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Sherry Jacob v. Canara Bank

Kerala High Court
Nov 10, 2004
Smart Summary (Beta)

Common Judgment (Basheer, J.) — Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment disposes of a batch of five cases (two writ appeals and three original petitions) which involve the same parties and issues concerning priority between a secured creditor (Canara Bank) and the State (revenue) in relation to certain immovable property of M/s Thomas Stephen & Company (the Company).

Key factual and procedural points drawn from the opinion:

  • The Company borrowed from Canara Bank and created mortgages (deposit of title deeds) as continuing security (initial mortgage dated 9 July 1974, renewed from time to time). The Company defaulted.
  • The Bank sued for recovery; the suit was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT/Tribunal). By decree dated 17 February 2000 the Tribunal directed payment of Rs. 41,25,451.64 with interest and held the Bank entitled to realize the decree by sale of mortgaged/hypothecated properties.
  • On 4 October 2002 a Recovery Officer of the Tribunal issued a proclamation for sale and held an auction on 31 January 2003. An auction purchaser (Aahammed Koya) was the successful bidder for item No.1 for Rs. 60,60,010; certificate of sale and confirmation issued on 19 June 2003; partial physical possession given on 30 June 2003.
  • Independently, the Tahsildar (Revenue Recovery), Kollam, had issued notice under Section 36 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act on 18 July 2000 attaching the same property for alleged sales tax arrears. A notice under Section 49(2) was issued on 13 February 2001 for sale to recover Rs. 8,13,381 (sale scheduled 17 March 2001).
  • The Bank filed O.P. No. 8845/2001 seeking certiorari to quash the revenue sale notice; a learned single Judge granted interim stay of further proceedings pursuant to the sale notice on 15 March 2001 (order still in force).
  • Despite the revenue attachment and earlier sale notice, the Recovery Officer conducted the sale in January 2003. The State (through District Collector and Tahsildar) filed W.P. No. 26523/2003 seeking to quash the Tribunal's sale and to direct the auction purchaser to hand over possession to revenue officers for a fresh sale. The auction purchaser filed W.P. No. 27302/2003 seeking protection of his title and to restrain revenue and RPFO from proceedings against the purchased property.
  • Two writ appeals (W.A. Nos. 1165/2003 and 1232/2003) were filed by the Company and a licensee respectively, challenging dismissal of original petitions that had contested the Recovery Officer's sale.
  • All matters were referred to the Division Bench and heard together because they are closely connected and relate to the same property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State can claim precedence or primacy for its debts (sales tax arrears) over the claims of a secured creditor (the Bank) in respect of the same property.
  2. More specifically, whether the State can enforce a statutory first charge on the property of a debtor (under Section 26-B of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act) in preference to an existing mortgage in favour of a secured creditor.
  3. Whether the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal, when the property was already under revenue attachment and after publication of a sale notice by revenue authorities, is legally valid.
  4. Whether the State can conduct a revenue sale beyond the amount quantified in the published revenue sale notice, or whether it must proceed only to the extent stated in that notice (and if it needs to recover more, take fresh steps under the Revenue Recovery Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Bank (Canara Bank) — (Sri P.B. Suresh Kumar)

  • The sale conducted by the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal is valid and cannot be set aside by the State merely because the property was attached for sales tax arrears.
  • The Tribunal had passed a decree after hearing the judgment debtor (dated 17 February 2000) entitling the Bank to realize the decree debt by sale of the mortgaged properties; a certificate of recovery had been issued and sale was conducted as per the RDDB Act and Rules.
  • Even if the State had a claim, recovery by the State should be permitted only from any surplus remaining after due satisfaction of the Bank's decree; the Bank's pre-existing mortgage right and decree protect it from the State's challenge to the Tribunal sale.
  • Section 26-B (statutory first charge) came into force on 1 April 1999 and there is no indication of retrospection; the Bank's mortgage predates Section 26-B and thus the pre-existing mortgage right should not be affected.
  • The Bank also invoked s.100 of the Transfer of Property Act (the charge created at the time of creation of the mortgage cannot be defeated by a later statutory charge).

