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RAVISHANKAR CHUNILAL PALIWAL (MEHTA) v. STATE OF GUJARAT
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion addresses three criminal miscellaneous applications filed under Article 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashment of multiple First Information Reports (FIRs) related to alleged offences arising from a pilgrimage tour organized by "Shera Charitable Trust" under the name "SehraPrantYatraSangh". The FIRs were registered at various police stations in Vadodara and Surat districts. The complainants allege that the accused collected large sums of money from pilgrims for a Mansarovar pilgrimage, but failed to obtain the necessary visas and did not complete the pilgrimage, subsequently refusing refunds. The applicants contend that after the first FIR was registered, the subsequent FIRs are repetitive and based on the same allegations, and thus should be quashed to avoid multiple prosecutions for the same offence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether multiple FIRs registered in relation to the same set of facts and allegations amount to multiple prosecutions for the same offence, thereby violating the protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India against double jeopardy.
- Whether subsequent FIRs that arise from the same incident or transaction can be quashed on the basis of the "test of sameness".
- Whether offences alleged in multiple FIRs that are similar in nature but registered at different police stations and involving different complainants can be tried together or separately.
- The applicability and interpretation of Sections 218, 219, 220, and 221 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding joinder of charges and trial of multiple offences.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants' Arguments
- The first FIR registered on 06.11.2018 at Adajan police station is the primary complaint, and all subsequent FIRs are mere repetitions of the same allegations.
- Article 20(2) of the Constitution prohibits prosecution and punishment for the same offence more than once, supported by the legal maxim nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.
- Once investigation and charge-sheeting based on the first FIR is complete, subsequent FIRs on the same facts should not lead to multiple prosecutions.
- Reliance on Supreme Court decisions establishing the principle that multiple FIRs arising from the same transaction or incident cannot be sustained.
- Application of the "test of sameness" to determine whether FIRs relate to the same incident or transaction, warranting quashing of subsequent FIRs.
- Reference to the Court's previous decision in Modnath Vaidhyanath Misha vs. State of Gujarat and other Apex Court rulings to support their position.
Respondent's Arguments
- All FIRs are distinct and pertain to separate offences, and can be tried under the same roof but not quashed.
- Section 218 of the Code mandates separate charges for distinct offences.
- Section 219 permits trial of up to three offences of the same kind committed within a year together, but does not bar separate trials for each offence.
- Section 219 refers to offences and not transactions, allowing separate trials even if offences are similar in nature.
- The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure allow for joinder or separate trial depending on circumstances, and no illegality arises from separate trials.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2013) 6 SCC 348 | Quashing of subsequent FIRs when they form part of the same transaction or conspiracy. | Applied to assess whether subsequent FIRs relate to the same incident and are thus impermissible. |
| Chirra Shivraj vs. State of A.P., AIR 2011 SC 604 | Principle against multiple prosecutions for the same offence. | Relied upon to support applicants' contention under Article 20(2). |
| Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat and others, (2010) 12 SCC 254 | Test of sameness for quashing subsequent FIRs; distinction between parts of the same transaction and different crimes. | Extensively discussed to analyze whether FIRs arise from the same transaction. |
| C. Muniappan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 | Principles regarding joint trial and multiple offences. | Referenced in context of trial procedures and joinder of offences. |
| Upkar Singh vs. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 | Interpretation of sections 218 and 219 of CrPC relating to joinder of charges and trial of offences. | Used to clarify that separate trials for offences of same kind are permissible. |
| T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181 | Trial of multiple offences and joinder of charges. | Applied to emphasize discretion in permitting joint trial and separate trials. |
| S.Swamirathnam vs. State of Madras, 1957 AIR(SC) 340 | Single conspiracy and same transaction principle for cheating offences. | Relied upon to illustrate single conspiracy covering multiple acts. |
| State of Jharkhand vs. Lalu Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav, AIR 2017 SC 3389 | Distinction between separate offences over different periods and joint trial principles under Article 20(2) and CrPC sections 219, 220, 221. | Applied to hold that offences of same kind within one year may be tried together but separate trials are not illegal. |
| Ram Nath Rai vs. Emperor, 1934 LawSuit (Pat) 55 | Single offence principle in retention of stolen property. | Used to support that series of acts may constitute one offence if connected as one transaction. |
