Dasrath Singh v. Smt. Ramwati

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Dasrath Singh, filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction against respondents no.1 and 2 (defendants) concerning a suit land. The petitioner alleged that the sale deed dated 23.11.2022 was executed fraudulently by the respondents by deception involving a will, and that the respondents obtained mutation in revenue records based on this sale deed. The respondents contested by filing an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, asserting that the petitioner had himself executed the sale deed after receiving consideration of Rs. 5,66,000/-. The petitioner had paid only a nominal court fee (Rs. 1000 for declaration and Rs. 120 for injunction), which the respondents challenged, arguing that ad-valorem court fee was payable since the petitioner was a seller in the transaction. The Trial Court allowed the respondents' application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC and directed the petitioner to pay the ad-valorem court fee. The petitioner challenged this order before the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the petitioner, who executed the sale deed, is liable to pay ad-valorem court fee despite pleading fraud in the execution of the sale deed?
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in allowing the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC directing payment of ad-valorem court fee?
3. What is the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in such matters?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

• The petitioner pleaded fraud in the plaint, contending that the sale deed was obtained by playing fraud and deception, and thus he should not be liable to pay ad-valorem court fees under Section 7(4)(g) of the Court Fees Act.
• The petitioner, an illiterate 87-year-old villager, was unable to understand the language of the sale deed and was deceived into executing it.

Respondents' Arguments

• The respondents contended that the petitioner executed the sale deed after receiving consideration of Rs. 5,66,000/-, which was reflected in the plaint as valuation of the suit.
• The petitioner paid only a nominal court fee, which was insufficient since he was a seller and party to the sale deed, thus ad-valorem court fee was payable.
• The civil suit was not maintainable due to non-payment of proper court fees.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shhankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329	Scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India	The Court applied the principle that interference under Article 227 is limited to cases of lack of jurisdiction, manifest procedural impropriety, or perversity, and not for routine correction of errors of fact or law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court noted that the petitioner was an executant of the sale deed, a fact undisputed in the record. Whether the sale deed was executed by fraud is a matter for the trial court to decide after proper evidence is led. At the present stage, the Court observed that the petitioner cannot deny execution of the sale deed to avoid payment of the proper court fee. The Trial Court's order directing the petitioner to pay ad-valorem court fee was based on the petitioner’s status as a party to the sale deed and his signature appearing on it. The High Court held that the Trial Court had rightly allowed the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC and no illegality was committed. Furthermore, the High Court emphasized the limited scope of interference under Article 227, referencing the Supreme Court’s guidelines in Shalini Shyam Shetty’s case, and found no grounds for interference in the Trial Court's order.

Holding and Implications

The petition is dismissed.

The direct effect of this decision is that the petitioner is required to pay the ad-valorem court fee as directed by the Trial Court. The High Court’s dismissal affirms the Trial Court’s order and clarifies that allegations of fraud in execution do not exempt a party from paying the appropriate court fee at the initial stage. No new precedent has been established; the ruling reinforces the limited scope of interference under Article 227 and the procedural propriety of the Trial Court’s order.