UPL LIMITED  v. REGISTRAR & ANR.

under Section 24(5) of the Act for seeking reliefs of, inter-alia, damages, injunction and rendition of accounts. At that juncture, the said application had undergone comprehensive trial, final arguments had been heard and a verdict was expected on merits. Nonetheless, the Registrar held the application to be not maintainable, reasoning that such an action could only be initiated following the grant of plant variety registration and not while the application for registration was still under consideration. Consequently, the application was rejected on the premise of being prematurely filed. This rationale of the Registrar is encapsulated in the following excerpt from the

Impugned Order:

"The main crux of the issue involved in this matter is that the Applicant has applied for compound registration of their Okra varieties RAADHIKA (REG/2018/164 H) along with AV 508-Female Parent (REG/20187 /164 P1) and AV 509 Male Parent (REG/2018/164 P2). The Applicant in their 24(5) application has stated that Respondent by commercializing varieties Bindu and NBH-45 is abusing the commercial interest of the applicant's varieties RAADHIKA hybrid and A V 509 male parent and A V 508 female parent.

Before adverting to the main issues involved in this matter. I am first inclined to adjudicate on the issue whether the Section 24(5) application is maintainable before registration of the variety. Section 24(5) is extracted hereunder:-

"24(5) The Registrar shall have power to issue such directions to protect the interests of a breeder against any abusive act committed by any third party during the period between filing of application for registration and decision taken by the Authority on such application."

Thus, Section 24(5) makes it clear that Registrar has power to issue directions to protect the interests of a breeder against any abusive act committed by third party from the date of filing of application to date of registration. So what is protected is only the 'interest' of the breeder and not 'right' of the breeder. The 'interest' of the breeder from the date of filing of application to registration crystallizes into 'right' only on registration. An interest as such is an imperfect or inchoate right which cannot be classified

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as a right. Further unlike Trade Marks and Copyright, only registration under PPVFR Act 2001 confers and clothes the plant breeder with rights which can be enforced through civil and criminal proceedings. Hence, it is also clear that pre-registration a breeder has no right over his variety which can be protected under Section 24(5) of the Act from the date of filing of application to registration only after the registration of the variety. Hence on registration of the variety, in case a registered breeder's variety has been abused from the date of filing of application to date of registration and subsequently also. Then in such case the registered breeder has two options namely with regard to period between date of filing of application to date of grant of registration (date of notification in case of Extant Notified Varieties) the applicant upon registration of the variety can file an application under Section 24(5) of PPV&FR Act, 2001 to Registrar for issuing directions in respect of abuse of his variety and from the date of registration onwards the registered breeder can file a suit for infringement under Section 64 of PPVFR Act, 2001.

If a direction is passed against a third party under Section 24(5) of PPVFR Act, 2001 during the pendency of an application no right accrues to the applicant breeder till registration then subsequently after the passing of the direction and before registration the application is rejected by opposition or otherwise or abandoned or closed then the third party would be severely prejudiced. Hence, Section 24(5) could be enforced by applicant breeder only on registration of the variety with respect to period between date of filing of application and date of grant of certificate of registration.

I have no hesitation to hold that a petition under Section 24(5) can be maintainable only upon registration of a variety and of course it may be with reference to the period from date of filing of application to the date of grant of certificate of registration but the application under Section 24(5) can be filed as well as enforced only upon the registration of the variety. This is because of the reason that legally an interest of a breeder cannot be enforced only a right can be enforced. Once the breeder obtains the right then he can enforce also the interest which has crystallised into the right under the Act.

Based on my aforesaid reasoning, I am of the firm view that an application under Section 24(5) can be filed only upon the registration of the variety which is the subject matter of this application and accordingly the Applicant has the liberty to file the same upon registration of the varieties which are the subject matter of this application. Accordingly, at this stage the instant application under Section 24(5) cannot be entertained. Hence, the application is disposed of as the same has been filed pre- maturely before registration."