| Ram Sarup Benia vs. Emperor, (1905) 9 CWN 1027 | Distinction between separate offences and single transaction in retention of stolen property. | Applied to demonstrate when multiple items can be treated as one offence for trial purposes. |
| Emperor vs. Sheo Charan, 1923 AII 547 | Definition of "transaction" in criminal proceedings and its effect on trial of multiple offences. | Referenced to explain the concept of one transaction covering multiple offences. |
| R. v. Griffith, 1965 (2) AER 448 | Conspiracy charges should be tried separately from substantive offences. | Quoted to caution against combined conspiracy and substantive offence trials causing confusion. |
| State of A P v. Cheemalapti Ganeswara Rao & Anr., (1964) 3 SCR 297 | Misjoinder of parties and the meaning of "same transaction". | Applied to elucidate factors determining whether offences form part of the same transaction. |
| Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, (1964) 2 SCR 378 | Separate conspiracies and their distinction as separate offences. | Used to affirm that distinct conspiracies are distinct offences not barred by Article 20(2). |
| Gopal Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 905 | Issue estoppel and separate offences committed in different periods. | Relied upon to reject estoppel where offences occur in different periods with different facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the factual matrix and legal principles governing multiple FIRs and trials for offences arising from the same or related transactions. It recognized that while the applicants argued for quashing of subsequent FIRs on the ground of repetition and protection against double jeopardy under Article 20(2), the State contended that the FIRs were distinct and could be tried together or separately.
The Court extensively reviewed the Apex Court precedents elucidating the "test of sameness" to determine whether multiple FIRs relate to the same incident or transaction. It acknowledged that if multiple FIRs arise from the same transaction or form part of the same conspiracy, subsequent FIRs could be quashed. However, if the FIRs pertain to different facets or distinct offences, separate FIRs and trials are permissible.
The Court emphasized the provisions of Sections 218, 219, 220, and 221 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provide for separate charges for distinct offences, allow up to three offences of the same kind committed within a year to be tried together, and authorize separate trials where appropriate.
Applying these principles to the present case, the Court observed that the offences alleged in the FIRs, although similar in nature and possibly part of a single conspiracy or modus operandi, involved different complainants and police stations. The Court declined to quash the subsequent FIRs at this stage without trial, noting that the offences could be tried together under Section 219 as enabling provision, but separate trials would not be illegal.
The Court directed that the FIRs registered in Vadodara district be transferred and tried together with the ongoing case at Surat, ensuring judicial efficiency and avoiding multiplicity of trials, without conceding the quashing of any FIR.
Holding and Implications
The applications for quashing the subsequent First Information Reports are dismissed.
The Court held that multiple FIRs arising from the same or similar offences involving different complainants and police stations are not liable to be quashed merely on the ground of repetition, especially where the offences may be distinct or parts of separate transactions. However, the Court directed consolidation of trials by transferring the FIRs from Vadodara to Surat for trial together with the ongoing matter, pursuant to Sections 218 and 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This decision does not set a new precedent on quashing FIRs but clarifies the application of existing principles regarding multiple FIRs, joinder of charges, and trial procedures, balancing protection against double jeopardy with the procedural rights of the prosecution to pursue distinct offences.
R/CR.MA/5113/2019 ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 5113 of 2019 With
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 5128 of 2019 With
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 5127 of 2019
==========================================================
RAVISHANKAR CHUNILAL PALIWAL (MEHTA)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
========================================================== Appearance:
ANMOL SUROLLIA(9379) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2 MR DIPESH D SONI(9996) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2 NISARG N JAIN(8807) for the Respondent(s) No. 2 MR HARDIK SONI, ADDL.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR(2) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI
Date : 10/06/2019
ORAL ORDER
1 These are the applications preferred under Article 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashment of the First Information Reports being CR.No.I-94 of 2018 dated 02.12.2018 registered with Navapura police station, District-Vadodara, which has culminated into Criminal Case No.4860 of 2019. First Information Report being CR.No.I-206 of 2018
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dated 16.11.2018 registered with Karjan police station, District:Vadodara, which has culminated into Criminal Case No.22 of 2019 and CR.No.I-245 of 2018 dated 13.11.2018 registered with Manjalpur police station, District: Vadodara, which has culminated into Criminal Case NO.1407 of 2019.
