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ANITA ANTONY v. STATE OF KERALA

Kerala High Court
Jun 10, 2022
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — C. Jayachandran, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter challenges Ext.P3, a detention order dated 25.01.2022 issued under Section 3 of the Kerala Antisocial Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 ("KAA(P)A"). Ext.P3 directed detention of the petitioner's son, Jose Antony @ Kalan Jose (the detenu), in Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram for a period of one year. The writ petition was filed to impugn that order. The Court heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the respondents and perused the record, including counter‑affidavits filed by respondents 1 and 2.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delay of 195 days between the last prejudicial activity (dates in the record: 14/15.07.2021) and the detention order dated 25.01.2022 vitiates the detention order.
  2. Whether compliance with bail conditions in the last crime negates the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority required for preventive detention under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A.
  3. Whether the remedy under Section 15 of the KAA(P)A or proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C. were feasible and sufficient instead of imposing preventive detention under Section 3.
  4. Whether offences initiated by police officers (suo moto or on police complaint) can be reckoned for the purpose of determining status as a 'known rowdy' under the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • There was a delay of 195 days from the last prejudicial activity (14.07.2021 per pleadings; FIR referenced as 15.07.2021 in the record) to the detention order dated 25.01.2022, which allegedly severs the live link; the delay is substantial and unexplained. Reliance was placed on Abhida Beevi v. State of Kerala, where a delay of 4 months was held fatal.
  • The detenu scrupulously followed bail conditions in the last crime (Crime No. 460 of 2021, Alappuzha North Police Station); hence, the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction that detention was necessary is said to be vitiated for want of application of mind.
  • All crimes were within Alappuzha District, so the feasibility of resort to Section 15 of the KAA(P)A was not considered by the detaining authority.
  • Proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C. had been initiated and no crime was committed for the six months when such proceedings were in place; therefore, Section 107 should have been sufficient.
  • Out of four crimes considered for detention, two were instituted suo moto on police complaints; reckoning such cases is said to be impermissible under the exclusion in the definition of 'known rowdy' in S.2(p)(iii).
  • Learned counsel also referred to certain aspects touching the merits of the four cases, but those particulars were not detailed in the opinion as they were considered not germane to the proceedings.