[Emphasis Supplied]

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3. Taking note of the aforenoted understanding of the Registrar, on 18^th July, 2023, after hearing the counsel for parties, the Court passed a detailed order and directed as follows:

"8. In the opinion of the Court, appearance of the Registrar would be required in this matter. Accordingly, Mr. Harish Vaidyanathan, ld. CGSC is requested to accept notice on behalf of the Registrar who shall place its stand on record as to whether Section 24(5) application would be maintainable prior to the registration.

9. Considering the provisions of Section 24(5) as also the fact that since the matter would require detailed hearing, Respondent No.2 is directed to place its accounts of sale of the impugned variety, namely, 'BINDU' before this Court in a sealed cover. However, it is clarified that the same would be without prejudice to the rights of Respondent No.2 and shall be subject to the outcome of the present appeal. Let the needful be done within four weeks.

10. Also, there appears to be some confusion in view of the fact that certain reliefs were given up by the Appellant before the Registrar. The Appellant is directed to place on record, all the versions of the prayers in the application which were filed before the Registrar along with specific dates when they were filed, within four weeks."

4. The parties have substantially complied with the aforenoted directions. Although no written response has been filed by the office of the Registrar, Mr. Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, CGSC representing the Registrar, states that their perspective on the interpretation of Section 24(5) of the Act and maintainability of an application prior to registration, has been articulated in the pleadings filed by the Registrar before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals No. 19653-19654/2017. A copy thereof has been handed over across the Board for the Court's perusal. Respondent No. 2 has, in a sealed cover, filed details of sales of the impugned variety. Additionally, the Appellant has filed additional documents placing on record the pleadings outlining the amended/ revised prayers made in the application filed before the Registrar.

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5. In the above background, the Court has heard the counsel for the parties. At the outset, we must address the issue as to whether an application under Section 24(5) of the Act could have been rejected by the Registrar on the ground that it was premature as there was no registration of the plant variety. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the relevant provision is reproduced hereinbelow:

"24. Issue of certificate of registration.—

(5) The Registrar shall have power to issue such directions to protect the interests of a breeder against any abusive act committed by any third party during the period between filing of application for registration and decision taken by the Authority on such application."

6. In the opinion of the Court, a plain reading of the provision and the expression "during the period between filing of application for registration and decision taken by the Authority on such application", explicitly provides that Section 24(5) of the Act vests the Registrar with the power to issue directions during the period between filing of an application for registration and the rendering a decision. Thus, the view taken by the Registrar in the present case is ex facie contrary to the mandate of the statute. Acknowledging this discrepancy, the Registrar has endeavoured to correct their previously flawed interpretation. Mr. Vaidyanathan, on instructions emphasises that the stance articulated in the Impugned Order is erroneous, and that the correct interpretation of the provision has been clearly delineated in the pleadings submitted before the Supreme Court. These submissions underscore a departure from the rationale that supported the Impugned Order. Relevant excerpts thereof are reproduced as under:

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"5. GROUNDS:

…XXX… …XXX… …XXX… D. That the Hon'ble High court has erred in declaring section 24 (5) of the PPV&FR Act, void without appreciating the object and scheme of the Act. It is submitted that Act is enacted provide for the establishment of an M 201 99 effective system for protection of plant varieties, the rights of farmers and plant breeders and to encourage the development of new varieties of plants. The provision protects the interest of the breeder against abusive acts of third parties. It is further submitted that if the said protection was not present, any person could steal the technology of a breeder, market /sell the same without getting the same registered under the PPV and FR Act.

E. That the scope and ambit of the power under section 24 (5) must be gathered from the other provisions of the Act and the power is limited for securing the interest of the applicant only during the period commencing from the application till the final decision on the application, which is an interim measure. It is further submitted that principles of grant of interim measures are well established and before passing any order the registrar would take into account the balance of inconvenience, the possibility of abuse and the capability of restoring the interests of the applicant if the application is finally granted. The order passed by the Registrar is always subject to judicial review.

..xx.. ..xx.. ..xx..