2 All the three applications have been preferred by Ravishankar Chunilal Paliwal (Mehta) and Ashokbhai Parmanandbhai Suryavanshi. They are common accused in all the three First Information Reports, which have been preferred by different complainants.
3 Factual matrix and the law points raised in all the three petitions being identical, they are being decided by a common order. Facts are being drawn from Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 5113 of 2019.
4 It is the case of the prosecution that
"Shera Charitable Trust" in the name and style of "SehraPrantYatraSangh" organised a tour to
"Mansarovar". Public was invited to fill-up the
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form and subscription for the tour and more than 50 people opted for the same. From each person, Rs.85,000/- had been collected as package amount of the said tour. The complainant on 04.04.2018 deposited Rs.1,70,000/- in the bank account of one of the accused as a part of his fare for two persons for the tour of "Mansarovar" pilgrimage and the receipt also was provided to him. The total amount deposited by the complainant and others came to Rs.10,20,000/-. This pilgrimage was scheduled on 20.08.2018, but it was postponed to 26.08.2018 and thereafter to 17.09.2018 and to 21.09.2018. On 20.09.2018 the complainant along with other pilgrims had gone to Udhna railway station and he was conveyed by petitioner No.1 that one Shri Kishan Paliwal would be accompanying them in Bandra-Gorakhpur train. They were to go to Kathmandu and he ensured that he would be meeting them at Kathmandu directly with the Visa.
5 As the pilgrims reached Gorakhpur and then to Pokhra, they were made to stay for two days
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and were taken to Kathmandu. At that stage, it was informed that Visa to China had not been obtained and, therefore, further tour to Mansarovar could not be proceeded with.
6 It is the say of the first informant that when enquired at Indian Embassy at Kathmandu, Nepal, it came to their knowledge that
"SehraPrantYatraSangh" had not at all applied for the Visa of the pilgrims. After returning they went to the office of the Trust where it was assured by petitioner No.1 that due to unavoidable circumstances, the tour to
"Mansarovar" could not be completed, the refund would be provided on 03.10.2018. When they went to the office for refund, the same was refused and, therefore, the First Information Report came to be lodged with Adajan police station, Surat being CR.No.I-240 of 2018 on 06.11.2018. It is the say of the petitioner that there is another First Information Report being CR.No.I- 94 of 2018 registered with Navapura police station, Vadodara Rural on 02.12.2018. The
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allegations made there are nothing, but, repetition of the two FIRs, which have already been filed and there are two more First Information Reports arising from the same incident are filed being CR.No.I- 206 of 2018 dated 16.11.2018 registered with Karjan police station, District: Vadodara, which has culminated into Criminal Case No.22 of 2019 and CR.No.I-245 of 2018 dated 13.11.2018 registered with Manjalpur police station, District:
Vadodara, which has culminated into Criminal Case NO.1407 of 2019. Thus, there are four accused in number and two of whom are before this Court.
7 According to the applicants, after the First Information Report was registered on 06.11.2018 at Adajan police station, Surat rest of the FIRs are repetition. In the impugned First Information Report, the date of journey, place of commencement of journey and the destination thereon and the package amount and the duration of the journey etc, are all same.
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Therefore, all subsequent registrations of First Information Report after the first one being repetition of the first First Information Report and founded on the same allegations, must be quashed.
8 It is the say of the applicants that they cannot be subjected to three or more prosecution cases in relation to the same offences on the strength of the three FIRs, as once investigation in respect of the First Information Report is over and the chargesheet is filed in the concerned Court, the same would take care of subsequently registered First Information Reports.
9 According to the applicants, Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India provides that no person shall be proceeded against or punished for the same offence more than once. The basic principle is embodied in the maxim nemo debetbispuniri pro uno delicto that is to say, that no one ought to be punished twice for the offence or for the same cause. Therefore, it is
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a settled proposition of law that no person shall be vexed with more than one trial for the offences arising out of the same set of facts.
10 Reliance is placed on the following decisions of the Apex Court, which are as under:_
10.1 Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2013) 6
SCC 348.
