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Natasha Narwal v. State (Nct Of Delhi)

Delhi High Court
Jun 15, 2021
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Natasha Narwal, a student pursuing MPhil-Ph.D. at Jawaharlal Nehru University, has been in custody since 29.05.2020 in connection with FIR No. 59/2020 registered on 06.03.2020 at the Crime Branch, New Delhi. The FIR initially invoked sections 147, 148, 149, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), with multiple additional offences under IPC, Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, Arms Act, and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) subsequently added. The prosecution alleges that the appellant was involved in instigating protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC), particularly in Muslim-dominated areas of Delhi, and was part of a larger conspiracy linked to riots in North-East Delhi between 22.02.2020 and 26.02.2020.

The appellant was also implicated in two other FIRs (No. 48/2020 and No. 50/2020) related to the same events, in which she was granted bail. The appellant was arrested in the subject FIR while already in judicial custody for one of the other FIRs. Charge-sheet in the subject FIR was filed on 16.09.2020, naming several accused including the appellant. Cognizance was taken by the Special Court, but charges under certain sections awaited sanction and are yet to be framed. The appellant challenged the rejection of her bail application dated 28.01.2021 by the Special Court through the present appeal under section 21(4) of the NIA Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the allegations against the appellant prima facie disclose offences under sections 15, 17, or 18 of the UAPA related to terrorist acts or conspiracy thereto.
  2. Whether the stringent conditions for bail under section 43D(5) of the UAPA apply to the appellant’s bail application.
  3. The extent to which the court should independently assess the charge-sheet and evidence despite sanction for prosecution having been granted by the Central Government under the UAPA.
  4. The permissible contours of constitutionally guaranteed right to protest under Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution and when protest crosses into criminal or terrorist activity.
  5. Whether the appellant is entitled to regular bail under general principles of bail considering the nature of allegations, evidence, and risk factors such as flight risk, tampering with evidence, or witness intimidation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant was not involved in any violent protests nor a member of certain groups alleged by the prosecution.
  • She participated in peaceful women-led protests but was not present at protest sites during the dates of alleged riots, supported by call detail records (CDRs) and CCTV footage.
  • Her name is falsely implicated based on statements of protected witnesses, without production of exculpatory evidence like CDRs and video footage.
  • No victim statements or medical evidence (MLCs) substantiate the allegations against her.
  • Applications for access to seized cell-phone data, CDRs, and video footage were rejected, obstructing her defense.
  • The prosecution’s case is an attempt to embroil her in a larger conspiracy without substantive evidence.
  • The ingredients of offences under sections 15, 17, or 18 UAPA are not made out; hence, section 43D(5) UAPA does not apply.
  • She poses no flight risk, will not tamper with evidence or intimidate witnesses, given her profile and conduct.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appellant was part of a conspiracy through multiple women’s rights and activist groups to destabilize the government under the guise of anti-CAA/NRC protests.
  • She attended meetings planning protests including chakka jaams and was present at various protest sites where instigation and distribution of harmful materials occurred.
  • She organized and instigated women protesters in 24x7 sit-ins and other protests that blocked traffic and gave inciting speeches.
  • She distributed chilli powder and other materials to protesters intended to be used against police and pro-CAA demonstrators.
  • Her name is linked to the actual riots in North-East Delhi, where violent and terrorizing acts were committed using weapons and incendiary materials.
  • These allegations are supported by statements of multiple witnesses, including protected witnesses, and video recordings seized by the police.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Asif Iqbal Tanha vs. State, Crl.A No. 39 of 2021 Detailed analysis of provisions related to terrorist acts and conspiracy under UAPA. Used to recapitulate the legal position on terrorist acts and the need for careful application of UAPA provisions.
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors Definition and scope of terrorist activity exceeding ordinary crime and public order disturbance. Emphasized that terrorism must cause effects beyond ordinary law enforcement capacity.
Peoples Union For Civil Liberties & Anr. vs. Union of India, (1994) 4 SCC 602 Psychological impact of terrorism on society and distinction from ordinary crime. Clarified the nature and purpose of terrorist acts as destabilizing the nation and challenging sovereignty.
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs State of Maharashtra through CBI, (2004) 9 SCC 580 Range of acts that constitute terrorism, including use of weapons of mass destruction. Illustrated the broad spectrum of terrorist acts considered under law.
A.K. Roy vs. Union of India and Ors, (1982) 1 SCC 271 Requirement of definitiveness in criminal law and narrow construction of vague penal provisions. Supported the principle that serious penal provisions must be clearly defined and narrowly construed.
Sanjay Dutt vs. State through CBI, (1994) 5 SCC 410 Extra care in applying serious penal provisions to avoid unjustly including unintended persons. Reinforced the need for just and fair application of penal laws with serious consequences.
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan vs Union of India and Anr, (2018) 17 SCC 324 Contours of legitimate protest under Article 19(1)(b) and when protests become unlawful. Guided the court's understanding of constitutionally protected protest versus prohibited conduct.
Ash Mohammad vs Shiv Raj Singh & Anr., (2012) 9 SCC 446 Principles governing grant of bail considering nature of accusations and evidence. Supported the court’s emphasis on judicious exercise of discretion in bail matters.
Sanjay Chandra vs CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 Case-specific consideration of bail based on facts and merits. Reiterated that bail decisions must be fact-sensitive.
P. Chidambaram vs. CBI, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1380 Requirement of specific and particularized allegations to deny bail. Applied to assess the sufficiency of the prosecution’s material against the appellant.
P. Chidambaram vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1549 Similar principles on bail and evidence required to sustain allegations. Used to reinforce the need for concrete evidence before refusing bail.
Moti Ram vs. State of M.P., (1978) 4 SCC 47 General principles on bail and presumption of innocence. Supported the court’s approach to bail considering the appellant’s profile and evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the allegations and material in the charge-sheet, finding no specific or particularized acts attributed to the appellant that would prima facie constitute offences under sections 15, 17, or 18 of the UAPA. It emphasized that the mere grant of sanction for prosecution by an independent authority under the UAPA does not absolve the court from independently assessing whether the charge-sheet discloses an offence.