Respondents' (State) Arguments

  • The delay of 195 days was satisfactorily explained in paragraph 24 of Ext.P3 and in counter‑affidavits: the detenu was in judicial custody (arrested 17.07.2021 and in custody until 18.10.2021); a recommendation for preventive detention was made prior to his release on bail; and the District Magistrate/District Collector was preoccupied with COVID‑19 related duties.
  • Bail conditions in Crime No. 460 of 2021 would not prevent future offences because similar bail conditions in previous matters had not deterred the detenu from committing subsequent crimes.
  • Recourse to Section 15 of KAA(P)A was not feasible given the gravity of offences (including trespass with grievous hurt and NDPS offences involving seized contraband); offences under the NDPS Act were to be treated seriously.
  • The detaining authority specifically considered and negated the sufficiency of Section 107 Cr.P.C. proceedings (noting different scope between Section 107 and preventive detention under the Act).
  • With respect to cases initiated by police officers, when police personnel were attacked or when the facts justify, the exclusion in the definition of 'known rowdy' will not preclude reckoning such offences (relying on Joicy v. State Of Kerala).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abhida Beevi v. State of Kerala, (2013) 1 KLT 286 Delay between prejudicial activity and detention order can be fatal where it is unexplained; proceedings under S.107 Cr.P.C. — adequacy is fact‑dependent and must be specifically addressed by detaining authority. The Court distinguished Abhida Beevi on facts because in that case the delay was unexplained; here the Court found a satisfactory explanation for the 195‑day delay and noted that Abhida Beevi's finding of fatality rested on an unexplained and inordinate delay. The Court also relied on Abhida Beevi's principle that Section 107 sufficiency is a question of fact that must be addressed by the detaining authority, and found that the detaining authority had so addressed it here.
Licil Antony v. State of Kerala, (2014) 11 SCC 326 On delay in making a detention order: courts should be pragmatic; no rigid formula; delay must be satisfactorily explained; the test of proximity is not mechanical; an explained delay may not vitiate detention. The Court applied Licil Antony to hold that the 195‑day delay did not vitiate Ext.P3 because respondents offered a tenable and reasonable explanation for the delay.
T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala, (1989) 4 SCC 741 Earlier settled legal position regarding delay in detention orders (authoritative on the subject). The Court noted that the legal position was previously settled by this decision and treated it as supportive authority for assessing delay issues; it formed part of the legal framework for analyzing whether the delay was satisfactorily explained.
Joicy v. State of Kerala, 2018 (1) KHC 37 Holds that the exclusion in the definition of ‘known rowdy’ (cases instituted by police officers) will not apply where police personnel were attacked (i.e., such cases may be reckoned). The Court relied on Joicy to reject the petitioner's contention that police‑initiated cases could not be reckoned; where police officers were attacked the exclusion would not apply and such offences were properly considered.
Ansar T.A. v. State of Kerala, 2017 (2) KHC 413 Supports reckoning of certain police‑initiated NDPS cases for purpose of classification under the Act. The Court relied on Ansar T.A. for the proposition that a chance detection/NDPS case initiated by police can be reckoned; the Court respectfully followed that dictum and rejected the petitioner's objection on this ground.
Thejas v. I.G. of Police, (2015) 3 KLT 1 Provides support for the proposition that the detaining authority must address the sufficiency of Section 107 Cr.P.C. proceedings and that such considerations inform the reasonableness of preventive detention. The Court cited Thejas to support approval of the detaining authority's conclusion that Section 107 proceedings were insufficient to prevent further crimes by the detenu.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds issue‑by‑issue, applying precedent and the material on record without purporting to re‑weigh factual findings made by the detaining authority.

  1. Delay (195 days):

    The Court examined the chronology: FIR in the last crime recorded on or about 15.07.2021; arrest on 17.07.2021; detenu in judicial custody until 18.10.2021 (over 90 days). Even before the detenu's release, the third respondent had filed a first report recommending preventive detention on 16.09.2021. Subsequent clarifications and further reports were filed (second report dated 02.12.2021 and a final report noted). Between 18.10.2021 and the impugned order on 25.01.2022 there were 78 days (including 20 holidays). The Court accepted respondents' explanation that detention proceedings were in progress prior to release on bail and that the District Collector's preoccupation with COVID‑19 matters further explained the temporal gap. Applying Licil Antony and T.A. Abdul Rahman, the Court held that the test of proximity is not rigid and that a satisfactorily explained delay does not vitiate detention. Abhida Beevi was distinguished on the ground that there the delay was unexplained.

  2. Bail compliance in last crime:

    The Court rejected the argument that compliance with bail conditions in the last crime destroys the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction. The Court noted that in earlier matters the detenu had been given similar bail conditions but subsequently committed further offences — indicating that compliance with bail in the last crime could not be relied upon to negate the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction. The Court found that the subjective satisfaction was supported by materials on record.

  3. Feasibility of Section 15 vs. Section 3:

    The Court distinguished the remedies: Section 15 is a lesser remedy by its nature, whereas Section 3 of the Act permits preventive detention for six months or one year and is intended for more serious/hardened offenders. The Court noted multiple prior crimes (six in seven years, four reckoned for detention), including offences under Sections 302, 308, NDPS and 307 IPC as set out in the tabular recital. Given the gravity of offences and the detenu's criminal propensity, the Court held that the detaining authority legitimately exercised discretion in choosing Section 3 rather than Section 15.

