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SHREE SAINATH INFRATECH PVT LTD & ANR v. MS. KAMLESH
Factual and Procedural Background
The matter concerns IA No.621/2023 in AEA-04/2023: an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal by the appellants SHREE SAINATH INFRATECH PVT. LTD. & ANR. against Kamlesh. The impugned order was an ex-parte judgment dated 05.05.2022 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (West) in CC No.545/2018. The present appeal was filed on 16.03.2023. The appellants sought condonation of delay in filing the appeal and advanced reasons and citations in support of their application. The Commission examined statutory limitation under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, relevant case law on the meaning of "sufficient cause", and the factual explanation offered by the appellants before rendering its decision on 12.04.2023.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the delay in filing the appeal (filed 16.03.2023 against an order dated 05.05.2022) can be condoned under the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, i.e., whether the appellants have shown "sufficient cause" for filing the appeal after the statutory period.
- Whether the explanation furnished by the appellants (including the date on which they became aware of the impugned order and their belief regarding the limitation period) satisfies the tests and principles laid down by the cited authorities for condonation of delay.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appeal challenges the District Commission's ex-parte order dated 05.05.2022 in CC No.545/2018; the appeal was filed on 16.03.2023 and an application for condonation of delay was moved.
- The appellants averred that they came to know of the ex-parte order only when they received a copy of the Execution Petition on 16.12.2022.
- The appellants contended that the limitation period for preferring an appeal was forty-five days (their claimed understanding), and that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate.
- The appellants asserted they had a good and bona fide prima facie case and that they would suffer irreparable loss if the appeal were not admitted, hence the application for condonation.
- The application referred to the Apex Court's explanation of "sufficient cause" in Basawaraj (AIR 2014 SC 746) to support the request for condonation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Basawaraj and Ors. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 | Explanation of the meaning of "sufficient cause" — what constitutes adequate or bona fide grounds for delay; requirement that the applicant must satisfy the Court that they were prevented by "sufficient cause" from prosecuting the case. | The Commission used this authority to articulate the standard for "sufficient cause" and to evaluate whether the appellants' explanation met that standard; it concluded the appellants did not furnish a satisfactory explanation under that test. |
| Anil Kumar Sharma v. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC) | Emphasis that prolonged delays (e.g., 590/601 days in that case) require satisfactory explanation including day-to-day delay; caution against entertaining highly belated appeals in consumer matters given statutory special periods for expeditious adjudication. | The Commission cited this decision to underscore the need for a clear, day-to-day explanation for delay and to highlight the policy of timely disposal of consumer disputes; it found the appellants' explanation deficient in that regard. |
| Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) (as cited in Anil Kumar Sharma) | Principle that the special period of limitation under the Consumer Protection Act must be kept in mind and that entertaining highly belated appeals undermines expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes. | Referenced (through the Anil Kumar Sharma citation) to support the Commission's view that long delays should not be readily condoned in consumer matters without adequate explanation. |
| Lingeswaran etc. v. Thirunagalingam, Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054-2055/2022 | Where delay has not been properly explained and there are no merits in the condonation application, the application should be dismissed; condoning delay in such circumstances would reward inaction and laches. | The Commission relied on this authority to support the approach that, absent proper explanation and merit, condonation should be refused; it applied that reasoning to the appellants' deficient explanation. |
| Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 | Limitation must be applied with full rigour where the statute prescribes it; courts cannot extend limitation on equitable grounds merely because hardship might result. | The Commission invoked this principle to emphasize that statutory limitation periods (here Section 15 CPA 1986) must be enforced and that the Court has no power to extend the period on equitable grounds where the statutory regime prescribes time limits. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Commission first identified the statutory period under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986: an appeal to the State Commission must be filed within thirty days from the date of the District Forum's order, subject to the State Commission entertaining an appeal after that period if satisfied that there was "sufficient cause" for not filing within time. The impugned order was dated 05.05.2022 and the appeal was filed on 16.03.2023, giving rise to a delay of 285 days beyond the 30-day period.
The Commission reviewed the appellants' written explanation: (i) they learned of the ex-parte order only upon receipt of the Execution Petition on 16.12.2022; (ii) they believed the limitation period was forty-five days; (iii) they claimed the delay was not intentional and that they had a prima facie good case. The Commission noted that paragraphs 2–6 of the condonation application contained this explanation but found the appellants failed to explain what actions were taken after 16.12.2022 to file the appeal.
Applying the legal principles in Basawaraj (definition of "sufficient cause"), the Commission examined whether the appellants had acted diligently and bona fide and whether a satisfactory explanation for the delay was furnished. The Commission also considered authorities stressing the need for day-to-day explanation for delay in lengthy cases and the limited scope for entertaining belated appeals in consumer matters (Anil Kumar Sharma; Anshul Aggarwal; Lingeswaran; Popat Bahiru Goverdhane).