J. That the Hon'ble High court has erred in declaring section 24 void without appreciating that Article 13 of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. 1991 (UPOV) which states that each contracting party shall provide measures designed to safeguard the interests of the breeder during the period between the filing or the publication of the application for the grant of breeder's right and the grant of that right. It is submitted that there is no mandatory requirement that a 'product has to be registered with the PPV authorities for same to be sold. The section was adopted from UPOV conventions situations. Κ. That once the interest is crystallized into a right, an order for compensation can be made which is appealable under section 5.6 (1) (e) of PPV&FR 'Act, 2001 before the Plant Varieties Protection Appellate Tribunal (PVPAT)."

7. Considering the above, the Court concludes that the Registrar

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overstepped their jurisdiction by adopting an interpretation of the provision that is not only discordant with its explicit language but also diverges from the Department's own interpretation of the said provision. Such a misinterpretation represents a clear failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested by the statute, rendering the Registrar's decision to be fundamentally flawed. Accordingly, the order is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

8. We must now turn to address the concerns raised by Mr. Chetan Lokur, counsel for Respondent No. 2, regarding the enforceability of Section 24(5) of the Act. This provision was held to be ultra vires by the Division Bench of this Court in 'Prabhat Agri Biotech v. Registrar of Plant Varieties'¹. However, this declaration has subsequently been stayed by the Supreme Court through order dated 31^stJuly, 2023 in 'Pioneer Overseas Corp. v. Kaveri Seed Co. Ltd.'². Therefore, the question emerges as to the effect of the Supreme Court's stay on the High Court's declaration of the provision as ultra vires.

9. Mr. Lokur has vigorously contended that the stay granted by the Supreme Court does not nullify the effect of the Division Bench's judgment concerning the declaration of Section 24(5) of the Act as ultra vires the Constitution of India. This argument posits that the Supreme Court's stay merely suspends the execution or enforcement of the Division Bench's decision without erasing its findings or reasoning. To support this argument, Mr. Lokur draws upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in

'Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust

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Association CSI CINOD Secretariat, Madras'³, to elucidate on the legal implications and effect of a stay order:

""10. In the instant case, the proceedings before the Board under Sections 15 and 16 of the Act had been terminated by order of the Board dated April 26, 1990 whereby the Board, upon consideration of the facts and material before it, found that the appellant-company had become economically and commercially non-viable due to its huge accumulated losses and liabilities and should be wound up. The appeal filed by the appellant-company under Section 25 of the Act against said order of the Board was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by order dated January 7, 1991. As a result of these orders, no proceedings under the Act were pending either before the Board or before the Appellate Authority on February 21, 1991 when the Delhi High Court passed the interim order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991. The said stay order of the High Court cannot have the effect of reviving the proceedings which had been disposed of by the Appellate Authority by its order dated January 7, 1991. While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This means that if an order passed by the Appellate Authority is quashed and the matter is remanded, the result would be that the appeal which had been disposed of by the said order of the Appellate Authority would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the Appellate Authority after the quashing of the order of the Appellate Authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority because in spite of the said order, the order of the Appellate Authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the passing of the interim order dated February 21, 1991 by the Delhi High Court staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991 does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated January 7, 1991 and it cannot be said that after February 21, 1991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the Appellate Authority. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that any proceedings under the Act were pending before the Board or the

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Appellate Authority on the date of the passing of the order dated August 14, 1991 by the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court for winding up of the company or on November 6, 1991 when the Division Bench passed the order dismissing O.S.A. No. 16 of 1991 filed by the appellant-company against the order of the learned Single Judge dated August 14, 1991. Section 22(1) of the Act could not, therefore, be invoked and there was no impediment in the High Court dealing with the winding up petition filed by the respondents. This is the only question that has been canvassed in Civil Appeal No. 126 of 1992, directed against the order for winding up of the appellant-company. The said appeal, therefore, fails and is liable to be dismissed."

[Emphasis Supplied]

10. Mr. Lokur further submits that the aforenoted judgment has been followed by several High Courts. Specifically, he relies on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in 'CCE v. Space Telelink Ltd.'⁴, wherein it was held that an order keeping the judgment of a lower court/ authority in abeyance would not deface the reasoning of the stayed decision. Further, he has also relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in 'Niranjan Chatterjee & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.'⁵, wherein the declaration of ultra vires was held to still have precedential value in spite of a stay on its operation by the Supreme Court.

