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Sallahuddin v. State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home U.P. Civil Secrett. Lko. And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The applicant, Salahuddin, is standing trial in S.T. No.13751 of 2021 for offences under various sections of the Indian Penal Code including Sections 417, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 121-A, 123 IPC and Sections 3, 5, and 8 of the U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, arising from Case Crime No.09 of 2021 at Police Station ATS, Gomti Nagar. The trial court had passed an order on 14.03.2023 deferring the cross-examination of the first prosecution witness, Vinod Kumar, due to his absence, and directed that the examination-in-chief of all prosecution witnesses be recorded first to expedite the trial, deferring their cross-examination until thereafter. The applicant challenged this order by filing the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 deferring cross-examination of prosecution witnesses in bulk without recording reasons is legally valid and in conformity with statutory provisions and judicial precedents?
- Whether the trial court exercised its discretion under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. judiciously and in accordance with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court?
- Whether the impugned order violates the proviso to Section 309 Cr.P.C. regarding expeditious trial?
- Whether the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable when an application seeking recall of the impugned order is pending before the trial court?
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The impugned order is patently illegal as it is cryptic, non-speaking, and does not disclose any reason for deferring cross-examination of witnesses.
- The statutory scheme under Sections 135 and 138 of the Indian Evidence Act requires examination-in-chief followed by cross-examination; Section 231(1) Cr.P.C. is an exception and must be exercised with circumspection, which the trial court failed to do.
- The impugned order contravenes the proviso to Section 309 Cr.P.C. by not ensuring expeditious trial.
- Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar and State of Kerala vs. Rasheed to emphasize the necessity of reasoned orders and careful exercise of discretion.
Opposite Party's Arguments
- The impugned order is a reasoned and speaking order passed in peculiar facts where the prosecution has to examine seventy-three witnesses and the trial needs to be expedited.
- The order cannot be considered arbitrary given the circumstances of the case.
- An application seeking recall of the impugned order is pending before the trial court, rendering the present application not maintainable.
- Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh and another vs. State of U.P. and others to support the maintainability argument.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar (2004) 5 SCC 568 | Requirement of reasoned and speaking orders; importance of giving reasons for judicial decisions. | The Court emphasized that the impugned order was cryptic and lacked reasons, violating settled principles of judicial discipline. |
| State of Kerala vs. Rasheed (2019) 13 SCC 297 | Discretion under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. to defer cross-examination must be exercised with circumspection and only in exceptional circumstances. | The Court held that the trial court's bulk deferral of cross-examination without recording sufficient reasons was improper. |
| Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh and another vs. State of U.P. and others (2004 SCC OnLine All 2085) | Maintainability of applications when recall applications are pending. | The Court distinguished this precedent, holding that in the present case, recall was not available due to Section 362 Cr.P.C. |
| Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal and others (2004) 7 SCC 338 | Criminal courts do not have power to recall substantive orders such as summons. | The Court relied on this to hold that recall of the impugned order was not legally permissible. |
| Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 | Judicial discretion must be exercised with due care and caution, considering reasonably foreseeable consequences. | The Court applied this principle to assess the exercise of discretion under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. |
| Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar (2003) 11 SCC 519 | Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion; orders must be reasoned. | The Court underscored the necessity of reasoned orders in judicial proceedings. |
| Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 1 All ER 1148 | Giving of reasons is fundamental to good administration. | Cited to reinforce the importance of speaking orders. |
| Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974) ICR 120 | Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. | Used to emphasize that non-reasoned orders hinder judicial review. |
| Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab (2015) 3 SCC 220 | Provisions of Section 309 Cr.P.C. regarding continuation of trial and adjournment. | Referred to highlight the legal framework for trial expeditiousness and adjournment. |
| S.J. Chaudhary v. State (UT of Delhi) (1984) 1 SCC 722 | Guidelines on adjournments and trial continuance under Section 309 Cr.P.C. | Referred to in the context of trial management and adjournments. |
| Shamoon Ahmed Sayed & Another v. Intelligence Officer, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 371 | Interpretation of Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. and legislative intent behind discretion to defer cross-examination. | Applied to evaluate the discretionary power of trial courts in deferring cross-examination. |
| Sisir Debnath v. State of W.B., 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 21442 | Discretion under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. | Supported the conclusion that the trial court's order lacked justification. |
| Amit Kumar Shaw v. State of W.B., 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 2632 | Strong case required for deferral of cross-examination under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. | Reinforced the need for sufficient reasons before deferring cross-examination. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the impugned order dated 14.03.2023, which deferred the cross-examination of seventy-three prosecution witnesses in bulk without recording any tenable or sufficient reasons. The Court noted that the statutory scheme under Sections 135 and 138 of the Indian Evidence Act mandates that witnesses be first examined-in-chief, followed by cross-examination and re-examination if necessary. Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. provides discretionary power to the trial judge to defer cross-examination, but this discretion must be exercised judiciously, cautiously, and only in exceptional circumstances.
