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UNION OF INDIA v. SAROJ DEVI

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 3, 2024
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Naik Inderjeet Singh, an Indian Army soldier, was deployed in Jammu & Kashmir on “Operation Rakshak.” While undertaking an Area Domination Patrol near the Line of Control (LoC) between 01:00 a.m. and 03:30 a.m. on 23 January 2013, he experienced severe breathlessness in extreme climatic conditions. Owing to inclement weather, air evacuation was impossible; he was carried on foot to Chowkibal’s Medical Inspection room where he was declared dead from cardio-pulmonary arrest.

The Army initially classified the death as a “battle casualty” but later re-classified it as a “physical casualty” attributable to service. The widow, Saroj Devi, received a special family pension yet was denied a Liberalised Family Pension (LFP). She challenged the denial before the Armed Forces Tribunal, which on 23 August 2019 directed the grant of LFP and ex gratia lump-sum benefits. The Union of India appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of Naik Inderjeet Singh qualifies as a “battle casualty” falling under Category E (f) of para 4.1 of the Defence Ministry order dated 31 January 2001, thereby entitling the respondent to a Liberalised Family Pension.
  2. Whether the Tribunal erred in holding that extreme climatic conditions near the LoC constitute a “war-like situation” within the meaning of Category E (f).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments (Union of India)

  • LFP is admissible only when death falls under Categories D or E of the 31 January 2001 order; Category D admittedly does not apply.
  • The deceased’s cardiopulmonary arrest is a “physical casualty,” not covered by any clause of Category E, particularly not clause (f).
  • Reliance on Supreme Court decisions in Kanchan Dua v. Union of India and Radhika Devi v. Union of India, where deaths not connected to battle conditions were held ineligible for LFP.

Respondent’s Arguments (Saroj Devi)

  • Relied on the Commanding Officer’s Battle Casualty Certificate and Army Order 1/2003, Appendix ‘A’, clause 1(g), which treats casualties due to illness from climatic conditions while operating on the LoC as “battle casualties.”
  • Contended that the patrol was undertaken in a war-like environment near the LoC, satisfying Category E (f).
  • Asserted that the appellants had not disputed the material facts pleaded in para 4.3 of the original application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kanchan Dua v. Union of India & Anr. (2020) 18 SCC 709 LFP not payable where death is not linked to battle conditions. Court held the facts of Kanchan Dua (death found in room) were distinguishable; precedent inapplicable.
Radhika Devi v. Union of India & Ors. (2020) 18 SCC 715 Similar limitation on LFP in non-battle deaths. Court noted the death in Radhika Devi was unrelated to extreme climatic conditions; therefore, the case did not govern the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Court scrutinised the undisputed facts—including the patrol’s proximity to the LoC, extreme climatic conditions, and the Commanding Officer’s initial classification of the death as a battle casualty.

2. Army Order 1/2003, Appendix ‘A’, clause 1(g) expressly categorises as “battle casualties” those occurring “while operating on the International Border or Line of Control due to natural calamities and illness caused by climatic conditions.” The deceased’s circumstances meet this textual requirement.

3. Once the death is a “battle casualty,” it automatically falls within Category E of the 31 January 2001 pension order. Clause (f) of Category E encompasses deaths arising from “war-like situations” and employs an inclusive, not exhaustive, definition; operations near the LoC during “Operation Rakshak” constitute such a situation.

4. The appellants’ reliance on Kanchan Dua and Radhika Devi was rejected because those cases involved facts devoid of extreme climatic conditions or LoC operations.

5. The Court condemned the administrative re-classification from battle to physical casualty, observing that decision-makers should act with sympathy towards widows of soldiers who die in harness.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Armed Forces Tribunal’s order, directing that Saroj Devi be granted Liberalised Family Pension and the relevant ex gratia lump-sum within three months. Additionally, the Court imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the Union of India, payable within two months.

Implications: The ruling secures enhanced pensionary benefits for the respondent and underscores that deaths attributable to extreme climatic conditions during operations near the LoC are to be treated as battle casualties, though the Court characterised its conclusion as fact-specific rather than establishing a broad new precedent.

Show all summary ...

2024 INSC 921

Civil Appeal @ Diary No. 20250 of 2021 Page 1 of 10 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 13730 OF 2024

(Arising out of Diary No. 20250 OF 2021)

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

SAROJ DEVI …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ABHAY S. OKA, J.

