PRAMOD KUMAR PALAI v. STATE OF ORISSA

W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 2 of 28 Headmaster of the said School by the Managing Committee without obtaining prior approval of the competent authority as required under the Rules is valid. Consequentially, whether the order of the competent authority in invalidating such appointment on the ground of absence of prior approval by the competent authority warrants any interference by this Court in the present Writ Petition.

2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass for which it is not necessary to delve into the pleadings of the parties in extenso. It would suffice to note that the Petitioner, after facing a process of selection was appointed as an Asst. Teacher in Ramaranga Aided U.P.(M.E.) School, Ramaranga in the District of Cuttack on 14^thAugust, 1990 and also joined in the said post on the same day. His appointment was approved on 15^thMay, 1993 by order passed by the Inspector of Schools, Cuttack Circle, Cuttack. The post of Headmaster of the School fell vacant on and from 3^rd May, 2008 due to untimely death of the incumbent.

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 3 of 28 On 8^thOctober, 2008, the Managing Committee of the School passed a resolution promoting/appointing the Petitioner to the post of Headmaster. The Management of the School thereafter sent necessary proposal to the District Inspector of Schools, Salipur for onward transmission to the Director of Elementary Education for approval of such appointment/promotion of the Petitioner. Accordingly, by letter dated 17^thJanuary, 2009, the District Inspector of Schools recommended the case of the Petitioner to the Director for approval. Since no action was taken in the matter, the Petitioner approached this Court in W.P.(c) No.17524/2010, which was disposed of on 28^thOctober, 2011 directing the Director, Elementary Education, Odisha (Opposite Party No.2) to consider and dispose of the representation of the Petitioner within a stipulated time. Even then, no action was taken. The District Inspector of Schools vide letter dated 30^thOctober, 2012 again recommended the case of the Petitioner to the Director. On 28^thJune, 2013, the State Government held that the promotion/appointment of

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 4 of 28 the Petitioner is illegal for want of prior approval under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Odisha Education (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and Members of the Staff of Aided Educational Institutions), Rules, 1974 (for short, '1974 Rules') and at the same time, directed the Director to dispose of the case of the Petitioner accordingly. The Petitioner challenged the said order of the State Government before this Court in W.P.(c) No.70/2015 which was disposed of by order dated 22^nd June, 2016 by quashing the impugned order and by remitting the matter to the Director to dispose of the case in accordance with law without being influenced by the order passed by the State Government. However, by order dated 5^thAugust, 2016, the Opposite Party No.2 rejected the case of the Petitioner on the ground that no prior approval was taken before promoting/appointing the Petitioner as Headmaster of the School. The said order is impugned in the present Writ Petition.

3. On such facts, the Petitioner states that the impugned order is a product of non-application of

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 5 of 28 mind by the Director. Further, in view of the amendment of sub-rule (2)(b) of the 1974 Rules, the concept of prior approval has become redundant which was not considered by the Director. Moreover, similarly situated persons, who were promoted without prior approval have since been approved, which amounts to discrimination. The Petitioner also rests his case on the ratio decided by this Court in the case of

Managing Committee, Majhipada M.E. School v. State of Orissa and others; reported in 1992 (1) OLR-447 to the effect that only because prior approval was not obtained, appointment of a Teacher cannot be treated as invalid.

4. In the counter affidavit filed by the State, reliance has been placed on the provision under Rule 8 (2) (b) of the 1974 Rules to state that prior approval by the competent authority is mandatory. The State has also relied upon the ratio of a decision of this Court in the case of State Of Orissa & Others v. Nabin Kumar Beura

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Beura; reported in 2011 (1) OLR 149 and some other cases.

The Petitioner filed a rejoinder refuting the averments made in the counter to reiterate that Rule 8(2)(b) having undergone an amendment on 3^rdJune, 1988, the expression 'prior approval' used in the first part of the provision has lost its sting and become redundant in view of the latter part of the provision providing for grant of post facto approval.

5. Heard Mr. K.K.Swain, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. Biplab Mohanty, learned Standing Counsel for the School and Mass Education Department.