The Commission rejected the appellants' stated belief that the limitation was forty-five days, observing the maxim "ignorance of law is no excuse". It further found that the appellants did not provide a day-to-day account of the delay after 16.12.2022 and therefore failed to satisfy the requirement of "sufficient cause" as elaborated in the cited precedents. On that basis, the Commission concluded there was no cogent reason to condone the delay.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The application for condonation of delay is dismissed and, consequently, the appeal filed beyond the stipulated period stands dismissed.
Direct consequences on the parties:
- The appellants' application for condonation of delay was not admitted and was dismissed on the grounds that "sufficient cause" was not shown.
- The appeal itself, being filed outside the statutory period and without sufficient cause shown for the delay, is dismissed.
- The Commission ordered that there shall be no orders as to costs in the facts of the case, and the file is to be consigned to the record room.
Broader implications: The opinion underscores and applies established authorities on the limited scope for condoning delay in consumer appeals, the need for a clear, day-to-day explanation for long delays, and the principle that ignorance of the law (including mistaken belief about the limitation period) is not a sufficient ground. The decision does not purport to set any new legal precedent; it applies existing precedents to the facts at hand.
Disposition and Administrative Notes
Order dated 12.04.2023 by the National/State Commission: application for condonation dismissed; appeal dismissed; no costs; file consigned to record room. The order bears the signatures/mentions of Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal (President), (Pinki) Member (Judicial), and (J.P. Agrawal) Member, as recorded in the provided opinion.
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SHREE SAINATH INFRATECH PVT. LTD. & ANR. V.
KAMLESH
12.04.2023
IA No.621/2023 IN AEA-04/2023
Vide this order, we shall dispose of the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
Perusal of the record shows that the present appeal was filed on 16.03.2023, challenging the impugned order dated 05.05.2022 passed by District Commission (West) in CC. No.545/2018. An application has been moved on behalf of the Appellant seeking condonation of delay of on the following grounds:
1. …
2. That the Ex-parte Order was passed by District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-III (West) on dated 05.05.2022 and the limitation period for preferring an appeal against the said order is forty-five days. However, the same can be condoned if this Hon'ble Commission is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing within this period.
3. That the Appellant/Opposite Party was apprised with the knowledge of this ex-parte Order dated 05.05.2022 when the Appellant/Opposite Party received copy of the Execution Petition on dated
16.12.2022.
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4. That the term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under: -
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is
"adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.
"
5. That the Appellant Opposite Party is still having period of limitation to file the present Appeal and is not time barred and the delay i filing of present
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Appeal was neither intentional nor deliberate one but due to above mentioned reasons.
6. That the appellant Opposite Party is having good and bonafide prima facie case in his favour and if delay in filing the the present appeal is not condoned then the Appellant/Opposite Party would suffer irreparable loss and injury which cannot be compensated in any manner, hence the present application.
Since the complaint case was filed in the year 2018, therefore, to adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under:
"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order
in such form and manner as may be prescribed. Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less." Perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an impugned order should be preferred within a period of thirty
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days from the date of such order. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned judgment was pronounced on 05.05.2022 and the present appeal was filed on 16.03.2023 with a delay of 285 days, though the Appellant has stated that the appeal is not barred by limitation. In order to condone the delay, the Appellant has to satisfy this commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported at AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or
"enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
"sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,
"sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any
"sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the
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Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.
" We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. reported at
IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon'ble NCDRC held as under: -
"12. ………we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained
." We further deem it appropriate to refer to judgment dated 25.02.2022 passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054-2055/2022 titled as Lingeswaran Etc. Versus Thirunagalingam, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -
"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the
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matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the
law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble National Commission, it is clear that 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
On perusal of record before us, Para 2 to Para 6 of the application for condonation of delay is the explanation given by the Appellant for the delay caused in filing this appeal. It has been stated that the Appellant came to know about the impugned order on 16.12.2022 when it received the copy of the execution petition. However, the Appellant has failed to
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explain the reasons what action it took for filing the appeal after
16.12.2022.
It is further stated that the Appellant was under the bonafide belief that the limitation period was 45 days and not 30 days. There is a maxim that "ignorance of law is no excuse". Therefore, we do not find any cogent reason for condoning the delay as admitted by the Appellant himself. The Appellant failed to explain the day-to-day delay caused after the pronouncement of the impugned judgment.
Having regard to the statutory position discussed above and the facts of the case, the Appellant failed to show any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present appeal. Therefore, the application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly, the dismissed on the above grounds.
Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the stipulated period shall also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no orders as to cost.
File be consigned to record room.
(Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal)
President
(Pinki)
Member (Judicial)
(J.P. Agrawal)
Member
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