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Union Of India, Thro... v. State Of Gujarat
Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion — S.H. Vora, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter arises from an application by the original complainant (Union of India through the Narcotics Control Bureau) seeking special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment and order dated 15/02/2020 in NDPS Case No. 5 of 2013, whereby the trial court (Additional Judge, Court No. 19, City Civil & Sessions Court, Ahmedabad) acquitted respondent No. 2 (original accused No. 2, Ruksanabanu, wife of Shaikh Mohammad Rafik) of offences under Sections 8(c), 20(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act.
Briefly, the prosecution case was that three accused were intercepted near Naroda Patiya Bus Stop after disembarking from a bus arriving from Himmatnagar. Accused No. 3 (Imtekhab Rafikbhai Rangrej) was found in possession of a bag containing 7.79 kg of charas; he refused to give the key, and the lock was forced open. Various items including phones and identity cards were recovered from the accused. On trial, accused Nos. 1 and 3 were convicted under the NDPS Act, while respondent No. 2 was acquitted by the trial court.
The prosecution examined seven witnesses and proved documentary evidence (as described in paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment). The present proceeding is an examination of the application for special leave to appeal, and the High Court considered the material placed before it and the trial judge's findings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the acquittal of respondent No. 2 rendered by the trial court is contrary to the evidence on record and therefore liable to be interfered with under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C.
- Whether the presumption under Section 35 of the NDPS Act (culpable intention/possession) should have been invoked against respondent No. 2, given her relationship to accused No. 1 and their travel history together with the other accused.
- Whether the statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act (Exhibit-89) by respondent No. 2, made while in custody, is admissible/corroborative and sufficient to displace the benefit of doubt.
- Whether the trial judge erred in allegedly overlooking the provisions of Section 67 while finding that Sections 42 and 50 of the NDPS Act were complied with.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's (Union of India through Narcotics Control Bureau) Arguments
- The acquittal of respondent No. 2 is bad in law and against the evidence on record.
- The trial judge overlooked the provisions of Section 67 of the NDPS Act; that statement (Exhibit-89) was corroborative if not a confession and should have been considered.
- Respondent No. 2, being the wife of accused No. 1, travelled with the convicted accused and therefore the presumption under Section 35 of the NDPS Act ought to have been raised — constructive possession or control over the bag (even if not physical possession) was argued.
- Evidence of joint travel (bus and railway charts and tour pass) was relied upon to establish non-stranger relationship among the three accused and to infer knowledge or intention regarding the contraband.
Respondent / Defence Position as Reflected in the Opinion
- The trial court found respondent No. 2 to be merely the companion of her husband (accused No. 1) and not an accomplice; nothing incriminating was found on her person and she did not hold the bag containing contraband.
- The factual record (as summarized by the court) indicated accused No. 3 held the bag and the key; he refused to surrender the key and the lock was forced open. No call details between accused No. 3 and respondent No. 2 were placed on record to suggest coordination or knowledge.
- The statement recorded under Section 67 was made while in custody and, absent corroboration, is a weak piece of evidence not sufficient to sustain conviction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu ((2014) 1 Crimes 42 (SC)) | Confessional statement recorded in custody is a weak piece of evidence and requires corroboration before it can be relied upon. | The court relied on this authority to hold that respondent No. 2's statement under Section 67, recorded while in custody, is weak and cannot be relied upon in absence of corroborative evidence; accordingly the trial judge was correct not to place reliance on it. |
| Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 | In an appeal against acquittal, appellate court should not reverse unless the trial court's findings are perverse, contrary to material, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. | The court applied this principle to conclude that the appellant failed to show that the trial court's findings met this high threshold; therefore interference was not justified. |
| Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana (1995 Supp (1) SCC 248; AIR 1995 SC 280) | The High Court's powers in appeals from acquittal are extensive but, as a rule of prudence, the High Court should give proper weight to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility and the presumption of innocence; if the trial court's reasons are reasonable and plausible, they should not be dislodged. | The court quoted and applied this passage to emphasize restraint in upsetting an acquittal where the trial court's reasons were plausible and could not be effectively demolished by the appellant. |
| Rajesh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 11 SCC 444 | Reiterates that unless the trial court's reasoning is perverse, an acquittal should not be disturbed by the appellate court. | The court cited this authority to support the proposition that High Court interference is circumscribed and should not be undertaken merely because an appellate court might have taken a different view. |
| Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 6 SCC 394 | Affirms the limited scope of interference with acquittal and the necessity of perversity or demonstrable unsustainability to justify reversal. | The court relied on this authority alongside Rajesh Singh to underline that acquittal ought to be left undisturbed unless trial court's reasoning is demonstrably wrong. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The High Court undertook a focused appraisal of the material and the trial court's findings. The principal analytical steps recorded in the opinion are as follows:
- Evidence on Possession: The deposition of PW-2 (Intelligence Officer) established that accused No. 3 was found with the bag containing contraband charas. The material shows accused Nos. 1 and 2 did not physically hold the bag and nothing incriminating was recovered from their persons.