6. Mr.Swain has taken the Court to the relevant provision namely, Rule 8(2)(b) of the 1974 Rules to submit that originally the Rule required prior approval of the Director in case of filling up of vacancy in a post carrying higher scale of pay by the Managing Committee. The said Rule was amended w.e.f. 3^rd June, 1988. The amended provision clearly provides

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 7 of 28 that the appointment shall be treated as regular appointment from the date the same is filled up on Ad hoc basis in the event of its approval by the competent authority. According to Mr. Swain, this implies grant of post facto approval and therefore, the requirement of prior approval in the first part of the provision automatically becomes redundant. Thus, the Managing Committee was within its power to give Ad hoc appointment against a post carrying higher scale of pay and to seek post facto approval and once such approval is obtained, it shall relate back to the date of Ad hoc appointment. Mr. Swain further argues that Rule 8(2) (a) relates to fresh appointment on Ad hoc basis while Rule 8(2)(b) relates to appointment to a post carrying higher scale of pay by an employee of the same Institution subject to fulfillment of other conditions. As such both the sub-rules are to be read disjunctively. Mr. Swain has relied upon the following decisions;

(i) Balaji Sahu v. State of Odisha and others;2018 (II) OLR 761.

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(ii) Itishree Ray v. State of Odisha and others;1998 (I) OLR 520.

(iii) Prafulla Kumar Pallai v. State of Orissa and others; 1999 SCC (L & S)

777.

(iv) Nilambar Satpathy v. State of Orissa and others; W.P.(C) No.7299/2005 disposed of on 16.4.2010.

(v) Managing Committee, Majjhipada M.E.School; 1992(1) OLR 447

(vi) State Of Orissa & Others v. Nabin Kumar Beura Beura; 2010 (II) ILR CUT 681

7. Mr. Swain further argues that even assuming that the requirement of prior approval is absolute yet considering the fact that the Petitioner has served as the Headmaster for several years without any interruption or objection by the Director, it must be construed as deemed approval of the Director to the promotion as was held by this Court in the case of

Prafulla Kumar Palei v. State of Orissa and others; reported in 1999 SCC (L & S) 777. Summing up his argument, Mr. Swain would urge as an alternative contention that several similarly situated Teachers have been granted post facto approval and therefore,

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 9 of 28 not granting the same benefit to the Petitioner would amount to gross discrimination being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, Mr. Swain has relied upon a decision of this Court rendered in the case of Nilambar Satpathy v. State of Orissa and others (W.P.(C) No.7299/2005 decided on 16.4.2010), wherein, relying upon the ratio of

Managing Committee, Majhipada M.E. School

(supra) direction was issued to consider the case of the Petitioner of that case regarding post facto approval.

8. Opposing the contentions put forth on behalf of the Petitioner as noted above, Mr. B. Mohanty, learned Standing Counsel for the School and Mass Education Department, argues that there cannot be watering down of the statutory provision in the manner suggested by the Petitioner as it would be entirely contrary to the legislative intent. Mr.Mohanty, further argues that the legislature in its wisdom has provided that the Managing Committee can make fresh appointments on Ad hoc basis, but in case of filling up

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 10 of 28 vacancies of posts carrying higher scale of pay by employees of the same Institution, prior approval of the Director is mandatory. Obviously, the legislative intent is to prevent possible arbitrary and mala fide intention as also favoritism by the Management of the Institution. The amended portion must therefore, be understood to have been incorporated in the context of fresh appointments only. Mr. B.Mohanty has relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Odisha and others v. Nabin Kumar Beura; reported in 2010 (II) ILR-CUT-681 to buttress his contentions.

9. On a consideration of the rival contentions noted above, it is apparent that the dispute boils down to interpretation of Rule 8 (2) and its two clauses namely,

(a) and (b). For immediate reference, the Rule is quoted herein below;

"8(2)Notwithstanding anything to be contrary in these rules it shall not be necessary to apply to or submit any appointment made by the Managing Committee of Governing Body to the Selection Board, if-

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(a) The appointment is made on ad hoc basis for a period not exceeding three months; or

(b) The vacancy in a post, carrying higher scale of pay, is filled up with prior approval of Government in case of a College and the concerned Director in case of an institution other than a College, by an employee of the same institution who possesses the prescribed qualifications and experience and whose performance in respect of the post he holds, has been found satisfactory. Such appointment shall be treated as regular appointment from the date, the same is filled up on ad hoc basis by the Managing Committee or the Governing Body, as the case may be, in the event of its approval by the competent authority." (Emphasis Supplied)

Prior to 3.6.1988, the Rule was as follows:

8(2) Notwithstanding anything to be contrary in these rules it shall not be necessary to apply to or submit any appointment made by the Managing Committee of Governing Body to the Selection Board, if-

(a) The appointment is made for a period not exceeding three months against a vacancy arising out of the relinquishment of charge by or removal of an employee; or

(b) The vacancy in a post, carrying higher scale of pay, is filled up with prior approval of Government in case of a College and the concerned Director in case of an institution other than a College, by an employee of the same institution who possesses the prescribed

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 12 of 28 qualifications and experience and whose performance in respect of the post he holds, has been found satisfactory. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis Supplied)

Thus, the following was added to Clause (b) of sub-rule (2) after the amendment;

"Such appointment shall be treated as regular appointment from the date, the same is filled up on ad hoc basis by the Managing Committee or the Governing Body, as the case may be, in the event of its approval by the competent authority."

