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Raheem Shah And Another (s) v. Govind Singh And Others (s).
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondent No. 1, as plaintiff, instituted Civil Suit No. 3 A/02 concerning rights over immovable property. The trial court decreed the suit on 01-10-2005. The present appellants, defendants No. 1 and 2, filed a Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure; however, the appeal was lodged 52 days after the limitation period expired. They therefore moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of the delay.
The First Additional District Judge, Nasrullaganj (Civil Appeal No. 35 A/2005), dismissed the appeal on 08-10-2010, holding that the delay had not been properly explained. A Second Appeal (No. 1185/2010) before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was also dismissed on 16-04-2015 for want of any substantial question of law. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court, which granted leave and heard the matter.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the lower Appellate Court erred in refusing to condone a 52-day delay in filing the Regular First Appeal, despite the appellants’ plea that the decree was not within their knowledge.
- Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the Second Appeal solely on the ground that no substantial question of law arose.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants
- The decree dated 01-10-2005 was not within their knowledge; they had participated only to the extent of filing a written statement, leading to the short delay in preferring the appeal.
- Given the modest 52-day delay and the substantive rights in immovable property at stake, the delay should have been condoned so the dispute could be adjudicated on merits.
Respondents
- Opposed condonation, asserting that the appellants failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the delay.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 | Courts should adopt a liberal, justice-oriented approach under Section 5 of the Limitation Act; “sufficient cause” is to be construed elastically. | The Supreme Court relied on this decision to emphasise that refusing to condone a short, non-deliberate delay defeats substantial justice, and that cases should be decided on merits wherever possible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court observed that the appellants’ primary explanation—that they were unaware of the trial court’s decree—was not considered by the lower Appellate Court. Noting that the delay was “only 52 days” and that valuable rights in immovable property were involved, the Court held that a technical approach should not override substantive justice.
Invoking the principles articulated in Anantnag v. Katiji, the Court reiterated that:
- Liberal construction of “sufficient cause” is mandated to ensure matters are disposed of on merits.
- Refusing condonation may unjustly extinguish meritorious claims, whereas granting it merely permits adjudication after hearing both sides.
- The judiciary is respected for removing injustice, not for upholding technical barriers.
Consequently, the Court criticised the “iron-cast technical approach” of the lower courts as “insensitive” and counter-productive to the speedy resolution of disputes.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court (16-04-2015) and the First Appellate Court (08-10-2010), condoned the 52-day delay, and restored Civil Appeal No. 35 A/2005 to the file of the First Additional District Judge, Nasrullaganj, District Sehore, Madhya Pradesh for fresh disposal on merits. The parties were directed to appear on 23-08-2023 at 11:00 A.M., and all contentions were left open.
Implications: The decision revives the first appeal and reinforces the Supreme Court’s long-standing directive that courts adopt a justice-oriented, rather than a purely technical, approach when exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. No new legal doctrine is created, but the judgment underscores the importance of substantive justice over procedural rigidity.
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the appeal papers.
3. Respondent No. 1 herein is the plaintiff in the original suit bearing Civil Suit No. 3 A/02. The suit was decreed by the trial court through its judgment dated 01.10.2005. The appellants herein who were the defendants No. 1 and 2 in the suit filed a Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code assailing the said judgment. Since there was delay of 52 days in filing the appeal, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed seeking condonation of delay. The lower Appellate Court through its judgment dated 08.10.2010 had dismissed the appeal bearing Civil Appeal No. 35A/2005 on the ground of limitation holding that the delay has not been properly explained and had consequently dismissed the appeal. Against the said judgment, the appellants were before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a Second Appeal bearing No. 1185/2010. The Second Appeal has been dismissed by the High Court through its judgment dated 16.04.2015 on the ground that there is no question of law for consideration.
4. It is in that light, the appellants are before this Court in this appeal. At the outset, having taken note that the contention in the appeal before the lower Appellate Court was that the judgment was not in the knowledge of the appellants herein, that aspect of the matter was required to be kept in view by the lower Appellate Court since the appellants in fact had not taken effective part except filing written statement. When there was delay of only 52 days in filing the appeal and furthermore when the parties were litigating with regard to the right over immovable properties, the substantial rights were to be decided between the parties. The delay could have been condoned and the appeal could have been decided on merits.
5. This Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 has held as hereunder:
“The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal.”
6. The above decision expressing the intention of justice oriented approach percolating down to all the courts was rendered nearly three decades ago but unfortunately the case on hand demonstrates the pervading insensitive approach, which apart from continuing the agony of the litigants concerned has also unnecessarily burdened the judicial hierarchy which after going through the entire process will have to set the clock back, at this distant point in time and prolong their agony. If only the court concerned had been sensitive to the justice oriented approach rather than the iron-cast technical approach, the litigation between the parties probably would have come to an end much earlier after decision on the merits of their rival contention.
7. If that be the position, the very manner in which the lower Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay when the delay was not inordinate is not justified and the High Court was also not justified in dismissing the appeal only on the ground that there was no question of law.
8. Hence, the judgment dated 16.04.2015 passed by the High Court as also the judgment dated 08.10.2010 passed by the lower Appellate Court are set aside. The delay in filing the appeal before the lower Appellate Court is condoned. The Civil Appeal No. 35A/2005 is restored to the file of the lower Appellate Court i.e. First Additional District Judge, Nasrullaganj, District Sehorr, M.P. The parties shall put forth their contentions on merits. All contentions are left open.
9. The parties shall appear before the lower Appellate Court without issuance of fresh notice/summons on 23.08.2023 at 11.00 A.M as the first date for appearance. The lower Appellate Court may thereafter regulate its proceedings and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible on its merits and in accordance law.
10. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.
11. Pending application(s) shall also stand disposed of.
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