10.2 Chirra Shivraj vs. State of A.P., AIR
2011 SC 604.
10.3 Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat and others, (2010) 12 SCC 254.
10.4 C. Muniappan vs. State of Tamil Nadu,
10.5 Upkar Singh vs. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13
SCC 292.
10.6 T.T.Antony vs. State of Kerala, (2001)
6 SCC 181.
11 This Court has heard learned advocate Mr. Anmol Surollia appearing with learned advocate
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Mr. D.D. Soni for the applicants, who have argued at length along the line of their applications and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. H.S.Soni for the respondent- State.
12 It is urged by learned advocate Mr.Surollia appearing with Mr. Soni that decision rendered by this Court in the case of Modnath Vaidhyanath Misha vs. State of Gujarat and another in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 6370 of 2013 on 30.06.2017 shall need to be regarded and applying the test of sameness, he has urged that when there is commonality in the First Information Reports, and when they have emerged from the same set of circumstances, the subsequent First Information Reports cannot be sustained.
12.1 He has heavily relied on the decision of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra), whereby it was revealed that the entire conspiracy of killing Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi and Tulsiram Prajapati had been covered by the First
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Information Report as the larger conspiracy was already forming part of the First Information Report for the murder of Tulsiram. The Supreme Court quashed the second First Information Report holding that killing of Tulsiram being part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of First Information Report, the same could not be sustained.
12.2 He has also relied on the decision of
S.Swamirathnam vs. State of Madras, 1957 AIR(SC) 340. In the said case, the Apex Court has held that there was single conspiracy to cheat members of the public and cheating was in pursuance of one conspiracy and the act was forming part of the same transaction.
12.3 Heavy reliance is placed by learned advocate on the provisions of section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to urge that when more than one piece of information is furnished to the police officer in-charge of the police station in respect of the same
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incident involving more than one cognizable offence, he need not register each pieces of information, but should register only one First Information Report and all other information provided to the police should be construed as statements falling under section 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
13 Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has urged that all the First Information Report are distinct and at the best can be tried under the same roof. It would be worthwhile to refer to Chapter XVII, under the heading of "The Charge- Joinder of charges", which speaks of separate charges for distinct offences. Under section 218 for every distinct offence, of which when any person is accused, a separate charge is to be framed. Section 218 provides, therefore, that three offence of same kind within a year may be charged together.
13.1 Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State has further urged that when a person is accused of more offences than one of
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the same kind, committed within the space of twelve months, from the first to the last of such offence, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three. Therefore, he has urged that section 219 of the Code refers to the offences and not the transactions.
13.2 He also urged that these provisions would apply where a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kinds, then trial for such offence is not barred. Even though such offence is based upon various acts, which by themselves are offences. He, however, fairly stated that there are decisions to indicate that if these offences are not of the same kind and exceed three in numbers, they cannot be joined in a single trial under this section.
13.3 This section, according to learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State authorizes three offences in one trial and
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would not bar a separate trial of accused for each separate offence and if a joint trial of three distinct offences is likely to lead to confusion, the Court can also refuse to try more than one offences.
14 Having thus heard both the sides and also having taken note of the fact that the accused in all four First Information Reports are identical and also noting that all the First Information Reports, speak of breach of trust and misappropriation of the amount collected by the petitioner No.1 for the purpose of pilgrimage of "Mansarovar", it can be noticed that the First Information Report, which has been lodged is dated 06.11.2018 at Surat, Adajan police station for the offences punishable under sections, 406, 420, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, details of which have been given are to the effect that both the petitioners and others remained present at
"SehraPrantYatraSangh" at Adajan road, Surat, whereby they had collected the amount of
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Rs.72,000/- for 16 days of tour to "Kailash Mansarovar", the date of which was scheduled 20.08.2018 and the amount also has been announced of Rs.85,000/-. The receipt also has been issued for the amount paid of Rs.85,000/- and the dates of pilgrimage went on being changed. Eventually, in the first informant also stated that for the Bandra Gorakhpur Terminus from Udhna, once again AC fare of Rs.2800/- had been demanded. They also asked for porter charges of Rs.400/- additionally at Kathmandu, Nepal. On 25.09.2018, he, with other pilgrims, was intimated that due to bad weather forecast, it is not possible to take the pilgrims on the return journey. They realized that in the last three to four years, he had not organized any
"Kailash Mansarovar" pilgrimage and has cheated him and many others. On the very line, others, who have been cheated have lodged First Information Reports at aforementioned police stations. The complainant of C.R.No.I-206 of 2018 registered with Karjan police station had
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also enquired with Indian Embassy at Kathmandu, Nepal in 2018 and realized that
"SehraPrantYatraSangh" has not applied for Visa for "Kailash Mansarovar" pilgrimage and the said Visa cannot be obtained without appointing Agent from Nepal or China. He had also published a false note that pilgrimage is not feasible because of the weather forecast. Rest of all the details are identical.