10. The Rules of statutory interpretation require that the statute, in the present case the relevant provision, has to be read as a whole in its context. In this context, it would be relevant to note that Rule 8 occurs under Chapter-II titled 'The Selection Board'. Rules 4 to 7 were repealed by Orissa Education (Selection Board for the State) Rules, 1992 w.e.f. 1^stOctober, 1992. Rule-8 carves out exceptions to selection by the Board. The Petitioner, already stated, was appointed in the year 1990 as an Asst. Teacher and was promoted as Headmaster on 3^rdMay, 2008, i.e. after repeal of Rules 4 to 7. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 13 of 28 as quoted above begins with a non-obstante clause giving liberty to the Management of the Institution to not apply to or submit any appointment made by it to the Selection Board in the following two cases;

(a) If the appointment is made on Ad hoc basis for a period not exceeding three months, or

(b) If the vacancy in a post carrying higher scale of pay is filled up with prior approval of the Director by an employee of the same Institution.

11. There is no dispute that prior approval of the Director was not obtained by the Managing Committee before appointing/promoting the Petitioner to the post of Headmaster of the School. While this omission on the part of the Managing Committee is cited as ground by the Director to invalidate the

promotion/appointment so made, the Petitioner, on the other hand, harps upon the amended portion of Clause (b) to contend that the expression 'prior approval' ought to be read down to imply that post facto approval could also be obtained to validate the appointment/promotion.

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12. Before proceeding further to interpret the provisions, it would be proper to first refer to the case laws relied upon by Mr. Swain. A reading of the said case laws reveals that in none of the said cases the effect of amendment to sub-rule 2(b) of the Rule was considered. This Court therefore, finds the case laws inapplicable to the fact situation obtaining in the present case. However, in view of what was decided in the case of Managing Committee, Majhipada M.E. School (supra), it would be profitable to refer to the same. It must be kept in mind that the said case involved alleged violation of Rule 5 (8) of the Rules which also required obtaining prior approval of the Inspector and read as follows:

"5(8). It shall not be necessary to apply to the Selection Board for appointments to vacancies [for a period of six months or till the date of receipt of the list referred to in sub-rule (2) from the Selection Board whichever is earlier] and all such appointments may be made by the Managing Committee or the Governing Body, as the case may be, with the prior approval of the Inspector in respect of an Institution other than a

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 15 of 28 College and of the Director in respect of a College."

Rule 5(9) was also discussed in detail, which is quoted herein below;

"5(9). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (8), it shall be competent for the Managing Committee or the Governing Body, as the case may be, to extend the term of appointment beyond six months till the recommendation of the Selection Board is received with the prior approval of Government."

It was held under Paragraph-10 as follows;

"The purpose behind drawing our attention to this letter is that though Rule 5(9) speaks of 'prior approval' post facto approval was accorded by the Government by a general communication covering a large number of cases. It has also been the experience of this Court that prior approval as required by Rule 5(9) of the Rules is very rarely taken of the concerned authority and matter is referred to the authority only after appointment is made by the Managing Committee and the concerned authority thereafter accords approval retrospectively with effect from the permissible date. So, the strict letter of the rules has not been insisted upon and we would be upsetting the general convention followed after the making of the rule, if we are to hold that any appointment made without prior approval would be illegal in the eye of law. This we should not like to do;

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 16 of 28 indeed, we would use the thinking of the relevant authorities about the real requirement of the rule according to them, to interpret the same in that vein. This aid is permissible."

Thus, considering the convention, this Court held under Paragraphs-13 and 14 as follows;

"13. We would, therefore, read down the requirement of the rule relating to prior approval as mere approval, which can be post facto also. It may be stated that in law it is permissible to read down a statutory provision to make the same intra vires and reasonable. Reference may be made in this connection to In re Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1941 FC 72: All Saints High School v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR,1980 SC 1042; Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, page 109 : Bidie v. Gen. Accident, Fire and life Insurance Corporation, (1948) 2 All E.R. 995 ; to the observations of Holmes, J. in Towne

v. Eigner, (1917) 245 US 413 : 62 L.Ed. 372, 376; to what was stated by Gwyer, J. in Central Provinces and Berar Act, (1939) FCR 18 ; and to the observation of the apex Court in Kedar Nath Singh v. State Of Bihar ., (1962) Supp. (2) SCR 769. According to us, it would be unreasonable, as it would unsettle the settled practice, if we were to hold that the letter of the law, which requires prior approval, must mean what it says, and giving of approval afterwards would not meet the requirement of law. To make the

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 17 of 28 provision reasonable, we would therefore, read it down.

