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NAROTTAM RATH v. STATE and ANR.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns a batch of writ petitions by petitioners (many of whom had earlier rounds of litigation) contesting the powers of Assistant Settlement Officers (ASOs) under the Orissa Survey and Settlement Act, 1958 (OSS Act). The petitioners challenge the ASOs' exercise of suo motu powers at the stage of preliminary publication of a draft Record of Rights (ROR) under Section 12 of the OSS Act, whereby ASOs issued orders directing that the lands be recorded in the name of the Government.
The lands in dispute are located in Khurda District (Bhubaneswar and outskirts). The litigation traces to a Division Bench order dated 29 January 1996 in OJC No. 9449 of 1993 that noted alleged irregularities in grant of leases in the Bhubaneswar Tahsil area and directed the State Government to scrutinize irregular lease cases. Many leases under the Orissa Government Land Settlement Act, 1962 (OGLS Act) had been granted in favour of the petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest.
Pursuant to the 1996 direction, ASOs purportedly exercised suo motu powers while examining applications for mutation (entries in the ROR). Several purchasers (some holding registered sale deeds) sought consequential entries in the ROR in their names. Where the matter had been remanded previously to the Additional District Magistrate (ADM) under challenges to the leases, some ADMs affirmed the leases; yet ASOs later declined to register the purchasers' names and directed entries in the name of the Government, leading to this round of litigation.
Numerous orders of Single Judges and Division Benches of this Court have repeatedly held, in similar circumstances, that ASOs under the OSS Act are bound by orders passed by the ADM under the OGLS Act and cannot override such orders. In several prior instances the matters were either remitted to the ASO for fresh examination or the impugned ASO orders were set aside.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an Assistant Settlement Officer (ASO), functioning under the OSS Act, has jurisdiction to exercise suo motu powers at the stage of preliminary publication of the draft ROR (under Section 12 of the OSS Act) to direct that lands be recorded in the name of the Government.
- Whether ASOs exercising powers under the OSS Act can override or question the validity of leases granted under the OGLS Act that have not been set aside by the competent authority (i.e., whether ASOs are bound by orders passed by the ADM under the OGLS Act).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422 | Affirmation of the principle that where a statute prescribes the manner of doing an act, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. | The Court relied upon this principle to support the conclusion that authorities must exercise powers only in the manner assigned by statute and cannot encroach on powers assigned to other authorities (i.e., ASOs cannot assume powers reserved under the OGLS Act). |
| Taylor v. Taylor, L.R. 1 Ch. 426 | Historical source cited for the origin of the rule that an act required to be done in a particular manner must be done in that manner. | Used as part of the doctrinal foundation for the rule relating to statutory manner of exercise of power referenced by the Court. |
| Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 | Statement of the same rule: "Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all." | Cited to reinforce the settled administrative law principle limiting authorities to statutory procedures; applied to deny ASOs jurisdiction to exercise powers not vested in them. |
| Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322 | Approval by the Supreme Court of the rule that a statutory mode must be followed. | Relied upon as part of the chain of authority establishing the statutory-manner principle which constrained the ASO's actions. |
| Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527 | Further approval of the rule that prescribed statutory procedures must be followed. | Used along with earlier authorities to sustain the conclusion that the ASO could not act beyond the statutory remit. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 | Reaffirmation of Nazir Ahmad's rule by a Three-Judge Bench. | Part of the authoritative line of cases cited to show the salutary administrative-law principle limiting powers to the statutory mode. |
| Captain Sube Singh v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (2004) 6 SCC 440 : AIR 2004 SC 3821 | That when a statute vests power to be exercised in a particular manner, the authority must exercise it only in that manner; the State cannot alter prescribed conditions by other means. | Cited to support the proposition that statutory powers must be exercised in the manner provided and that the State/authority cannot encroach upon that framework—applied to the ASO context. |
| Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 4 SCC 9 | Referenced as a related authority on the same principle regarding the statutory mode of exercise of power. | Served to reinforce the legal principle limiting the ASO from exercising powers not given by statute. |