15 In 'BABUBHAI VS. STATE OF GUJARAT', (2010)
12 SCC 254, there were two separate FIRs in respect of the same transaction and the Apex Court was considering the test of sameness to hold that the subsequent registration of FIR is, if, in furtherance of the same incident or the incident, which are parts of the same transactions come to the fore, second FIR is impermissible. But, if, the second FIR pertains to two different facets of crime, second FIR is permissible. The Apex Court also has reiterated the well-known principle that an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is a very important
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document. It is the first information of commission of a cognizable offence, recorded by the police officer in-charge of a police station and it sets criminal machinery and law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation, which ends with the filing of the report under Section 169 of the Code and forwarding of the report under Section 173 of the Code. If, a Police Officer in-charge of a police station is given more than one piece of information of the same incident, he need not enter such information into diary. Although, information given is either oral or in writing, after once the investigation is commenced on the basis of the first information report, especially, statements under Section 162 of the Code.
16 The Apex Court also has held that in the case of second or subsequent FIR, the Court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out, whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of
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the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If, the answer is in affirmation, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case, in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different version or counter claim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted.
17 Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Patna High Court in 'RAMNATH RAI VS. EMPEROR', 1934 LawSuit (Pat) 55, where, the Patna High Court was considering the petition for the revision of the judgment of a Court of Sessions, rejecting an appeal from a Magistrate, who had convicted the petitioners under Section 411 for retaining four bullocks, knowing them to have been stolen. There was no evidence adduced,
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as to when the bullocks came into possession of the petitioner, but, it was proved that they were property of other persons.
17.1 The point for consideration before the Patna High Court was the objection of the petitioner was that the retention of each bullock was a separate offence, and therefore, there should be a separate trial and separate charge-sheets should have been preferred, where, the Court Court held that this fact was enough to constitute a single offence of retaining and there was no necessity as was held by the judges that a series of offences limited to three should have been charged.
18 Reliance is also placed on the decision in 'RAM SARUP BENIA VS. EMPEROR', (1905) 9 CWN 1027, where, three accused were charged with receiving or retaining eight sets of cooking utensils, stolen from different persons at different times, and on a second count with aiding or abetting each other in retaining such property. It was urged that in the first and
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second counts were illegal, as there was no evidence of separate receiving. However, the Court observed that in the matter of retaining, there was only one offence, although, there may have been separate offences of receiving. The judges held that the distinction was not of importance, but, held that there was a separate offence in respect of each of the articles alleged to have been dishonestly retained, but, that if it had been shown that the dishonest retention of all the articles was so connected as to form one transaction, more than three of such offence could have been charged and tried in one trial.
18.1 In 'EMPEROR VS. SHEO CHARAN', 1923 AII 547, It has been held in a series of cases that if a quantity of stolen property is found in possession of an individual in circumstances, which lead to the conclusion that he was retaining the whole of such property knowing it to have been stolen, there cannot be separate trial in respect of separate portions
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of the stolen property. The Court, further, held as under:
[7] It is perfectly true that considered in the light of derivation merely the etymological significance involves activity, but in its context in Section 235 it has a wider significance for which a synonym may be found in the word affair." If a man is found in concealed possession of a diamond necklace of which each individual diamond has been the subject of a separate theft and he knows that the diamonds have been stolen his dishonest possession of the necklace is one.
"transaction" in the sense that that words is used in Section 235.
[8] Similarly the simultaneous possession of a number of bullocks at a meal and the offer of them for sale is one "transaction" and any number of separately stolen bullocks may be the subject of a single trial. In my opinion,
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there is no substance in the point and I would dismiss this petition."