1. Leave granted.

FACTUAL ASPECT

2. The respondent is the widow of late Naik Inderjeet Singh (for short, 'the deceased'). The deceased was employed in the Indian Army on 27thFebruary 1996. He was part of an Area Domination Patrol. The Area Domination Patrol was launched from Manjit Main to Rangwar Post for domination of the Rangwar gap in the proximity of the Line of Control (for short, 'LC') along the Anti Infiltration Obstacle System (for short, 'AIOS'). A fence

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built by the Indian Army to prevent cross-border infiltration is known as AIOS. He complained of breathlessness during duty in extreme climatic conditions from 1.00 a.m. to 3.30 a.m. on 23rd January 2013. He was taken to the nearby Rangwar Post. The regimental medical officer found the condition of the deceased very critical. He could not be air-evacuated due to bad weather. Therefore, he was evacuated on foot. When he was taken to Chowkibal's MI room, he was declared dead. The cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest. His death was initially classified as a 'battle casualty' but was later classified as a 'physical casualty' attributable to military service. The respondent was granted all terminal benefits, including a special family pension. As she was denied a Liberalised Family Pension (LFP), she filed an original application before the Armed Forces Tribunal (for short, 'the Tribunal'). The respondent sought quashing of the order dated 10thFebruary 2016, by which the benefit of LFP was denied to her. She prayed for a direction to grant her LFP with interest. The appellants opposed the original application. Ultimately, by the impugned judgment dated 23rdAugust 2019, the Tribunal allowed the application and directed that the respondent be granted LFP and ex- gratia lumpsum amount payable in case of battle casualties dying in harness. The present appeal takes exception to the said judgment and order.

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SUBMISSIONS

3. Shri Vikramjeet Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General, pointed out that LFP is governed by the order dated 31st January 2001 issued by the Director (Pensions) of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India. He submitted that LFP is granted in case of death of an armed forces personnel under the circumstances mentioned in categories D and E of paragraph 4.1 of the order dated 31stJanuary 2001. He submitted that, admittedly, category D does not apply to the deceased. He submitted that the case of the deceased is not covered by any of the clauses in category E. He submitted that as the deceased died due to cardiopulmonary arrest, his case was classified as a 'physical casualty' attributable to military service, and, therefore, the respondent was paid a special family pension. He relied on this Court's decisions in the case of Kanchan Dua v. Union of India and Anr.1, and

Radhika Devi v. Union of India and Ors.2He submitted that the present case is covered by both decisions. He submitted that the view taken by the Tribunal is entirely erroneous.

4. Shri K Parameshwar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, supported the impugned

1 (2020) 1 8 SCC 709

2 (2 02 0) 18 SCC 715

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judgment by relying upon documents annexed to the counter affidavit.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS

5. We must deal with the factual aspects. In paragraph

4.3 of the original application filed by the respondent, the following are the averments made:

"4.3 That while the husband of the applicant was posted in J&K and was part of Area Domination Patrol which was launched from Manjit Main to Rangwar Post for domination of Rangwar Gap in the proximity of LC and along the AIOS in extreme climatic condition on 23/01/2013 from 0100 Hrs to 0330 Hrs. The husband of the applicant complained of breathlessness and was taken to Rangwar Post where he was given First Aid. The condition of the husband of the applicant deteriorated and was required for immediate evacuation, but due to the inclement weather, air evacuation could not be done and husband of the applicant was taken on foot to Chowkibal where he was declared dead. The Commanding Officer of the Unit has issued a Battle Casualty Certificate on 23/01/2013 whereby the death of the husband of the applicant has been treated as Battle Casualty."

In the reply filed to the original application, the appellants did not dispute the correctness of the averments made in paragraph 4.3. The appellants could not have disputed the

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said facts as they were also mentioned in the certificate issued by the Commanding Officer.

6. There is no dispute that the grant of LFP is governed by the order dated 31stJanuary 2001 issued by the Director (Pensions). The said order applies to those who were in service as of 1stJanuary 1996 or joined service thereafter. Clause 6.1 of the order dated 31stJanuary 2001 reads thus:

"6. Liberalised Family Pension (LFP)

6.1 In case of death of an Armed Forces Personnel under the circumstances mentioned in category "D" & "E" of Para 4.1 above, the eligible member of the family shall be entitled to Liberalised Family Pension equal to reckonable emoluments last drawn as defined in Para 3.1 above, both for officers and PBOR. Liberalised Family Pension at this rate shall be admissible to the widow in the case of officers and to the nominated heir in the case of PBOR until death or

disqualification.

………………………………………………………."

7. In the present case, the respondent has not contended that the case of the deceased falls in category D. The tribunal accepted that the case falls in category E, which reads thus:

"Category E Death or disability arising as a result of:-

(a) Enemy action in international war.

