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BAJAJ FINANCE LTD., MUMBAI v. THE TAX RECOVERY OFFICER (1), BBSR
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, a finance company, challenges an order dated 22 February 2023 made by the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO) declaring a mortgage created by the borrower (opposite party no. 2) void and proceeding to attach the mortgaged property. The borrower had created an equitable mortgage on 29 March 2016 to secure repayment. The petitioner seeks interference with the TRO's order on the ground that the order lacks a clear finding on the date of creation of the mortgage. The writ petition was filed on 22 June 2023. The petitioner contends that the mortgage was created prior to any tax recovery proceedings, while the revenue contends otherwise and seeks to file a counter. The borrower opposes the petition, arguing that the mortgage was created after tax proceedings were initiated and relies on provisions under the Income Tax Act to support the voiding of the mortgage.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the impugned order declaring the equitable mortgage void correctly determined the date of creation of the mortgage vis-à-vis the initiation of proceedings under the Income Tax Act, 1961.
- Whether the Tax Recovery Officer's order complies with the requirements under section 281 of the Income Tax Act regarding the voidability of transfers made after initiation of tax proceedings.
- Whether the writ petition is maintainable in the face of an alternative efficacious remedy available under rule 86 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act.
- The applicability and interpretation of statutory provisions, including section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, section 31-B of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, and section 281 of the Income Tax Act, in determining priority between secured creditors and revenue claims.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The equitable mortgage was created on 29 March 2016 and duly registered, prior to any tax recovery proceedings initiated by the revenue.
- The impugned order lacks a clear finding on the date of creation of the mortgage, which is crucial for determining its validity.
- Section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act and section 31-B of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act give priority to secured creditors over revenue claims with effect from 1 September 2016.
- The impugned order is vague and does not comply with the statutory requirements under section 281 of the Income Tax Act for declaring a transfer void.
- The petitioner has already initiated recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, which are being obstructed by the revenue's declaration of the mortgage as void.
Revenue’s Arguments
- The writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal under rule 86 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act.
- The impugned order correctly finds that tax recovery proceedings under the Income Tax Act were instituted prior to the creation of the equitable mortgage.
- The impugned order is supported by notices issued under the Income Tax Act, including a notice dated 23 September 2013, and information from CERSAI indicating the initiation of proceedings before the mortgage was created.
- The Tax Recovery Officer has the power under rule 83 of the Second Schedule to take evidence and declare the mortgage void if it was created subsequent to initiation of tax proceedings.
Borrower’s Arguments
- The Supreme Court judgment in Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade is inapplicable as it was decided under a now-amended provision of section 281 which required a civil suit for adjudication, which is no longer the case.
- The impugned order does contain a finding regarding the date of creation of the mortgage based on information from CERSAI under rule 83 of the Second Schedule.
- Rule 11 of the Second Schedule requires objections to attachment to be preferred for investigation, and sub-rule (6) permits instituting a civil suit if the investigating officer rejects the objection.
- The petitioner raised objections by letter dated 26 April 2022, indicating awareness of the certificate case initiated on 23 March 2020.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Recovery Officer, Nagpur v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, (1998) 6 SCC 658 | Interpretation of section 281 of the Income Tax Act prior to amendment; requirement of civil suit to declare transfer void. | The Court held this precedent does not aid the petitioner as the provision was amended removing the requirement of proving intention to defraud revenue by civil suit. |
| Connectwell Industries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2020) 5 SCC 373 | Priority of secured creditors over Crown debts unless statute provides otherwise. | The Court found this precedent supports the petitioner’s position that secured creditors have priority, but it requires a clear finding on the date of mortgage creation. |
| Maa Kalika Bhandar v. the Collector and District Magistrate, Khordha, RVWPET no. 156 of 2022 | Application of section 281 of the Income Tax Act regarding attachment and mortgage priority. | The Court referred to this order to illustrate similar factual and legal issues regarding timing of mortgage creation and tax attachment. |
| Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 | Requirement for clarity and precision in administrative orders. | The Court relied on this precedent to emphasize that the impugned order is vague and omits essential findings, rendering it unsustainable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the impugned order and found that it fails to specify essential factual findings, particularly the dates of initiation of the tax proceedings and the creation of the mortgage. The absence of these dates makes it impossible to determine whether the mortgage was created before or after the tax proceedings, which is critical under section 281 of the Income Tax Act. The Court noted that while the Tax Recovery Officer has powers under rule 83 of the Second Schedule to take evidence, the impugned order does not demonstrate that such evidence was laid to substantiate the declaration of the mortgage as void.
