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SINDU G. MENON v. THE STATE OF KERALA

Kerala High Court
Nov 19, 2024

Crl.M.C. No.8771 of 2019

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2024:KER:86624

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN

TUESDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2024 / 28TH KARTHIKA, 1946

CRL.MC NO. 8771 OF 2019

CRIME NO.2948/2015 OF ALUVA POLICE STATION, ERNAKULAM

AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED IN CC NO.1562 OF 2015 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS -I,

ALUVA

PETITIONERS/ACCUSED 1 TO 3:

1 SINDU G. MENON

AGED 47 YEARS, W/O. GIRISH MENON,

KSHETHRAM, PAREKATTIL LANE, BANK JUNCTION,

ALUVA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683 101

2 SREEKUMARAN NAIR,

AGED 54 YEARS, S/O. CHANDRASEKHARAN PILLAI,

PAREKKATTIL PUNCHAYIL HOUSE, OPP.

AROGYALAYAM HOSPITAL, BANK JUNCTION, ALUVA,

ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683 101.

3 UNNIKANNAN NAIR,

AGED 49 YEARS, S/O. CHANDRASEKHARA PILLAI,

PAREKKATTIL PUNCHAYIL HOUSE, OPP.

AROGYALAYAM HOSPITAL, BANK JUNCTION, ALUVA,

ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683 101.

BY ADVS.

V.N.SANKARJEE

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2

SRI.V.N.MADHUSUDANAN

SMT.R.UDAYA JYOTHI

SRI.M.M.VINOD

SMT.M.SUSEELA

RESPONDENTS STATE, COMPLAINANT & DEFACTO COMPLAINANT :

1 THE STATE OF KERALA

REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,

HIGH COURT OF KEREALA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT,

PIN - 682 031

2 THE SUB INSEPCTOR OF POLICE,

ALUVA POLICE STATION, ALUVA, ERNAKULAM

DISTRICT, PIN - 683 101

3 RAVINDRAN NAIR,

AGED 55 YEARS, S/O. RAMAKRISHNA PILLAI,

KRISHNAVILAS, BANK JUNCTION, ALUVA,

ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683 101.

BY ADV.:

SRI.RENJITH.T.R, SR.PP

THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY

HEARD ON 19.11.2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY

PASSED THE FOLLOWING:

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P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN, J.

------------------------------------------- Crl.M.C. No.8771 of 2019

-------------------------------------------- Dated this the 19th day of November, 2024

O R D E R

This Crl.M.C is filed to quash the proceedings in CC No.1562/2015 on the files of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Aluva, which arises from Crime No.2948/2015 on the files of Aluva Police Station. The above case is charge sheeted alleging offences punishable under Sections 452, 294(b) and 506(i) of the Indian Penal Code. The case was registered based on a private complaint filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Aluva, which was forwarded under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.

2. The prosecution case is that the 1st petitioner had a dog, which attempted to attack the

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children of the 3rd respondent and hence the 3rd respondent demanded to captivate the dog. Due to the enmity in having so demanded, the petitioners together on 14.08.2015 at about 09.30 AM trespassed into the car porch of the 3rdrespondent's house, used obscene language against him and intimidated the 3rdrespondent. Hence, it is alleged that the accused committed the offence. According to the petitioners, even if the entire allegations are accepted, no offence is made out against the petitioners.

3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor.

4. The prosecution allegation as per Annexure-I final report is extracted hereunder:

"ഒന്നാം പ്രതി വീട്ടിൽ വളർത്തുന്ന നായ ഒന്നാം സാക്ഷിയുടെ വീിടെ കാമ്പൗണ്ടിൽ യറിവന്ന് ിയാടെ

ളിച്ചുടൊണ്ടിരുന്ന കുട്ടിടെള ഉപദ്രവിക്കാൻ ശ്രമിച്ചു ഭയടെ+ടുത്തിയതിടെന തുർന്ന് ഒന്നാം പ്രതികയാ് നായടെയ

