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KAUSHIK M BHATT v. EDELWEISS ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED AND ANR
P.H. Jayani 03 WPST6264.2024.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO. 6264 OF 2024
Kaushik M. Bhatt
Aged 70 years,
Residing at 17-100, Ellora Park, Race Course Circle, Vadodara,
Gujarat - 390 023. ….. Petitioner v/s.
1. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited Having its Registered Office at
Edelweiss House, Windsor Ln,
Kolivery Village, MMRDA Area,
Kalina, Santacrus (East),
Mumbai - 400098.
2. The State of Maharashtra ….. Respondents
Mr. Yashpal Thakur a/w. Mr. Mukund Pandya for the Petitioner. Ms. Sonal Sanap i/b. M/s. Apex Law Partners for Respondent No.1. Mr. C.D. Mali, APP for the State - Respondent No.2.
CORAM : SHYAM C. CHANDAK, J.
RESERVED ON : 07thAUGUST, 2024.
PRONOUNCED ON : 18thOCTOBER, 2024
JUDGMENT :-
1) Petitioner, arrayed as accused no.3 in Criminal Complaint No.6988/SS/2016 pending before 33rdCourt of Metropolitan Magistrate, Ballard Pier, Mumbai has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and seeks for quashing and setting-aside of the 1/20
2024:BHC-AS:41753
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said complaint under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (N. I. Act) and the impugned Order passed on dated 17 thMarch, 2017 thereby the learned Magistrate directed to issue process for the said offence against all the accused including the Petitioner.
2) Heard Mr. Thakur, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Ms. Sanap, learned Counsel for Respondent No.1 and Mr. Mali, learned APP for the State. Perused the Petition.
3) Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and with consent of the parties, taken up for hearing.
4) Facts giving rise to this Petition are that, accused no.1 - M/s. Kemrock Industries and Exports Ltd. availed Secured Term Loan of Rs.30 Crores from Respondent No.1 formerly known as M/s. L&T Finance Limited, under a Loan Agreement bearing no.741409 with certain terms and conditions including a condition to repay the loan within 36 months along with agreed interest @ 12.50% p.a. Accused no.2, being Managing Director, executed a 'Deed of Guarantee' in favour of Respondent No.1/L&T Finance Limited, to ensure repayment of the loan. It is alleged that, accused Nos.2 to 7 are Directors and accused Nos.8 & 9 are Authorized Signatories of the accused No.1. They all are responsible for the day to day affairs, conduct and management of the business of accused No1. That, the accused No.1 issued a cheque dated 15thJune 2014, for a sum of Rs.10 Crores, towards part payment of the loan. Said cheque
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was deposited for encashment on 30thAugust 2014, however, it returned dishonoured for the reason 'Exceeds Arrangements' as per the bank memo dated 01stSeptember, 2014. Hence, Respondent No.1 addressed the statutory notice to all the accused on 11thSeptember, 2014. All the accused received the notice but did not pay the dishonoured cheque amount. It is alleged that said cheque was issued by accused No.1 with knowledge and consent of accused Nos.2 to 7 and under signature of accused Nos.8 and 9, as accused Nos.2 to 7 are involved in day to day transactions of accused No.1. Thus, all the accused have committed the alleged offence.
5) The learned Magistrate considered the complaint, verification statement and the documents enclosed, and held that, there is a prima facie case against the accused, hence, passed the impugned Order dated 17thMarch 2017 and directed to issue process against all the accused.