14. So, because of lack of prior approval, appointment of a teacher cannot be regarded to be invalid. But then, what view has to be taken regarding the validity of the appointment if there be no approval even afterwards? As to this question, we would say that the answer would depend on the fact as to who is questioning the appointment. If the approving authority raises this question, the same would be permissible, and what it too can do is to refuse approval, the effect of which would be that the teacher cannot continue after the approval is refused. This action would not amount to invalidation of the very appointment, so much so as to regard the same as void, because of which it could even be suggested that the teacher was not entitled to receive his salary for the period of service rendered by him prior to the date of refusal of the approval which would have disastrous consequences. We cannot permit such a consequence to take effect, because if it were to be held that in such a case the teacher was not even entitled to receive his salary, an effort may be made to recover the same from him. There is another reason for our taking the aforesaid view, which is based on the de facto doctrine, which is invoked when a prayer for issuing a writ of quo warranto is issued when the holder of the office has no valid title to it, inter alia, because he lacks the necessary

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 18 of 28 eligibility condition to be appointed to the office in question. If the de facto doctrine can apply, as it does, even when the office holder lacks the requisite qualification to hold the office, the same has to apply, a fortiorari, to those cases where infirmity in appointment is based on non-fulfilment of a statutory condition like approval of some other authority. The de facto doctrine does not permit invalid appointments to be treated as void appointments because of the serious consequences that might follow if the appointments were to be treated as void."

13. Mr. Swain has basically endeavored to persuade this Court to adopt the same principle to read down the expression 'prior approval' occurring in Rule 8 (2)(b) more or less on similar grounds.

14. This Court finds that another Division Bench of this Court in Nabin Kumar Beura (Supra) however, referred to the observations made in the case of

Managing Committee, Majhipada M.E. School

(supra) in extenso, but nevertheless held that post facto approval could not be obtained as a matter of right when the institution is already an aided institution.

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 19 of 28 However, keeping in view the principle laid down in

Managing Committee, Majhipada M.E. School

(supra), it was held that the refusal of the authority to accord approval would only operate prospectively and since the Institution had utilized the services of the person concerned, he shall be entitled to grant-in-aid till the date of refusal to accord approval.

15. Having dealt with the case laws relied upon by the parties, this Court would proceed to analyze the effect of amendment of the provision under Rule 8(2)(b). If the entire rule is read as a whole, it would be evident that Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) relates to fresh appointment made by the Managing Committee on Ad hoc basis for a period of three months. The word 'Ad hoc' as per Black's Law Dictionary 7^thEdition means- formed for a particular purpose and in the present context, would obviously mean temporarily i.e. for three months. Clause (b), on the other hand, does not contain any such expression rather it refers to filling up of vacancy in a post carrying higher scale of pay by

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 20 of 28 an employee of the same aided Institution with the rider that the same should be with prior approval of the competent authority. It is clear that such appointment is intended to be permanent in nature and not Ad hoc or for any particular purpose and/or for a particular duration of time.

16. Coming to the amended portion, which has been quoted hereinbefore, the same provides for treating appointment on Ad hoc basis by the Managing Committee as regular appointment from the date it is filled up as such upon approval by the competent authority. This obviously relates to a post facto approval. It has been argued at length on behalf of the Petitioner that being inserted as part of Clause (b) it also implies that the filling up of vacancy by the Managing Committee as referred to in the earlier part of the clause can also be Ad hoc in nature. As otherwise, the whole amendment itself becomes superfluous and unnecessary which cannot be the case. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 21 of 28 of the State that notwithstanding its placement as part of Clause (b), which could be due to the draftsman's error or an act of inadvertence, the same can only relate to fresh appointment made on Ad hoc basis by the Managing Committee as provided under Clause (a).

17. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the arguments as above. If the interpretation as suggested by learned counsel for the Petitioner were to be accepted, it would render the expression 'prior approval' occurring in the first part of the provision redundant and otiose. But then, legislature cannot be presumed to have used an expression superfluously. Had such been the intention of the legislature, it could as well have deleted the expression 'prior approval' occurring in the first part of the provision. Thus, this Court is faced with a situation, where there is an apparent conflict/contradiction between the unamended and amended parts of Clause (b). Of course, this Court is conscious of the cardinal principal of interpretation that the words and

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 22 of 28 expressions used in a statute are to be given their plain and grammatical meaning, but then in view of what has been discussed hereinbefore, it is difficult on the face of it to reconcile the conflicting provisions as stated above. Faced with such a situation, the Court has no option but to rely upon the principle embodied in the maxim, Reddendo Singula Singulis, which basically means, when a sentence in a statute contains several antecedents and several consequences, they are to be read distributively, that is to say, each phrase or expression is to be referred to its appropriate objects.