19 In 'STATE OF JHARKHAND VS. LALU PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD YADAV', AIR 2017 SC 3389, the question was of joint trial and double jeopardy. This had arisen out of three different and separate judgments and orders of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, discharging three accused persons namely Lalu Prasad Yadav, Sajal Chakraborty and Dr. Jagannath Mishra, on the ground of their conviction in one of the criminal cases arising out of the Fodder Scam of erstwhile State of Bihar. Applying the provisions under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and under Section 300 of the Code, whereby, the learned Single Judge quashed the FIRs on the ground that they have been convicted in one of the cases, involving the same ingredients with respect to Chaibasa treasury. The Apex Court, while considering the provisions of Section 300 of the Code, also considered the provisions of Sections
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219, 220 and 221 of the Code. The Court held that it is apparent from the provisions of Sections 212 and 219 that there needs to be a separate trial for the offences covering the different period for more than one year. The relevant observations read thus:
"24. This Court in Natwar Lal Sakar Lal Mody v. The State of Bombay 26 (1984) DLT 64 considered the question of joint trial of persons and offences for conspiracy as per provisions contained in section 239(d) of the old Cr.PC. This Court has laid down that separate trial is the rule and joint trial is an exception. Joint trial would be an irregular exercise of discretion if a court allows innumerable offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons to be under the protecting wings of an all-embracing conspiracy, and if each or some of the offences can be separately tried, it would be appropriate and lawful.
Joint trial prolongs the trial and causes waste of judicial time and complicates the matter which might otherwise be simple, and it would confuse the accused and cause prejudice to them. Court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is satisfied that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and committed the separate acts pursuant to conspiracy. This Court has laid down thus :
"11. This discussion leads us to the following legal position. Separate trial is the rule and joint trial is an exception. While Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a joint trial of person and offences within defined limits, it is within the discretion of the Court to permit such a joint trial or not, having regard
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to the circumstances of each case. It would certainly be an irregular exercise of discretion if a Court allows an innumerable number of offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons under the protecting wing of all-embracing conspiracy, if each or some of the offences can legitimately and properly form the subject-matter of a separate trial; such a joint trial would undoubtedly prolong the trial and would be a cause of unnecessary waste of judicial time. It would complicate matters which might otherwise be simple; it would confuse accused and cause prejudice to them, for more often than not accused who have taken part in one of the minor offences might have not only to undergo the long strain of protracted trial, but there might also be the likelihood of the impact of the evidence adduced in respect of other accused on the evidence adduced against him working to his detriment. Nor can it be said that such an omnibus charge or charges would always be in favour of the prosecution for the confusion introduced in the charges and consequently in the evidence may ultimately benefit some of the accused, as a clear case against one or other of the accused may be complicated or confused by the attempt to put it in a proper place in a larger setting. A Court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is clearly satisfied on the material placed before it that there is evidence to prove prima facie that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and they committed the separate acts attributed to them pursuant to the object of the said conspiracy."
(Emphasis Supplied)
25. This Court in Ranchhod Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1965 SC 1248 has also considered the question of joint trial in the case of criminal breach of trust. It has been observed that normal rule is that there should be a charge for each distinct offence. Court is authorized to lump up the various items with respect to which criminal breach of trust was committed and to mention the
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total amount misappropriated within a year in the charge. When so done, the charge is deemed to be the charge of one offence. This Court has laid down that a separate trial with respect to each distinct offence of criminal breach of trust with respect to an individual item is the correct mode of proceeding with the trial of an offence of criminal breach of trust. This Court has laid down thus : "(14.) Section 222, Cr. P.C. reads :
"(1) The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence, and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which, it was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.
