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BHISHAM LAL VERMA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Factual and Procedural Background
A complaint dated 23 June 2012 was lodged by the Joint Director, State Urban Development Authority, Uttar Pradesh, alleging irregularities in the construction of toilets under the Integrated Low-Cost Sanitation Scheme and embezzlement of public funds. The petitioner, Bhisham Lal Verma (then Project Director/Additional District Magistrate, Rampur), was named as one of the accused. FIR C.C. No. 1280 of 2012 was registered under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The State Government accorded sanction for prosecution on 3 December 2013. A charge-sheet dated 30 April 2015 was filed before the Sessions Judge, Rampur, and cognizance was taken on 12 June 2015; the matter was numbered as Special Case No. 19 of 2016 before the Special Court, Bareilly.
The petitioner thereafter invoked Section 482 CrPC twice:
- First petition (Criminal Misc. Application No. 8465 of 2018): challenged only the sanction order. The Allahabad High Court, by order dated 15 December 2020, disposed of the petition granting liberty to raise the issue of sanction before the Trial Court.
- Second petition (Criminal Misc. Application No. 2014 of 2022): sought to quash the charge-sheet, the cognizance order, and the entire proceedings. The High Court dismissed it on 20 February 2023 as not maintainable, holding that the petitioner could not challenge piecemeal what was already available for challenge during the first petition.
The present Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenged the High Court’s refusal to entertain the second Section 482 application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a second petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is maintainable when the grounds now raised were already available at the time the first Section 482 petition was filed.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- A second Section 482 petition is permissible when it is not a “repeat application on the same facts.”
- Relied on precedent recognising maintainability of subsequent petitions in changed circumstances, including:
- Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Mohan Singh (1975) 3 SCC 706
- Anil Khadkiwala v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 17 SCC 294
- S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2007) 4 SCC 70
- Vinod Kumar, IAS v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 559
- Asserted that principles of res judicata do not bar a fresh invocation of inherent jurisdiction.
Amicus Curiae’s Arguments
- Successive petitions are barred when no new facts arise; Section 482 cannot be used to circumvent the prohibition on review under Section 362 CrPC.
- Distinguished the precedents cited by the petitioner, emphasising that they allowed a second petition only where circumstances had materially changed.
- Relied on authorities warning against “instalment pleas,” including:
- Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437
- Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal (1981) 1 SCC 500
- R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna Sastry (2002) 10 SCC 401
- S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunan, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 94
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Mohan Singh (1975) 3 SCC 706 | A subsequent Section 482 petition is maintainable if filed on changed circumstances and not on identical facts. | Petitioner relied on it; Court held the case actually supports the view that absence of changed circumstances bars a second petition. |
| Anil Khadkiwala v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 17 SCC 294 | Subsequent petition permissible where new facts emerge. | Cited by petitioner; Court found no new facts here, hence precedent did not assist the petitioner. |
| S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2007) 4 SCC 70 | Withdrawal of an earlier petition with liberty does not bar a fresh Section 482 petition; res judicata inapplicable. | Petitioner relied on it; Court noted liberty was not reserved in the first petition to challenge charge-sheet or cognizance, distinguishing this case. |
| Vinod Kumar, IAS v. Union of India (2021 SCC OnLine SC 559) | Earlier dismissal does not absolutely bar a later Section 482 petition if facts justify. | Same distinction drawn – justification absent because facts were unchanged. |
| Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437 | Inherent power can’t be exercised to review or override earlier orders; Section 362 CrPC bar cannot be bypassed. | Supported Court’s conclusion that successive identical petitions are impermissible. |
| Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal (1981) 1 SCC 500 | Inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to do what the Code expressly prohibits. | Relied on to reinforce limits on Section 482 power. |
| R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna Sastry (2002) 10 SCC 401 | Second Section 482 petition not maintainable when based on pre-existing facts and earlier order has attained finality. | Court cited as analogous; applied to hold the second petition barred. |
| S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunan, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 94 | All available pleas should be raised in first Section 482 petition; “instalment pleas” discouraged. | Quoted with approval; forms the core rationale of the ruling. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasised that while there is no absolute bar on filing a second petition under Section 482 CrPC, such a petition is maintainable only when predicated on facts or circumstances that were not in existence or not discoverable at the time of the first petition. Allowing litigants to raise successive, previously available pleas would enable accused persons to “stall the proceedings to suit their own interest,” constituting an abuse of process.
