Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

V.K.LAILA v. USHALAL

Kerala High Court
Aug 29, 2024

2024:KER:65231

CRL.REV.PET NO. 454 OF 2014

1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN

THURSDAY, THE 29TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024 / 7TH BHADRA, 1946

CRL.REV.PET NO. 454 OF 2014

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 15.07.2013 IN CRA NO.775 OF 2006

OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT(ADHOC II), THRISSUR

JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2006 IN CC NO.86 OF 2002 OF JUDICIAL

MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS, CHAVAKKAD

REVISION PETITIONER/1ST RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:

V.K.LAILA

AGED 52 YEARS, W/O.MAJEED,

VALEGATTIL HOUSE, P O, IRINGAPRAM, PUTHENPALLY,

CHAVAKKAD TALUK, THRISSUR DIST

BY ADV SRI.G.SREEKUMAR (CHELUR)

RESPONDENTS/APPELLANT AND STATE OF KERALA/ACCUSED AND STATE

OF KERALA:

1 USHALAL

W/O.SUMESHLAL, PARAYIL MUDOKIL HOUSE,

THOZHIYOOR, POOKODE VILLAGE, CHAVAKKAD TALUK,

THRISSUR DIST, PIN-680001

2 THE STATE OF KERALA

REP BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ,

HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682031

BY ADVS. SRI.P.P.HARRIS

SRI.N.M.MADHU

SRI.SANGEETHARAJ N.R., PP

THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD

ON 29.08.2024,THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE

FOLLOWING:

1

P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN, J.

-------------------------------- Crl.R.P. No.454 of 2014 ---------------------------------------------- Dated this the 29th day of August, 2024

ORDER

This criminal revision petition is filed challenging the judgment dated 15.07.2013 in Criminal Appeal No.775/2006 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court (Fast Track Court-II), Thrissur. Petitioner is the complainant in C.C.No.86/2002 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chavakkad. The above case is filed by the petitioner alleging the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the 1strespondent. The trial court, after completing the evidence, convicted the 1strespondent and sentenced him. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the 1strespondent filed an appeal before the Sessions Court and the appeal was considered by the Additional Sessions Court (Fast Track Court- II), Thrissur. The learned Session Judge remanded the case observing that since the case is tried as a summary trial, the successor Magistrate has to try the case de novo. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of the above judgment of

2

the appellate court:

"11. Sec. 326 Cr.P.C. enables Judge or the Magistrate to continue with the trial commenced by the predecessor. But sub-section. 326(3) excludes trial of summary case. The appellant side had referred to the decision tendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2011(6) Supreme 173 (Nitinhbai Saevatilal Shah and another v Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal and another). It was held that in summary trial proceedings successor Magistrate has no authority to proceed with the trial from the stage at which his predecessor has left it. Provisions of Sec. 326(1) and 326 (2) of Cr.P.C. are not applicable to summary trial. He has got to try the case de novo. The mandatory language in which sec. 326(3) leaves no manner of doubt that when the case is tried as summary case a Magistrate who succeeds the Magistrate who had recorded the part or whole of the evidence cannot act on evidence so recorded by his predecessor. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the cardinal principal of law in crminal trial is that it is a right of an accused that his case should be decided by a judge who has heard the whole of it. Reference has been made to the decision of the apex court rendered in Payare Lal v. State Of Punjab . (AIR 1962 S.C. 690). This principle was being rigorously applied till the introduction of Sec. 350 in Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898. Sec. 326 of the new

3

code deals with what was intended to be dealt with by section 350 of the old Code. In Nitinbhai's case it was held that no amount of consent by parties can confer jurisdiction who was there exists none, on a court of law nor can they divest a court of jurisdiction which it possesses under the law. It was a case where the complainant and the accused had declared that they had no objection to proceed with the matter on the basis of evidence recorded by the predecessor in office. The ratio in aforesaid case had been followed by the Hon'ble High Court in the case law Balan V. Preetha and Another reported in 2012 KHC 220, wherein it was held that continuation of trial and disposal of the case by Magistrate adopting the evidence recorded by his predecessor would be against the provision under 326(3) Cr.P.C. It was held that the Magistrate in a summary trial cannot proceed with the case placing reliance on the evidence recorded by his predecessor and he has to undertake de novo trial of the case except with respect to those cases which fall within the import of Sec. 326 of Cr.P.C. In a subsequent case law reported in 2011(6) Supreme 173 (Kannan v. Narayana Swami), the Hon'ble High Court held that when both sides had conceded that the trial was conducted following procedure governing summons case, evidence recorded by predecessor Magistrate forming part of record can be used by successor to dispose the case. It was a case where the

4

complainant wanted de novo trial and the accused filed objections that the ratio laid down in Nitin Bhai's case by the apex court is not applicable. It was held by the Hon'ble High Court that the purport of Sec. 143 of Negotiable Instruments Act was not that an offence under Sec. 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act can be tried only summarily. It was held that where the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is one of summary trial then of course the decision tendered by the apex court in Nithin Bai's case has to be followed. But in other case where trial was proceeded as in a summons case no reliance can be made on the said decision of the apex court for a de novo trial on transfer of a presiding officer in midst of trial.