(2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of
S. 234:
Provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one year." Sub-section (2) is an exception to meet a certain contingency and is not the normal rule with respect of framing of a charge in cases of criminal breach of trust. The normal rule is that there should be a charge for each distinct offence as provided in S. 233 of the Code. S. 222 mentions what the contents of the charge should be. It is only when it may not be possible to specify exactly particular items with respect to which criminal breach of trust took place or the exact date on which the individual items were misappropriated or in some similar contingency, that the Court is authorised to lump up the various items with respect to which criminal breach of trust was committed and to mention the total amount misappropriated with a year in the charge. When so done, the charge is deemed to be the charge of one offence. If several distinct
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items with respect to which criminal breach of trust has been committed are not so lumped together, no illegality is committed in the trial of those offences. In fact a separate trial with respect to each distinct offence of criminal breach of trust with respect to an individual item is the correct mode of proceeding with the trial of an offence of criminal breach of trust. (15.) Learned counsel for the appellant also relied on S. 234, Code of Criminal Procedure and urged that three offences of criminal breach of trust could have been tried at one trial as sec. 234 provides that when a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three. This again is an enabling provision and is an exception to sec. 233, Code of Criminal Procedure If each of the several offences is tried separately, there is nothing illegal about it. It may also be mentioned that the total number of items charged in the four cases exceeded three.
(16.) Lastly, reference was made, on behalf of the appellant to sec. 235, Code of Criminal Procedure and it was urged that all these offences were committed in the course of the same transaction, and therefore, they should have been tried at one trial. Assuming, without deciding, that these offences could be said to have been committed in the course of the same transaction, the separate trial of the appellant for certain specific offences is not illegal. This section too is an enabling section."
26. In R. v. Griffith 1965 (2) AER 448 it has been laid down that a conspiracy should be tried separately to substantive counts. The Court of Appeal in England has laid down thus : "9. The practice of adding what may be called a rolled up conspiracy charge to a number of counts of substantive offences has become common. We express the very strong hope that this practice will now cease and that the courts will never again have to
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struggle with this type of case, where it becomes almost impossible to explain to a jury that evidence inadmissible against the accused on the substantive count may be admissible against him on the conspiracy count once he is shown to be a conspirator. We do no believe that most juries can ever really understand the subtleties of the situation. In our judgment, except in simple cases, a conspiracy count (if one is needed at all) should be tried separately to substantive counts."
27. In State of A P v. Cheemalapti Ganeswara Rao & Anr. (1964) 3 SCR 297 this Court dealt with misjoinder of parties under section 239 of the old Cr.P.C. This Court with respect to 'same transaction' has observed thus : "10. Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it seems to us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have not come across a single decision of any Court which the Legislature has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression. But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same."
Further, it was held that: "Where, however, several offences are alleged to have been committed by several accused persons it may be more reasonable to follow the normal rule of separate trials. But here, again, if those offences are alleged not be wholly unconnected but as forming part of the same transaction the only consideration that will justify separate trials would be the embarrassment or difficulty caused to the accused persons in defending themselves." (Emphasis supplied)
When several offences are alleged to have been committed by several accused persons this Court
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has laid down that normal rule is of separate trials.
28. In Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra (1964) 2 SCR 378, this Court considered the question of conspiracy in a case where the accused had first defrauded one Jupiter company and thereafter another company called Empire. Argument was raised that once having been convicted of conspiracy qua the Jupiter case, he could not be convicted qua company called Empire. This Court relying upon judgment in State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte (1961) 3 SCR 107 has laid down thus :
"In the present case, applying the test laid down by this Court, the two conspiracies are not the same offence: the Jupiter conspiracy came to an end when its funds were misappropriated. The Empire conspiracy was hatched subsequently, though its object had an intimate connection with the Jupiter in that the fraud of the Empire was conceived and executed to cover up the fraud of the Jupiter. The two conspiracies are distinct offences.
It cannot even be said that some of the ingredients of both the conspiracies are the same. The facts constituting the Jupiter conspiracy are not the ingredients of the offence of the Empire conspiracy, but only afford a motive for the latter offence. Motive is not an ingredient of an offence. The proof of motive helps a Court in coming to a correct conclusion when there is no direct evidence. Where there is direct offence for implicating an accused in an offence, the absence of proof of motive is not material. The ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they do not form the same offence within the meaning of Art.20(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, that Article has no relevance to the present case."
29. In Gopal Prasad Sinha v. State Of Bihar . (1970)
2 SCC 905 offence was committed between two different periods when the accused was working as Cashier. On the basis of acquittal in the first offence, plea of issue estoppel was raised for the second period during trial. This Court had
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rejected the submission thus :
"7. In our opinion, the High Court came to the correct conclusion. The basic principle underlying the rule of issue- estoppel is that the same issue of fact and law must have been determined in the previous litigation. The question then arises: Was it the same issue of fact which was determined in the earlier case? A person may be acting as a cashier at one period and may not be acting as a cashier at another period, especially as in this case it was found that the appellant had never been appointed as a cashier.