The Court referred extensively to the judgment in State of Kerala vs. Rasheed, which elaborates that deferral of cross-examination requires sufficient reasons and cannot be asserted as a matter of right. The Court also emphasized the requirement of reasoned and speaking orders as established in State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar and other precedents, highlighting that failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice.
The Court observed that the impugned order was cryptic and non-speaking, lacking any explanation or justification for deferring cross-examination of all prosecution witnesses in bulk. It further considered the argument regarding the pending recall application and held that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and can be exercised to prevent abuse of process or failure of justice. The Court distinguished the precedent relied upon by the State regarding recall of orders, noting that substantive orders like summons cannot be recalled under Section 362 Cr.P.C.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the trial court did not exercise its discretion under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. in consonance with statutory provisions and judicial guidelines, and that the impugned order was liable to be quashed. The Court directed the trial court to proceed expeditiously with the trial in accordance with Section 309 Cr.P.C.
Holding and Implications
The Court allowed the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and set aside the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA/ ATS)/ Additional Sessions Judge-V, Lucknow in S.T. No.13751 of 2021.
The trial court was directed to proceed expeditiously with the trial, adhering to the provisions of Section 309 Cr.P.C. The decision directly affects the parties by restoring the normal sequence of examination and cross-examination of witnesses and ensuring compliance with procedural safeguards. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing legal principles to the facts of this case.
Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:33579
A.F.R.
Court No. - 15 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 4201 of 2023
Applicant :- Sallahuddin
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home U.P. Civil Secrett. Lko. And Others
Counsel for Applicant :- Salil Kumar Srivastava,Rahul Srivastava
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I,J.
1. Heard Sri Salil Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Shiv Nath Tilhari, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the entire record.
2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicant for quashing the order dated 14.03.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA/ ATS)/ Additional Sessions Judge-V, Lucknow in S.T. No.13751 of 2021 titled as State vs. Salahuddin and others arising out of Case Crime No.09 of 2021, under Sections 417, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 121-A,
123 I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 of U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, Police Station ATS, Gomti Nagar, pending in the court of learned Special Judge (ATS/ NIA Court)/ Additional Sessions Judge-V, Lucknow.
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3. The brief facts giving rise to the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. also is that the present applicant is standing trial for the offences under Sections 417, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 121-A,
123 I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 of U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, which emanated from Case Crime No.09 of 2021. Vinod Kumar has been examined as prosecution witness-1 in the learned trial court. The learned trial court has passed the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 stating therein that examination-in-chief of P.W.-1, Vinod Kumar has been done and his cross-examination is yet to be completed. Due to his absence on 14.03.2023, the cross-examination of P.W.-1, Vinod Kumar was deferred. The learned trial court also observed in the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 that as there is a direction of this Court to get the trial expedited, therefore, the learned trial court directed that the examination in chief of all the prosecution witness would be recorded first. Admittedly, there are 73 witnesses listed in the charge sheet. Their cross-examination will stand deferred and once the examination-in-chief of all the prosecution witnesses has been done, they would be summoned for their cross- examination.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned order dated 14.03.2023, the applicant has filed the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is patently
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illegal insofar as it is not reasoned and speaking order and the same does not disclose any reason for doing so.
6. His further submission is that the statutory scheme for examination of witnesses is contained in Sections 135 and 138 of Indian Evidence Act. The provisions contained in Section 231(1) Cr.P.C. is an exception to the general rule for examination and cross- examination of witnesses. Therefore, while passing such sweeping order in exercise of its discretionary power, the learned trial court ought to have acted with utmost circumspection and care, which is not reflected from the impugned order dated 14.03.2023.