  4. Proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C.:

    The Court reviewed the requirement from Abhida Beevi that the detaining authority must specifically consider whether Section 107 proceedings are sufficient. The Court found that the detaining authority had considered Section 107 and recorded reasons (including subsequent crimes committed after initiation of Section 107 proceedings). The Court adopted the view that Section 107 is a lesser and different remedy concerned with maintaining peace and does not curtail free movement; preventive detention is a harsher measure aimed at hardened offenders. The Court therefore approved the detaining authority's conclusion that Section 107 was insufficient in this case, citing Thejas in support.

  5. Reckoning of police‑initiated cases:

    The Court examined two crimes that were said to have been instituted on police complaints (one involving attack on police personnel and burning of a police jeep; the other an NDPS detection). The Court relied on Joicy and Ansar T.A., holding that where police officers were attacked, or where the reasoning in Ansar T.A. applies (NDPS detections), such cases may be legitimately reckoned for classification as a 'known rowdy' and included in the detaining authority's calculus. The Court expressly followed those decisions.

  6. Conclusion from materials and discretion:

    Having considered the record, the Court concluded that the detenu's conduct fit the definition of 'known rowdy' under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A and that Ext.P3 complied with procedural requirements. The Court declined to interfere with the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction or its discretionary choice of remedy where that discretion was properly exercised and supported by materials on record.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Court upheld Ext.P3 and dismissed the writ petition. Writ Petition dismissed.

Direct Consequences

  • Ext.P3 detention order dated 25.01.2022 — directing detention of Jose Antony @ Kalan Jose under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A — is sustained by the Court.
  • The petitioner's grounds of challenge (delay, bail compliance, feasibility of Section 15 or Section 107, and exclusion of police‑initiated cases) were considered and rejected for the reasons recorded in the opinion.

Broader Implications

The Court applied and followed established precedent (including Licil Antony, T.A. Abdul Rahman, Abhida Beevi, Joicy, Ansar T.A., and Thejas) in reaching its conclusion. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal rule; it determined the present matter on the existing authorities and the facts and materials before the detaining authority.

End of summary. All information is derived exclusively from the provided opinion and no facts or inferences beyond the text have been added.

Show all summary ...

C. Jayachandran, J.:— Ext.P3 detention order dated 25.01.2022 issued under Section 3 of the Kerala Antisocial Activities (Prevention) Act 2007 [for short, ‘KAA(P)A’] is under challenge in this Writ Petition. As per the order impugned, petitioner's son, Jose Antony @ Kalan Jose, (detenu, for short) was directed to be detained in the Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram for a period of one year.

2. Heard Smt. Sai Pooja, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Anas, learned Government Pleader (attached to the Advocate General), on behalf of the respondents. Perused the records.

3. Ext.P3 order is challenged by the petitioner on the following grounds;

(i) There is delay of 195 days from the date of last prejudicial activity (i.e. 14.07.2021-the date on which FIR was registered in the last crime bearing No. 460 of 2021 of Alappuzha North Police Station) and the date of Ext.P3 order (25.01.2022), thereby severing the live link between the two. The delay is substantial, which is not explained. Even a delay of 4 months was held to be fatal by a Division Bench of this Court in Abhida Beevi v. State of Kerala, [(2013) 1 KLT 286].

(ii). All conditions stipulated in the order granting bail in the last crime (Crime No. 460 of 2021 of Alappuzha North Police Station) was scrupulously followed by the detenue, wherefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the second respondent/District Magistrate - to the effect that there is no way, except a detention order, to restrain the detenue from indulging in unlawful activities - smacks of total non application of mind.

(iii). All the crimes registered against the detenue are within the limits of Alappuzha District, wherefore, the feasibility of achieving the purpose by resorting to section 15 of the Act was not considered by the second respondent.

(iv). No crime was committed by the detenue for a period of six months, when proceedings dated 10.04.2019 was initiated under Section 107 CrPC. In such circumstance, it should have been found by the second respondent that proceedings under section 107 Cr.P.C. would have been amply sufficient to prevent the detenue from indulging in any crime.