State / Revenue (Sri Raju Joseph, Senior Special Government Pleader — Taxes)

  • The State relies on the doctrine of priority of Crown (government) debts and on Section 26-B of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act which creates a statutory first charge on the property of a dealer for tax, penalty, interest and other amounts due under the Act.
  • Section 26-B begins with a non-obstante clause and therefore overrides any other law; it creates a first charge that gives the State priority even over secured creditors.
  • The property was attached by the tahsildar and a revenue sale notice had been published before the Recovery Officer's sale; therefore the Recovery Officer's sale is illegal and vitiated.
  • The revenue quantified the recoverable amount in the published sale notice as Rs. 8,13,381; the State contended that total dues may be much larger (near Rs. 33 lakhs) but maintained that the State's rights are founded on the statutory first charge and established doctrine of priority.

Auction Purchaser (Aahammed Koya)

  • Filed W.P. No. 27302/2003 seeking a writ of mandamus to restrain revenue officers and the Regional Provident Fund Organisation from proceeding against the property he purchased at the Recovery Officer's auction.
  • Sought a declaration that the property purchased is not liable to proceedings for recovery of sales tax or EPF dues; asserted rights as purchaser under the Tribunal sale.

Company and Licensee (W.A. Nos. 1165/2003 and 1232/2003)

  • The Company challenged the Tribunal sale, contending improperness or invalidity; the learned Single Judge had dismissed the Company's original petitions and the Company appealed.
  • The licensee contended he had an agreement for sale in respect of 8.5 cents of the property and sought relief, but the agreement expressly acknowledged the mortgage in favour of the Bank and that the matter was subject to litigation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Builders Supply Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 1061 Noted a consensus of judicial opinion that arrears of tax due to the State can claim priority over private debts. The Court invoked this decision as part of the documentary background establishing the long-standing principle that State tax claims may claim priority over other debts.
Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co., (2000) 5 SCC 694 Explained the principle of priority of government debts founded on public policy and necessity; upheld statutory priority where legislation so provides (reference to Karnataka Land Revenue Act, s.1158 in that case). The Court quoted and relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning to reinforce that the State's priority is founded on public policy and is recognized where statutory provisions grant it; applied the logic to the present Section 26-B issue.
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. National Iron & Steel Rolling Corporation & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 19 Interpreted a statutory first charge in the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act to operate on the entire property of the dealer including the interest of a mortgagee; rejected the contention that the first charge applies only to the equity of redemption. The Court treated this directly analogous precedent as authoritative on the interpretation of Section 26-B, holding that the statutory first charge operates on the entire property and includes the mortgagee's interest.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. State Bank of Indore & Ors., (2002) 10 KTR 366 (SC) Considered a provision (Section 33-C of M.P. Act) identical to Section 26-B and held statutory first charge prevails over other charges including mortgages; followed Bhikhabhai's case. The Court relied on this decision as reinforcing the conclusion that an identical statutory charge (to Section 26-B) has precedence over mortgages and other charges, thereby supporting the present holding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a structured manner:

  1. The Court framed the central statutory provision in issue: Section 26-B of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act which provides, in unambiguous language and under a non-obstante clause, that "any amount of tax, penalty, interest and any other amount... payable by a dealer... shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer." The Court emphasized that the non-obstante clause gives the provision overriding effect over "anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force."
  2. The Court reviewed the established doctrine of priority of Crown (government) debts, noting prior Supreme Court and High Court authorities that recognize the State's preferential right to recover tax dues as founded on public policy and the needs of sovereign functioning. The decision in Dena Bank was quoted to explain the public policy rationale for conceding State priority.
  3. The Court examined directly analogous Supreme Court rulings dealing with identical statutory provisions in other States (Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh). In particular, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (1995) held that a statutory first charge operates on the entire property including the mortgagee's interest and not merely on the equity of redemption. State of Madhya Pradesh v. State Bank of Indore (2002) followed Bhikhabhai's dictum and similarly held that identical statutory first charge provisions prevail over mortgages.
  4. Applying those precedents, the Court concluded that Section 26-B's statutory first charge "will prevail over any charge or right created in favour of a mortgagee/secured creditor." The Court expressly held that the precedence is not confined to the equity of redemption; the mortgagee's interest is included within the ambit of the statutory first charge.
  5. The Court considered the Bank's contention regarding non-retrospectivity of Section 26-B and the submission based on s.100 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court observed that identical arguments were raised and rejected in the cited Supreme Court authorities (Bhikhabhai and State Bank of Bikaner). The Court also noted relevant facts: Section 26-B was introduced w.e.f. 1 April 1999, the Tribunal's decree was passed in 2000, and (importantly for priority) the tax liability had arisen in 1974-75 — i.e., the tax liability pre-dated the creation of mortgage rights. On these facts and in light of the authorities, the Court rejected the Bank's non-retrospectivity and Transfer of Property Act arguments.
  6. The Court then addressed the validity of the Recovery Officer's sale: it found that the revenue authorities had attached the property and published a sale notice prior to the Tribunal's sale; the Recovery Officer conducted the sale without notice to the revenue though a revenue sale notice had earlier been published (the revenue sale however did not, at that earlier time, culminate in sale). On these facts, and because of the statutory first charge in favour of the State, the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer without giving notice to revenue was liable to be set aside.
  7. Regarding the content and limits of the revenue sale, the Court observed that the Tahsildar's published sale notice quantified recoverable dues as Rs. 8,13,381. The State argued the total dues might be higher, but the Court accepted the submission of the Bank and auction purchaser that the State cannot proceed beyond the published sale notice without initiating fresh steps as provided under the Revenue Recovery Act. Thus the revenue may proceed under its published sale notice, and if it seeks to recover additional amounts beyond what was quantified it must take fresh statutory steps.
  8. On the reliefs sought by the auction purchaser and challenges by the Company/licensee: the Court held that the auction purchaser's rights depend on the validity of the Recovery Officer's sale (which the Court found invalid). The Company's and licensee's appeals were dismissed on their merits for reasons explained (the Tribunal decree had become final; the mortgage and sale were in the context of litigation; the licensee's agreement was subject to mortgage and pending litigation; licencee's occupation was permissive).