| Anjum M.H. Ghaswala (Constitution Bench) | Reaffirmation by a Constitution Bench of the general rule that powers vested in an authority must be exercised in the manner provided by statute. | Cited as doctrinal support for the proposition that ASOs must adhere strictly to the procedures and limits laid down in the OSS Act and cannot assume functions vested in authorities under other statutes. |
| Mrs. Sneha Mohanty v. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.189361 of 2013 (20 Aug 2013) | Held that the ASO "has no jurisdiction to review the order passed by the revisional authority in a proceeding under the OGLS Act regarding lease of Government land". | Used as an early Division Bench authority for the proposition that ASOs lack jurisdiction to revisit decisions under the OGLS Act; supports setting aside ASO orders in the present matters. |
| Nilendri Mohanty v. State, W.P.(C) No. 8402 of 2014 (4 July 2014) | One of a series of Division Bench orders in 2014 addressing similar issues (ASO jurisdiction vis-à-vis OGLS Act leases). | Part of the cluster of Division Bench decisions relied upon to establish that ASOs are bound by ADM/ OGLS Act orders and cannot question validity of leases. |
| Kamal Basini Mohanty v. State of Orissa, W.P.(C) No. 8237 of 2014 (4 July 2014) | Another Division Bench order from the 2014 series on ASO jurisdiction and lease validity. | Relied upon with the other 2014 decisions to show consistent judicial position that ASOs lack jurisdiction to override OGLS Act orders. |
| Kapaleswar Firms Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No. 11165 of 2014 (8 July 2014) | A further Division Bench decision in the 2014 series addressing the same question. | Used as part of the body of High Court precedent directing that ASOs are bound by lease orders and must follow statutory procedure. |
| Tridev Kodamasingh v. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No. 4596 of 2014 (27 Oct 2014) | Decision expressing the principle that leases granted under OGLS Act cannot be declared invalid unless set aside by competent authority; ASOs are bound by such lease orders. | The passage quoted from this decision was used to state explicitly that ASOs have no jurisdiction to doubt lessees' possession or to direct recording in favour of the State where the lease remains in force. |
| Padmanav Prusty v. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.12776 of 2014 (order dated 6 April 2018) | Held that the ASO was not authorized to cancel leases or encroach upon authorities under other revenue laws; ASO's impugned order was without jurisdiction. | Relied upon to support the view that ASOs cannot act as appellate/cancelling authorities under the OGLS Act and that impugned ASO/Appellate Sub-Collector orders were without jurisdiction. |
| Rukmani Panigrahi v. State of Orissa, W.P.(C) No. 2207 of 2015 (disposed 13.07.2015) | Held that the Assistant Settlement Officer cannot dispose of matters beyond preparing the final ROR in accordance with the draft (PARCHA). | Cited to support setting aside an ASO order and remitting the matter to record disputed land in favour of the petitioner in accordance with the draft ROR. |
| Vijay Krishna Poultry Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No. 8774 of 2019 and batch (Single Judge judgment dated 18 June 2021) | Held that settlement authorities acted without jurisdiction in passing orders under the OSS Act that overrode ADM orders under the OGLS Act; impugned orders were void and final publications pursuant to such void orders were not sustainable. | Relied upon to conclude that ASO/settlement authority orders that ignore OGLS Act settlements are void; supports setting aside ROR publications made pursuant to void orders and remitting for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. |
| Lily Nanda v. State of Odisha, (2018) 1 OLR 559 | Cited as supporting authority in the Single Judge's reasoning that impugned orders cancelling leases or ignoring OGLS settlements were not permissible. | Referenced as supporting precedent for invalidating the impugned settlement authority orders that effectively cancelled leases beyond their jurisdiction. |
| OJC No. 9449 of 1993 (Division Bench order dated 29 January 1996) | Directed the State Government to scrutinize irregular lease cases in the Bhubaneswar Tahsil area; noted allegations of irregularities in grant of leases. | Described as the genesis of subsequent executive and administrative action; the Court observed that ASOs claimed to act pursuant to that direction but that the direction itself did not authorize cancellation of leases without due procedure under the OGLS Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of logical steps based exclusively on the materials and authorities referred to in the opinion:
- Identification of common features: The petitions involved similar facts—lands in Khurda District, prior litigation history, leases under the OGLS Act, and ASO orders at the draft ROR stage directing recording in the name of the Government.
- Historical and procedural context: The Court traced the litigation back to a 1996 Division Bench direction (OJC No. 9449 of 1993) that led the State to scrutinize leases. That exercise, however, did not furnish ASOs with authority to cancel leases or to supplant statutory processes under the OGLS Act.