The Court analyzed the precedents cited by the parties and concluded that the Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade judgment does not apply due to amendments in the law. The Connectwell Industries judgment supports the principle that secured creditors generally have priority over Crown debts unless a statute provides otherwise, but requires clear findings on timing. The Court also recognized that the revenue and borrower have alternative forums, such as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to adjudicate disputed facts regarding priority and validity of the mortgage.
Given the vagueness and omission in the impugned order, the Court held that it cannot sustain the order declaring the mortgage void. The Court also noted that the writ jurisdiction is not the appropriate forum to decide disputed questions of fact which require detailed evidence and adjudication.
Holding and Implications
The impugned order dated 22 February 2023 is set aside and quashed.
The interim order is vacated, and the writ petition is allowed and disposed of accordingly. The decision restores the petitioner’s right to recover under the mortgage without the declaration of voidness by the TRO. The Court did not set any new precedent but emphasized the necessity for clear findings of fact in orders declaring mortgages void under section 281 of the Income Tax Act. The parties are free to pursue their respective remedies before appropriate forums such as the Debts Recovery Tribunal for adjudication of disputed facts.
Arindam Sinha, J.:— Mr. Panigrahy, learned advocate appears on behalf of petitioner, a finance company. He submits, opposite party no. 2 is borrower from his client. Said opposite party created mortgage in respect of the property, being land and construction thereon, to secure repayment. His client has challenged order dated 22 February, 2023 made by the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO) in declaring the mortgage to be void and proceeding to attach the property. He seeks interference.
2. Mr. Satapathy, learned advocate, Senior Standing Counsel appears on behalf of revenue. Mr. Mishra, learned senior advocate appears on behalf of the borrower.
3. The writ petition was moved on 22 June, 2023. We reproduce below paragraph 4 from our order made that day.
“4. Adjournment is granted to the parties and particularly opposite parties to demonstrate from impugned order that there has been a finding on date of creation of the equitable mortgage for the consequent finding that it was later.”
4. Mr. Panigrahy hands up documents to demonstrate that equitable mortgage created by the borrower was on 29 March, 2016 duly registered. He relies on several judgments including of coordinate Bench.
(i) Judgment of the Supreme Court in Tax Recovery Officer, Nagpur v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, (1998) 6 SCC 658 : AIR 1999 SC 427. He relies on paragraph 9.
(ii) Judgment of the Supreme Court in Connectwell Industries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2020) 5 SCC 373. He relies on paragraph 9.
(iii) Order dated 2 December, 2022 made by coordinate Bench in, inter alia, RVWPET no. 156 of 2022, arising out of W.P.(C) no. 26500 of 2021 (Maa Kalika Bhandar v. the Collector and District Magistrate, Khordha). He relies on paragraph 9.
5. Mr. Panigrahy then relies on section 26-E of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 to submit, with effect from 1 September, 2016 overriding effect and priority was given to secured creditors over claims, inter alia, of revenue, tax, cess etc. He also relies on section 31-B in Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 to demonstrate that with effect also from 1 September, 2016 said Act gives priority to secured creditors. He submits, there be interference in quashing impugned order, which does not even indicate finding on when the mortgage was created by the borrower.
6. Mr. Satapathy submits, counter is required to be filed. He points out, when the writ petition was moved, direction was not made for filing counter and today he seeks it. On query from Court, he is unable to point out from impugned order that there is finding as to when the mortgage was created by the borrower. He refers to impugned order to point out that several notices stood issued by the Assessing Officer (AO) to the borrower, including notice dated 23 September, 2013 under section 143(2) of Income Tax Act, 1961, pertaining to assessment year 2012-2013. Addressee of the notice was borrower. He relies on several passages in impugned order, of which we reproduce below 2 last paragraph in it.
“In the instance case, clear and unambiguous facts demonstrate that the proceedings under Income Tax Act, 1961 were instituted prior to creation of equitable mortgage, this fact is corroborated with the information received from CERSAI under rule 83 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961. Hence, the equitable mortgage created by the bank being a subsequent transaction is void in terms of the provisions of section 281 of the Act.”
7. He submits, the writ petition is not maintainable as petitioner has efficacious alternative remedy of appeal under rule 86 in Part-VI of the Second Schedule.
8. Mr. Mishra, learned senior advocate appears on behalf of the borrower and submits, Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (supra) is inapplicable in law. This is because the judgment was rendered on provision in section 281 before amendment w.e.f. 1 October, 1975. Interpretation of the earlier provision required revenue to have adjudication by civil suit. It is no longer required under present provision.