Holding and Implications

The Court's dispositive rulings and their direct consequences are as follows:

Core Rulings:

  • The statutory first charge created by Section 26-B of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act prevails over any charge or right created in favour of a mortgagee/secured creditor. The first charge operates on the entire property, and the interest of the mortgagee is not excluded from that charge.
  • The sale conducted by the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal (auction held 31 January 2003) is set aside. The sale was conducted while the property was under revenue attachment and after publication of a revenue sale notice; the Recovery Officer proceeded without notice to the revenue authorities and therefore the sale is invalid.

Case Disposition (as ordered):

  • W.A. Nos. 1165/2003 and 1232/2003 (filed by the Company and the licensee respectively) are dismissed.
  • O.P. 8845/2001 (filed by the Bank) and W.P. (C) 27302/2003 (filed by the auction purchaser) are dismissed.
  • W.P. 26523/2003 (filed by the State/revenue) is allowed; accordingly the Recovery Officer's sale is set aside.
  • The revenue authorities are at liberty to proceed against the Company's property under the Revenue Recovery Act and on the strength of the first charge created by Section 26-B of the KGST Act — subject, however, to the limits of any published revenue sale notice; if the revenue seeks to recover an amount in excess of the sum specified in its published notice, fresh statutory steps must be taken.
  • The auction purchaser is entitled to approach the Tribunal for refund of the purchase money deposited pursuant to the set-aside sale.
  • The parties are directed to bear their respective costs in all the above cases.

Note: This summary strictly reflects the contents of the provided opinion. No additional facts, inferences or external legal materials have been introduced beyond those explicitly set out in the judgment text.

Show all summary ...

Basheer, J:

This bunch of 5 cases � 2 Writ appeals and 3 original petitions � has thrown up an important question for our consideration. Since the parties and issues involved are the same, we are disposing of these cases by this common judgment.

2. Can the State claim precedence or primacy for its debts over the claims of a secured creditor? To be a little more specific- Can the State enforce a statutory first charge on the property of a debtor, in preference to an existing mortgage in favour of a secured creditor?

3. A brief reference to some of the essential facts is necessary to answer the above question.

4. M/s. Thomas Stephen & Company, Kolllam (hereinafter referred to as �the Company) which was engaged in the manufacture and sale of roofing tiles, bricks etc. had availed of various loans from Canara Bank at Thamarakkulam (for short, the Bank). The Company had furnished sufficient security for repayment of the debt, in addition to creating mortgage by deposit of title deeds of certain items of immovable property as a continuing collateral security. The mortgage was created, initially, on July 9, 1974 which was renewed from time to time. Since the Company defaulted in repayment of the loan, the Bank instituted a suit for recovery of money before the Subordinate Judge�s Court, Kollam. Later the suit was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Ernakulam (for short, the Tribunal). By judgment dated February 17, 2000, the Tribunal directed the Company to pay the plaintiff/bank a sum of Rs.41,25,451.64 together with interest at the rate of 15% per annum from August 24, 1992. It was held that the plaintiff/Bank was entitled to realize the decree debt by sale of the mortgaged/ hypothecated o properties.

