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Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Sep 4, 2023
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were tried by the Judicial Magistrate on a complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”). They were convicted and directed to pay the cheque amount of Rs 2,52,36,985 with 9% interest per annum. Upon appeal, the Sessions Court—invoking Section 148 NI Act—suspended the sentence under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) on the condition that the appellants deposit 20% of the compensation amount. The High Court affirmed that order, relying on Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 11 SCC 341. The present Supreme Court judgment reviews the legality of those conditional suspension orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appellate court, when entertaining a prayer for suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC in a conviction under Section 138 NI Act, is mandatorily required to direct the accused to deposit a minimum of 20% of the fine/compensation under Section 148 NI Act.
  2. Whether the Sessions Court and the High Court erred in treating the deposit requirement as an absolute rule, thereby failing to consider possible exceptions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The lower courts misunderstood Section 148 NI Act as imposing an inflexible obligation to deposit 20%, without recognising the possibility of exceptions.
  • Counsel informed the Supreme Court that the appellants have, in fact, deposited 20% of the compensation, but submitted that this issue requires examination by the High Court.

Respondent (Original Complainant)'s Arguments

  • No plea for dispensing with the 20% deposit had been made before the Sessions Court or the High Court; therefore, those courts had no reason to consider an exception.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi, (2019) 11 SCC 341 Purposive interpretation of Section 148 NI Act: although the word “may” is used, deposit of at least 20% is generally the rule; departure is permissible for special reasons. The High Court read the decision as making the 20% deposit mandatory; the Supreme Court clarified that Surinder Singh Deswal allows exceptions where imposing the deposit would be unjust or deprive the right of appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined paragraph 8 of Surinder Singh Deswal and concluded that the earlier decision endorses a purposive—rather than literal—reading of Section 148 NI Act. The provision establishes a general rule that the appellate court should direct a deposit of at least 20% of the compensation or fine, but also recognises exceptional situations where such a condition would be unjust or would effectively deny the right of appeal. In such instances, the appellate court must record specific reasons for waiving or modifying the deposit.

Both the Sessions Court and the High Court proceeded on the mistaken premise that the 20% deposit requirement is absolute. The Supreme Court rejected the respondent’s submission that an explicit plea for exemption is a prerequisite, stating that an application under Section 389 CrPC inherently seeks unconditional suspension, placing the onus on the appellate court to assess whether an exception applies.

Consequently, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts failed to exercise the discretion contemplated by Section 148 NI Act and Surinder Singh Deswal. Their orders were therefore set aside.

Holding and Implications

Appeals ALLOWED; impugned High Court orders set aside.

The revision petitions are restored to the High Court, which must:

  • Ascertain whether the appellants have already deposited 20% of the compensation.
  • Re-examine the suspension of sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s clarification that the 20% deposit is generally required but dispensable in exceptional cases, with reasons recorded.

The interim Supreme Court order suspending the sentence will remain operative until the High Court disposes of the revision petitions. The decision clarifies that Section 148 NI Act confers a discretionary, though generally obligatory, power rather than an immutable mandate, but it sets no new precedent beyond reinforcing the interpretative guidance of Surinder Singh Deswal.

Show all summary ...

Abhay S. Oka, J.— Leave granted. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

2. The appellants in these two appeals were the accused before the learned Judicial Magistrate who tried them on a complaint filed by Respondent 1 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “the NI Act”). The learned Magistrate convicted the appellants and directed them to pay the cheque amount of Rs 2,52,36,985 with interest thereon @ 9% p.a.

3. An appeal was preferred by the appellants before the Sessions Court. Relying upon Section 148 NI Act, the Sessions Court granted relief under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) subject to condition of the appellants depositing 20% of the amount of compensation. Vide the impugned judgment 2022 SCC OnLine MP 5852 2022 SCC OnLine MP 5853, the High Court has confirmed the order of the Sessions Court.

