR 167 dated 14thFebruary, 1990 authorizing different officers to sign the pleadings on behalf of Government of India in any suit by or against the Government. The Garrison Engineer is one of such officers. That being the clear position emerging from reading of the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India and GSR No.167 of 1990, it cannot be said that the Garrison Engineer

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was not an officer authorized to sign pleadings on behalf of the Government of India.

10. It is not disputed by the respondent that the Garrison Engineer, who signed the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 on behalf of Union of India/Government of India was not the person authorized by the Government of India to represent it in civil proceedings by or against the Government. The learned Single Judge has totally misconstrued the nature of contract i.e. made by the President on behalf of Union of India and has erroneously treated the Chief Engineer, who had executed the arbitration agreement/contract agreement on behalf of the President, as party to the arbitration agreement.

11. In the contract, which contains an arbitration clause, there are only two parties, one Union of India and the other the respondent- contractor. The contracts on behalf of Union of India in terms of Article 299 of the Constitution of India are expressed to be made by the President and the same are executed by such person or persons and in such manner as the President may direct or otherwise. The authority of the Chief Engineer to execute the contract containing arbitration clause on behalf of the President is not in dispute. We would, therefore, hold that notwithstanding a contract by the Union of India is made by the President and executed through its authorized officer, neither the president nor its authorized officer becomes party to the contract. The party to the contract shall only be the Union of India.

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12. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents are in the different context and are not applicable to the case on hand. In the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with service of notice under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and held that the service of arbitral award on the counsel, who was appearing for a party before the arbitration, would not be sufficient service. To the similar effect are the other judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. In none of the judgments, either Hon"ble Supreme Court or the High Court of Bombay or High Court of Delhi have held that an authorized officer of the Government is not competent to file application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 or that an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1997 can only be filed by the officer, who has signed the arbitration agreement on behalf of the President.

13. Otherwise also, from a perusal of the application filed by the appellants before the learned Single Judge, it clearly transpires that the Union of India through Chief Engineer is also a party, though the application was signed by the Garrison Engineer. In that view of the matter, failure of the Chief Engineer to sign the pleadings, which were singed by the Garrison Engineer would only be an irregularity and a curable defect and would not entail dismissal of the application without providing opportunity to the appellants to correct the irregularity. The defect, if at all it has there, was curable and was not fatal to the maintainability of the application itself.

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14. For all these reasons, we find merit in this appeal and the same is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the matter is sent back to the learned Single Judge for disposal on merits and in accordance with law.

(Puneet Gupta) (Sanjeev Kumar) Judge Judge

JAMMU

03.01.2025

Vinod,PS Whether the order is speaking : Yes Whether the order is reportable: Yes Vinod Kumar

2025.01.02 22.40

I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Jammu

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