5. On October 4, 2002 the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal issued a proclamation for sale of two items of the mortgaged properties in execution of the decree in favour of the Bank. The sale was held on January 31, 2003. One Aahammed koya (hereinafter referred to as �the auction purchaser) was the successful bidder in respect of item No.1. The bid amount of Rs.60,60,010/= offered by the auction purchaser for the above property having an extent of 40 cents with buildings therein was accepted. The Recovery officer issued a certificate of sale and an order of confirmation in favour of the auction purchaser on June 19, 2003. According to the auction purchaser, he was put in �actual physical possession� of only 31.50 cents of land along with the building therein on June 30, 2003. the reaming 8.50 cents and the building therein were not delivered to him on that day, since one Sri. Sherry Jacob (the licensee for short) was stated to be in occupation of the said land and building on the strength of an agreement for sale between him and the Company.

6. But it appears that long prior to the sale mentioned above, the Tahsildar (Revenue Recovery), Kollam had issued a notice on July 18, 2000 under Section 36 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act 1890 (for short, the R.R. Act), attaching the said property belonging to the Company. This order of attachment was issued since the Company had allegedly committed default in payment of sales tax arrears to the tune of Rs.33,04,577/= for the assessment years 1974-75 to 1997-98. Subsequently on February 13, 2001, the Tahsildar issued a notice under Section 49(2) of the RR Act for sale of the above immovable property belonging to the Company to recover a total sum of Rs.8,133,381/=. The sale was scheduled to be held on March 17, 2001.

7. It was at this juncture that the Bank filled the present Original Petition voz., O.P.No.8845/2001 praying for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the sale notice issued by the Tahsildar under the R.R. Act. A learned single Judge before whom this Original Petition came up for consideration issued an order of interim stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the sale notice. The above order was passed by the learned single Judge on March 15,2001. The said order is still in force.

8. But, as mentioned earlier, the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal had conducted sale of the attached property on January 31, 2003. the State Government through the District Collector, Kollam and the Tahsildar (R.R), Kollam have therefore filed W.P.No.26523/2003 with a prayer too quash �the entire sale proceedings� conducted by the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal. There is a further prayer for a direction to the auction purchaser to hand over possession of the property to the Revenue Officers to enable them to conduct �fresh sale for realization of arrears�.

9. The third Writ Petition viz., W.P.No.27302/2003 has been filed by the auction purchaser. The prayer in the writ petition is to issue a writ of mandamus to the Revenue Officers and also the Regional Provident Fund oroganisation not to proceed against the property purchased by the auction purchaser in the auction held by the said authorities. There is a further prayer for a declaration that the property purchased by him in the auction is not liable to be proceeded against for recovery of either arrears of sales tax or towards dues payable under the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act.

10. W.A.Nos.1165/2003 and 1232/2003 are filed by the Company and the licensee respectively against a common judgment passed by the learned single Judge dismissing the two Original Petitions filed by them challenging the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal.

11. The above three writ petitions filed by the Bank, the State and the auction purchaser have come up before us, on a reference made by a learned single Judge, to be heard along with the two writ appeals, �since the issues involved in these cases are closely connected and related to the same property�.

12. Sri. P.B. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the Bank submits that the sale conducted by the Recovery officer of the Tribunal cannot be set at naught at the instance of the State on the ground that the property had been attached for recovery of arrears of sales tax. The Tribunal constituted under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 (for short �the RDDB At) had passed the decree in favour of the Bank after hearing the judgment debtor. The plaintiff/Bank was found entitled to realise the decree debt by sale of the mortgaged properties.
A certificate of recovery was issued by the Tribunal and the Recovery Officer had brought the property to sale. The sale was held on January 31, 2003 as provided under the act and the Rules. The property which was sold by the Recovery Officer was mortgaged to the Bank on July 9, 1974. The decree enabled the Bank to bring the mortgaged property to sale. Even assuming the State was entitled to recover any arrears of sales tax from the Company by proceeding against the mortgaged property, such recovery can be effected only if any amount is left over after due satisfaction of the decree in favour of the Bank. Since the Bank had a pre-existing mortgage right over the property and since a decree was passed by the Tribunal even prior to the date of attachment by the State under the RR Act, the challenge made by the State to the sale by the Recovery Officer is wholly untenable.