Applying that principle, the Court noted that the charge-sheet and the cognizance order had existed well before the petitioner’s first Section 482 application in 2018, yet he chose to challenge only the sanction order. Because no new circumstance arose after the High Court’s 2020 order, the petitioner lacked a legitimate basis for a second application aimed at quashing the charge-sheet and cognizance. Consequently, the Allahabad High Court correctly dismissed the second petition as non-maintainable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed.
Implications: The decision confirms that successive applications under Section 482 CrPC are impermissible when they seek relief based on grounds that were available at the time of an earlier petition. While the Court acknowledged that a categorical ban would be inappropriate, it reinforced a fact-sensitive limitation designed to curb abuse of the inherent jurisdiction. No broader doctrinal shift was announced, but the ruling underscores the requirement that all available grievances should be consolidated in the first Section 482 petition to avoid piecemeal litigation.
2023 INSC 955
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Crl.) No. 7976 OF 2023 Bhisham Lal Verma … Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh and another … Respondents
O R D E R
SANJAY KUMAR, J
1. 'Is a second petition maintainable under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on grounds that were available for challenge even at the time of filing of the first petition thereunder?'
2. This is the short question that arises for consideration.
3. As the issue turned on the very maintainability of the case, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel, was requested to assist the Court and, with his usual graciousness, he agreed to do so.
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4. We may first note the relevant facts: Complaint dated 23.06.2012 was filed by the Joint Director, State Urban Development Authority, Uttar Pradesh, before the Station House Officer, Police Station Kotwali, Rampur, alleging irregularities in the construction of toilets under the Integrated Low Cost Sanitation Scheme and embezzlement of public funds by the persons involved. The petitioner herein, being the Project Director/Additional District Magistrate, Rampur, at the relevant time, was also implicated. Thereupon, C.C. No. 1280 of 2012 was registered on the file of Police Station Civil Lines, Rampur, under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC read with Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1988'). The petitioner was amongst the accused named therein.
5. In exercise of power under Section 197 Cr.P.C. and Section 19 of the Act of 1988, by order dated 03.12.2013, the Government of Uttar Pradesh accorded sanction to prosecute the petitioner for the offences alleged under Sections 409, 420, 467 and 471 IPC and Sections 7 and 13 of the Act of 1988 and any other offences relating thereto. Upon completion of the investigation, charge sheet dated 30.04.2015 was laid before the learned Sessions Judge, Rampur. Therein, the petitioner was charged with offences under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and Sections 7 and
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13 of the Act of 1988. By order dated 12.06.2015, the learned Sessions Judge, Rampur, took cognizance. The case was thereafter taken on file by the Special Court at Bareilly as Special Case No. 19 of 2016.
6. Long thereafter, the petitioner filed his first petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C., viz., Criminal Misc. Application No. 8465 of 2018, before the Allahabad High Court. Therein, he chose to challenge only the Government's sanction order dated 03.12.2013. The State opposed the application, pointing out that a challenge to the sanction could be made before the Trial Court. Thereupon, the petitioner's counsel sought liberty to approach the Trial Court by way of an appropriate application challenging the sanction. Accepting that plea, the High Court disposed of the application, vide order dated 15.12.2020, granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the Trial Court and challenge the sanction order. Significantly, at the time of filing of this first petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the charge sheet was very much on record and the learned Sessions Judge, Rampur, had already taken cognizance.
