Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

PREM RAJ v. POONAMMA MENON

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 2, 2024
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Prem Raj, borrowed Rs. 2,00,000 from the complainant K. P. B. Menon with a promise to repay on demand. Upon demand, the appellant issued a cheque dated 30 June 2002 drawn on South Indian Bank, with Canara Bank, Irinjalakuda Branch as the collecting bank. The cheque was dishonoured for “insufficient funds / payment stopped by drawer.” After a statutory notice dated 22 December 2002 went unanswered, the complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Concurrently, the appellant instituted Original Suit No. 1338 of 2002 before the Additional District Munsif, Irinjalakuda, seeking (a) a declaration that the same cheque was a “security cheque,” (b) mandatory injunction for its return, and (c) a prohibitory injunction restraining encashment. The civil court decreed the suit on 11 April 2003, a decision affirmed in appeal on 30 January 2007.

Despite the civil decree, the criminal prosecution proceeded. The Judicial First Class Magistrate convicted the appellant on 14 August 2007, sentencing him to one year’s simple imprisonment and compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs, in default six months’ further imprisonment. The Additional Sessions Judge, Thrissur, upheld the conviction on 11 January 2011, and the High Court of Kerala partly allowed a revision only to a limited extent on 23 January 2018, maintaining the conviction. The present appeal challenges those concurrent findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be sustained when, in respect of the same cheque and transaction, a competent civil court has already decreed that the cheque was issued merely as security.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Relied on M/s Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India to contend that findings of civil courts are binding on criminal courts.
  • Cited K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras to submit that, at minimum, criminal courts must yield on issues concerning sentence and damages where a prior civil decree exists.
  • Argued that the civil decree declaring the cheque to be a security instrument extinguishes any “legally enforceable debt,” an essential ingredient of Section 138 N.I. Act, making the criminal conviction unsustainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (1970) 3 SCC 694 Decisions of civil courts are binding on criminal courts. Considered but noted to have been later limited/overruled; used for historical context.
K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police & Anr. (2002) 8 SCC 87 Conflicting civil and criminal decisions not generally relevant except for sentence or damages. Formed the basis for holding that criminal court must respect civil decree regarding the cheque’s character.
M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras AIR 1954 SC 397 Priority of criminal proceedings; possibility of conflicting findings envisaged by law. Quoted to show that no hard-and-fast rule exists but highlighted limited relevance of conflicting findings.
Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra (2009) 13 SCC 729 Clarified that Karam Chand was overruled; civil findings not automatically binding. Referenced to chart evolution of law on interplay between jurisdictions.
Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414 No embargo on civil courts considering evidence from criminal proceedings. Relied upon to demonstrate fluidity between civil and criminal fora.
Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370 (Constitution Bench) Different standards of proof in civil and criminal cases; one finding not binding on the other. Cited extensively; nevertheless, court emphasized that Premshanker carved out exceptions for sentence and damages.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised the parallel tracks of litigation and found it “concerning” that both civil and criminal remedies were pursued on exactly the same cheque. It emphasized:

  1. The civil court’s decree explicitly categorised the cheque as a “security cheque,” negating the existence of a legally enforceable debt—a prerequisite for Section 138 liability.
  2. Applying the ratio in K.G. Premshanker, the Court held that, where sentence and damages are in issue, criminal courts must give way to prior civil determinations.
  3. Although later precedents (e.g., Vishnu Dutt Sharma, Iqbal Singh Marwah) stress that findings are not automatically binding, the Court distinguished the present case because both sentence (imprisonment) and damages (compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs) had been imposed, squarely attracting the Premshanker exception.
  4. Consequently, sustaining the conviction would conflict with the civil decree and violate the statutory requirement of a subsisting debt. The criminal proceedings were therefore declared “unsustainable in law.”

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE QUASHED.

All criminal proceedings arising from CC No. 51 of 2003 stand set aside, and the compensation amount is to be returned to the appellant forthwith. The decision underscores that, in circumstances where a civil decree conclusively declares a cheque to be only security—thereby negating a legally enforceable debt—a subsequent or concurrent prosecution under Section 138 N.I. Act cannot be maintained. The ruling is confined to cases involving overlapping civil findings on sentence or damages and does not create a blanket bar on simultaneous civil and criminal actions in all cheque-dishonour disputes.

Show all summary ...

2024 INSC 260 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO………………OF 2024

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9778/2018) PREM RAJ … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

POONAMMA MENON & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

Leave granted.

2. Appellant herein challenges judgment and order dated 23rdJanuary, 2018 passed in Crl.R.P. No.1111 of 20111, whereby the High Court of Kerala allowed, only in part, his Revision Petition against the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Thrissur,2dated 11thJanuary, 2011, in Criminal Appeal No.673 of 2007, which, in turn, upheld his conviction, as handed down by the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate3vide order dated 14thAugust,

1 'Impugned Judgment'

2 'Lower Appellate Court'

3 'Trial Court'

1

2007 in CC No.51 of 2003, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.4

3. The sole issue that we are required to consider is, whether, a criminal proceeding can be initiated and the accused therein held guilty with natural consequences thereof to follow, in connection with a transaction, in respect of which a decree by a competent Court of civil jurisdiction, already stands passed.

4. The facts necessary to put into perspective the issue in the present appeal are:-

4.1 The Appellant borrowed Rs.2,00,000/- from the Complainant, K.P.B Menon "Sreyes," with the promise that he would repay it on demand.

4.2 On receipt of such demand, he issued a cheque dated 30thJune, 2002 for the said amount from the South Indian Bank, encashment thereof was to be through Canara Bank, Irinjalakuda Branch, to which the cheque was sent through the post with a covering letter dated 24th September, 2002.