13. But Sri. Raju Joseph, learned Senior Special Government Pleader (Taxes) contends that in view of the statutory first charge created in favour of the State by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 26-B of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (the KGST Act, for short), neither the Bank nor the auction purchaser can be heard to say that the right of the mortgaged (Bank) is indefeasible or unimpeachable. State has got priority in respect of its debts against the claim of even a secured creditor. This preferential right available to a Crown debt is well recognized. More importantly Section 26-B of the KGST Act further creates a statutory first charge in favour of the State on the property of the dealer if he commits default in payment of sales Tax, penalty etc.

14. The doctrine of �Priority of Crown debts� has been the subject of a catena of judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court and various High Courts. The preferential right of the Crown in the matter of recovery of debts over other creditors subject to certain conditions is well settled. In Builders Supply Corporation v. Union of India (AIR 1965 SC 1061) a Constitution Bench of the
Apex Court had noticed a consensus of judicial opinion that the arrears of tax due to the State can claim priority over private debts.

15. The following observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dena Bank v. Bhikhab hai Prabhudas Parekh & Co. ((2000) 5 SCC 694) is apposite:

�The principle of priority of government debts is founded on the rule of necessity and of public policy. The basic justification for the claim for priority of State debts rests on the well-recognised principle that the State is entitled to raise money by taxation because unless adequate revenue is received by the State, it would not be able to function as a sovereign government at all. It is essential that as a sovereign, the State should be able to discharge its primary governmental functions and in order to be able to discharge such functions efficiently, it must be in possession of necessary funds and this consideration emphsises the necessity and the wisdom of conceding to the State, the right to claim priority in respect of its tax dues�..�

16. In Bhikhabhai�s case (supra) the question was whether the State of Karnataka could raise a preferential claim over the properties which were mortgaged in favour of Dena Bank. The above claim was raised by the State of Karnataka in the suit filed by Dena Bank against its debtors. The trial court negative the claim of the State and held that the bank was entitled too get a decree on the strength of the mortgage create in its favour. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court of Karnataka, the matter was settled between the plaintiff/Bank and the defendants on certain terms and conditions stipulated in the compromise petition. But the state of Karnataka which was not a party to the compromise contended that the compromise was not binging on the State as it would defeat its preferential right. After hearing the parties and on a consideration of the terms of compromise, the High court held that the sales tax arrears recoverable by the State from the defendants had priority over the plaintiff�s claim. In the appeal filed by Dena Bank before the Supreme court, it was contended that the right of preference or precedence given to the state of Karnataka over the right of the Bank to proceed against the mortgaged property was not legally sustainable. But the supreme court replied the contentions of the appellant Bank after referring to section 158 and other relevant provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act 1964. It was noticed by the Supreme Court that sub-section (1) of Section 1158 of the Karnataka Act gave �statutory recognition to the doctrine of the State�s priority for recovery of debts�. It was also noticed by their Lordships that the above sub-section gave precedence to the claim of the State government to recover any money payable under provisions of the Act. �Over any other debt, demand or claim whatsoever whether in respect of mortgage, judgment decree of execution or attachment or otherwise howsoever against any land or the holder thereof�.

17. It is submitted by Sri. Raju Joseph, the learned Govt. Pleader, that the company which was an assessee under the KGST Act had failed to remit the sales tax, penalty et. For the assessment year 1974-75 and thereafter. Though notices of demand were issued to the Company on several occasions, the tax arrears were never paid. In March 1978n the Government had granted stay of all revenue recovery proceedings on condition that the Company furnished security for the amount in arrears. Pursuant to the above order of the Government, the Company had executed a security bond on June 26, 1978 by which they gave the movable and immovable assets of the Company as security. In July 2000 revenue recovery proceedings were again initiated. Ext.P4 notice under �Section 34 of the RR Act was issued and subsequently the property of the Company was put under attachment. It was thereafter that in February 2001 sale notice under Section 49(2) of the R.R. Act was published for sale of the immovable property of the company. It is the admitted position that the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal had sold the property in auction when the property was under revenue attachment and also after a notice of sale was issued by the revenue authorities. Therefore the contention of the Revenue is that the sale by the Recovery Officer is totally illegal and vitiated especially since Section 26-B of the KGST Act creates a first charge on the property of the defaulting dealer.