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പൂട്ടിയിാൻ പറഞ്ഞതിലുള്ള വിക3ാധം നിമിത്തം ിയാടെനയും മറ്റും അസഭ്യവാക്കുൾ പറഞ്ഞ് അപമാനിക്കണടെമന്നും ഭീഷണിടെ+ടുത്തണടെമന്നും ഉള്ള ഉക=ശകത്താടും രുതക?ാടും കൂി 14.08.2015 തീയതി 3ാവിടെ? 09.30 മണിക്ക് ആലുവ ടെവസ്റ്റ് വികLജ് ആലുവ 3യിൽ ബാങ്ക് ജംഗ്ഷൻ ഭാഗത്ത് നിന്ന് സുമാർ 50 മീറ്റർ പിഞ്ഞാറ് മാറിയുള്ള പാകറക്കാട്ടിൽ ലൈ?നിൽ കറാഡിടെ വക്ക3ിിൽ ആയി സ്ഥിതിടെVയ്യുന്ന PL37 എന്ന് നമ്പർ ഇട്ടിട്ടുള്ള ഇ?ക്ട്രി് കപാസ്റ്റിടെ ടെതക്കുപിഞ്ഞാറ് മൂ?ഭാഗത്ത് നിന്നും 8 മീറ്റർ ടെതക്ക് പിഞ്ഞാറ് മാറിയും ഒന്നാം സാക്ഷിയും മറ്റും കുടുംബമായി താമസിക്കുന്നതും ആലുവ മുനിസി+ാ?ിറ്റിയിൽ നിന്നും VIII/26 എന്ന് നമ്പർ ഇട്ടിട്ടുള്ളതുമായ വീിടെ ാർകപാർച്ചിൽ ഒന്നു മുതൽ മൂന്നും കൂിയ പ്രതിൾ കുറ്റ3മായി അതിക്രമിച്ച് യറി ഒന്നാം സാക്ഷിടെയയും മറ്റും അസഭ്യവാക്കുൾ വിളിച്ച് പറഞ്ഞു നായടെയ അഴിച്ചുവിടുന്നതിടെന കുറിച്ച് എടെiങ്കിലും പ3ാതി പറഞ്ഞാൽ 3ണ്ടാം സാക്ഷിടെയ ടൊന്നുളയുടെമന്ന് ഒന്നാംപ്രതി ഭീഷണിടെ+ടുത്തിയും മ3ണ ഭയം ജനി+ിച്ചും 3ണ്ടും മൂന്നും പ്രതിൾ കVർന്ന് ഒന്നാം സാക്ഷിയുടെ വീടും പ്രസ്സും തീയിട്ട് നശി+ിക്കും എന്നും ഒന്നാം സാക്ഷിടെയയും 3ണ്ടാം സാക്ഷിടെയയും ി സാക്ഷിളുടെ മക്കടെളയും ടൊന്നുളയും എന്ന് പറഞ്ഞ് ഭീഷണിടെ+ടുത്തിയും കമൽ വകുപ്പുൾ പ്രാ3മുള്ള കുറ്റം ടെVയ്തിട്ടുള്ളതായി ടെവളിവായിട്ടുള്ളതാണ്."

5. The main offence alleged against the petitioners is under Section 294(b) IPC. Even if the entire allegations are accepted, I am of the

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considered opinion that the offence under Section 294(b) IPC is not made out. It is only stated that the accused shouted with filthy words. The same will not attract the offence under Section 294(b) IPC. The ingredients of Section 294(b) IPC is considered by the Apex Court and this Court in several decisions. The Apex Court in Apoorva Arora v. State (Govt. Of NCT of Delhi) [2024 KHC Online 6153] considered the meaning of obscenity. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of the above judgment.

"34. From a plain reading of Section 67 and the material that is characterised as 'obscene' therein, it is clear that the High Court posed the wrong question, and it has naturally arrived at a wrong answer. At the outset, the enquiry under Section 292 of the IPC or under Section 67 of the IT Act does not hinge on whether the language or words are decent, or whether they are commonly used in the country. Rather, from the plain language of the provision, the inquiry is to determine whether the content

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is lascivious, appeals to prurient interests, or tends to deprave and corrupt the minds of those in whose hands it is likely to fall. The High Court embarked on a wrong journey and arrived at the wrong destination.

