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VEMPARALA SRIKANT AN... v. GENERAL SECRETARY, I...
Judgment Summary — LPA 744/2024 (Delhi High Court, 5 August 2024)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal (LPA 744/2024) was preferred under Clause X of the Letters Patent Act, 1866, challenging the judgment dated 14 May 2024 of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi. The Single Judge had dismissed W.P.(C) 11375/2022 titled "Vemparala Srikant And Anr. vs. General Secretary, India Bulls Centrum Flat Owners Welfare Co-Operative Society, Hyderabad" on the sole ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
The appellants in the Letters Patent Appeal were represented by Mr. Harsh V. Singhal, Advocate. The respondent (General Secretary, India Bulls Centrum Flat Owners Welfare Co-Operative Society, Hyderabad) was not represented. The present judgment was delivered on 5 August 2024 by a Division Bench comprising the Acting Chief Justice Manmohan, ACJ (oral) and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) in its revisional or appellate jurisdiction, against an order of a State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC), can be challenged before the High Court of Delhi (this Court) or must be challenged before the respective jurisdictional High Courts (i.e., the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the cause of action arose).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sterling Agro Industries Limited vs. Union of India, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3162 | Relied on by the learned Single Judge to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. | The Division Bench noted that the Single Judge had relied upon this decision to dismiss the writ petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction and considered that precedent in the context of the appeal. |
| Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand Jain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 877 | Holds that orders passed by the NCDRC in appellate/revisional jurisdiction can be assailed under Articles 226 or 227 before the jurisdictional High Court. | The Court treated this Supreme Court pronouncement as authoritative and dispositive on the question presented, concluding that challenges to NCDRC appellate/revisional orders lie before the jurisdictional High Court. |
| Ibrat Faizan (as cited within Universal Sompo) | Explains the importance of approaching the concerned High Court where remedies under Article 227/226 are available. | Quoted (via Universal Sompo) to support the principle that an aggrieved party should approach the concerned/jurisdictional High Court rather than the Supreme Court where a High Court remedy is available. |
| Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 | Explains the scope and ambit of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. | Relied upon (via Universal Sompo) to define the parameters within which a High Court exercises supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. |
| Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 29 | Referenced as a recent decision following the principles in Estralla Rubber regarding Article 227. | Noted as part of the line of authorities explaining the limited scope of Article 227 and the need to approach the concerned High Court. |
| Ambica Industries vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) 6 SCC 796 | Affirms that a High Court exercises power under Article 227 in respect of orders within its territorial jurisdiction and that the High Court where the first court is located should be considered appropriate when tribunals sit across states. | The Division Bench relied on this authority to justify the interpretation that "concerned High Court" means the High Court within whose territorial limits the cause of action originated (here, Telangana). |
| CCE v. Enkay HWS India Ltd., (2002) 139 ELT 21 (Del) | Discussed in Ambica Industries as an example where the High Court was held not to have jurisdiction because the adjudicating authority functioned outside its territorial limits. | Cited within the Ambica Industries discussion to demonstrate the principle that territorial connection to the adjudicating authority determines High Court jurisdiction under relevant statutes and constitutional provisions. |
| Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta v. CIT, (1978) 14 DLT 11 (SN) : (1978) 113 ITR 817 (Del) | Held that the High Court of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction the original adjudicating authority functions has jurisdiction to deal with references under the statute concerned. | Referenced (via Ambica Industries) as part of the jurisprudence supporting territorial nexus as the criterion for High Court jurisdiction. |
| Suresh Desai and Associates v. CIT, (1998) 230 ITR 912 : (1998) 71 DLT 772 (Del) | Reiterated the territorial principle regarding jurisdiction of the High Court where the original adjudicating authority functions. | Referenced to support the proposition that siting of the adjudicating authority, not the appellate seat, drives jurisdictional competence of the High Court. |
| CCE v. Technological Institute of Textile, (1998) 76 DLT 862 (DB) | Applied the territorial jurisdiction principle in a reference/arising-under-statute context. | Used as further precedent in the chain of authorities illustrating that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the adjudicating authority functions is the proper forum. |
| Stridewell Leathers (P) Ltd. v. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages (P) Ltd., (1994) 1 SCC 34 : AIR 1994 SC 158 | Referred to in Ambica Industries while dealing with the scope of the expression "the High Court" under statutory provisions. | Included in the chain of authorities demonstrating the territorial approach to High Court jurisdiction under statutes and constitutional provisions. |
| L. Chandra Kumar (referenced in Universal Sompo) | Mentioned in relation to the limitations of the remedy under Article 136 (special leave) as an effective alternative to Article 227 remedies. | Used to support the reasoning that where an accessible remedy exists before a High Court, litigants should avail that remedy rather than seek relief directly in the Supreme Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Division Bench proceeded through the following analytical steps, grounded in the authorities cited in the opinion:
- Identification of the central question: whether orders of the NCDRC in appellate/revisional jurisdiction against SCDRC orders must be challenged in the jurisdictional High Courts.