6) Learned Counsel for Petitioner firstly submitted that, as per the Annual Report of 2012-2013, Petitioner was an Independent Non- Executive Director of the accused no.1. Secondly he submits that, except bald, general and vague allegations that, Petitioner was Director of accused No.1, no specific role has been assigned to the Petitioner to show that, directly or indirectly Petitioner was involved in the business of accused. No.1. Even in the verification statement, no role has been attributed to the Petitioner to indicate that, he was involved in day-to-day
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affairs or conduct of business of the accused no.1. 6.1) Thirdly, he submits that, the dishonoured cheque was issued on 15thJune, 2014, however, the Petitioner had already severed his ties with the company by his resignation on 01stApril, 2014 and therefore, by virtue of his designation in the Company and resignation, the Petitioner cannot be said to have involved in day-to-day affairs and conduct of the business of accused no.1. To support this submission, learned Counsel produced a certified copy of Form DIR-12, issued by Registrar of Companies, and submitted that this document is incontrovertible and unimpeachable piece of evidence, therefore, it can be relied upon even if filed by the Petitioner/accused. Fourthly, he submits that, the 'List of Signatories' of accused no.1, relied upon to support the complaint, was obtained from the record of Ministry of Company Affairs. However, name of the Petitioner is not reflecting from the said list. Consequently, the subject complaint is not maintainable and the impugned Order of issue process is not sustainable in law qua the Petitioner, therefore, the complaint as well as the impugned Order be quashed and set-aside.
7) Per contra, Ms. Sanap, learned Counsel for Respondent No.1 submits that, Petitioner has two addresses. The notice demanding the dishonoured cheque amount was issued and served upon the Petitioner at both the addresses. Despite receipt of the statutory notice, the Petitioner did not reply the same. Citing the decision in the case of S.P. Mani and
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Mohan Dairy vs. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan1, she submits that, it was essential for the person to whom statutory demand notice issued under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to give appropriate reply to the notice. The person concerned is expected to clarify his or her stance. If the person concerned has some unimpeachable and incontrovertible material to establish that he or she has no role to play in the affairs of the company/firm, then such material should be highlighted in the reply to the notice as a foundation. If any such foundation is laid, the picture would be more clear before the eyes of the complainant. The complainant would come to know as to why the person to whom he has issued notice says that he is not responsible for the dishonour of the cheque. Had the respondent herein given appropriate reply highlighting whatever he has sought to highlight before to the complainant, then probably the complainant would have undertaken further enquiry and would have tried to find out what was the legal status of the firm on the date of the commission of the offence and what was the status of the respondent in the firm. The object of notice before filing of the complaint is not just to give a chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission to make his stance clear so far as his liability under Section 138 of the NI Act is concerned. Thus, resignation of the Petitioner is seriously disputed. 7.1) She submits that, in the case in hand, all the necessary
1 . (2023) 1 0 SCC 685
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averments were made in the statutory notice and in the complaint. The complaint is supported by the appropriate verification statement and the relevant documents which clearly constitute the alleged offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the Petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
8) Before delving into the issue further, it would be apt to look into the following decisions cited by learned Counsel for Petitioner. i)
Ashoke Mal Bafna Vs. Upper India Steel Mfg. Engg. Co. Ltd.2. In this case, the cheques dated 28-12-2004 with validity for a period of six months were issued while the Appellant was Director of the Company but during that period the cheques were not presented for realization at the bank. The Appellant had resigned as Director w.e.f. 2-1-2006. The fact of his resignation was furnished by Form 32 to the Registrar of Companies on 24-03-2006. Thereafter, the Appellant had played no role in the activities of the default Company. This fact remained substantiated with the Statement filed by the default Company on 20-02-2006 with the Registrar of Companies as in an advertisement of the Company seeking deposits, only the names of three Directors of the Company were shown as involved in the working of the Company and the name of Appellant was not therein. Indisputably, the cheques bounced on 24-08-2006 due to insufficient funds, were neither issued by the Appellant nor the Appellant was involved in the day to day affairs of the Company. Therefore the case against said Appellant was quashed.