35. Profanity is not per se obscene: The second threshold error is in the finding of the High Court that the language is full of swear words, profanities, and vulgar expletives that could not be heard in open court and also that it is not the language of the youth. Based on this finding, the High Court has held that the content is obscene as it "will affect and will tend to deprave and corrupt impressionable minds". In its own words, the High Court held:

"30. …this Court found that the actors/protagonists in the web series are not using the language used in our country i.e. civil language. The Court not only found excessive use of "swear words",

"profane language" and "vulgar expletives" being used, it rather found that the web series had a series of such words in one sentence with few Hindi sentences here and there. In the episode in

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question, there is clear description and reference to a sexually explicit act. The Court had to watch the episodes with the aid of earphones, in the chamber, as the profanity of language used was of the extent that it could not have been heard without shocking or alarming the people around and keeping in mind the decorum of language which is maintained by a common prudent man whether in professional or public domain or even with family members at home. Most certainly, this Court notes that this is not the language that nation's youth or otherwise citizens of this country use, and this language cannot be called the frequently spoken language used in our country.

36. When the entire content of the series is seen in the light of above, it would lead any common person to a conclusion that the language used in the web series is foul, indecent and profane to the extent that it will affect and will tend to

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deprave and corrupt impressionable minds. Therefore, on the basis of this finding it can be held that the content of the web series will certainly attract the criminality as envisaged under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act."

(emphasis supplied)

The specific material which the High Court found to be obscene, i.e., that which tends to deprave and corrupt impressionable minds, was "foul, indecent and profane" language. Nothing more. The High Court has equated profanities and vulgarity with obscenity, without undertaking a proper or detailed analysis into how such language, by itself, could be sexual, lascivious, prurient, or depraving and corrupting. It is well- established from the precedents cited that vulgarity and profanities do not per se amount to obscenity. While a person may find vulgar and expletive-filled language to be distasteful, unpalatable, uncivil, and improper, that by itself is not sufficient to be 'obscene'. Obscenity relates to material that arouses sexual and lustful thoughts, which is not at all the effect of the abusive language or profanities that have

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been employed in the episode. Rather, such language may evoke disgust, revulsion, or shock. The reality of the High Court's finding is that once it found the language to be profane and vulgar, it has in fact moved away from the requirements of obscenity under Section 67 of the IT Act. The High Court failed to notice the inherent contradiction in its conclusions.

6. In Sangeetha Lakshmana v. State Of Kerala [2008 (1) KHC 812], this Court also considered the meaning of obscenity. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of the above judgment.

"5. In order to satisfy the test of obscenity, the words uttered must be capable of arousing sexually impure thoughts in the minds of its hearers. The word "rascal" does not have the tendency of depraving or corrupting those minds which are open to the prurient of lascivious influences. Secondly, the occurrence itself allegedly took place when the Sub Inspector went to the flat in question in purported exercise of rendering aid to the bank for taking possession of the flat. As a matter of

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fact, as per Annexure B proceedings of the Debts Recovery Tribunal dated 12/07/2006 all proceedings pursuant to the possession notice dated 07/07/2006 issued by the bank were stayed till 17/08/2006. There is no dispute that the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal was passed in the morning of 12/07/2006. If so, neither the bank nor the police officer could have proceeded to the flat in question for taking possession of the same. Hence, the Inspector had no business at all at the premises in question, much less, do any act in discharge of his duties. If so, it cannot be said that the Sub Inspector (a public servant) was deterred by the petitioner from discharging his official duties. Such being the position, allowing the above CC Case to proceed further will amount to abuse of the process of the Court. Accordingly, all proceedings in CC 293 of 2006 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam is quashed."

7. In Latheef v. State of Kerala [2014 (2) KHC 604], this Court again considered the ingredients to attract Section 294(b) IPC. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of the above judgment.

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"5. Abusive words or humiliating words or defamatory words will not as such amount to obscenity as defined under the law. Of course there is no doubt that the words alleged to have been used by the revision petitioner are in fact abusive and humiliating. But to make it obscene, punishable under S.294(b) IPC it must satisfy the definition of obscenity. S.294 IPC does not define obscenity. Being a continuation of the subject dealt with under S.292 IPC the definition of obscenity under 292(1) IPC can be applied in a prosecution under S.294 IPC also. To make punishable, the alleged words must be in a sense lascivious, or it must appeal to the prurient interest, or will deprave and corrupt persons. In P. T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko reported in 1967 KHC 231 : 1967 KLT 799 this Court held that, "the test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences." In Sangeetha Lakshmana v. State Of Kerala reported in 2008 (1) KHC 812 : 2008