- Key and Lock Facts: Accused No. 3 had the key and refused to hand it over; consequently, the officers broke the lock and opened the bag. This factual matrix supported the trial judge's inference that accused No. 3 had physical possession and control of the bag.
- Section 35 Presumption: The applicant urged that Section 35's presumption of culpable intention should have been raised against respondent No. 2 due to her relationship with accused No. 1 and joint travel. The court examined this contention and found no evidence that respondent No. 2 had the requisite knowledge or conscious possession of the contraband; mere companionship and joint travel did not, on the material before the trial court, justify drawing the legal presumption.
- Statement under Section 67: The court treated respondent No. 2's Section 67 statement (Exhibit-89) as recorded during custody and hence a weak piece of evidence. Applying the principle from Tofan Singh (as cited), the court held that absent corroboration such a statement could not be relied upon to overturn an acquittal.
- Compliance with Sections 42 and 50: The trial judge had found these mandatory provisions were complied with. The High Court noted this finding and did not accept the submission that the trial judge had overlooked Section 67 in a manner that would vitiate the acquittal.
- Scope of Interference on Acquittal: The court reiterated settled principles (Ramesh Babulal Doshi; Ram Kumar; Rajesh Singh; Bhaiyamiyan) that appellate interference with an acquittal is circumscribed and permissible only when trial court findings are perverse or demonstrably unsustainable. The appellant did not demonstrate that the trial court's findings met that threshold.
- Conclusion of Analysis: Given the totality of evidence and the law on appellate restraint, the court concluded that reasonable doubt remained as to respondent No. 2's knowledge or conscious possession of the contraband and endorsed the trial court's acquittal.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: The application for special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. was dismissed; accordingly, the captioned Criminal Appeal was also dismissed.
Implications:
- The trial court's acquittal of respondent No. 2 is upheld; the High Court endorsed the trial judge's findings and reasoning.
- The direct consequence is that respondent No. 2 remains acquitted of the NDPS offences charged against her in the trial court judgment dated 15/02/2020.
- The opinion does not announce or establish any novel legal principle; the court applied established authorities regarding the limited scope for upsetting acquittals and the need for corroboration of custodial statements. No new precedent was set by this decision.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to and based only upon the information contained in the provided opinion. No external facts or inferences beyond the text have been added.
S.H. Vora, J.:— Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 15/02/2020 passed in NDPS Case No. 5 of 2013 by the learned Additional Judge, Court No. 19, City-Civil & Sessions Court, Ahmedabad whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent No. 2 herein-original accused No. 2-Ruksanabanu wife of Shaikh Mohammad Rafik for the offences punishable under Sections 8(c), 20(b) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act” for short), the original complainant-Union of India through Narcotics Control Bureau has preferred the captioned application seeking special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (“the Code” for short).
2. Briefly stated; the case of the complainant is that all the original three accused committed the offence punishable under Sections 8(c), 20(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act; inasmuch as; when accused No. 3 was searched; found with contraband Charas weighing 7.79 Kg from the bag held by him. It is also the case of complainant that all the three accused were intercepted by the complainant near Naroda Patiya Bus Stop when they disembarked from Bus no. RJ01PA2003 coming from Himmatnagar. It is also the case of complainant that accused No. 3-Imtekhab Rafikbhai Rangrej was in possession of bag and refused to provide its key and therefore lock of the bag was forced open and the aforesaid quantum of Charas was found therein. Apart from this; various other articles such as phone and ID Card were found from the possession of all the three accused.
3. On a trial, the accused No. 3-Imtekhab Rafikbhai Rangrej and accused No. 1-Shaikh Moha were found guilty for the offences punishable under the NDPS Act; whereas the respondent No. 2-original accused No. 2 was given benefit of doubt.
4. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined 07 prosecution witnesses and have proved various documentary evidence through depositions of PW 1 to 7, more particularly, as described in paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment and order.
5. We have heard learned Advocate Mr. Pandya appearing for the applicant-original complainant and have minutely examined the material placed before us for consideration of application filed for special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of Code, as also the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge.