11. In view of the aforenoted judgments, Mr. Lokur contends that the Division Bench judgment cannot be said to be wiped out of existence merely on account of its stay by the Supreme Court. He argues that the reasoning set forth by the Division Bench would still apply to the extent that Section 24(5) of the Act continues to be unconstitutional and therefore has no legal effect. Accordingly, he submits that, notwithstanding the view taken by the Registrar as noted above, there is no ground to interfere with the Impugned Order.

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12. The Court has carefully considered Mr. Lokur's arguments but does not find them compelling. It is important to recognise that the impact of an interim stay varies depending on the specific circumstances and context in which it is granted. The nature of the dispute, whether it involves individual parties or raises questions of wider legal or constitutional significance, would be a pertinent factor for judicial scrutiny in understanding the implications of any stay granted. The rationale behind imposing a stay is as varied as the disputes themselves, and is often tailored meticulously to fit the unique circumstances of each case. It is this specificity that resists a blanket approach to interpreting the effects of a stay, i.e., there cannot be a one-size- fits-all approach to understanding the impact of a stay order. Hence, the Court emphasises the need for a nuanced case-by-case examination when assessing the ramifications of a stay order. Each order of stay must be considered on its own merits, with careful consideration of the unique aspects of the case and the complexities of the legal issues addressed.

13. In the matter at hand, the Division Bench's decision in Prabhat Agri Biotech (supra) specifically addressed the constitutional validity of Section 24(5) of the Act, stemming from writ petitions that questioned the vires of the provision. The crux of the Division Bench's ruling is encapsulated in extracted portion of the judgment:

"40. … Section 24 (5) of the Protection of Plant Varieties & Farmers' Rights Act as cast at present may undoubtedly be an adequate remedy to prevent abusive practices (assuming that what is abusive can be defined over a period of time); yet the danger of abuse of the provision itself and the attendant (likely) long term injury to innocent breeders, farmers and those in the business of development of hybrids and plant varieties far outweighs its benefits, in view of the unguided nature of the power, which is destructive of the rule of law and contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Section 24(5) of the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001, is, therefore, declared void. …"

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14. Subsequently, the Supreme Court intervened, issuing a stay on the operation of this judgment through its decision in Pioneer Overseas (supra), directing as under:

"UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

Let the matter be listed on 22nd November, 2017, for final disposal.

Pleadings shall be completed from all spectrum by that time.

In the meantime, there shall be stay of the operation of the judgment dated 2nd December, 2016, passed by the High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition (C) Nos.250 of 2009 and 7102 of 2011."

[Emphasis Supplied]

15. We thus note that the Division Bench specifically tackled the constitutionality of Section 24(5) of the Act, and through their judgment held the provision to be unconstitutional. This precise determination has been put on hold by the Supreme Court's interim stay order, which was issued without any specified conditions or limitations. The essence of this judicial interlude lies in the Supreme Court's intention to suspend the effect and operation of the Division Bench's declaration of unconstitutionality, pending a comprehensive and final resolution on the matter. In light of this, the most logical interpretation of the Supreme Court's interim order is to view it as a temporary stay on the Division Bench's declaration, thereby maintaining the status quo of Section 24(5) until the Supreme Court provides a conclusive judgment. Entertaining Mr. Lokur's argument regarding the continued precedential influence of the Division Bench's judgment in spite of the stay, would essentially negate the Supreme Court's

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intent behind issuing the stay. Such a perspective would undermine the stay's practical effect, suggesting that the Supreme Court's interim measure is without substantive legal consequence.