4.3 It was dishonoured due to insufficient funds and 'payments stopped by drawer'. The Complainant came to know of such dishonour and issued a notice of demand dated 22ndDecember, 2002. Accounting for no action on the part of the appellant, the complaint, the subject matter of the instant proceedings, came to be filed.

4 'N.I. Act'

2

5. Equally, though, the appellant (accused) had filed Original Suit No.1338 of 2002. The five parties impleaded as defendants were, (i) K.P. Bhaskara Menon; (ii) K.P. Vipinendra Kumar5; (iii) Praveen Menon; (iv) The Manager South Indian Bank Limited Kathikudam, Via Koratty, Trichur; and (v) N.T. Raghunandanan. The prayers made therein were to, (a) declare cheque No.386543 of the South Indian Bank Limited, Kathikudam, as a security cheque; (b) issue mandatory injunction directing the 1stdefendant to return the said cheque; and (c) issue a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants 1 to 4 named hereinabove from taking any steps to encash the said cheque.

5.1 The Additional District Munsif, Irinjalakuda, decreed the Suit on 11thApril, 2003 in favour of the plaintiff (accused). The Suit in respect of defendant No.4, namely the Manager, South Indian Bank, was dismissed and the Suit was wholly decreed against the remaining defendants.

5.2 Defendant No.1 filed an appeal before the Additional Subordinate Judge, Irinjalakuda in C.M.A.No.6/2006. In its judgment dated 30th January, 2007, the Court observed that "The lower court correctly analysed the facts and arrived at the right conclusion. I find no reason to interfere the order of the lower court. Hence I dismissed this appeal."

5 2nddefendant

3

6. Therefore, it appears from the record that the very same cheque was in issue before the Civil Court and also the Court seized of the Section 138 N.I. Act complaint.

The conclusions drawn by the Courts below, subject matter of the instant lis, are as under:

6.1 The Trial Court convicted the appellant herein to undergo simple imprisonment for one year as well as pay compensation of Rs.2 lakhs in default whereof, he was to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months. The determination of the issues, i.e., whether the decree passed by the Munsif Court would be binding on it, is of note. It was observed that a Court exercising jurisdiction on the criminal side is not subordinate to the Civil Court. Further, it was held "That order was an ex-parte order as far as criminal complaint is concerned the order of injunction issued cannot be granted and the hands of the criminal court cannot be fettered by the civil court".

6.2 The First Appellate Court framed primarily one point for consideration - whether the cheque was issued against a legally enforceable debt, thereby attracting the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. This point was held against the appellant and therefore, the conviction handed down by the Court below, accordingly confirmed.

4

7. The High Court, in revision, observed that no perversity could be indicated in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court. The same was dismissed.

8. We find the manner in which this matter has travelled up to this Court to be quite concerning. We fail to understand as to how a civil as well as criminal course could be adopted by the parties involved, in respect of the very same issue and transaction, in these peculiar facts and circumstances.

9. In advancing his submissions, Mr. K. Parameshwar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, placed reliance on certain authorities of this Court. In M/s. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.6, this Court observed that:

"…….It is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true."

In K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police & Anr7., a Bench of three learned Judges observed that, following the M.S. Sheriff vs. State of Madras8,

no straight-jacket formula could be laid down and conflicting decisions of civil and criminal Courts would not be a relevant consideration except for the limited purpose of sentence or damages.

6 (1970) 3 SCC 6 94

7 (2002) 8 SCC 87

8 AIR 1954 SC 397

5

10. We notice that this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra (Smt.)9,

had observed as under:

"26. It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this Court in Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India (1970) 3 SCC 694, wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil court will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled therein…"

This Court in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja10 considered a numerous precedents, including Premshanker (supra) and Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra), to opine that there is no embargo for a civil court to consider the evidence led in the criminal proceedings.

The issue has been laid to rest by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah11 :

"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence, while in a criminal case, the entire burden lies on the prosecution, and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. While examining a similar contention in an appeal against an order directing filing of a complaint under Section 476 of the old Code, the following observations made by a Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [1954 SCR 1144: AIR 1954 SC 397: 1954 Cri LJ 1019] give a complete answer to the problem posed: (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16)

"15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings, we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on

9 (2009 ) 13 SCC 729

10 (2021) 1 SCC 414

11 (2005) 4 SCC 370

6

this point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.

16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.

This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished."

(Emphasis Supplied)

11. The position as per Premshanker (supra) is that sentence and damages would be excluded from the conflict of decisions in civil and criminal jurisdictions of the Courts. Therefore, in the present case, considering that the Court in criminal jurisdiction has imposed both sentence and damages, the ratio of the above-referred decision dictates that the Court in criminal jurisdiction would be bound by the civil Court having declared the cheque, the subject matter of dispute, to be only for the purposes of security.

12. In that view of the matter, the criminal proceedings resulting from the cheque being returned unrealised due to the closure of the account would be

7

unsustainable in law and, therefore, are to be quashed and set aside. Resultantly, the damages as imposed by the Courts below must be returned to the appellant herein forthwith.

13. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Hence, the judgment and order passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Thrissur, in Criminal Appeal 673 of 2007, which upheld the conviction, as handed down by the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate in CC No. 51 of 2003, which came to affirmed by the High Court of Kerela in Crl.R.P.No.1111 of 2011 is quashed and set aside. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………………….J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

……………………….J.

(ARAVIND KUMAR)

New Delhi

April 02, 2024

8