- Survey of High Court and Supreme Court authorities: The Court surveyed a line of Division Bench and Single Judge decisions of this Court as well as Supreme Court authorities establishing a settled principle: statutory powers must be exercised in the manner prescribed and authorities cannot assume functions outside their statutory remit. The Court relied on those authorities to position the ASO's acts as inconsistent with settled law.
- Application to the facts: On the facts, ASOs were found to have exercised suo motu powers to override orders of the ADM under the OGLS Act (or to decline mutation requests despite existing lease confirmations), which the Court concluded was beyond their jurisdiction under the OSS Act. The Court emphasized that powers to cancel or resume lands lie under the OGLS Act (e.g., Section 3-B) and related rules, not within the limited settlement role of the ASO under the OSS Act.
- Remedies considered and rejected: The Court considered remanding matters to ASOs for fresh decisions but rejected that approach because the matters had already gone through multiple rounds of litigation and because the legal position was clear from the authorities: remand would only multiply litigation where the statutory allocation of powers is settled.
- Consequential relief: Because the impugned ASO and appellate orders were held to be without jurisdiction, the Court set those orders aside and directed corrective administrative action (recording petitioners' names in the ROR in accordance with law), while preserving the State's statutory remedies under the OGLS Act (Section 3-B) should the Government seek to recover land by proper procedure.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petitions were disposed of in the terms set out by the Court: the impugned ASO orders declining to record petitioners' names and the corresponding appellate orders were set aside, and directions were issued to the ASOs to record the petitioners' names in the ROR in accordance with law.
Specific consequential directions (as ordered):
- The impugned orders of the ASOs declining to accept petitioners' requests to record their names in the ROR on the ground that the land belongs to the Government were set aside.
- The corresponding appellate authority orders affirming such ASO orders were set aside.
- ASOs were directed to proceed to record the petitioners' names in the ROR in accordance with law within eight weeks.
- Where land stood recorded in the final published ROR in the name of the Government, that entry would stand cancelled by virtue of this order and the ASO was to record the land in favour of the respective petitioners.
- All directions were to be carried out within four months from the date of the judgment.
- The Court made clear that this order did not prevent the Government from exercising powers under Section 3-B of the OGLS Act in accordance with law.
Implications: The direct consequences are corrective relief for the petitioners (set-aside of ASO and appellate orders and administrative directions to record petitioners' names). The opinion rests on existing legal principles and prior decisions; it does not announce a novel principle beyond applying established authority that statutory powers must be exercised in the manner prescribed and that ASOs cannot override orders under the OGLS Act. The Government retains statutory remedies under the OGLS Act for recovery of land through the procedure that statute prescribes.
This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information not present in the opinion has been added or inferred.
1. A common question of law arises in all these writ petitions and they are accordingly disposed of by this common judgment.
2. For the Petitioners in the present writ petitions, it is not the first time that they are litigating before this Court. In some cases, there have been at least two earlier rounds of litigation. The present batch of writ petitions has several common features. In all of them, the Petitioners are questioning the powers of the Assistant Settlement Officer (ASO), an authority functioning under the Orissa Survey and Settlement Act, 1958 (OSS Act), to purportedly exercise suo motu powers at the stage of a preliminary publication of a draft record of rights (ROR) under Section 12 of OSS Act and to pass orders directing that the lands in question be recorded in the name of the Government in the ROR.
3. Another common feature of all these cases is that the lands in question are in Khurda District either in the city of Bhubaneswar or in its outskirts. The litigation has its genesis in an order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 29 January 1996 in OJC No. 9449 of 1993 noting the allegations made about irregularities committed in the grant of leases of land in Bhubaneswar Tahsil area; and directing the State Government to scrutinize all irregular lease cases and thereafter take appropriate action. Those leases under the Orissa Government Land Settlement Act, 1962 (OGLS Act) were granted in favour of either the Petitioners themselves or their vendors and their predecessors-in-interest.
4. On the basis of the above general direction issued by this Court in OJC No. 9449 of 1993, orders came be passed in purported exercise of suo motu powers by ASOs at the stage of examining the applications for mutation of the names of the purchasers in the RORs. Many of these purchasers had purchased the land in question through registered sale deeds (RSDs) and were asking for consequential entry of their names in the ROR on the basis of such RSDs.
5. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in OJC No. 9449 of 1993, action was sought to be taken under the OGLS Act to cancel the leases. At that stage, writ petitions were filed in this Court in which orders were passed remanding the matters to the Additional District Magistrate (ADM) to examine, after hearing the Petitioners, whether in fact leases hadbeen granted validly in their favour. The Court is informed that in some of these cases, on such remand, the ADM again passed orders affirming the grant of lease in favour of the Petitioners or their vendors or the predecessors-in-interest. The grievance is that even in such cases where the ADM had confirmed the grant of leases in favour of the predecessors-in-interest of the Petitioners, the ASOs at the stage of examining the request for mutation in the ROR, again exercised purported suo motu power to decline such registration of ROR and issued positive directions that they should in fact be recorded in the name of the Government. This has triggered the present round of litigation.
6. This Court has been shown numerous orders passed by both the learned Single Judge of this Court as well as various Division Benches where in similar circumstances, it has been repeatedly held that the ASOs exercising powers under the OSS Act are bound by the orders passed by the ADM under the OGLS Act and cannot possibly override such orders.
7. Among the earliest of such orders is an order dated 20 August, 2013 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.189361 of 2013 (Mrs. Sneha Mohanty v. State of Odisha) holding that the ASO “has no jurisdiction to review the order passed by the revisional authority in a proceeding under the OGLS Act regarding lease of Government land”.
8. Then there are a series of orders passed by the Division Benches of this Court in 2014 including an order dated 4 July 2014 in W.P. (C) No. 8402 of 2014 (Nilendri Mohanty v. State); an order dated 4 July 2014 in W.P.(C) No. 8237 of 2014 (Kamal Basini Mohanty v. State of Orissa); an order dated 8 July 2014 in W.P.(C) No. 11165 of 2014 (Kapaleswar Firms Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Odisha); and an order dated 27 October 2014 in a batch of writ petitions, the lead case of which was W.P.(C) No. 4596 of 2014 (Tridev Kodamasingh v. State of Odisha), where it was held as under:
“The leases having been granted either under the OGLS Act or under any other appropriate law, unless and until it is set aside or declared invalid by the competent authority under the appropriate statute the lease cannot be said to be invalid. Unless and until the lease is either set aside or leasehold lands are resumed by the order of the competent authority, the Assistant Settlement Officer/Settlement authorities are bound by the lease orders and have no jurisdiction to question the validity of the lease concerned. For the omission of the State Government to scrutinize and to find out any irregularities in respect of any lease, no fault can be imputed either to the lessees or to the petitioner, who have purchased by registered sale deeds portions of such leasehold lands. Since the Assistant Settlement Officer was in seisin of the matter, it was incumbent on him to make field enquiry to find out the actual possession of the petitioners and he having not done so it is not open to him to doubt about the possession of the petitioners over the lands which they claimed and on that ground direct recording of the land in favour of the State.”
9. In many of the above cases, the matters were remanded to the ASO to again examine the matters and pass appropriate orders.
10. Then there are a series of orders that were passed by the Division Benches of this Court in 2018. In W.P.(C) No. 12776 of 2014 (Padmanav Prusty v. State of Odisha), an order was passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 6 April 2018 where it was noticed that the ASO was “swayed away by the observation of this Court passed in OJC No. 9449 of 1993, which is a general instruction to the State Government to find out the fraud, if at all committed in granting lease of the case. But never that order shows any cancellation of lease without following the due procedure of law”. It was then observed as under:
“10. … It must be made clear that it was none of the business of the Assistant Settlement Officer to go into the question of correctness of lease and direct to change the draft record because the authority under the OGLS Act, lease principle or Government Grants Act under which there are hierarchy of authorities to take cognizance of any irregularity and illegality and then pass the order of cancellation under the concerned statute. The Assistant Settlement Officer is not authorized to encroach upon the authority as prescribed under other revenue laws to behave like appellate authority to cancel the lease. On the other hand, the impugned order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer is without jurisdiction and wholly erroneous. Similarly, the Additional Sub-Collector, without mentioning the provision of law under which he heard the appeal, has dismissed the appeal and as such, the same is also without jurisdiction and illegal.