7. In order to buttress his aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar1 and State of Kerala vs. Rasheed2.
8. Learned counsel for the applicant has also submitted that the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is also against the provisions contained in proviso to Section
309 Cr.P.C., therefore, the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 being patently illegal and an abuse of process of this Court, deserves to be quashed.
9. Per contra, learned A.G.A. for the State has vehemently opposed the prayer by submitting that the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is a reasoned and speaking order, which has come to be passed in the
2 (2 019) 13 SCC 2 97
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peculiar facts and circumstances of this case where the prosecution has to examine as many as seventy three witnesses and the trial is to be concluded expeditiously, therefore, the same cannot be said to be arbitrary.
10. His further submission is that an application seeking recall of impugned order dated 14.03.2023 moved by the present applicant is pending disposal with the learned trial court. Therefore, also the present application is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed.
11. In order to buttress his aforesaid submission, learned A.G.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh and another vs. State of U.P. and others3.
12. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. for the State and upon perusal of record, it transpires that the present applicant is standing trial for the offences under Sections 417, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 121-A, 123 I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 of U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, which emanated from Case Crime No.09 of 2021. Vinod Kumar has been examined as prosecution witness-1 in the learned trial court. The learned trial court has observed in the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 that examination-in-chief of P.W.-1, Vinod Kumar has been recorded and his cross-examination is yet to be completed. Due to his absence on 14.03.2023, the cross- examination of P.W.-1, Vinod Kumar was deferred. The learned trial court also observed by means of impugned
3 2004 SCC OnLine All 2085
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order dated 14.03.2023 that as there is a direction of this Court to get the trial expedited, therefore, the learned trial court directed that the examination in chief of all the prosecution witness would be recorded first. Their cross- examination will stand deferred and once the examination- in-chief of all the prosecution witnesses has been recorded, they would be summoned for their cross- examination.
13. Being germane to the present controversy, Sections 135 and 138 of Indian Evidence Act are quoted herein below:-
"135. Order of production and examination of witnesses.—The order in which witnesses are produced and examined shall be regulated by the law and practice for the time being relating to civil and criminal procedure respectively, and, in the absence of any such law, by the discretion of the Court.
138. Order of examinations.—Witnesses shall be first examined-in chief then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined.
The examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts but the cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief."
14. The ambit of provision contained in Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in Rasheed's case (supra). Paragraph Nos.15, 17, 18, 19 and 23 of
Rasheed's case (supra), being relevant, are quoted herein below:-
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"15. Section 231 CrPC indicates that the Judge is given the discretion to defer cross-examination of a witness, until any other witness or witnesses have been examined. Section 231 is set out hereinbelow:
"231. Evidence for prosecution.—(1) On the date so fixed, the Judge shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution.
(2) The Judge may, in his discretion, permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross- examination."
(emphasis supplied) The phraseology of Section 231(2) mirrors Section 242(3) ["242. Evidence for prosecution.—(1)-(2)* * *
(3) On the date so fixed, the Magistrate shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution:Provided that the Magistrate may permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross-examination."] CrPC which provides for a similar discretion to a Magistrate in the trial of a warrant case under Chapter XIX CrPC."
17. The Karnataka High Court in Shamoon Ahmed Sayed & Another v. Intelligence Officer [Shamoon Ahmed Sayed
v. Intelligence Officer, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 371 :
2009 Cri LJ 1215 : ILR 2008 KAR 4378] , delivered by Shantanagoudar, J. (as he then was), had observed that Section 231(2) as well as Section 242(3) CrPC must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent behind the enactment of Section 251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
18. What follows from the discussion is that the norm in any criminal trial is for the examination- in-chief of witnesses to be carried out first, followed by cross-examination, and re- examination if required, in accordance with Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
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Section 231(2) CrPC, however, confers a discretion on the Judge to defer the cross- examination of any witness until any other witness or witnesses have been examined, or recall any witness for further cross-examination, in appropriate cases. Judicial discretion has to be exercised in consonance with the statutory framework and context while being aware of reasonably foreseeable consequences. [ A Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465 had elucidated upon the nature and manner of exercise of judicial discretion in para 21. The relevant extract has been reproduced hereunder : (SCC p. 584, para 21)"21. … Every kind of judicial discretion, whatever may be the nature of the matter in regard to which it is required to be exercised, has to be used with due care and caution. In fact, an awareness of the context in which the discretion is required to be exercised and of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its use, is the hallmark of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion."(emphasis supplied)] The party seeking deferral under Section 231(2) CrPC must give sufficient reasons to invoke the exercise of discretion by the Judge, and deferral cannot be asserted as a matter of right.