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(b) Action during deployment with a peacekeeping mission abroad.

(c) Border skirmishes.

(d) During laying or clearance of mines including enemy mines as also minesweeping operation.

(e) On account of accidental explosions of mines while laying operationally oriented mine-field or lifting or negotiating minefield laid by enemy or own forces in operational areas near international borders or the line of control.

(f) War like situations, including cases which are attributable to/aggravated by :-

(i) Extremist acts, exploding mines etc. while on way to an operational area.

(ii) Battle inoculation training exercises or demonstration with live ammunition.

(iii) Kidnapping by extremists while on operational duty.

(g) An act of violence/attack by extremists, anti-social elements, etc.

(h) Action against extremists, antisocial elements, etc. Death/disability while employed in the aid of civil power in quelling agitation, riots or revolt by demonstrators will be covered under this category.

(i) Operations specially notified by the Govt. from time to time."

(emphasis added)

A perusal of the reply filed to the original application shows that the stand of the appellants is that clause (f) of category

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E is not applicable as the death of the deceased was attributable to military service and was classified as a 'physical casualty'. It was contended that the death was not treated as a 'battle casualty'. The stand taken is that the case of the deceased was not covered by clause (f) of category E as it was not a case of 'battle casualty' as the deceased died due to cardiopulmonary arrest. Therefore, the only question to be decided is whether the case will be covered by the category of 'battle casualty'.

8. It is brought on record that initially, the Commanding Officer had categorised the death as a 'battle casualty', and later on, it was changed to a 'physical casualty'. To the counter filed by the respondent, a copy of Army Order 1 of 2003 has been annexed as Annexure R-6. The

circumstances for the classification of physical/battle casualties have been incorporated in Appendix 'A'. In Appendix 'A', category 1 is of battle casualties. Clause (g) thereto reads thus:

"(g) Casualties occurring while operating on the International Border or Line of Control due to natural calamities and illness caused by climatic conditions."

9. Coming to the facts of the case, it is not disputed that on the date of the death, the deceased was posted with his battalion in Jammu and Kashmir as part of

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Operation Rakshak. He was part of an Area Domination Patrol for domination of the Rangwar gap in the proximity of LC. He was doing duty from 1.00 a.m. to 3.30 a.m. The certificate issued by the Commanding Officer records the following facts:

a) The deceased was working in extreme climatic conditions on the date of his death;

b) He was part of Operation Rakshak, and he was also part of the routine Area Domination Patrol close to LC. There were extreme climatic conditions at that place; and

c) When the deceased became breathless, his condition was such that he needed immediate evacuation. However, immediate evacuation by air could not be done due to bad weather conditions. Ultimately, he was taken on foot, and when the team carried him to Chowkibal's MI room, he was declared dead.

10. Thus, the death can be attributed to illness caused by extreme climatic conditions. Hence, as per clause 1 (g) of Appendix 'A' of the Army Order 1 of 2003, the case will fall in 'Battle Casualties'. The reason is that the deceased was operating near LC in extreme climatic conditions. He was part of Operation Rakshak and was on duty near LC. The casualty caused by illness due to climatic conditions

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is covered by clause 1 (g). In this case, the respondent's husband was a victim of illness caused by extreme climatic conditions. Therefore, the case of the deceased will fall in the category of 'Battle Casualties'.

11. Clause (f) of category E is attracted when death arises as a result of war-like situations. The definition of death as a result of war-like situations is an inclusive definition, and the case cannot remain confined to sub- clauses (i) to (iii) of category E (f). In this case, the death has occurred as a result of a war-like situation prevailing near LC. Therefore, we concur with the view taken by the Tribunal that clause (f) of category E was applicable.

12. The decisions in the cases of Kanchan Dua v. Union of India and Anr.1 and Radhika Devi v. Union of India and Ors.2 have been decided on the basis of the peculiar facts of the cases. The same can have no application to the facts of this case. In the first case, the deceased was found dead in his room. In the second case, the death was not caused by extreme climatic conditions.

13. In our view, in a case like this, the respondent ought not to have been dragged to this Court, and the decision- making authority of the appellants ought to have been sympathetic to the widow of a deceased soldier who died in harness. Therefore, we propose to impose costs

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quantified as Rs.50,000/-, which will be payable to the respondent.

14. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The directions contained in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment shall be implemented within a maximum period of three months from today. We direct the appellants to pay the costs quantified as Rs.50,000/- to the respondent within a period of two months from today.

……………………..J.

(Abhay S. Oka)

……………………..J.

(Augustine George Masih)

New Delhi; December 03, 2024

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