Bookmark
PDF
Share
CaseIQ

PARTEEK BANSAL v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Supreme Court Of India

Apr 19, 2024

Judgment

CaseIQ

Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (Parteek Bansal) married respondent No. 3 on 21 March 2015 in Udaipur. On 10 October 2015, the complainant (respondent No. 2 and father of respondent No. 3) lodged a complaint at Police Station Hisar, Haryana that was registered on 17 October 2015 as FIR No. 19/2015 under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC against the appellant and his relatives. Five days later, on 15 October 2015, the complainant filed a second complaint at Women Police Station, Udaipur on the same allegations; it was registered on 1 November 2015 as FIR No. 156/2015 under Sections 498A, 506 IPC and other offences.

A police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. was filed in Hisar in December 2015 only against the appellant. Trial proceeded as Criminal Case No. 232-I/2015 before the Judicial Magistrate, Hisar, culminating in the appellant’s acquittal on 2 August 2017 when neither the complainant nor the alleged victim appeared to testify.

Meanwhile, the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the Rajasthan High Court to quash the second FIR. On 6 March 2017 the High Court dismissed the petition, holding that (a) the Udaipur complaint was earlier in point of time and (b) Rajasthan police were unaware of the Hisar proceedings. The appellant’s present appeal challenges that order. On 3 April 2017, the Supreme Court stayed investigation in FIR No. 156/2015.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the second FIR (No. 156/2015, Udaipur) based on the same allegations as the first FIR (No. 19/2015, Hisar) constitutes an abuse of process warranting quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Whether the Rajasthan High Court erred in holding that the Udaipur complaint preceded the Hisar complaint and that Rajasthan police lacked knowledge of the earlier proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Both complaints are on identical facts; lodging a second FIR is impermissible.
The High Court’s findings that the Udaipur complaint was prior in time and that Rajasthan police were unaware of the Hisar FIR are factually erroneous.
Reliance placed on the decisions in Prem Chand Singh v. State of UP and T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala.

Respondents' Arguments

The Hisar court lacked territorial jurisdiction because the alleged offences occurred in Udaipur; therefore, the Hisar judgment of acquittal is void.
Investigation by Rajasthan police should proceed; the Supreme Court’s interim stay alone has halted it.
Reliance placed on Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, Chennai.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Prem Chand Singh v. State of UP (2020) 3 SCC 54	Relied upon by the appellant; specific principle not discussed in the text.	The judgment notes the reliance but does not analyse or apply the case.
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala & Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 181	Relied upon by the appellant; specific principle not discussed in the text.	The judgment notes the reliance but does not analyse or apply the case.
Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 100	Relied upon by the respondents; specific principle not discussed in the text.	The judgment notes the reliance but does not analyse or apply the case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court confined itself to whether continuation of the second FIR amounted to abuse of the criminal process. It found:

Error on chronology: Documentary dates show the Hisar complaint (10 October 2015) and FIR registration (17 October 2015) pre-dated the Udaipur complaint (15 October 2015) and FIR registration (1 November 2015). The High Court’s contrary finding was “contrary to the records and admitted facts.”
Knowledge of earlier proceedings: The Udaipur complaint itself recited that an earlier complaint had been lodged at Hisar, demonstrating that Rajasthan police were aware of parallel proceedings; the High Court’s contrary observation was therefore erroneous.
Identity of allegations: Both complaints concerned the same matrimonial dispute and alleged dowry demands; therefore the second FIR duplicated proceedings already underway.
Conduct of complainant: Respondents 2 and 3, particularly respondent No. 3 (a gazetted police officer), misused state machinery: (a) they initiated two complaints in quick succession, (b) they did not withdraw or transfer the Hisar complaint, and (c) they failed to appear at trial, leading to the appellant’s acquittal.
Abuse of process: Lodging successive FIRs on identical facts, coupled with the complainants’ non-participation at trial, manifested an intent to harass the appellant. This justified exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED – The Supreme Court set aside the Rajasthan High Court’s order, quashed FIR No. 156/2015 (Women Police Station, Udaipur), and imposed costs of ₹5,00,000 on respondent No. 2 (payable 50 % to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and 50 % to the appellant).

Implications: The decision terminates all criminal proceedings arising from the second FIR and reinforces the principle that multiple FIRs on the same facts constitute abuse of process. No new legal doctrine was created; the ruling applies the existing prohibition against successive FIRs and underscores the court’s readiness to impose monetary costs for vexatious litigation.