2 AIR 2 017 SC 2 854
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ii) Rajesh Viren Shah Vs. Redington (India) Limited3. In this case both the Appellants were directors and resigned on 09-12-2013 and 12-03-2014 respectively. The Form 32 to that effect stood accepted on 09-12-2013 and 20-03-2014. However, said Appellants were arrayed as accused in the complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act for dishonoured cheques dated 22-03-2014. Veracity of Form No.32 was not disputed by the contesting Respondent nor the act of resignation simpliciter was questioned. The Appellants had not played any role in issuance of the cheques. Therefore, it is held that the Appellants can in no way be responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time. Hence were discharged from the prosecution.
iii) Pooja Ravinder Devidasani vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors4. In this case, after resignation of the appellant as a Director, Form 32 under the Companies Act, 1956, was filed on 20th December 2005 with the Registrar of Companies. In the said Form 32, the names of two Directors, who were newly appointed, were shown with remarks "appointed as a Director-Operations" and against the name of the appellant the remark "resigned as a Director" were shown. The Respondent No.2 was aware of this fact. The trade finance facility was extended by the Respondent No.2 to the default company during the period from April-2008 to October-2008. The Annual Return filed by the Company for the year ending 31stMarch 2006, showed that the appellant was no longer a Director of the Company i.e., "Date of ceasing : 17-12-2005". The Cheques in question were issued by the Company in the year 2008 i.e. about two and half years after resignation of the appellant as Director.
3 (2024) 4 SCC 3 05
4 AIR 2015 SC 675
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This fact itself emphasized that the appellant was not involved in the affairs of the Company when the Cheques were issued and had no role either in the conduct of the business of the Company or in issuing the Cheques. Hence, the process was quashed against her.
iv) Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd vs Anu Mehta & Ors5. In this case after referring various earlier pronouncements, the Hon'ble Supreme Court summarized the conclusions as under :-
a) Once in a complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act the basic averment is made that the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed, the Magistrate can issue process against such Director;
b) If a petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of such a complaint by the Director, the High Court may, in the facts of a particular case, on an overall reading of the complaint, refuse to quash the complaint because the complaint contains the basic averment which is sufficient to make out a case against the Director.
c) In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of more particulars about role of the Director in the complaint. It may do so having come across some unimpeachable, uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the
5 AIR 2015 SC 1072
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issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of the process of the court. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the Director. … In such cases, if the High Court is convinced that prosecuting such a Director is merely an arm- twisting tactics, the High Court may quash the proceedings. It bears repetition to state that to establish such case unimpeachable, uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or some totally acceptable circumstances will have to be brought to the notice of the High Court. Such cases may be few and far between but the possibility of such a case being there cannot be ruled out. In the absence of such evidence or circumstances, complaint cannot be quashed;
d) No restriction can be placed on the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court always uses and must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to prevent inter alia the abuse of the process of the Court. There are no fixed formulae to be followed by the High Court in this regard and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court at that stage does not conduct a mini trial or roving inquiry, but, nothing prevents it from taking unimpeachable evidence or totally acceptable circumstances into account which may lead it to conclude that no trial is necessary qua a particular Director.
9) In Pooja (Supra) it is laid down that, "...Non-executive Director is no doubt a custodian of the governance of the Company but does not involve in the day-to-day affairs of the running of its business
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and only monitors the executive activity. To fasten vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Act on a person, at the material time that person shall have been at the helm of affairs of the Company, one who actively looks after the day-to-day activities of the Company and particularly responsible for the conduct of its business. Simply because a person is a Director of a Company, does not make him liable under the N. I. Act. Every person connected with the Company will not fall into the ambit of the provision. Every person connected with the Company will not fall into the ambit of the provision. Time and again, it has been asserted by this Court that only those persons who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time of commission of an offence will be liable for criminal action. A Director, who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time, will not be liable for an offence under Section 141 of the N.I. Act. In National Small Industries Corp.Ltd vs. Harmeet Singh Paintal & Anr, 2010 (3) SCC 330 this Court observed :
Section 141 is a penal provision creating vicarious liability, and which, as per settled law, must be strictly construed. It is therefore, not sufficient to make a bald cursory statement in a complaint that the Director (arrayed as an accused) is in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more as to the role of the Director. But the complaint should spell out as to how and in what manner Respondent 1 was in charge of or
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was responsible to the accused Company for the conduct of its business. This is in consonance with strict interpretation of penal statutes, especially, where such statutes create vicarious liability.