4. The High Court relied upon the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 11 SCC 341, (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 461, (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 765. The High Court proceeded on the footing that, as this Court has interpreted the word “may” appearing in Section 148 as “shall”, the relief of suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC can be granted only by directing the accused to deposit minimum of 20% of the compensation/fine amount.

5. Para 8 of the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal (2019) 11 SCC 341, (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 461, (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 765 reads thus : (SCC p. 350)

“8. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that even considering the language used in Section 148 NI Act as amended, the appellate court “may” order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court and the word used is not “shall” and therefore the discretion is vested with the first appellate court to direct the appellant-accused to deposit such sum, and the appellate court has construed it as mandatory, which according to the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants would be contrary to the provisions of Section 148 NI Act as amended is concerned, considering the amended Section 148 NI Act as a whole to be read with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Section 148 NI Act, though it is true that in the amended Section 148 NI Act, the word used is “may”, it is generally to be construed as a “rule” or “shall” and not to direct to deposit by the appellate court is an exception for which special reasons are to be assigned. Therefore amended Section 148 NI Act confers power upon the appellate court to pass an order pending appeal to direct the appellant-accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation either on an application filed by the original complainant or even on the application filed by the appellant-accused under Section 389 CrPC to suspend the sentence. The aforesaid is required to be construed considering the fact that as per the amended Section 148 NI Act, a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court is directed to be deposited and that such amount is to be deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the appellate court for sufficient cause shown by the appellant. Therefore, if amended Section 148 NI Act is purposively interpreted in such a manner it would serve the Objects and Reasons of not only amendment in Section 148 NI Act, but also Section 138 NI Act. The Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended from time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence of the dishonour of cheques. So as to see that due to delay tactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of the appeals and obtaining stay in the proceedings, an injustice was caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in the court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and having observed that such delay has compromised the sanctity of the cheque transactions, Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 NI Act. Therefore, such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 NI Act and also Section 138 NI Act.”
(emphasis supplied)

6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 NI Act. Hence, normally, the appellate court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the appellate court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded.

7. Therefore, when the appellate court considers the prayer under Section 389 CrPC of an accused who has been convicted for offence under Section 138 NI Act, it is always open for the appellate court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the appellate court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded.

8. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the original complainant is that neither before the Sessions Court nor before the High Court, there was a plea made by the appellants that an exception may be made in these cases and the requirement of deposit or minimum 20% of the amount be dispensed with. He submits that if such a prayer was not made by the appellants, there were no reasons for the courts to consider the said plea.

9. We disagree with the above submission. When an accused applies under Section 389 CrPC for suspension of sentence, he normally applies for grant of relief of suspension of sentence without any condition. Therefore, when a blanket order is sought by the appellants, the court has to consider whether the case falls in exception or not.

10. In these cases, both the Sessions Courts and the High Court have proceeded on the erroneous premise that deposit of minimum 20% amount is an absolute rule which does not accommodate any exception.

11. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants, at this stage, states that the appellants have deposited 20% of the compensation amount. However, this is the matter to be examined by the High Court.

12. In these circumstances, we set aside the impugned orders 2022 SCC OnLine MP 5852 2022 SCC OnLine MP 5853 of the High Court and restore the revision petitions filed by the appellants before the High Court. We direct the parties to appear before the roster Bench of the High Court on 9-10-2023 in the morning to enable the High Court to fix a date for hearing of the revision petitions. As the contesting parties are before the Court, it will not be necessary for the High Court to issue a notice of the date fixed for hearing. The High Court, after hearing the parties, will consider whether 20% of the amount is already deposited or not. If the Court comes to the conclusion that 20% of the amount is not deposited, the Court will re-examine the revision petitions in the light of what we have observed in this judgment. Till the disposal of the restored revision petitions, the interim order 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1204 passed by this Court ordering suspension of sentence will continue to operate.

13. The appeals are allowed in above terms. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.