(v). Out of the four crimes considered, two are cases instituted suo moto on the complaints of police officers, the reckoning of which is bad in law, in view of the specific exclusion made in the definition of ‘known rowdy’ in S.2(p) (iii).

4. Learned counsel also referred to certain aspects touching the merits of four cases reckoned for the purpose of detention, which we are not detailing here, for, the same is not germane for consideration within the scope of the present proceedings. On the above enumerated grounds, learned counsel contended that Ext.P3 order impugned is not sustainable in law.

5. Refuting the above allegations, learned Government Pleader invited our attention to the two counter affidavits filed by respondents 1 and 2, based upon which, it was contended as follows:

The delay of 195 days between the date of last prejudicial activity and the date of detention order is properly explained in paragraph no. 24 of Ext.P3 detention order. The fact that the detenu was in judicial custody; that recommendation for preventive detention was made prior to his release on bail; and that the District Magistrate/District Collector was fully pre-occupied in taking steps to contain the spread of Covid-19 pandemic were espoused to answer the delay.

6. Learned Government Pleader submitted that the bail conditions in Crime No. 460 of 2021 would not fetch the desired result, since similar conditions in the bail orders in earlier crimes did not deter the detenu from committing subsequent crimes.

7. Recourse to remedy under Section 15 of the KAA(P)A was not feasible because of the gravity of the offences involved. In the last crime, the detenu, who is the first accused, trespassed into the house of a 51 year old man and caused grievous hurt. Two cases are under the NDPS Act, wherein both drugs and ganja are contrabands seized. Offences under the said Act are to be viewed seriously since it has the potential of affecting both the physique and psyche of the youth, submits the learned Government Pleader.

8. The sufficiency of proceedings under Section 107, Cr.P.C, was specifically considered and negated by the 2 respondent/District Magistrate as could be seen from the discussion in page nos. 10 and 15 of Ext.P3 order. Learned Government Pleader also contented that the relative scope of a proceeding under Section 107 Cr.P.C. and the instant proceedings under the KAA(P)A are different altogether.

9. Finally, learned Government Pleader submitted that in cases where the police personnel were attacked, the bar/exclusion in the definition of ‘known rowdy’ of cases initiated by police officers will not apply, as held in Joicy v. State Of Kerala, [2018 (1) KHC 37].

10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides, we find considerable force in the submission made by the learned Government Pleader, so as to sustain Ext.P3 detention order. Though there is a delay of 195 days between the last prejudicial activity [15.07.2021] and the date of detention order [25.01.2022], we notice that the same has been satisfactorily explained by virtue of the contents of paragraph no. 24 of the impugned order/Ext.P3, as also, in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2. As regards the last crime, FIR was registered on 15.07.2021 and the detenu was arrested on 17.07.2021. He was in judicial custody until 18.10.2021, on which date, he was released on bail. It is relevant to note that, even before the detenu's release on 18.10.2021, the third respondent preferred his first report dated 16.09.2021, recommending preventive detention of the petitioner. The detaining authority, presumably after perusing the available materials, sought for clarification/further information regarding bail and bail conditions. We find the information sought for quite necessary, as otherwise, the contention would have been that the sufficiency of bail conditions was not considered by the detaining authority. Accordingly, the third respondent/District Police Chief preferred his second report on 02.12.2021 incorporating the details of the bail order, as also, the final report filed on 12.10.2021. It is relevant to note that the detenu was in judicial custody for a period of more than 90 days, from 17.07.2021 to 18.10.2021. During the period from 18.10.2021 up to the date of the impugned order, 25.01.2022, there were 78 days, of which, 20 days were holidays. The above referred aspects, coupled with the serious pre-occupation of the second respondent/District Collector in containing the spread of COVID-19 SARS virus offer adequate explanation to the delay alleged. The petitioner's contention in this regard based on Abhida Beevi (supra) is not tenable, for, the said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case, there was a delay of more than 4 months, which was not explained at all, either in the impugned order or in the counter affidavit filed. What was held fatal is the unexplained and inordinate delay.