- Recognition that the learned Single Judge had relied upon Sterling Agro Industries (Del HC) to dismiss the writ petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction.
- Reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Universal Sompo (2023) as an authoritative pronouncement directly addressing the identical issue. Universal Sompo held that orders of the NCDRC in appellate/revisional jurisdiction can be challenged under Articles 226 or 227 before the jurisdictional High Court.
- The Court extracted and relied upon passages from Universal Sompo emphasising (a) the importance of approaching the "concerned" or "jurisdictional" High Court when remedies under Articles 226/227 are available, (b) the limited and supervisory nature of Article 227, and (c) the desirability of directing litigants to the High Court to secure an accessible and less expensive remedy than an Article 136 special leave petition.
- The Bench interpreted the phrase "concerned High Court or jurisdictional High Court" to mean the High Court within whose local territorial limits the original cause of action arose, observing that all foundational facts in this case arose within the State of Telangana.
- The Court fortified this territorial interpretation by reference to Ambica Industries (2007), which explained that the High Court will exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in respect of orders passed within its territorial jurisdiction and that treating the situs of the first court as determinative avoids anomalous results when tribunals sit across multiple States.
- Drawing on the line of authorities cited in Ambica Industries (including decisions such as Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta, Suresh Desai and Associates, CCE v. Technological Institute of Textile and Stridewell Leathers), the Court observed that territorial nexus to the adjudicating authority is the established criterion for determining the appropriate High Court forum.
- The Court also considered practical consequences and policy concerns: permitting challenges to NCDRC appellate/revisional orders in a geographically remote High Court (e.g., Delhi) would impose an unfair burden on ordinary consumers and encourage forum shopping; the doctrine of forum conveniens disfavors such an outcome.
- On the combined force of the Supreme Court authority (Universal Sompo), the territorial-jurisdiction jurisprudence (Ambica and related cases), and practical considerations, the Division Bench concluded that the Single Judge's dismissal on territorial-competence grounds was correct and unassailable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Division Bench dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal and the connected applications. The Court therefore affirmed the Single Judge's order dismissing the underlying writ petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction.
Core Ruling: The appeal is DISMISSED (the appeal alongwith the applications is dismissed, though without any costs).
Implications:
- The Court applied and followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Universal Sompo that orders of the NCDRC in appellate/revisional jurisdiction can and should be challenged before the jurisdictional (concerned) High Court under Articles 226 or 227, rather than in some other High Court (such as Delhi) lacking a territorial nexus to the underlying cause of action.
- In the present factual matrix, because the foundational facts arose in the State of Telangana and the appellant had proceeded before forums in Telangana (District Forum and SCDRC), the High Court of Telangana is the "concerned" or "jurisdictional" High Court to entertain any challenge.
- The Division Bench emphasized practical consequences (access to justice, avoidance of forum shopping, doctrine of forum conveniens) and noted no departure from the Supreme Court's authoritative position — the present decision does not purport to lay down a new precedent but applies existing Supreme Court and High Court jurisprudence to uphold territorial jurisdictional limits.
