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Chhote Lal Surya Vanshi v. State Of Chhattisgarh
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CRA No. 403 of 2014
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
CRA No. 403 of 2014
Chhote Lal Surya Vanshi S/o Jay Lal Suryavanshi, aged about 45 years, R/o Village Kotkharra, P.S. Gourela, District Bilaspur (C.G.) ---- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh, through Arkshi Kendra, Gourela, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
---- Respondent
For Appellant :- Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate.
For Respondent :- Mr. Arjit Tiwari, Panel Lawyer. Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal
Judgment On Board
(09.02.2023)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J
1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC has been preferred by the appellant-accused against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.02.2014 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pendra Road, District Bilaspur in Sessions Trial No.17/2013 by which the appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay fine of ₹ 200/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for one month.
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2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 20.12.2012 at 3 a.m., in Village Kotkharra, Police Station Gourela, District Bilaspur, the appellant assaulted deceased-Nankun Bai by axe and caused her death and thereby committed the aforesaid offence.
3. Further case of the prosecution is that on the date of the offence appellant along with his wife-Nankun Bai, deceased, and Ku. Radha (PW-3), aged about 3 years, grand-daughter went to sleep in the shop adjoining to their house. In the morning, Nankun Bai-deceased was found stained with blood and Ku. Radha (PW-3) was crying and the appellant was not present. Deceased-Nankun was lying injured and was taken to the Sanatorium Hospital, Gourela where she was declared dead by the doctor and pursuant to which Merg Intimation was registered vide Ex.P/11 and the dead body was sent for postmortem which was conducted by Dr. B.S. Paikra (PW-11) and in the postmortem report (Ex.P/8), Dr. B.S. Paikra (PW-11) opined the cause of death to be head injury, fracture of skull bone and Hemetoma and nature of death is homicidal. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P/5) axe was seized vide Ex.P/6 and it was sent for FSL, but FSL report has not been brought on record only query report (Ex.P/9) is there and as per the query report injury could have been caused by the axe.
4. After due investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pendra Road and, thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellant / accused
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abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed the offence.
5. In order to bring home the offence prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 18 documents and defence in support of his case has not examined any witnesses but exhibited one document i.e. Ex. D/1.
6. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record convicted the appellant / accused for the offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.
7. Mr. Vivek Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the conviction is based on unreliable testimony of Shiv Lal Suryavanshi (PW-2) and Ku. Radha (PW-3). He would further submit that the statement of Shiv Lal Suryavanshi (PW-2) has improved upon the case diary statement and that of Ku. Radha (PW-3) shows that according to her, the appellant had assaulted with the help of club whereas the deceased is found having sustained axe injury which means that witness is not reliable and, as such, appellant deserves to be acquitted and appeal deserves to be allowed.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State, would support the impugned judgment and submit that apart from the evidence of Shiv Lal Suryavanshi (PW-2) and Ku. Radha (PW-3), the evidence on record that in the night the appellant, his wife-deceased and the child witness Ku. Radha (PW-3) were sleeping and thereafter the dead
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body of appellant's wife was found in the house of the appellant and the appellant was absconding and the appellant has failed to explain how his wife sustained homicidal death and therefore, there is sufficient evidence against the appellant herein and the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.
10. The first question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded the finding in affirmative on the basis of postmortem report (Ex.P/8) which is proved by Dr. B.S. Paikara (PW-11) which is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 11.The appellant has primarily been convicted on the ground that it is the case of house murder and secondly Ku. Radha (PW-3) being the eye witness has seen the incident and supported the case of the prosecution. We will consider both incriminating piece of evidence one by one.
12. First circumstance is that the trial Court has found proved that the dead body was found in the house of the appellant and the appellant and deceased were last seen together by Shiv Lal Suryavanshi (PW-
2) which has not been explained by the appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC.
13. Now, the question would be, whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act
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would be applicable or not?
14. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under:-
"106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.— When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."
15. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned.
1 6. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer1 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of AIR 1956 SC 404
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the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: -
"11.… The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B)."
Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.
17.The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State Of Bihar . of Bihar2in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: -
"22.Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.
2 3.When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the (2021) 10 SCC 725
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accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused."
18. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab3, while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him.
19. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State Of Bihar . of Bihar4and
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it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence.
20. Now, the question is, whether the prosecution has discharged its initial or general burden or primary duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
21. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid legal position, it is quite vivid that the prosecution has only established that the death of the deceased Nankun Bai was homicidal in nature. On the date of offence the appellant, deceased and Ku. Radha (PW-
3) were staying in the shop adjoining to the house of the appellant and, as such, body of the deceased was found injured and the shop in question was found opened and the appellant was also found absconded. Though the death was found homicidal in nature and the appellant was absconding but there is no evidence on record that the appellant was seen running away from the area in question immediately after the incident, as the shop in question is situated in a residential area and the motive has also not been established that the relationship between the appellant and deceased was not cordial. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to discharge its primary burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sawal Das (supra), Section 106 of the Evidence Act can be applied only when the prosecution has led evidence which if believed will sustain conviction, or makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which
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the burden of proof may lie upon the accused.
22. In these circumstances, the prosecution has relied upon the next piece of evidence is that the eye witness Ku. Radha (PW-3), who is minor girl, aged about 3 years, in her statement before the Court she stated that when she woke up at morning, she had seen the appellant assaulting her grand-mother by "lathi" which was informed to Shiv Lal Suryavanshi (PW-2), her maternal uncle. According to Ku. Radha (PW-3), appellant assaulted the deceased by lathi but from the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/5, axe has been seized vide Ex.P/6 (property seizure memo). As such, the part of statement of Ku. Radha (PW-3) that the appellant has assaulted the deceased by lathi is not established.
23. Now, only the statement of Ku. Radha (PW-3) remains to be considered whether she should be believed or not?
24. According to the statement of Ku. Radha (PW-3), she was wearing frock on which also stains of blood were found and it was seized vide Ex.P/4 and was sent to the FSL for forensic examination also, but the FSL report was not brought on record. It is also not established that the frock worn by Ku. Radha (PW-3) was stained with human blood or not. As such, the statement of Ku. Radha (PW-3) is also not reliable
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weapon of the offence i.e. axe and blood on her clothes and only on the basis of subsequent conduct which is relevant under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, the appellant cannot be convicted. In that view of the matter, appellant is entitled for the benefit of doubt.
25. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are unable to sustain conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 26.02.2014 passed in Sessions Trial No.17/2013 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pendraroad, District Bilaspur, is hereby set aside. The appellant stands acquitted from the charge framed against him for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and since the appellant is in jail, he be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other matter.
26. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal)
Judge Judge
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