Show all summary ...

2024 INSC 324

SLP(CRL.) NO. 2520 OF 2017 Page 1 of 11 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(Special Leave to Petition (Crl.) No.2520 OF 2017) PARTEEK BANSAL …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAM NATH, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal assails the correctness of the judgement and order dated 06.03.2017 passed by the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 3259 of 2015 dismissing the said petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973¹for quashing the FIR No. 156 of 2015, Women Police Station, Udaipur under Sections 498A, 406, 384, 420 and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code, 1860².

1 In short, "Cr.P.C."

2 In short, "IPC"

3. At the outset, it would be relevant to mention that the sole ground on which the quashing was sought was that this was a second FIR on the same set of allegations made by the complainant after two weeks of lodging the first FIR being FIR No. 19 of 2015 under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC, Police Station, Hisar, Haryana.

4. The relevant facts are briefly stated hereunder:

(i). The appellant and respondent No.3 came in contact with each other in June, 2014 through internet.

(ii). The complainant (respondent No.2) who is the father of respondent No.3 had visited the appellant in Udaipur, who is a

Chartered Accountant based in Hisar, for proposal of marriage of his daughter (respondent No.3) who was at that time posted as Deputy Superintendent of Police at Udaipur, Rajasthan.

(iii). On 18.02.2015 engagement took place and thereafter on 21.03.2015, the marriage was solemnised at Udaipur. On 10.10.2015, the respondent No.2 filed a complaint at Police Station, Hisar, Haryana under Section 498A

IPC etc. The said complaint was registered at Police Station Hisar on 17.10.2015 as FIR No. 19 of 2015 under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC.

(iv). In the meantime, respondent No.2 submitted another complaint on

15.10.2015 i.e. five days after the first complaint at the Police Station, Udaipur in the State of Rajasthan on the same set of allegations as in the previous complaint. This complaint came to be registered on 01.11.2015 as FIR No. 156 under Section 498A/506 IPC etc.

(v). In the first FIR No. 19 of 2015 along with the appellant other family members were also roped in. However, after further investigation, a Police Report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. was submitted in December, 2015 only against the appellant under Section 498A IPC. Based on the said Police Report, the Magistrate took cognizance and the trial proceeded and a case was registered as Crl. Case No. 232-I of 2015, in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Hisar.

(vi). In the meantime, the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the Rajasthan High Court for quashing of the second FIR No. 156 of 2015 registered at Udaipur. By the impugned order, the High Court has dismissed the said petition on 06.03.2017 primarily on two grounds. Firstly, that the complaint at Udaipur was prior in point of time than the complaint in Hisar. The second ground was that the Rajasthan Police was not aware of the earlier proceedings/complaint before the Hisar Police and as such the Udaipur Police should be at liberty to investigate the said complaint made at Udaipur.

(vii). Aggrieved by the impugned order, the present petition was preferred before this Court on which notice was issued on 03.04.2017, and this Court also stayed further investigation in the FIR No. 156 dated 01.11.2015 P.S. Women Police Station, Udaipur, until further orders. As such the said FIR has not been investigated so far.

(viii). After the impugned order was passed, the trial at Hisar was concluded, and the Trial Court vide judgement dated 02.08.2017 acquitted the appellant. Copy of the said judgment has been placed along with additional documents (I.A. No. 118201 of

2021).

(ix). A perusal of the judgment and order of acquittal reflects that the prosecution examined ASI Sheela Devi Investigating Officer as PW-1 who proved the Police Papers, Head Constable Raja Ram as PW-2, who proved the documents relating to marriage etc., Jaipal Singh, DSP as PW-3, who also proved some of the police papers, and Sub Inspector Mane Devi as PW-4, who had prepared the Challan upon completion of the investigation.