Disposition: The appeal and the connected applications were dismissed without costs. (Acting Chief Justice Manmohan, ACJ; Justice Tushar Rao Gedela — 5 August 2024.)
LPA 744/2024 Page 1 of 7 $~24
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 744/2024 & C.M. APPL. 44223-26/2024, CAV 356/2024 VEMPARALA SRIKANT & ANR .....Appellant Through: Mr. Harsh V. Singhal, Advocate. versus
GENERAL SECRETARY, INDIA BULLS CENTRUM FLAT
OWNERS' WELFARE CO-OPERTATIVE SOCIETY, HYDERABAD ..…Respondent
Through: None.
% Date of Decision: 5th August, 2024.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
J U D G M E N T
MANMOHAN, ACJ : (ORAL)
1. Present appeal has been preferred under Clause X of the Letters Patent Act, 1866, assailing the judgment dated 14thMay, 2024, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, dismissing the W.P.(C) 11375/2022 titled "Vemparala Srikant And Anr. vs. General Secretary, India Bulls Centrum Flat Owners Welfare Co-Operative Society, Hyderabad", only on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the underlying petition.
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2. The only question in the present appeal for consideration of this Court is whether an order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as "NCDRC") in a Revision Petition or an Appeal against an order passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as "SCDRC") can be challenged before this Court or has to be challenged before the respective jurisdictional High Courts ?
3. Learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment has relied upon the five Judges Bench judgment of this Court in Sterling Agro Industries Limited vs. Union of India, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3162 to dismiss the underlying writ petition only on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned judgment.
5. Apart from the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sterling Agro Industries Limited (supra), the issue raised in the writ petition, in our opinion, is no more res integra in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand Jain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
877. In that case, the Supreme Court had examined an identical issue and held that so far as the orders passed by the NCDRC in Appellate/Revisional jurisdiction is concerned, the same can be assailed under the provisions of Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950, before the jurisdictional High Court. The relevant paragraphs of Universal Sompo (supra) are as under:
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37. This Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra), while explaining the importance of approaching the High Court, more particularly when a remedy is available by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution (supervisory jurisdiction) observed as under:
"12. ….Also, in a given case, this Court may not exercise its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in view of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party before the concerned High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as it is appropriate that aggrieved party approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. xxx xxx xxx
13. Now so far as the remedy which may be available under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it cannot be disputed that the remedy by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India may be too expensive and as observed and held by this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the said remedy can be said to be inaccessible for it to be real and effective. Therefore, when the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the
concerned High Court is provided, in that case, it would be in furtherance of the right of access to justice of the aggrieved party, may be a complainant, to approach the concerned High Court at a lower cost, rather than a Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
14.1. The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. ., (2001) 8 SCC 97, which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 29). Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It goes without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to bear in mind the limited
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jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the rigour of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India."
(Emphasis supplied)
38. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we have reached to the conclusion that we should not adjudicate this petition on merits. We must ask the petitioner herein to first go before the jurisdictional High Court either by way of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution or by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, after the High Court adjudicates and passes a final order, it is always open for either of the parties to thereafter come before this Court by filing special leave petition, seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)
6. In our considered opinion, the words "concerned High Court or jurisdictional High Court" would imply a High Court, within whose local limits of the territorial jurisdiction, the original cause of action has arisen. We are also of the opinion that all the foundational facts necessary to constitute a cause of action arising within the local limits of a High Court would confer upon such High Court the necessary jurisdiction to exercise its powers under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India.