11. In Licil Antony v. State of Kerala, [(2014) 11 SCC 326], the Honourable Supreme Court observed thus as regards delay in making the detention order:

“9. While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the Court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard - and - fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenue from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay, the Court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.

18. Even in a case of undue or long delay between the prejudicial activity and the passing of detention order, if the same is satisfactorily explained and a tenable and reasonable explanation is offered, the order of detention is not vitiated.”

(Underlined by us for emphasis).

12. The legal position in this regard was settled earlier by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala, [(1989) 4 SCC 741].

13. As held in Licil Antony (supra), the test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. On the facts above referred, we find a tenable and reasonable explanation offered by the respondents, wherefore, the order of detention cannot be held to be vitiated on account of delay.

14. The second contention is a claim that the detenu had scrupulously followed the bail conditions in the last crime [Crime No. 460 of 2021 of Alappuzha North Police Station] and therefore, the subjective satisfaction to initiate proceedings under the KAA(P)A is vitiated. We cannot endorse the said submission of the learned counsel. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, the last prejudicial activity reckoned by the detaining authority is the fourth crime and in all previous crimes, while being enlarged on bail, the detenu was put on similar condition that he shall not indulge in any criminal activity while on bail. This condition has been contemptuously violated by the detenu, as is established by the subsequent crimes, including the last one of the year 2021. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the compliance with the bail condition in the last crime cannot be gainsaid by the detenu, to assail the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, which is otherwise established by materials on record.

15. The third contention is with respect to the feasibility of the remedy under Section 15 of the KAA(P)A in preference to the one under section 3 of the Act. Here, we notice the distinction between the two provisions based on the gravity of the attendant facts and circumstances, as also, the criminal propensity of the offender. We note that, there were six cases against the detenu in the past 7 years, of which, two were not reckoned for the purpose of the instant detention. We also note that the detenu had indulged in serious offences as could be seen from the tabular statement shown here.

Sl. No. Police Station and Crime No. Date & Time Offence Stage Court 1 Alappuzha North 705/2015 28.05.2015 at 19.30Hrs. U/s.294(b), 324, 307, 302 & 34 of IPC Pending Trial SC-684/2016 Adl & Dist. Sessions Court, Alappuzha 2 Alappuzha North 1574/2017 04.09.2017 U/s.294(b)0 0, 341, 324, 332, 506ii, 308 of IPC & U/s.20 r/w Sec.27 of Arms Act & U/s, 3(2)(3) of PDPP Act Pending Trial SC-279/2018 Adl & Dist. Sessions Court, Alappuzha 3 Alappuzha North 1930/2018 18.10.2018 at 15.45Hrs. 8(c), 22(b) & 29 of NDPS Act Pending Trial SC-1930/2018 Adl & Dist. Sessions Court-III, Alappuzha 4 Alappuzha North 460/2021 14.07.2022 at 22.30Hrs. U/s143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 452, 324, 326, 307 of IPC Charge Sheet filed JFMX-1 Alappuzha

16. In the first crime, the offence involved includes the one under Section 302 and in the second, Section 308. The third one is with respect to the NDPS Act and the fourth is with respect to offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The report of the third respondent/District Police Chief is to the effect that the detenu is a potential threat to the law abiding citizens in the locality. In such circumstance, we cannot find fault with the detaining authority in electing the remedy under Section 3, as against the one under Section 15 of the KAA(P)A. We also find that the choice in this regard is a matter of discretion based on subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and the detenu cannot lay any claim as regards the desirability of one choice in preference to the other; nor can we interfere in such discretion properly exercised or find fault thereof.