He was a temporary senior accounts clerk who was alleged to be doing the work of a cashier. If there is any likelihood of facts or conditions changing during the two periods which are under consideration then it is difficult to say that the prosecution would be bound by the finding in a previous trial on a similar issue of fact. It seems to us that the later finding must necessarily be in contradiction of the previous determination. There can be no such contradiction if the periods are different and the facts relating to the carrying on of the duties of a cashier are different."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. It is pertinent to mention here that this Court in this very case has negatived the contention of joint trials and amalgamation of trials in the aforesaid decisions. When parties are different, issue of estoppel would not arise. The substantive offence is that of defalcation. Conspiracy was an allied offence to the substantive offence.
31. Section 218 deals with separate charges for distinct offences. Section 219 quoted above, provides that three offences of the same kind can be clubbed in one trial committed within one year. Section 220 speaks of trial for more than one offence if it is the same transaction. In the instant case it cannot be said that defalcation is same transaction as the transactions are in different treasuries for different years, different amounts, different allotment letters, supply orders and suppliers. Thus the provision of
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section 221 is not attracted in the instant case. There are different sets of accused persons in different cases with respect to defalcation.
32. There may be a conspiracy in general one and a separate one. There may be larger conspiracy and smaller conspiracy which may develop in successive stages involving different accused persons. In the instant case defalcations have been made in various years by combination of different accused persons."
6. It is, thus, clear from the detailed discussion, above that offences when are alleged to have been committed by several accused persons, ordinarily, as a normal rule, a separate trial shall need to be followed and if, those offences are not wholly unconnected, but, are forming the part of the same transaction, separate trial may not be justifiable. Whether, the transaction can be regarded of the same kind would also depend, particularly, on the facts of each case. If the offences are the result of the very conspiracy, then, the same are required to be dealt with in one trial and even if it is the very conspiracy where separate execution resulted in commission of separate offences, the trial could be separate. Assuming that without adjudicating, if these offences could be said to have been committed in the course of the same transactions, the separate trials of the petitioner for certain specific offences are not illegal.
7. In the instant case also, if, one looks at
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the different FIRs, even if, it is considered that the modus operandi of the petitioners is similar, in committing crime and even if it is believed without deciding anything at this stage that it was the single conspiracy, the same would not make it a case of single trial. As also held by the Apex Court in
'STATE OF JHARKHAND VS. LALU PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD YADAV'(Supra), where, in furtherance of a general conspiracy offences take place in various parts or against different persons, at the best, this can be said to be a case, where, same kind of offences have been committed and three offences of the same kind within one year may be charged/tried together. Section 219 of the code is again an enabling section and if each of the several offences is tried separately, there is no illegality also.
20 These are different first informants, who have lodged their complaint for the offences allegedly committed by the applicants. It would be in the fitness of things to direct three of the matters to have clubbed before a particular Court.
21 This Court chooses not to conclude, without trial, at this juncture whether it is the single conspiracy leading to commission of offences against different victims or in furtherance of a general conspiracy, offences have taken place in different parts, against different persons of
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the same kind. The fact remains that all the three offences alleged to be of the similar kind, since need to be tried under section 219 of the code of criminal , without acceding to the request of quashing of subsequent FIRsof Vadodara district, the Court deems is it appropriate to direct all the 3 to be tried together.
22 Out of these three First Information Reports registered at Navapura and Karjan are in the District: Vadodara whereas only one matter is lodged at Adajan, Surat. It would be in the fitness of things if all the three matters are tried at one place following the provisions of sections 218 and 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is surely not the case of quashing, but they can be tried together. The one at Adajan, Surat since has already started, the rest of the matters at Vadodara shall be transferred to Surat and shall be tried with the ongoing matter. On receipt of copy, the Criminal Cases shall be transferred within Two weeks with above directions.
23 Application stands disposed of accordingly.
(MS. SONIA GOKANI, J. )
SUDHIR
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