A company may have a number of Directors and to make any or all the Directors as accused in a complaint merely on the basis of a statement that they are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more is not a sufficient or adequate fulfillment of the requirements under Section 141. "
10) Keeping in mind the facts of the reported cases, the decision rendered therein and the principles enunciated through said decisions, I have carefully considered the facts and circumstances of the case in hand in the light rival submissions.
11) Learned Counsel for Petitioner vehemently submitted that, as per the Annual Report of 2012-2013 of accused No.1, Petitioner was an Independent Non-Executive Director of accused no.1. Such a Director does not have pecuniary relationship with the company as he is not a Promoter of the Company, its holding, subsidiary or associate company. An Independent Non-Executive Director does not participate in day-to- day affairs and management of the company. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot be held responsible for the day to day affairs, conduct and management of the business of accused No.1.
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11.1) However, the photocopy of Form No.12 and certified copy of Form No.12 produced on record indicate that, on 1stApril, 2014 the Petitioner resigned as the Director of accused No.1. Meaning thereby, in the next Financial Year 2013-2014, Petitioner was a Director of accused No.1. Yet, Petitioner has not produced any document to show as to when the Board of Directors of accused No.1 held the meeting, resolved to appoint him as Director and appointed so. Even if the Annual Report of the year 2012-2013 mentions that Petitioner was an Independent Non- Executive Director, the relevant Appointment letter is not produced. That apart, the 'Non-executive Director' category is not marked in the Form No.12. Thus, it is not sufficiently cleared by the Petitioner as to whether at the relevant time he was an Independent Non-Executive Director or the Director. In fact, looking at the facts of the case and the material on record, the Petitioner has taken a completely contradictory stance, therefore, I find it difficult to accept either of the same. 11.2) One of the Forms No.12 is a certified copy of the year 2023. However, it is necessary to note that, from both the forms it is not discernible as to exactly when the said form was submitted with the ROC. There is sufficient material on record which indicates that, not only accused No.1 company but its directors including Petitioner were served with the statutory notice thereby demanding the dishonoured cheque amount. Yet, the Petitioner did not reply that notice and clarified the
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situation in so far as his position in and connection with the accused No.1. Therefore, it is difficult to rely upon this document without any supporting material. In fact, since Form No.12 is not carrying the date of its submission, it is difficult to accept that the Petitioner has resigned before issuance of the dishonoured cheque. Besides this it is significant to note that, the subject cheque was issued on 15thJune, 2014 and the resignation of the Petitioner is allegedly accepted on 15 May, 2014 i.e., in the close proximity to the issuance of the cheque. This circumstance makes the fact of resignation doubtful. The delay in filing this Petition has added to that. No doubt, the list of signatories of accused No.1 does not mention the name of the Petitioner but this document is of no avail because it is of the year 2016 and the dishonoured cheque was issued much prior, i.e., in the year 2014.