9. He then submits with reference to above quoted paragraph from impugned order that there is reference to information received from CERSAI under rule 83 of the Second Schedule. Such information carried date of creation of mortgage and hence, it cannot be said there was no finding regarding date of creation of mortgage in impugned order. Furthermore, rule 11 in the Second Schedule requires petitioner to prefer objection to the attachment made in execution of the certificate, for there to be investigation regarding the objection. He also relies sub-rule (6) in rule 11, which gives option to the objector to institute a suit in a civil Court to establish the right, on it rejected by the investigating officer. Mr. Panigrahy responds, by letter dated 26 April, 2022, objection was raised by his client pointing out that the certificate case was initiated on 23 March, 2020.
10. Paragraph 9 from Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (supra) is reproduced below.
“9. The Tax Recovery Officer, therefore, has to examine who is in possession of the property and in what capacity. He can only attach property in possession of the assessee in his own right, or in possession of a tenant or a third party on behalf of/for the benefit of the assessee. He cannot declare any transfer made by the assessee in favour of a third party as void. If the Department finds that a property of the assessee is transferred by him to a third party with the intention to defraud the Revenue, it will have to file a suit under Rule 11 (6) to have the transfer declared void under Section 281.”
11. Paragraph 9 from Connectwell Industries (supra) is reproduced below.
“9. It is trite law that, unless there is preference given to the Crown debt by a statute, the dues of a secured creditor have preference over Crown debts. [See; Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co., Union of India v. SICOM Ltd., Bombay Stock Exchange v. V.S. Kandalgaonkar, CIT v. Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd.]”
12. We find, the Supreme Court in Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (supra), by relied upon paragraph 9 declared the law on interpretation of section 281, as it stood prior to the amendment w.e.f. 1 October, 1975. The judgment does not come in aid of petitioner. Present provision omitted requirement of finding intention of borrower to defraud revenue. Connectwell Industries (supra) declared, it is trite law that unless there is preference given to the Crown debt by a statute, the dues of a secured creditor have preference over Crown debts. On facts, the Supreme Court found notice under rule 2 was issued on 11 February, 2003 but charge over the property created in favour of the financier was much prior. The Court held, as the charge over the property was created much prior to notice under rule 2, therein appellant's submission had force being that rigors of rule 2 and rule 16 in Schedule II were not applicable to the case. Further argument was that Government debt in India is not entitled to have precedence over prior secured debt. Here we may add, the judgment comes to aid of petitioner not on point of reference of dates but that there must be clear finding on date of creation of the mortgage.
13. Moving on to order dated 2 December, 2022 (supra) we find fit to reproduce below a passage from paragraph 6 in the order dealing with the review applications.
“6. Mr. T.K. Satapathy, learned counsel for the Review Petitioner Nos. 2 & 4/Income Tax Department argues that the properties in Writ Petitions W.P.(C) No. 26500/2021 & W.P.(C) No. 27775 of 2021 were attached by the Income Tax Department prior to their mortgage in favour of the Bank on 28.06.2016 and hence the mortgage is void in terms of the provisions u/s. 281 of the Income Tax Act and the corresponding relevant rules. It is his contention that the property was mortgaged in favour of the Bank on 28.06.2016 whereas the Income Tax Authorities had attached the same on 31.12.2015. Hence, the mortgaged transaction in favour of the Bank is void.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In above case, the borrower had moved the writ Court challenging enforcement for recovery by the mortgagee bank. Contention of the borrower was that the mortgage could not be enforced for recovery by the bank inasmuch as it was created after there was attachment under the Income Tax Act. Hence, by operation of provision in section 281, the mortgage was void. This challenge of the borrower was relegated to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), wherein the bank and the borrower had already initiated proceedings regarding recovery under the Act of 2002. However, petitioner here is the finance company, a secured creditor seeking interference as impugned order affects its interest of obtaining recovery under the mortgage. On query from Court, Mr. Panigrahy submits, recovery proceeding under the Act of 2002 had already been launched by his client. The borrower challenged the same in the DRT. Said challenge of the borrower in the DRT is the same challenge it had made against the bank, in the review petition disposed of by order dated 2 December, 2022 (supra). The borrower is obstructing recovery in alleging the mortgage having been declared void by revenue, to continue to enjoy the property.
15. Reverting back to our extracted paragraph 4 from our order dated 22 June, 2023 we find from submissions at the Bar there is no dispute on fact regarding creation of the mortgage. However, in impugned order there is omission of finding regarding date of creation of the mortgage. We reproduce below another passage from impugned order.
