M.P.STATE INDUSTRIES CORP. LTDD. v. DADURAO KHATARKAR & ANR.

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Section 65 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1960') challenging the order passed by the Labour Court, Betul on 29.08.2002 wherein the dispute referred by respondent No.1/workman has been decided. The order was passed by the Labour Court in favour of respondent No.1 declaring his dismissal from service to be illegal, unjustified and directing his reinstatement with full back wages. The respondent No.1/workmen in pursuance to the order passed by the Labour Court on 29.08.2002 submitted his joining on 02.03.1998 but his joining was not accepted and he was not allowed to be reinstated, then he filed a claim before the Labour Court claiming salary w.e.f. 02.03.1998 till 31.12.2001, but the Labour Court rejected his claim. Thereafter, an appeal was preferred by respondent No.1/workman against the said order before the Industrial Court and the Industrial Court vide order dated 15.07.2003 (Annexure-P/1) directed that salary for the period when respondent No.1/workman submitted his joining till his reinstatement, be paid to him. The said order is under challenge in the present writ petition.

3. The impugned order is being assailed by the petitioner/employer mainly on the ground that the petitioner's organization has been closed down w.e.f. 01.02.1999 and order in this regard has been passed by the Office of Labour Commissioner, Bhopal, on 23.01.1999 (Annexure-P/2) and therefore, it is submitted that the order of Industrial Court was illegal because after closure of industry, no wages could be granted to respondent No.1.

4. Shri Dubey submits that at the most, respondent No.1 is entitled to get wages w.e.f. 02.03.1998 to 01.02.1999 because after closure of industry, no wages can be paid to him.

5. Shri Shrivastava on the other hand submits that the order dated 23.01.1999 regarding closure of industry is not applicable for the

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reason that the said order has been passed in respect of 33 employees who were working in petitioner's organization as piecemeal employee. He submits that the petitioner had different organizations in which separate work was being done but closure of one industry does not amount to closure of all industries which were being run by the petitioner/employer. He submits that even otherwise this fact was never placed before the Labour Court and also before the Industrial Court but only after passing of the order in favour of respondent No.1, the petitioner/employer came with a stand by filing this petition and for the first time before this Court, order dated 23.01.1999 has been produced showing that the industry has been closed down w.e.f. 01.02.1999 and therefore, it is submitted that the order passed by the Industrial Court, which is impugned in this petition, cannot be set aside and the petition being without any substance, deserves to be dismissed.

6. Considering the rival submissions made by the counsel for the parties on facts and law both and perusal of record, this Court is of the following opinion:-

(6.1) That in a dispute raised by respondent No.1 under the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960, an order has been passed by the Labour Court on 18.02.1998 wherein the present petitioner/employer has also contested the matter and appeared before the Labour Court and finally the Labour Court had found that misconduct alleged against respondent No.1/workman has not been proved, therefore, his termination was held illegal directing his reinstatement with back wages. (6.2) In pursuance to the order of reinstatement, respondent No.1/workman submitted his joining on 02.03.1998 but that has not been accepted and he was not allowed to be reinstated. Thereafter, he preferred a claim before the Labour Court asking wages w.e.f. 02.03.1998 till

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31.12.2002, but the Labour Court has rejected his claim. Then he preferred an appeal before the Industrial Court and that appeal was registered as C.A.276/MPIR/2002 and decided vide order dated 15.07.2003 (Annexure- P/1) directing respondent No.1 therein to pay back wages w.e.f. 02.03.1998 till the date of accepting his joining i.e. 31.12.2001. Moreover, the order passed by the Labour Court on 18.02.1998 was challenged by the present petitioner/employer by filing an appeal before the Industrial Court and that appeal was registered as Appeal No.123/MPIR/98 and decided vide order dated 05.09.2001 allowing the same in part setting aside the order of back wages but keeping the remaining part of the order intact, meaning thereby the order of reinstatement of respondent No.1/workman was not challenged by the petitioner/employer.

(6.3) Challenging the said order of Industrial Court passed on 15.07.2003, this petition has been filed.

7. Although, the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner is founded mainly on the ground that the order passed by the Industrial Court is unexecutable for the reason that the industry has been closed down w.e.f. 01.02.1999 in pursuance to the order passed by the Labour Commissioner, Bhopal, on 23.01.1999 whereby permission has been granted to retrench 33 piecemeal employees w.e.f. 01.02.1999 considering the-then status of the industry wherein the components of watches which were being assembled in the industry of the petitioner were not available due to short of supply and flow of electric watches in the market and reduce in demand of mechanical watches. But it is not proper for this Court to examine that aspect because in the Industrial Court, nobody appeared on behalf of the petitioner to apprise the Court about the order dated 23.01.1999 and the-then status of company. Even otherwise, as has been pointed out by the counsel for respondent No.1 that the order

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dated 23.01.1999 has been passed in respect of piecemeal employees, does not mean that there is closure of whole industry because the other units, according to him, are still functioning and respondent No.1 had to be accommodated because there was an order of competent Court in his favour. The petitioner neither appeared before the Industrial Court nor contested the matter by placing the order dated 23.01.1999 or any material on record indicating that there was closure of the industry where respondent No.1 was working.

8. Looking to the limited scope of interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, I am of the opinion that interference in the finding given by the Court below, without any cogent material, would be improper. This Court is not sitting in appeal as an appellate authority and it is also not inclined to probe any enquiry to ascertain the existence of the industry where respondent No.1 was working or the fact that he could have been accommodated in other units of the petitioner/employer. Even, there is no material indicating that the other units of petitioner's industry are not functioning and as such, whatever submission is made by the counsel for respondent No.1 vis-a-vis the finding given by the Industrial Court, in my opinion, does not seem proper to be interfered with. The Supreme Court in a case of Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar Vs. Paschim Gujrat Vij Company Ltd. & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.4558 of 2014) has considered the scope of interference in the matter of award/order passed by the Labour Court while entertaining the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution by the High Court. The observation made by the Supreme Court is as under:-

"9. We find the judgment and award of the Labour Court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the Labour Court in its award as it is well settled law that the High Court cannot

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exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice.

It is relevant to mention that in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 338], with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that:

"The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court." It was also held that:

"High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it." Thus it is clear, that the High Court has to exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution judiciously and to further the ends of justice. In the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation .. [(2010) 3 SCC 192 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146] this Court held that: "20. … In view of the above discussion, we hold that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed serious jurisdictional error and unjustifiably interfered with the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court with compensation of Rs 87,582 by entertaining a wholly unfounded plea that the appellant was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the Regulations.""

9. Further, in a case reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 parties being

Jai Singh and Others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another, the Supreme Court has dealt with the nature and scope of Article 227 of Constitution and observed as under:-

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"15. We have anxiously considered the submissions of the learned counsel. Before we consider the factual and legal issues involved herein, we may notice certain well-recognised principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly the High Court, under this article, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well-known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It can not be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice."

10. In view of the above cited enunciation of law, I do not find it proper to interfere in the order passed by the Industrial Court which is impugned in this petition. The petition being without any substance, is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost.

(SANJAY DWIVEDI)

JUDGE

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