17. As regards the contention based on Section 107, Cr.P.C, we would first refer to the Bench decision in Abhida Beevi (supra), wherein it is held as follows:

“Whether the proceedings under S.107 of Cr.P.C. are sufficient or not is a question of fact depending upon various factors. In the case of certain persons, the proceedings under S.107 of Cr.P.C. may be sufficient for preventing them from committing anti-social activities causing breach of peace or disturbing public tranquillity. In respect of certain other persons, the proceedings under S.107 of Cr.P.C. may not be sufficient. One thing is quite certain. Unless the detaining authority specifically addresses the question whether the proceedings under S.107 of Cr.P.C. initiated against a person are sufficient or not in the light of the materials concerning those proceedings produced before that authority, the question whether the proceedings under S.107 of Cr.P.C. are sufficient or not cannot be decided(sic).”

18. Now, we will refer to page no. 10 of the impugned order/Ext.P3, where the relevant conclusion of the 3 respondent, as taken note of by the 2 respondent, is extracted herein below:

19. This recommendation is seen considered by the 2 respondent/District Magistrate at page no. 15 of Ext.P3 and his subjective satisfaction is also recorded. The consideration made by the Detaining Authority is very much evident from the extract in vernacular, herein above. The fact that, the detenu had indulged in 6 crimes [although four crimes alone were reckoned for the purpose of proceedings under the KAA(P)A], which includes crimes after initiation of proceedings under Section 107, Cr.P.C, as well, would establish that proceedings under Section 107 is not sufficient to restrain the petitioner from indulging in further crimes. We cannot, but approve the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority based on the recommendation of the sponsoring authority. In adopting the above view, we garner strength from a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Thejas v. I.G. of Police, [(2015) 3 KLT 1].

20. That apart, the relative scope of the two proceedings are different and independent. Proceedings under Section 107, Cr.P.C, is in the nature of security for keeping peace and public tranquility. After issuing show cause, the Executive Magistrate can order the suspected person to execute a bond to keep peace for such period not exceeding one year. The free movement of such person is not curtailed at all. Apprehension with respect to breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility is the criteria for initiating a proceeding under Section 107, Cr.P.C. This is a lesser remedy, just to ensure peace and public tranquility, to be applied in the case of lesser criminals and not hardened ones. We note the remedy under Section 110, Cr.P.C, for habitual offenders, where, again, the course open is execution of a bond for a period not exceeding three years. Whereas, the remedy under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A is a larger and serious remedy, where the suspect is put to preventive detention for a period of six months or one year, as the case may be. For this, the detaining authority should be satisfied of the various parameters, including the in-built safeguards as contained in the definition of a ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’. As it is well settled, preventive detention is a harsher remedy, whereby the life and liberty of a person is at stake even without a formal trial to adjudicate his guilt. Needless to say that such remedy is to be applied in the case of hardened criminals, where the interests of the public at large outweighs individual liberty. The requirements while curtailing individual liberty is considered and reflected in the definition of ‘known goonda’ and ‘known rowdy’. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the feasibility, if any, of the proceedings under section 107, Cr.P.C, is not an alternative for a proceeding under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A.

21. Now, we come to the final contention that two crimes initiated by police officers should not have been reckoned. One is a case where two police officers were attacked to deter them from performing their official duties and a police jeep was gutted. The other is a case of chance detection of narcotic drug from the possession of the detenu, along with two others, under the NDPS Act. The legal position in this regard is no more res integra. As regards the former, a Bench decision of this Court in Joicy (supra) and as regards the latter, Ansar T.A. v. State Of Kerala, [2017 (2) KHC 413] are the answers. We are in respectful agreement with the dictum laid down therein. In as much as the petitioner's contention is squarely in the teeth of the said decisions, we reject the same.

22. We are satisfied that the detenu's facts answer the definition of ‘known rowdy’ as per Section 2(p) (iii) of the KAA(P)A. Ext.P3 is issued after complying with all procedural requirements stipulated. The grounds of challenge are repelled, with the result, this Writ Petition will stand dismissed.