(x). The Trial Court further records that prosecution tried its best to secure the presence of the complainant and the victim but they did not turn up to depose before the Court. Left with no alternative, the Trial Court proceeded to close the evidence of the prosecution and after recording the

statement of the appellant under Section

313 Cr.P.C., proceeded to hear the counsel for the parties and record the finding of acquittal.

5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to both the complaints, the judgement of acquittal as also the errors apparent on the face of record in the impugned order regarding both the grounds, that the complaint at Udaipur was prior in point of time than that at Hisar, and secondly that the Rajasthan Police had no knowledge of the proceedings at Hisar.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents, both the State of Rajasthan as also the complainant, have vehemently argued that the Court at Hisar had no territorial jurisdiction as the offence had been committed at Udaipur, and therefore, the judgment of acquittal delivered by the Hisar Court was void. The complaint ought to have been examined and investigated by Rajasthan Police, but owing to the interim order passed by this Court the investigation has not proceeded as such the petition deserves to be dismissed. We have also been taken through the

relevant statutory provisions under the Cr.P.C. in particular Sections 300, 177, 461 and Article 22 of the Constitution of India by the counsel for the parties and further reliance has also been placed on the following judgements:

(i). Prem Chand Singh vs. State of UP³ (ii). T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala & Ors.⁴ (iii). Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr.⁵

The first two have been relied upon by the counsel for the appellant and the third by the counsel for the respondents.

7. Without going into these statutory provisions and the case laws relied upon by the parties, we are convinced that the impugned proceedings are nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is not denied by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that they did not lodge complaint at Hisar. They also did not file an application withdrawing their complaint on the ground that it was wrongly filed here or that the said complaint may be transferred to Udaipur for investigation as the offence was committed at

3 (2020) 3 SCC 54

4 (2001) 6 SCC 181

5 (2004) 8 SCC 100

Udaipur. They allowed the investigating agency to continue to investigate in which their statements were also recorded. The respondent No.3 was a gazetted Police Officer at the relevant time and was also well aware of the laws, in particular the Cr.P.C. and the provisions thereto. Neither the complainant nor the victim entered the witness box before the Hisar Court allowing total wastage of the valuable time of the Court and the investigating agency. Merely because she was a Police Officer, she first managed to get an FIR lodged at Hisar through her father, and thereafter she moved to her hometown at Udaipur and got another complaint lodged by her father within a week.

8. The following admitted dates would be relevant to upset the finding of the High Court that the complaint at Udaipur was prior in point of time:

(i). Complaint at Hisar is dated 10.10.2015. (ii). Complaint at Udaipur is dated 15.10.2015. (iii). FIR registered at Hisar is dated 17.10.2015 (iv). FIR registered at Udaipur is dated

01.11.2015.

On what basis the High Court recorded the finding that the complaint at Udaipur was prior in point of

time is not discernible from the above dates and is contrary to the records and the admitted facts.

9. It is also not in dispute that in the complaint lodged at Udaipur, the allegations were the same as in the complaint at Hisar and additionally it was stated in the complaint at Udaipur that the complainant had earlier lodged a complaint at Hisar. Thus, the investigating agency at Udaipur was well aware of the complaint on similar allegations being lodged at Hisar. The High Court again fell in error in observing that the Rajasthan Police was not aware about the earlier proceedings initiated at Hisar. The High Court and the Rajasthan Police were expected to at least read the complaint carefully.

10. Thus, on both the counts, we find that the High Court fell in error in dismissing the petition of the appellant.

11. In the facts and circumstances as recorded above, we are of the view that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had been misusing their official position by lodging complaints one after the other. Further, their conduct of neither appearing before the Trial Court

at Hisar nor withdrawing their complaint at Hisar, would show that their only intention was to harass the appellant by first making him face a trial at Hisar and then again at Udaipur. It would also be relevant to note that the appellant had been arrested and thereafter granted bail. And now before this Court, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have been vehemently opposing the quashing of the FIR at Udaipur. We may also note that in the complaint made at Hisar, there are allegations to the effect that when respondent No.2 visited the appellant at Hisar, he had made a demand of Rs. 50,00,000/- and also an Innova Car. Thus, the argument that no offence was committed in Hisar but only at Udaipur was also not correct. We thus deprecate this practice of state machinery being misused for ulterior motives and for causing harassment to the other side, we are thus inclined to impose cost on the respondent No.2 in order to compensate the appellant.

12. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court is quashed, and the impugned proceedings registered as FIR No. 156 of 2015 dated 01.11.2015, Women

Police Station, Udaipur are quashed with costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rs. Five Lacs Only) which shall be deposited with the Registrar of this Court within four weeks and upon deposit of the same, 50% may be transmitted in the account of Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and the remaining 50% to the appellant.

………………………………..……J

(VIKRAM NATH)

………………………………..……J

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI

APRIL 19 ,2024