12. The appellant side would distinguish the case law in Kannan's case on the argument that it was a case where the complainant after disposal of the case had sought for de novo trial when the accused objected the same. In the case in hand the learned Magistrate who disposed the case by impugned judgment had not complied with the requirement as provided under second proviso of Sec. 143(1) as to assume that the summons trial procedure was adopted against the mandate under Sec. 143(1) that the case shall be tried summarily. The facts and circumstances of the case in hand enable this court to follow the ratio laid down in Nitinbhai's case and Balan's case referred

5

above. Especially when there is nothing on record to show that the appellant had consented to reliance on evidence recorded by predecessor for disposal the case. The point is therefore decided in favour of the appellant.

13. For the reasons stated above it is found that the conviction and sentence as per the impugned judgment are liable to be set aside and case shall be remanded back for de novo trial and disposal by the Magistrate. I do so. Send back the lower court records. Parties shall appear before the trial court on 17.8.2013. Learned magistrate shall see that the trial and disposal of the case is expedited it being an old case."

Aggrieved by the same, this revision is filed by the complainant.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the 1strespondent.

3. The counsel for the petitioner takes me through the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in Baharuni J.V. and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another [2014 (4) KHC

476] the Apex Court observed that each case has to be decided based on the facts by the Court concerned and find out whether it is tried as a summary procedure or as a summons case. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of that judgment :

6

60. The ratio in Nitinbhai must not be followed mechanically to remand matters to trial courts for de novo trial. There should be proper application of judicial mind and evidence on record must be thoroughly perused before arriving at any conclusion with regard to mode of trial.

61. However, to summarise and answer the issues raised herein, following directions are issued for the Courts seized off with similar cases:

1. All the subordinate Courts must make an endeavour to expedite the hearing of cases in a time bound manner which in turn will restore the confidence of the common man in the justice delivery system. When law expects something to be done within prescribed time limit, some efforts are required to be made to obey the mandate of law.

2. The learned Magistrate has the discretion under Section 143 of the N.I. Act either to follow a summary trial or summons trial. In case the Magistrate wants to conduct a summons trial, he should record the reasons after hearing the parties and proceed with the trial in the manner provided under the second proviso to Section 143 of the N.I. Act. Such reasons should necessarily be recorded by the Trial Court so that further litigation arraigning the mode of trial can be avoided.

3. The learned Judicial Magistrate should make all possible attempts to encourage compounding of offence at an early stage of litigation. In a prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the compensatory aspect of remedy must be given priority over the punitive aspect.

4. All the subordinate Courts should follow the directives of the Supreme Court issued in

7

several cases scrupulously for effective conduct of trials and speedy disposal of cases.

5. Remitting the matter for de novo trial should be exercised as a last resort and should be used sparingly when there is grave miscarriage of justice in the light of illegality, irregularity, incompetence or any other defect which cannot be cured at an appellate stage. The appellate Court should be very cautious and exercise the discretion judiciously while remanding the matter for de novo trial.

6. While examining the nature of the trial conducted by the Trial Court for the purpose of determining whether it was summary trial or summons trial, the primary and predominant test to be adopted by the appellate Court should be whether it was only the substance of the evidence that was recorded or whether the complete record of the deposition of the witness in their chief examination, cross examination and re-examination in verbatim was faithfully placed on record. The appellate Court has to go through each and every minute detail of the Trial Court record and then examine the same independently and thoroughly to reach at a just and reasonable conclusion.

62. We, therefore, direct all the Criminal Courts in the country dealing with cases falling under Section 138 of the N.I. Act to follow the above-mentioned procedure discussed in the preceding paragraphs for speedy and expeditious disposal of cases as per the purport of the Act.

63. In the light of the discussion made above, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its true

8

perspective. The High Court erred in arriving at a conclusion that the mode of trial in all these matters was summary trial whereas the record of the trial Court adequately shows that regular trial was undertaken in these matters. Hence, in our considered opinion, the matters are required to be remanded back to the High Court for consideration on merits. We make it clear, that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the cases. The High Court should, by conducting an independent inquiry and by reasoned order, dispose of the cases on their own merits as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months due to the fact that these cases are languishing for almost 14 years.

4. In the light of the above principle, I am of the considered opinion that the appellate court has to reconsider the appeal in the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Baharuni's case (supra).

Therefore, this criminal revision petition is allowed with following directions:

1. The judgment dated 15.07.2013 in Criminal Appeal No.775/2006 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court (Fast Track Court-II), Thrissur is set aside.

9

2. The Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court- II), Thrissur is directed to reconsider Criminal Appeal No.775/2006, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the 1st respondent, in the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Baharuni J.V. and Another v. State of Gujarat and Another

[2014 (4) KHC 476].

3. The petitioner and the 1strespondent will appear before the appellate court on 23.09.2024.

4 The learned Sessions Judge will dispose the appeal, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within three months from the date of appearance of the parties.

sd/-

P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN

JV JUDGE

10