18. In this context it is necessary to refer to Section 26-B of the KGST Act which reads thus:

�26-B. Tax payable to be first charge on the property:--Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, any amount of tax, penalty, interest and any other amount, if any, payable by a dealer or any other person under this Act, shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer, or such person.�

19. A perusal of the above statutory clause unambiguously shows that any amount of tax, penalty etc. payable by a dealer �shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer or such person� (emphasis supplied). Section 26-B starts with a non-obstante clause, which necessarily gives it an overriding effect to any other law in force. It creates a first charge on the property of the dealer in no uncertain terms. But does this statutory first charge have an overriding effect on the pre-existing mortgage right of a secured creditor? Can the State take the plea that the �statutory first charge� operates on the entire property under mortgage and not only on the right of equity of redemption available to the mortgagor/dealer?

20. Two identical statutory provisions contained in the Sales Tax Acts of the State of Rajasthan and the State of Madhya Pradesh which are in pari material to Section 26-B of the KGST Act had come up before the supreme Court for consideration in almost similar situations. In State bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. National Iron & Steel Rolling corporation & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 19, the question was whether the statutory first charge in Section 11AAAA in the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act 1954 could have precedence over an existing mortgage. In a suit filed by the State bank of Bikaner and Jaipur against the defendant for recovery of certain amount advanced by t to the defendants on the strength of mortgage created in its favour, the Commercial Tax Officer got himself impleaded on the ground that he had a prior claim for recovery of m ore than Rs. One lakh as sales tax due from the defendant and therefore he was entitled to realize it by sale of the mortgaged property. The claim of the Commercial Taxes Officer was accepted by the trial court and it was affirmed in revision by the High court. After considering the provisions contained in Section 11-AAAA of the Rajashthan Act, the Supreme Court held that the statutory first charge created by the above provision operates on the entire property of the dealer including the interest of the mortgagee therein. The contention that the first charge would operate only over the equity of redemption was rejected by the Supreme Court. A perusal of the above revision in Section.

21. In State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. V. State Bank of Indore & Ors. (2002) 10 KTR 366 (SC), Section 33-C of the Madhya Pradesh general Sales tax Act 1958 was considered. Incidentally, Section 33-C of the M.P> Act is also identical to Section 26-B of the KGST Act. In this case also their Lordships held that the statutory first charge prevails over another charge including mortgage. The dictum laid down in Bhikabhai�s case (supra) was followed by their Lordships in this case.

22. In view of the above two decisions of the supreme Court in State bank of Bikaner and State Bank of Indore (supra) which had dealt with two exactly identical statutory provisions as contained in Section 26-B of the KGST Act, we have no hesitation to hold that the statutory first charge will prevail over any charge or right created in favour of a mortgagee/secured creditor. The statutory first charge gets precedence over an existing mortgage right. The precedence or priority is not confined to right of redemption alone. In this context the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner�s case (supra) may also be noticed:

�Where a mortgage is created in respe4ct of any property, undoubtedly an interest in the property is carved out in favour of the mortgagee. The mortgagor is entitled to redeem his property on payment of the mortgage dues. This does not, however, mean that the property ceases to be the property of the mortgagor. The little to the property remains with the mortgagor. Therefore a statutory first charge is created on the property of the dealer . the property subjected to the first charge is the entire property of the dealer. Interest of the mortgagee is not excluded from the first charge (emphasis supplied).

23. Sri. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the bank has raised yet another contention. According to the learned counsel, Section 26-B was introduced only with effect from April 1, 1999. There is no indication that the above provision would have retrospective. The contention is that since the mortgage in favour of the Bank was pre-existing a son the date of introduction of Section 26-B in the KGST Act, the pre-existing right of the Bank would not be affected.

24. It is pertinent to note that an identical contention was raised in Bhikhabhai�s case and in State Bank of Bikaner�s case (supra). The said contention was repelleld by the Supreme Court in both the cases. The principle laid down by their Lordships in the two decisions would squarely apply in this case also. It may be noted that as on the date of introduction of Section 26-B of the KGST Act, the right of the Bank based on the mortgage had not c45ystallised into a decree. The Tribunal had passed the decree only in the year 2000. But Section 26-B was introduced in April 1999. The sale of the mortgaged property was held in the year 2003. It is true that the mortgage was created in favour of the Bank in the year 1979. But significantly, the liability of tax had arisen in the year 1974-75, long prior to the creation of the mortgage in favour of the Bank. Thus, in our view, the contention raised by the learned counsel cannot be sustained for the above reasons also.