11.3) In short, looking at the rival contentions what appears at the end is, that the Respondent No.1 has discharged its initial burden by way of the necessary averments. Therefore, even if said averment is denied by the Petitioner, the burden of proof that at the relevant point of time he was only an Independent Non-Executive Director or he was not at all the Director, lies specifically on him. This onus is required to be discharged by the Petitioner with the help of cross-examination or leading evidence and unless it is so proved in accordance with law, in my opinion, he cannot be discharged of his liability. In this regard it is apt to refer the
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decision in Rallis India Ltd vs. Poduru Vidya Bhusan & Ors6, wherein in paragraph 15 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "Strictly speaking, the ratio of the SMS Pharmaceuticals (S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Limited Vs. Neeta Bhalla and Anr., 2005 (8) SCC 89) can be followed only, after the factum that accused were the Directors or Partners of a Company or Firm respectively at the relevant point of time, stands fully established. However, in cases like the present, where there are allegations and counter-allegations between the parties regarding the very composition of the firm, the above rule of 'specific averment' must be broadly construed. Indeed, it would be nothing short of a travesty of justice if the Directors of a Company of Partners of a Firm, who, having duped a third-party by producing false documents (like a fake partnership deed) or making false statements (that some others were in charge of the Company/Firm), at a subsequent stage, seek protection from prosecution on the ground that they were not directly indicted in the complaint - such a proposition strikes against one of the very basic tenets of the law of natural justice, which is, that none shall be allowed to take advantage of his own default. Of course, the above observation is of a general nature, and has no bearing on the present case, but nonetheless, the power to quash a criminal proceeding with respect to an offence under Section 141 of the Act, must be exercised keeping this advisory and caveat in mind.". This
6 . 2012 (1) SCC (CRI) 778
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advisory is considered in Gunmala Sales (Supra) in paragraph 22.
12) In Gunmala Sales (Supra), in paragraph 26, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, SMS Pharma-(1), which is a three-Judge Bench decision, still holds the field. So far as Directors who are not signatories to the cheques or who are not Managing Directors or Joint Managing Directors are concerned, it is necessary to aver in the complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act that at the relevant time when the offence was committed, the Directors were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. This is a basic requirement. There is no deemed liability of such Directors. In the case in hand, the complaint clearly mentions that, accused Nos.2 to 7 are Directors and accused Nos.8 & 9 are Authorized Signatories of the accused No.1. They all are responsible for the day to day affairs, conduct and management of the business of accused No.1.
13) In paragraphs 27, 28, 29 and 30 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed and held as under :
27. This averment assumes importance because it is the basic and essential averment which persuades the Magistrate to issue process against the Director. That is why this Court in SMS Pharma-(1) observed that the question of requirement of averments in a complaint has to be considered on the basis of provisions contained in Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act read in the light of the powers of a Magistrate referred to in
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Sections 200 to 204 of the Code which recognize the Magistrate's discretion to reject the complaint at the threshold if he finds that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. Thus, if this basic averment is missing the Magistrate is legally justified in not issuing process. But here we are concerned with the question as to what should be the approach of a High Court when it is dealing with a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing such a complaint against a Director. If this averment is there, must the High Court dismiss the petition as a rule observing that the trial must go on? Is the High Court precluded from looking into other circumstances if any? Inherent power under Section 482 of the Code is to be invoked to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Can such fetters be put on the High Court's inherent powers? We do not think so.
28. SMS Pharma-(1), undoubtedly, says that it is necessary to specifically aver in the complaint that the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time when the offence was committed. It says that this is a basic requirement. And as we have already noted, this averment is for the purpose of persuading the Magistrate to issue process. If we revisit SMS Pharma-(1), we find that after referring to the various provisions of the Companies Act it is observed that those provisions show that what a Board of Directors is empowered to do in relation to a particular company depends upon the roles and functions assigned to Directors as per the memorandum and articles of association of the company.