11. The propriety demands that the authority vested with the power under the statute must exercise the power as assigned under the Act and he cannot encroach the power of other authority purportedly assigned to that authority under the said Act. On the other hand, in the case of Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422, Hon'ble Supreme Court, have observed at paragraphs 31 and 32 in the following manner:
“31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor, [L.R.] 1 Ch. 426 which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 who stated as under:
“Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.”
32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322 and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527. These cases were considered by a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad's case (supra) was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognised as a salutary principle of administrative law.
12. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Captain Sube Singh v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (2004) 6 SCC 440 : AIR 2004 SC 3821 at paragraph-29 of the said judgment have observed that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself. Paragraph-29 of the said judgment is placed in the following manner for better appreciation:
29. In Anjum M.H. Ghaswala a Constitution Bench of this Court reaffirmed the general rule that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself. (See also in this connection Dhanajaya Reddy v. State Of Karnataka ., (2001) 4 SCC 9. The statute in question requires the authority to act in accordance with the rules for variation of the conditions attached to the permit. In our view, it is not permissible to the State Government to purport to alter these conditions by issuing a notification under Section 67(1)(d) read with subclause (i) thereof.
13. With due regard to the aforesaid decisions, it is made clear that if a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner, then said authority has to exercise only in that manner provided under the statute. A similar matter, i.e., W.P.(C) No. 2207 of 2015 (Rukmani Panigrahi v. State of Orissa) has also been disposed by this Court on 13.07.2015 with the finding that the Assistant Settlement Officer cannot dispose of such matter while being only authorized to prepare the final record of right in accordance with the draft record of right (PARCHA). Relying upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the judgment of this Court, the impugned order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Bhubaneswar Settlement Camp, Rental Colony, Bhubaneswar in Objection Case No. 16372/4306 of 2013 and the order dated 16.9.2013 passed by the Additional Sub-Collector, Bhubaneswar in, Appeal Case No. 1806 of 2013 are liable to be set aside and the Court do so.”
14. Having held as above, this Court remitted the matter to the ASO “to finally record the disputed land in favour of the Petitioner in accordance with draft record of right (PARCHA) under the OSS Act within a period of three months”.
15. Then we have an order dated 10 May, 2018 in W.P.(C) No. 18357 of 2014 where again it was held likewise and a direction was issued remitting the matter to ASO to finally record the disputed land in favour of the Petitioner. The learned Single Judge of this Court in a detailed judgment dated 18 June 2021 in W.P.(C) No. 8774 of 2019 and batch (Vijay Krishna Poultry Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Odisha) dealt with a similar issue and held that the settlement authorities had acted without jurisdiction in passing the orders under the OSS Act overriding the orders passed by the ADM under the OGLS Act. In para-30 of the said order, it was observed as under:
“30. Nevertheless, the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can interfere with an order passed by the statutory authority when it acts in a manner not recognized under law. In all these writ petitions, the properties in question were settled under the provisions of the O.G.L.S. Act. The settlement authority also accepted the same and proceeded in the settlement operation up to the stage of Section 11 of the Act, 1958. But, surprisingly the authority under the Act has acted in a different manner and passed the impugned orders without recognizing the settlement of the land under the provisions of the O.G.L.S. Act. Law is well settled that the authorities under the Act cannot sit over the settlement made under the O.G.L.S. Act. There is ample provision under the O.G.L.S. Act to cancel the lease granted in favour of beneficiary and in fact, the said settlements had undergone the test of its validity. It appears from the impugned orders that the Assistant Settlement Officer/Addl. Sub-Collector conveniently avoided the settlement made under the O.G.L.S. Act by ignoring the same, which is not permissible under law. The impugned orders have, in effect, resulted in cancelling the lease granted in favour of beneficiary, which is not within the domain of the settlement authorities. My view gets support from the case of Lily Nanda v. State of Odisha reported in (2018) 1 OLR 559. As such, the impugned orders are without jurisdiction and the same are void. The action taken or publication made pursuant to the said void orders are also equally ineffective and no nest in the eyes of law. Thus, final publication of the R.O.Rs. under Section 12-B of the Act, 1958 pursuant to the void orders is not sustainable in the eyes of law.”