25. The other contention raised by the learned counsel is based on Section100 of the transfer of Property Act. It is urged by the learned counsel that the charge created under Section100 at the time of creation of the mortgage cannot be defeated by a statutory charge which came into operation at a later stage. This contention has also been answered by their Lordships in Bhikhabhai�s case and the answer is against the petitioner.

26. In view of the above legal position, it has to be held that the right, any, of the Recovery Officer too conduct sale of the mortgaged property in question was only subject to the statutory first charge available in favour of the State top recover the sales tax arrears from the Company. The admitted position is that the revenue authorities had effected attachment of the property even prior too the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer. Though a sale notice was published by the revenue officers, the sale did not take place. This sale notice was also long prior to the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer. Thus in any view of the matter the sale conduct by the Recovery Office without notice to the revenue is liable to be set aside.

27. The next question that arise for consideration is whether the State can be allowed to conduct a revenue sale for recovery of its alleged arrears. It is pertinent to note that in the sale notice the Tahsildar ((RR) had quantified the amount recoverable from the Company as Rs.8,13,381/=. The learned Special Government Pleader for Taxes has, however, contended before us that the total amount due from the Company is much more than that and it may come to nearly Rs.33 lakhs. But learned counsel for the Bank and the auction purchaser submit that the State cannot be permitted to go beyond the sale notice. If the State has to recover more money, fresh steps will have to be initiated as provided under the Revenue Recovery Act. We find considerable force in the above contention. The grievance of the State was that despite the sale notice published by its officers, the recovery officer had proceeded too sell the property ignoring the earlier attachment. If that be so, the State has to necessarily exercise its right of sale with reference to the sale notice issued by it in February 2003. But at the same time, it will be always open to the Revenue to initiate fresh steps for sale to recover the entire balance due.

28. As regards the claim of the auction purchaser, it has to be held that his right can only be subject to the validity of the sale held by the Recovery Officer. We have already found that the ale conducted by the Recovery Officer was not legally valid.

29. As regards the two writ appeals filed by the Company and the license are concerned, we have no hesitation to hold that these two appeals are without any merit. As far as WA.11165/2003 filed by the Company is concerned, the appellant cannot be hard to say that the sale by the Recovery Officer was not proper or valid. Admittedly the decree passed by the Tribunal against the company had become final. The sale was conducted on the strength of a certificate of recovery issued by the Tribunal after hearing the Company/judgment debtor. In our view, the learned Single Judge right in repelling the contentions raised by the Company against the sale.

30. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The Company is now in liquidation. The company court had passed orders of winding up. The official Liquidator is in charge of the affairs of the Company. In fact, the Official Liquidator had addressed this Court on behalf of the Company, as he had got himself impleaded in the case. It was submitted that the Official Liquidator will await the orders of the Company court in the matter of discharge of the liabilities of the Company.

31. WA.1232/2003 filed by the licensee is also without any merit. Though it was contended by the licensee that the Company had agreed to sell 8.5. cents in item No.1 of the mortgaged property, there is nothing on record to substantiate the above contention. It is admitted by the licensee himself that there is a clear recital in Ext.Pp1 agreement for sale that the said transaction will always be subject to mortgage in favour of the Bank. It is also the admitted position that there is a further recital in the agreement that the property which was agreed to be sold was subject too a mortgage in favour of the Bank and that the matter was pending in litigation. In that view of the matter the licensee is not entitled too claim that the Company is bound to assign the property to him by virtue of the agreement for sale. It may be true that he has been in possession of 8.5 cents and the building therein. But his occupation is only permissive and he can continue in occupation till the licence to occupy is revoked.

In the result WA.Nos.1165/2003 and 1232/2003 are dismissed. Similarly OP.8845/2001 and WP(C). 27302/2003 are also dismissed.

WP.26523/2003 is allowed.

The sale conducted by the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal is set aside. The revenue authorities shall be at liberty to proceed against the property of the Company under the RR Act and on the strength of the first charge created over the property by virtue of Section 26-B of the KGST Act. The auction purchaser shall be entitled to approach the Tribunal for refund of the purchase money deposited by him pursuant to the sale held by the Recovery Officer.

The parties are directed to suffer their respective costs in all the above cases.