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There is nothing which suggests that simply by being a Director in a company, one is supposed to discharge particular functions on behalf of a company. As a Director he may be attending meetings of the Board of Directors of the company where usually they decide policy matters and guide the course of business of a company. It may be that a Board of Directors may appoint sub-committees consisting of one or two Directors out of the Board of the company who may be made responsible for the day-to-day functions of the company. This Court further observed that what emerges from this is that the role of a Director in a company is a question of fact depending on the peculiar facts in each case and that there is no universal rule that a Director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs. What follows from this is that it cannot be concluded from SMS Pharma-(1) that the basic requirement stated therein is sufficient in all cases and whenever such an averment is there, the High Court must dismiss the petition filed praying for quashing the process. It must be remembered that the core of a criminal case are its facts and in factual matters there are no fixed formulae required to be followed by a court unless it is dealing with an entirely procedural matter. We do not want to discuss 'the doctrine of Indoor Management' on which submissions have been advanced. Suffice it to say, that just as the complainant is entitled to presume in view of provisions of the Companies Act that the Director was concerned with the issuance of the cheque, the Director is entitled to contend that he was not concerned with the issuance of cheque for a variety of reasons. It is for the High Court to consider these submissions. The High Court
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may in a given case on an overall reading of a complaint and having come across some unimpeachable evidence or glaring circumstances come to a conclusion that the petition deserves to be allowed despite the presence of the basic averment. That is the reason why in some cases, after referring to SMS Pharma-(1), but considering overall circumstances of the case, this Court has found that the basic averment was insufficient, that something more was needed and has quashed the complaint.
29. When a petition is filed for quashing the process, in a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may find that the basic averment is sufficient, that it makes out a case against the Director; that there is nothing to suggest that the substratum of the allegation against the Director is destroyed rendering the basic averment insufficient and that since offence is made out against him, his further role can be brought out in the trial. In another case, the High Court may quash the complaint despite the basic averment. It may come across some unimpeachable evidence or acceptable circumstances which may in its opinion lead to a conclusion that the Director could never have been in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time and therefore making him stand the trial would be abuse of the process of court as no offence is made out against him.
30. When in view of the basic averment process is issued the complaint must proceed against the Directors. But, if any Director wants the process to be quashed by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that only a bald
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averment is made in the complaint and that he is really not concerned with the issuance of the cheque, he must in order to persuade the High Court to quash the process either furnish some sterling uncontrovertible material or acceptable circumstances to substantiate his contention. He must make out a case that making him stand the trial would be abuse of the process of court. He cannot get the complaint quashed merely on the ground that apart from the basic averment no particulars are given in the complaint about his role, because ordinarily the basic averment would be sufficient to send him to trial and it could be argued that his further role could be brought out in the trial. Quashing of a complaint is a serious matter. Complaint cannot be quashed for the asking. For quashing of a complaint it must be shown that no offence is made out at all against the Director.
14) Conspectus of the aforesaid discussion is that, the complaint filed by Respondent No.1 contains the basic and necessary averments required to constitute the alleged offences under Sections 138 and 141 of the N.I Act. Admittedly, the accused No.1 has taken a huge loan amount of Rs.30 Crores. However, not a single accused including the Petitioner has informed as to what the accused No.1 did of that amount and how much accused No.1 has repaid. It is axiomatic that the loan amount at issue constitutes public funds. Repayment of such loans on time, keep the nation's economy growing. The Petitioner was connected with accused No.1 for sufficient time, therefore, he was required to explain the use of the loan amount and why it was not repaid in time, for satisfaction of the
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Court. The Petitioner has not informed whether he was getting any remuneration or honorarium or salary from accused No.1, when he was serving there. Nor the Petitioner has clarified as to whether he was engaged in any other occupation to earn income. As such it is difficult to say with certainty that, the Petitioner has not received any benefit of the loan amount at the relevant time. Therefore, and for the reasons in the forgoing paragraphs, even though the Petitioner denied his liability for the alleged offences by relying the documents referred above, said documents are not of requisite unimpeachable and uncontrovertible standard which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable, thereby helping to safely conclude that, the Petitioner is innocent. In fact, it is purely a question of trial. It is trite, the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and where, read as a whole, the factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint it should not be quashed. In short, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of Cr.P.C. together, there is a prima facie case against the Petitioner of the alleged offences and no case is made out for quashing the subject complaint and the impugned Order. The Petition thus failed and liable to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly.
(SHYAM C. CHANDAK, J.)
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PREETI
HEERO
JAYANI
Digitally signed by PREETI
HEERO JAYANI
Date: 2024.10.19 17:24:47 +0530
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