6. According to learned Advocate Mr. Pandya for the applicant-original complainant, the acquittal recorded qua respondent No. 2-original accused No. 2 is bad in law and against the evidence on record; inasmuch as; the learned trial Judge has overlooked the provisions of Section 67 of NDPS Act though the learned trial Judge found and observed that the provisions of Sections 42 and 50 of the NDPS Act which are mandatory provisions of the Act is complied with. It is further urged by him that the learned trial Judge has misread the evidence; inasmuch as; respondent No. 2 who is wife of accused No. 1 was all through out with other two accused who are convicted and she travelled with them from Jaipur to Ahmedabad in the Luxury Bus No. RJ01PA2003 and as per tour pass (Exhibit-26) and thus respondent No. 2 being wife of accused No. 1 culpability presumption of Section 35 of NDPS Act triggers.
7. It is vehemently argued by learned Advocate Mr. Pandya that respondent No. 2; being wife of accused No. 1, she has knowledge of the contents of the bag where-from the contraband Charas was found and therefore she is said to have culpable intention. In other words, Mr. Pandya tried to demonstrate and explain that possession in a case may not be physical possession; but can be constructive having power and control over the article and accused No. 3 was holding physical possession; subject to the power and control of respondent No. 2 and her husband. In order to substantiate the submission, learned Advocate Mr. Pandya has drawn attention of this Court to the fact that all the three accused travelled together from Ahmedabad to Jammu and back as per railway charts and tour pass placed and proved before the trial Court. Not only that; the statement of respondent No. 2 recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act (Exhibit-89) is also corroborative piece of evidence if not a statement of confession and therefore the learned trial Judge ought to have looked into such statement. In nutshell, it is submitted by learned Advocate Mr. Pandya that respondent No. 2; being wife of accused No. 1 and she travelled from Jammu to Ahmeabad and back through railway and bus and stayed together with other convicted accused persons, there can be no iota of doubt that all the accused were in conscious possession of contraband Charas and thus the learned trial Judge ought to have raised presumption under Section 35 of the NDPS Act and thereby to record conviction rather than acquittal of respondent No. 2.
8. We have extensively heard learned advocate Mr. Pandya for the applicant. The testimony of PW-2-Mr. Sajansing Dhisaramsing, Intelligence Officer, Serving with NCB Office, Ahmedabad whose deposition recorded below Exhibit-32 establishes that accused No 3-Imtekhab was found with contraband Charas contained in a bag he hold. It is found and noticed by us that accused Nos. 1 and 2 did not hold the bag and neither anything incriminating was found from their person. On scrutiny of evidence, the learned trial Judge found that respondent No. 2 was merely a companion of her husband-accused No. 1-Shaikh Mohammed Rafik and she was not an accomplice in the crime. The submissions of learned Advocate Mr. Pandya that all the three accused were travelling together and not strangers to one other in their tour from Ahmedabad to Jammu and back and therefore the culpability presumption of Section 35 of NDPS Act comes into play and burden shifts upon respondent No. 2 to prove that she was not aware or had any knowledge to the fact that the bag contains the contraband Charas. No doubt, the moment the person had intention or knowledge of the fact, he or she is said to have culpable intention. In a case on hand, accused No. 3-Imtekhab was holding the bag with key. As deposed by PW 2, he did not part with the key and therefore the Officer broke open the lock and thus respondent No. 2 being companion of her husband and except for her presence as her husband's companion right from the receipt of information, her conscious possession as understood under the law does not surface even reasonable doubt. No any call details prior to and after the incident is placed on record between accused No. 3-lmtekhab and respondent No. 2.
9. Thus, the learned trial Judge on appraisal of entire evidence and so also here no doubt of a reasonable degree can be entertained that she had real knowledge of the nature of the substance locked in the bag and key in possession of accused No. 3.
10. Lastly, the submissions based on confessional statement of respondent No. 2 so as to implicate her in offence which needs not to be taken any further in light of a decision rendered in case of Tofan Singh v. State Of Tamil Nadu ., ((2014) 1 Crimes 42 (SC)), because the confessional statement is recorded when respondent No. 2 was in custody and therefore, it being the weak piece of evidence and in absence of any corroborative evidence, no reliance can be placed upon such statement and thus the learned trial Judge has rightly done so. Under the circumstances, the learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the respondent No. 2 for the elaborate reasons stated in the impugned judgment and we also endorse the view/finding of the learned trial Judge leading to the acquittal of respondent No. 2.
11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal appeal if other view is possible, then also, the appellate Court cannot substitute its own view by reversing the acquittal into conviction, unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. (Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State Of Gujarat ., (1996) 9 SCC 225). In the instant case, the learned APP has not been able to point out to us as to how the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse, contrary to material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable.
12. In the case of Ram Kumar v. State Of Haryana ., reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 248 : AIR 1995 SC 280, Supreme Court has held as under:
“The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal.”
13. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394, while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view.
14. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
15. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present application for special leave to appeal fails and same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In view of dismissal of the application for special leave to appeal, captioned Criminal Appeal also deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.
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