18. The Black's Law Dictionary 7^thEdition refers to reddendo singula singulis as 'assigning or distributing separate things to separate person or separate words to separate subjects'. Applying this Rule is perhaps the only way to reconcile the apparently conflicting sentences occurring in the provision under Clause (b) of sub-rule (2). As has already been stated hereinbefore, the statute has to be read as a whole and

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 23 of 28 one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statue. Further, such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid a head on clash between two sections of the same Act and, whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonize. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers; reported in 2003 (3) SCC 57 wherein, it was held as follows;

"14. A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be avoided. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. (See Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edition), page 361, Craies on Statutes (7th Edition) page 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edition) page 221.)

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15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.

16. The Courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used.

17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes vs. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries (1940) 3 All E.R. 549 (CL) referred to in Pye vs. Minister for Lands for NSW (1954) 3 All ER 514 (PC). The principles indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India (AIR 1992 SC 1)

18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.

19. The Court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. [See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and Anr. (AIR 1992 SC 81)]. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the Court to avoid a head on clash between two sections of the same Act. [See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain.

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20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. It should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other.

21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "useless lumber' or 'dead letter' is not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy."

(Emphasis Supplied)

Therefore, in construing the provision under Rule 8 the reasonable interpretation would be, notwithstanding its placement in Clause (b) the amended provision shall relate to clause (a) only and not to Clause (b). In other words, the provision permitting grant of post-facto approval shall relate to Ad hoc appointment provided under Clause (a). As has been argued by learned State counsel, the placement of the amended portion in Clause (b), could be due to the error of the draftsman or even an act of inadvertence but whatever it may be, the effect of the amendment cannot be construed so narrowly. It is only in the above manner that the apparent conflict can be harmonized so as to give effect to the

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 26 of 28 legislative intent. This Court finds itself persuaded to agree with the reasoning suggested by the learned State counsel that the requirement of prior approval in case of filling up of vacancy in posts carrying higher scale of pay by employees of the same aided Institution by the Managing Committee seems to be to prevent arbitrary, whimsical, capricious, malafide actions as also of nepotism and favoritism.

19. For the reasons indicated in detail hereinbefore, this Court is unable to accept the contentions raised by Mr. Swain on behalf of the Petitioner. Such being the finding of this Court, the natural corollary would be to concur with the order of rejection of the application for approval by the Director. Undoubtedly, the Petitioner's appointment/promotion did not have any sanction of law, but then this Court also being a Court of equity, cannot remain oblivious to the fact that several similarly situated persons have been granted such benefit. The reason for grant of such benefit notwithstanding the statutory provision is

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 27 of 28 neither forthcoming nor something that this Court would like to dwell upon. But fact remains that some orders have been passed by the Director, copies of which are enclosed as Annexure-8 series to the Writ Petition, granting approval, which is in the nature of a post facto approval to similar appointments/ promotions made/granted by the Managing Committees. It is further to be kept in mind that the Petitioner has been discharging the duty of Headmaster since 8^thOctober, 2008. The proposal to obtain approval was moved within a reasonably short time i.e. on 17^thJanuary, 2009 and yet the Government took nearly 5 years to respond that too being directed by this Court and ultimately, the Director rejected the case of the Petitioner on 5^th August, 2016, which is after a long period of nearly 8 years. There has never been any objection from any quarter, much less from the side of the Director or the State functionaries to the functioning of the Petitioner as such. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, ends of justice would be best served if the

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W.P.(C) No. 15569 of 2016 Page 28 of 28 impugned order is allowed to operate prospectively as was done in the case of Nabin Kumar Beura (Supra).

20. For the foregoing reasons therefore, the Writ Petition is partly allowed. The impugned order under Annexure-7 is confirmed subject to the modification that it shall operate from the date of its issue, i.e. on and from 5^thAugust, 2016 only. It is made clear that the Petitioner shall be entitled to all financial benefits including grant-in-aid till the above date.

21. Before parting with the case, this Court would like to point out that ambiguities in statutory provisions as is seen in the instant case, can be properly addressed if the same are referred to the Law commission of the State for examination and making necessary suggestions to the State Government to make corrections, if any, to the statutes. This court hopes that the concerned authorities shall do the needful in this regard.

………..…….……………. Sashikanta Mishra, Ashok Kumar Behera Judge

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