7. However, it was only in the year 2022 that the petitioner felt inspired to file a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., viz., Criminal Misc. Application No. 2014 of 2022. His prayers therein were to quash the charge sheet dated 30.04.2015; the cognizance order dated 12.06.2015;
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and the proceedings in Special Case No. 19 of 2016, insofar as he was concerned. This application was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court, vide order dated 20.02.2023. Therein, the High Court noted that the petitioner had earlier filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 8465 of 2018 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a limited prayer - to quash the sanction order dated 30.12.2013. Holding that it was not open to the petitioner to go on challenging the proceedings one by one and as he had not felt aggrieved by the charge sheet or the order of cognizance when he had filed the first petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court concluded that the subsequent petition challenging the same would not be maintainable and dismissed the application. It is against this order that the petitioner approached this Court by way of the present case.
8. On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, learned senior counsel, would argue that a second petition is maintainable under Section 482 Cr.P.C.. He relied on the judgment of this Court in
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Mohan Singh and others1. Therein, it was held that a subsequent application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, presently Section 482 Cr.P.C, would be maintainable in changed circumstances. It was affirmed that a subsequent application, which is not a
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repeat application squarely on the same facts and circumstances, would be maintainable. To the same effect was the more recent decision of this Court in Anil Khadkiwala vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another2. Earlier, in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and another3, this Court held that when the first petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C was withdrawn with liberty to avail remedies, if any, available in law, the High Court would not be denuded of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on being petitioned again and the principle of res judicata would not stand attracted. Again, in Vinod Kumar, IAS. v. Union of India and others4, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that dismissal of an earlier petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C would not bar filing of a subsequent petition thereunder in case the facts so justify.
9. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned amicus curiae, would however point out that entertainment of the second petition in Mohan Singh (supra) was held permissible as the circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent petition were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier one and that was the distinguishing factor which saved the second petition. He would further point out that, in Simrikhia v. Dolley
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(2019) 17 SCC 294
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Writ Petition No. 255 of 2021, decided on 29.06.2021 = 2021 SCC OnLine SC 559
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Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and another5, this Court cautioned that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be invoked to override the bar of review under Section 362 Cr.P.C. Reference was made to Sooraj Devi vs. Pyare Lal and another6which held that the inherent power of the Court could not be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He also drew our attention to R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna Sastry and others7, wherein a quash petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed on 28.01.1995 and without mentioning the same, another petition was filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a similar prayer. Noting that the second petition was not made on the strength of anything which had developed after 28.01.1995 but only on the facts which subsisted prior to that date, this Court held that the second petition was not maintainable, as the High Court did not have the power to upset the order dated 28.01.1995 which had attained finality.
10. In S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunan8, the Madras High Court observed that a person who invokes Section 482 Cr.P.C. should honestly come before the Court raising all the pleas available to him at that point of
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(1990) 2 SCC 437
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(1981) 1 SCC 500
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(2002) 10 SCC 401
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(2006) 1 MWN (Cri) DCC 1 = 2006 SCC Online Mad 94
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time and he is not supposed to approach the Court with instalment pleas. It was further observed that there may be a change of circumstances during the course of criminal proceedings which would give scope for the person aggrieved to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, but when he is posted with all the facts and circumstances of a case, he cannot withhold part of it for the purpose of filing yet another petition seeking the same relief.
11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr.P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted.
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12. In the case on hand, the filing of the charge sheet and the cognizance thereof by the Court concerned were well before the filing of the first petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., wherein challenge was made only to the sanction order. That being so, the petitioner was not at liberty to again invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to the charge sheet and the cognizance order at a later point of time. The impugned order passed by the Allahabad High Court holding to this effect is, therefore, incontrovertible on all counts and does not warrant interference.
The Special Leave Petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Before parting with the case, we place on record our
appreciation and gratitude to Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned amicus curiae, for his able and scholarly assistance.
………………………..,J
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
………………………..,J
(SANJAY KUMAR)
October 30, 2023 New Delhi.
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