(2) KLT 745 : 2008 (1) KLD 339 this Court held thus, "in order to satisfy the test of obscenity, the words alleged to have been uttered must be capable of arousing sexually impure

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thoughts in the minds of its hearers." Thus it is quite clear that, to make obscene the alleged words must involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or the words must have the effect of depraving persons, and defiling morals by sex appeal or lustful desires. I find that the words alleged to have been used by the revision petitioner in this case are really abusive and humiliating, but those words cannot be said to be obscene. As already stated, every abusive word or every humiliating word cannot, by itself, be said to be obscene as defined under the Indian Penal Code. I find that the conviction against the revision petitioner under S.294(b) IPC in this case, on the basis of the above words alleged to have been used by him, is liable to be set aside, and the revision petitioner is entitled to be acquitted. In the result, this revision petition is allowed. The conviction and sentence against the revision petitioner under S.294(b) IPC in ST No. 3810/1998 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chittoor are set aside, on the finding in revision that the revision petitioner is not guilty of the offence punishable under S.294(b) IPC. The revision petitioner will stand released from prosecution on acquittal, and the

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bail bond executed by him will stand discharged."

(underline supplied)

In the light of the above dictum, even if the entire allegations in Annexure-I are accepted in toto, the offence under Section 294(b) IPC is not made out.

8. The other offence alleged against the petitioners is under Section 506(i) IPC. The ingredients to attract the offence under Section 506(i) IPC is considered by the Apex Court in Manik Taneja and anr. v. State of Karnataka and anr.

[2015 KHC 4046]. The relevant portion of the above judgment is extracted hereunder:

"13. S.506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation.

"Criminal intimidation" as defined in S.503 IPC is as under:

"503. Criminal Intimidation.-- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that

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person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.

Explanation.-- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section."

14. A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.

15. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public

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duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and

circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in S.503 IPC."

(underline supplied)

In the light of the above dictum, even if the entire

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allegation in Annexure-I final report are accepted in toto, the offence under Section 506(i) IPC is not made out.

9. What remains is Section 448 IPC. The admitted case of the prosecution is that the accused entered into the car porch of the defacto complainant to commit the offence. First of all, this Court found that the offence under Sections 294(b) and 506(i) IPC are not made out. If that be the case, it cannot be said that the petitioners reached there with any intention to commit any offence.

10. Section 448 IPC deals about punishment for house trespass. House trespass is defined in Section 442 of IPC, which says that, whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining any building, tent or vessel used as human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship or as a place for the custody of the property is said to commit

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house trespass. Criminal trespass is defined in Section 441 IPC, which says that, whoever enters into or upon the property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property.

11. This Court already found that, the petitioners had not committed any offence. In such circumstances, Section 448 IPC is not attracted. The Apex Court in Sonu Choudhary v. State of NCT Delhi [2024 KHC Online 6626], observed like this:

"10. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, admittedly, the incident had taken place in a restaurant run by the injured PW-1, Rajat, which cannot be said to be either a place used for human dwelling or for worship or for the custody of the property. Hence, the very ingredients of the offence under 5.452, namely, the criminal trespass as contemplated in S.441 and house trespass as contemplated in S.442 having not been made out by the prosecution,

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the appellant could not have been convicted for the offence under 5.452 IPC."

In the light of the above dictum, the offence under Section 448 IPC is also not attracted.

12. The upshot of the above discussion is that, the prosecution against the petitioners are unsustainable.

Therefore, this Criminal Miscellaneous Case is allowed. All further proceedings against the petitioners in CC No.1562/2015 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Aluva, arising from Crime No.2948/2015 of Aluva Police Station are quashed.

Sd/-

P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN

SSG/nvj JUDGE

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APPENDIX OF CRL.MC 8771/2019

PETITIONER ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE 1 TRUE COPY OF THE CHARGE SHEET ALONG

WITH M.P NO. 1610/15 ON THE FILE OF

THE JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS

MAGISTRATE'S COURT, ALUVA AND

F.I.R.

ANNEXURE II TRUE COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT DATED

25-07-2019 TOGETHER WITH DISCHARGE

SUMMARY ISSUED FROM THE ASTER

MEDICITY TO THE 1ST PETITIONER.

RESPONDENTS EXHIBITS : NIL

//TRUE COPY// PA TO JUDGE