16. In light of the above, it would also be apposite to consider the precedents cited by Mr. Lokur in support of his contention. Firstly, it is imperative for us to appreciate the holding of the Supreme Court in

Chamundi Mopeds (supra) within the context in which it was delivered. In the said judgment, the Court held that the High Court's stay order would not have the effect of reviving the proceedings before the Appellate Authority by erasing the Appellate Authority's direction. Accordingly, the Court drew a distinction between the staying and quashing of an order to hold that a stay order cannot be relied upon to deny the existence of the stayed decision. However, the Supreme Court simultaneously noted that while the stay order does not wipe the lower court/ authority's decision out of existence, it does halt the operational consequences of the same. Accordingly, in the instant case, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Chamundi Mopeds (supra) would mean that the underlying rationale and analysis of the Division Bench continue to remain part of the legal discourse and may influence future deliberations and decisions, however, for the period that the stay is effective, the application of the Division Bench's ruling on Section 24(5) being ultra vires has been kept on hold, thereby allowing the provision to remain in force and applicable as per the statute's original intent.

17. The remaining two cases cited by Mr. Lokur are similarly of no avail. In CCE (supra), the Division Bench of this Court relied upon Chamundi Mopeds (supra) to hold that an interim stay does not nullify the stayed

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decision. However, it must be noted that the Court therein independently arrived at the conclusion to align with the reasoning of the stayed decision, but at no point rendered a finding that the stayed decision would still have the binding effect of a precedent. This differs from the case of Niranjan Chatterjee (supra), wherein the High Court of Calcutta did, in fact, hold that the stayed decision would continue to have precedential value. However, the factual backdrop of the said decision differs significantly from the present case, as the stay directed by the Supreme Court therein attached specific conditions for maintenance of status quo as well as other directions, which ultimately guided the Court's understanding of the effect such a stay would have. In the present case, as evident from the above extracted stay order of the Supreme Court in Pioneer Overseas (supra), there are no such conditions mentioned. Consequently, it would follow that the operation of the Division Bench's declaration of Section 24(5) of the Act as being ultra vires shall remain on hold and the said provision would continue to operate as it existed prior to the Division Bench's judgment, until a final determination is made by the Supreme Court. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that in the instant case, the Appellant's application under Section 24(5) of the Act was filed subsequent to the Supreme Court's stay, yet was entertained, indicating that the Registrar's position on this issue is similarly aligned with the aforenoted rationale of the Court as to the persisting validity of the provision.

18. The Court also finds merit in the Appellant's reliance on Virbhadra Singh & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors.⁶, wherein this Court had considered and rejected a similar argument as the one raised by

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Mr. Lokur, to the following effect:

"199. So far as the submission of the learned Advocate General Mr. Dogra premised on the decision of the Guahati High Court in Navendra Kumar (supra) is concerned, I am of the view that since the said decision has been stayed by the Supreme Court, the said decision cannot be pressed into service. Reliance placed by Mr. Dogra on Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. (supra) is of no avail. In that case, the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) had ordered the winding up of the appellant company. The Appellate Authority had upheld it. The High Court in writ jurisdiction had stayed the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority. The Supreme Court examined the effect of the said stay order in the context, that the jurisdictional High Court, in the mean time, directed winding up of the appellant and the appeal against the winding up order was also dismissed. The Supreme Court, in this context held that mere stay of the order of the Appellate Authority by the High Court did not tantamount to revival of the appeal before the Appellate Authority against the order of the BIFR directing winding up of the Appellant company. Only upon quashing of the order of the Appellate Authority, would the appeal revive - and then it could be said that the bar under Section 22 of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 would apply. …

…xxx… …xxx… …xxx…

200. The situation in the present case is that the decision of the Guahati High Court made a declaration with regard to the legal status of CBI. That declaration has been stayed. Thus, the legal status of the CBI remains unaffected by the said judgment. Stay of the said judgment does not mean that the proceedings before the Guahati High Court stand revived, or that the said issue is still at large before the said High Court. No doubt, the judgment of the Guahati High Court is not set aside, but it is of no effect. It cannot be relied upon as an authoritative pronouncement by the said High Court. It cannot be followed, or pressed into service as a precedent."

[Emphasis Supplied]

19. Therefore, the Court remains unconvinced by this argument raised on behalf of Respondent No. 2, and accordingly finds it apposite to draw from the aforenoted reasoning in Virbhadra Singh (supra) to hold that the declaration of Section 24(5) of the Act as ultra vires, while not wiped from existence, would still have no legally binding effect on this Court in view of the stay granted by the Supreme Court. In other words, Section 24(5) of the Act has not been erased from the statute, and the argument raised by Mr. 6 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7747

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Lokur to that effect is rejected.