7. We are fortified in the view by the judgement of the Supreme Court in Ambica Industries vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) 6 SCC
796. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:-
"17. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India as also Clause (2) of Article 226 thereof, the High Court would exercise its discretionary jurisdiction as also power to issue writ of certiorari in respect of the orders passed by the subordinate courts within its territorial jurisdiction or if any cause of action has arisen therewithin but the same tests cannot be applied when the appellate court exercises a jurisdiction
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over a tribunal situated in more than one State. In such a situation, in our opinion, the High Court situated in the State where the first court is located should be considered to be the appropriate Appellate Authority. The Code of Civil Procedure did not contemplate such a situation. It provides for jurisdiction of each court. Even a District Judge must exercise its jurisdiction only within the territorial limits of a State. It is inconceivable under the Code of Civil Procedure that the jurisdiction of the District Court would be exercisable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the district, save and except in such matters where the law specifically provides therefor.
xxx xxx xxx
26. In CCE v. Enkay HWS India Ltd. [(2002) 139 ELT 21 (Del)] Arijit Pasayat and D.K. Jain, JJ. in a case arising under Section 35-H of the Central Excise Act opined: (ELT pp. 21-22, paras 2-3)
"2. When the matter was placed for admission, we pointed out to learned counsel for the petitioner that this High Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, in view of the decision of this Court in Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta v. CIT [(1978) 14 DLT 11 (SN) : (1978) 113 ITR 817 (Del)] . In the said case, while dealing with the scope of entertaining reference under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short 'the IT Act'), it was observed that this High Court, that the State within whose territorial jurisdiction original adjudicating authority functions would have jurisdiction to deal with the reference under the statute concerned. The view was again reiterated in Suresh Desai and Associates v. CIT [(1998) 230 ITR 912 : (1998) 71 DLT 772 (Del)] . That was also a case under Section 256(2) of the IT Act. In a petition for reference arising under the Act in CCE v. Technological Institute of Textile [(1998) 76 DLT 862 (DB)] it was held that the High Court within whose jurisdiction adjudicating authority functions would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter. We have also expressed similar view in Central Excise Act case [ CEA Case No. 7 of 2000 disposed of on 30-10-2000] taking note of decision of the Apex Court in Stridewell Leathers (P) Ltd. v. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages (P) Ltd. [(1994) 1 SCC 34 : AIR 1994 SC 158] while dealing with the scope of expression 'the High Court' under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, 1956 (in short 'the Companies Act').
3. We find no substance in the plea of learned counsel for petitioner that site of the Commissionerate or Appellate Authority determines the jurisdiction in view of what has been stated in the aforesaid decision."
xxx xxx xxx
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38. We have noticed hereinbefore that if the decision of the High Court in the aforementioned question is taken to its logical conclusion, the same would lead to a great anomaly. It would also give rise to the problem of forum shopping. We may notice some examples to show that the determination of the appellate forum based upon the situs of the tribunal would lead to an anomalous result. For example, an assessee affected by an assessment order in Bombay may invoke the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court to take advantage of the law laid down by it which may be contrary to judgments of the High Court of Bombay. This cannot be allowed. (See Suresh Desai and Associates v. CIT [(1998) 230 ITR 912 :
(1998) 71 DLT 772 (Del)] , ITR at pp. 915-17 and CCE v. Technological Institute of Textile [(1998) 76 DLT 862 (DB)] .)"
8. In the present case, it is not disputed that all the foundational facts giving rise to the cause of action to the appellant to approach the Consumer Fora arose within the State of Telangana. It is undisputed that the appellant had approached the District Consumer Forum in Hyderabad and then the SCDRC in the State of Telangana. In that view of the matter, coupled with the aforesaid observations, it is apparent that it could only be the High Court of State of Telangana which would be the "concerned High Court or the jurisdictional High Court".
9. Besides, in case this Court were to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant, the resultant situation would be absurd. In that, if one were to consider the situation of an ordinary consumer, it would be, as a fall out of such interpretation, that a consumer who is agitating for his rights in far of places like Assam, Manipur or any other distant part of the country would have to necessarily travel to Delhi for such redressal. This interpretation cannot be countenanced, particularly in view of the doctrine of "forum conveniens".
10. Thus, in that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is unassailable.
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11. The appeal alongwith the applications is dismissed, though without any costs.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.
AUGUST 5, 2024/kct/rl
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