“In the instant case, clear and unambiguous facts demonstrate that the proceedings under Income Tax Act, 1961 were instituted prior to creation of equitable mortgage, this fact is corroborated with the information received from CERSAI under rule 83 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961. Hence, the equitable mortgage created by the bank being a subsequent transaction is void in terms of the provisions of section 281 of the Act.”
16. We enquired of revenue and the borrower regarding finding on initiation of the proceeding, based on which the authority declared creation of the mortgage as void. Mr. Satapathy points out from impugned order that apart from aforesaid notices, there is reference to survey under section 133A, conducted at business premises of the borrower on 31 December, 2015. He submits consequent to the survey there was demand notice and there has been issuance of certificate. Mr. Mishra relies on immediately above quoted passage from impugned order to reiterate, mention of information received from CERSAI is deemed to include date of creation of the mortgage and the authority has said, clear and unambiguous facts demonstrate that the proceeding under Income Tax Act was instituted prior to creation of equitable mortgage. Mr. Panigrahy draws attention to letter dated 15 March, 2022 issued by revenue to his client in respect of the proceeding against the borrower pertaining to assessment year 2016-2017, wherein there is clear statement that the certificate case is dated 23 March, 2020.
17. We also reproduce below paragraph 9 of order dated 2 December, 2022 (supra).
“9. It cannot be disputed that the question whether the attachment of the mortgaged property by the Tax Department or “any proceedings” stood initiated by the Income Tax Department prior to the mortgage are serious questions of disputed facts, which cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The Income Tax Department was well within its right to seek a declaration of transaction being void before the forum of appropriate jurisdiction before seeking its simple impleadment before this Court, which concededly has not been done till now. Therefore, relegating the parties to seek adjudication on this issue by our order cannot be faulted with by any stretch of reasoning. The Income Tax Department is also free to seek its remedy before the appropriate forum including DRT to establish by leading cogent evidence that the action had been initiated which constituted “proceedings” prior in time of creation of an equitable mortgage in favour of the Bank so as to seek a declaration of the mortgage being void or the attachment being prior in time so as to seek a priority of charge. The Secured Creditor/Bank would be equally free to stress the impact of Section 26(E) and Section 31(B) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 qua the priority of the claim. Accordingly, the adjudication before this Court in view of Section 281 of the Income Tax Act is also rejected. However, we observe that the I.T. Department and the parties would be free to raise all these pleas before the DRT for adjudication in accordance with law.”
18. Section 281 on amendment with effect from 1 October, 1975 provides for certain transfers to be void. The voidable transfer is to be shown as made during pendency of any proceeding under the Act of 1961 or after the completion thereof but before service of notice under rule 2 of the Second Schedule, resulting in a claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee on completion of the proceeding. Clause (i) in the proviso excepts the transfer from being void if made for adequate consideration and without notice of pendency of such proceeding or, as the case may be, without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee. Impugned order does not give illumination regarding the assessment proceeding pursuant to notices issued under provisions of assessment procedure, referred therein, as had resulted, on completion of the proceeding, in a claim of tax requiring the TRO to certify the claim and thereafter declare the mortgage void. There is also no finding in impugned order that the mortgage was created after notice of the tax or other sum payable by the mortgagor assessee as a result of completion of the assessment proceeding in respect of one or more of the assessment years referred to in the mentioned notices.
19. By impugned order valuable right of recovery of petitioner as secured creditor was sought to be interfered with. We notice that impugned order was made after order dated 2 December, 2022 (supra) giving liberty to both, borrower and revenue, there being connection between said and present borrowers to be essentially the same person, to approach the DRT or any other forum for ventilating their grievance. We are told, instead of so doing, in this case revenue has issued impugned order. As aforesaid, from it we have been unable to locate finding on date of initiation of proceeding as prior to date of creation of the mortgage. Neither of the two dates have been mentioned in impugned order. In the circumstances, impugned order is bad for being vague. We are fortified in taking such view, without going into enquiry on documents referred to in impugned order, by judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 851.
20. Omission to mention finding on dates of initiation of proceeding and creation of the mortgage, to demonstrate that the mortgage was created subsequent to initiation of the proceeding cannot be supplied on contention that the Tax Recovery Officer has power under rule 83 in the Second Schedule empowering him to take evidence exercising power of civil Court. The power is undoubtedly there and the officer has and had the power but in exercise of the power there must be laid evidence to substantiate declaration of the mortgage being void. So far as rule 86 is concerned, revenue was not heard to argue that impugned order is not one, which is conclusive in declaring the mortgage void.
21. Impugned order is set aside and quashed.
22. The interim order stands vacated. The writ petition is allowed and disposed of.
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