19. Several High Courts have held that the discretion under Section 231(2) CrPC should be exercised only in "exceptional circumstances" [Sisir Debnath v. State Of W.B., 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 21442; Shamoon Ahmed Sayed v. Intelligence Officer, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 371 :
2009 Cri LJ 1215 : ILR 2008 KAR 4378] , or when
"a very strong case" [Amit Kumar Shaw v. State of W.B., 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 2632] has been made out. However, while it is for the parties to decide the order of production and examination of witnesses in accordance with the statutory scheme, a Judge has the latitude to exercise discretion under Section 231(2) CrPC if sufficient reasons are made out for deviating from the norm.
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23. While deciding an application under Section 231(2) CrPC, a balance must be struck between the rights of the accused, and the prerogative of the prosecution to lead evidence. The following factors must be kept in consideration:
(i) possibility of undue influence on witness(es);
(ii) possibility of threats to witness(es);
(iii) possibility that non-deferral would enable subsequent witnesses giving evidence on similar facts to tailor their testimony to circumvent the defence strategy;
(iv) possibility of loss of memory of the witness(es) whose examination-in-chief has been completed;
(v) occurrence of delay in the trial, and the non-availability of witnesses, if deferral is allowed, in view of Section 309(1) CrPC [ "309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.—(1) In every inquiry or trial the proceedings shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded:"See also Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 226 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 712; and S.J. Chaudhary v. State (UT of Delhi), (1984) 1 SCC 722 :
These factors are illustrative for guiding the exercise of discretion by a Judge under Section 231(2) CrPC.
(emphasis supplied)"
15. It is also useful to refer to a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhaniram Luhar's
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case (supra). Paragraphs No.7 and 8, being relevant, are extracted herein below:-
"7. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same it becomes lifeless. (See Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar [(2003) 11 SCC 519 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 212 : (2003) 7 Supreme 152] .)
8. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union [(1971) 1 All ER 1148 : (1971) 2 QB 175 : (1971) 2 WLR 742 (CA)] observed:"The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration." In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree [1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)] it was observed:"Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice." "Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at." Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made; in other words, a speaking-out. The "inscrutable face of the sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance."
16. Thus examined in the light of aforesaid settled legal position, it transpires that the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is cryptic, by means of which, cross- examination of 73 prosecution witnesses has been deferred in bulk without recording existence of any such tenable ground as has come to be recognized by the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.23 of Rasheed's case (supra).
17. So far as the objection of learned A.G.A. for the State to the effect that the recall application is still pending with the learned trial court, therefore, the instant application cannot be maintained, is concerned, it is needless to mention that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is an extra-ordinary power vested with the High Courts in order to prevent abuse of process of the Court or failure of justice.
18. The ratio of a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal and others4is that any criminal court does not have power to recall its own order, which is substantive in nature like order issuing summon. Therefore in the considered opinion of this Court, the law laid down by this Court in Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh's case (supra) is distinguishable insofar as in the instant case, it cannot be said that the remedy seeking recall of impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is available to the applicant in view of restriction contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C.
19. It is needless to mention that the power vested with the learned trial court under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. is a discretionary power, which should be exercised judiciously. Therefore, the learned trial court will always be at liberty to pass appropriate order, in accordance with law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rasheed's case (supra).
4 (2004 ) 7 SCC 338
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20. The upshot of aforesaid discussion is that the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. deserves to be allowed and is, accordingly, allowed. Consequently, the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA/ ATS)/ Additional Sessions Judge-V, Lucknow in S.T. No.13751 of 2021 titled as State vs. Salahuddin and others arising out of Case Crime No.09 of 2021, under Sections 417, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 121-A, 123 I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 of U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, Police Station ATS, Gomti Nagar, is, hereby, set aside.
21. The learned trial court concerned is also directed to proceed with the trial of S.T. No.13751 of 2021 titled as State vs. Salahuddin and others expeditiously having regard to the provisions contained in Section 309 Cr.P.C.
(Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I, J.) Order Date :- 28.04.2023 cks/-
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