20. This brings us to the final issue for consideration, which pertains to the nature of relief to be considered by the Registrar if the application were to be restored. On this issue, Mr. Lokur has drawn the attention of this Court to the communication written by the Appellant to the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Authority in response to the defects raised at the time of filing the application. It would be appropriate to extract the entire communication for the sake of clarity:

"To, The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Authority New Delhi -110012

28.06.2021

In Re: Application under 24(5) of PPV & FR Act, 2001 by UPL Ltd. in respect of candidate hybrid Raadhika- Okra variety- REG/2018/164H

Sub: Curing of Defects Sir I Madam,

We are the advocates for the Applicant in the aforesaid S.24(5) application. In respect of the defects raised we submit the following:-

1. Defect 1:- Authorisation form in Form PV-1 is being filed. You may kindly substitute the same for the vakalatnama already filed on record.

2. Defect 2:-

(a) It is humbly submitted that the relief sought for in paragraph 18(a), 18(b) and 18(c) are well within the scope of S.24(5). The statute itself contains no such exclusion and there are no binding judicial precedents limiting the Ld. Registrar's powers to prevent the grant of such relief. Even the Hon'ble Delhi High Court judgment in W.P.(C) 250 of2009 has been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of lndia.

Nevertheless, at the present instance and considering the objection raised, without prejudice to our rights and contentions in this respect, and fully reserving the same and craving leave to assert such prayer for injunctive reliefs at an appropriate time or in future proceedings, we submit that the Applicant is not pressing said prayers for injunctive reliefs for the present.

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(b) As regards the ex-parte nature of relief in paragraph 19, it is submitted that the scope of S.24(5) does not in any manner prohibit the grant of ex- parte relief and that the Authority has the power to grant such relief. However, at the present instance and in light of the objection raised, the prayer is not pressed even though it is the Applicant's submission that the same is maintainable in law and under S.24(5). The waiver of ex-parte relief is maybe deemed to be without prejudice to the Applicant's rights and contentions in law and in equity. Instead, the Applicant is only pressing for interim orders, after notice.

Accordingly, modified prayer at paragraphs 18, 19 is being filed herewith. You may kindly substitute the same for the prayer pages already filed on record.

3. Defect 3:-

Noted. And amended prayer is being filed herewith. Accordingly, I state that all defects have been cured and you may kindly process the matter at the earliest since there is urgency in the matter. Yours Truly

Adarsh Ramanujan/ Lzafeer Ahmad B F

Advocates for Applicant"

[Emphasis Supplied]

21. Mr. Lokur contends that while removing the aforenoted Defect No. 2, the Appellant has given up the reliefs sought in Paragraphs No. 18 (a), (b) and (c) of the application and therefore cannot reagitate the same in appeal. However, in the opinion of the Court, this is a misreading of the

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"d. Pass any other order as the Ld. Registrar deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case"

22. In view of the above, it would be an erroneous construction to hold that the Appellant, in addition to foregoing their prayers for injunctive reliefs, had also given up their prayers for damages and costs as stated in Paragraphs No. 18(a) and 18(c). This would effectively render the application to be infructuous.

23. Considering the foregoing reasons and analysis, the Court is of the opinion that the present appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the following directions are issued:

23.1. Impugned Order dated 25^thJuly, 2022 is set aside.

23.2. The Appellant's application under Section 24(5) of the Act is restored to its original number. Registrar shall proceed to decide the same on its own merits in accordance with law in respect of reliefs sought at Paragraphs No. 18(a), 18(c) and 19 of the modified prayers enclosed with the covering letter of the Appellant dated 28^thJune, 2021.

23.3. The information disclosed in sealed cover by Respondent No. 2 in terms of this Court's directions shall be transmitted to the Registrar for appropriate consideration at the time of deciding the Appellant's restored application.

24. With the above directions, the appeal is disposed of, along with pending applications.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

FEBRUARY 22, 2024/ab

(corrected and released on 07^th March, 2024)

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