16. The learned Single Judge in the above judgment went so far as to say that even if such order of the ASO under the OSS Act had resulted in a final publication of the ROR under Section 12-B of the OSS Act that would not be sustainable in the eye of law. Consequently, even the RORs published pursuant to the final list were set aside. The matters were remitted to the authorities under the OSS Act for a fresh a adjudication in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.
17. At one stage of the arguments in the present cases, a question arose whether in many of these cases there had been a final publication of the list as envisaged in Rule 29 of the Orissa Survey and Settlement Rules, 1962 (OSS Rules)? That was because in terms of Section 13 of the OSS Act, the final publication of the list lends a presumption of correctness to every entry made on the ROR and the remedy for a person aggrieved by such entry in the final list published under Section 13 of the OSS Act is to prefer a revision petition under Section 15(b) of the OSS Act before the Board of Revenue. Where there is no such final publication of list, and an order has been passed by an ASO at the stage of publication of the draft rOR under Section 12 of the OSS Act, the remedy lies by way of an appeal under Section 12-A of the OSS Act.
18. In some of the cases before us, such appeals were in fact filed and rejected by the Appellate Authority under Section 12-A of the OSS Act perhaps on the ground that in the meanwhile a final list had been published. However, the position is not very clear from the pleadings in these writ petitions. Therefore, two scenarios can possibly emerge i.e., one where there has been a final publication of the ROR in terms of Section 13 of the OSS Act read with Rule 29 of the OSS Rules and another where there has been no such final publication of the ROR. Nevertheless in both scenarios, a common feature, as already noticed, in all these writ petitions is that ASOs have passed orders declining the request of the Petitioners for recording their names in the ROR in respect of the land in question. It must be noted at this stage that in all these writ petitions while issuing notice, this Court had directed status quo to be maintained and that interim order has continued. In most of these writ petitions, no counter affidavits have been filed despite the petitions having been pending over 8 years now.
19. Be that as it may, it is plain that in all these cases, the ASOs exercised ‘suo motu powes’ to override the orders of the ADM under the OGLS Act in favour of the predecessors-in-interest of the Petitioners or refused to record their names in the ROR despite there being no objections to the draft publication of the ROR.
20. Clearly the ASOs were acting without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of their powers under the OSS Act It is obvious that powers which could have been exercised only under the OGLS Act were sought to be exercised by the ASO which was impermissible in law for them to do. The above extracted portions of the orders of this Court conclusively settle the legal position in this regard and do not bear repetition.
21. The question that next arises is what should be the consequential orders passed by this Court consequent upon the setting aside of all such orders of the ASOs and the Appellate Authorities under the OSS Act, which are without jurisdiction. One course of action, as has been done in some of the cases, is to remand the matters to the ASO for a fresh decision by following the law and the correct legal procedure. However, that course does not commend itself to this Court for the simple reason that there have been at least two rounds of litigations already involving these very Petitioners and their lands in question Remanding the matters would only multiply litigation when the legal position is already clear. If the Government seeks to recover land which it believes belongs to the Government, then there are enough provisions under the OGLS Act to take care of such contingencies. For instance Section 3-B of the OGLS Act provides for resumption of land and imposition of penalty. The Rules made under the OGLS Act set out the detailed procedure for exercise of such powers. In other words, the Govenment is not powerless or remediless in such a contingency. There is no need for an ASO exercising limited powers under the OSS Act to take up on himself or herself the task of seeking to recover Government land when there are no such powers vested in the ASO under the OSS Act.
22. In that view of the matter, the following directions are issued in all these writ petitions:
(i) The impugned orders of the ASOs declining to accept the request of the Petitioners for recording of their names in the ROR in respect of the lands in question on the ground that the land belongs to the Government, are hereby set aside;
(ii) The corresponding orders by the Appellate Authorities affirming such orders of the ASOs are also hereby set aside;
(iii) A direction is issued to the ASOs to now proceed to record the names of the respective Petitioners concerning the land in question in their names in the ROR, in accordance with law within a period of eight weeks.
(iv) Where the land in question stands recorded in the final published RoR in the name of the Government that entry will stand cancelled by virtue of this order and the ASO will proceed to record it in favour of the respective Petitioners.
23. The above directions will be carried out within a period of four months from today. It is made clear that this order will not prevent the Government from exercising powers under Section 3-B of the OGLS Act, in accordance with law.
24. The writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms.
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