The court relied on authoritative Supreme Court precedents to clarify the narrow and careful construction required for the definition of terrorist acts, distinguishing terrorism from ordinary crimes or disturbances of law and order. It underscored that the UAPA is intended to address threats to national defense and sovereignty, not to be applied broadly to conventional offences.

Regarding the right to protest, the court noted that legitimate dissent is a fundamental democratic feature protected under Article 19(1)(b), and only protests that turn violent or unlawful fall outside constitutional protection. The court observed that offences related to violent protests are subject to trial under separate FIRs where bail was granted to the appellant.

On the general principles of bail, the court reiterated the need for judicious discretion, considering the nature of accusations, evidence, risk of flight, tampering with evidence, and witness intimidation. It observed that the appellant’s profile, conduct, and delay in arrest negated reasonable apprehensions of such risks.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish prima facie that the appellant committed terrorist acts or conspiracy under UAPA, and that the stringent bail conditions under section 43D(5) UAPA do not apply. Therefore, the appellant’s bail application must be considered under general principles, which favor granting bail in this case.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 28.01.2021 rejecting the appellant’s bail application is set aside. The appellant is admitted to regular bail subject to specified conditions including furnishing personal bond, maintaining contact details with the Investigating Officer, residing at the recorded address, surrendering passport if any, and refraining from contacting prosecution witnesses or tampering with evidence.

The decision directly affects the appellant by granting bail pending trial. The court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits of the pending trial. No new precedent altering existing legal principles was established; rather, the court reaffirmed the necessity for courts to independently assess UAPA charges and protect constitutional rights to protest and fair bail consideration.

Show all summary ...

$~S~ * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision: 15 June 2021 + CRL.A. 82/2021

NATASHA NARWAL ..... Appellant Through: Mr. Adit S. Pujari, Ms. Tusharika Mat too and Mr. Kunal Negi ,

Advocates.

versus

STATE OF DELHI NCT ..... Respondent Through: Mr. Amit Mahajan, Mr. Amit Prasad, and Mr. Rajat Nair, SPPs for the State alongwith Mr. Dhruv Pande and Mr. Shantanu Sharma, Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI

J U D G M E N T

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.

Introduction

The appellant, Natasha Narwal has preferred the present appeal under section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act 2008 ('NIA Act', for short) impugning order dated 28.01.2021 made by the learned Special Court ('impugned order', for short) rejecting the appellant's bail application in case FIR No. 59/2020 ('subject FIR', for short) dated 06.03.2020 registered initially under sections 147 / 148 / 149 / 120B of the Indian Penal Code 1860 ('IPC', for short) at P.S.: Crime Branch, New Delhi, to which offences

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under sections 109 / 114 / 124A / 153A / 186 / 201 / 212 / 295 / 302 / 307 / 341 /353 / 395 / 419 / 420 / 427 / 435 / 436 / 452 / 454 / 468 / 471 / 34 IPC, sections 3 / 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984 ('PDPP Act', for short), sections 25 / 26 of Arms Act 1959 and sections 13 / 16 / 17 / 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 ('UAPA', for short) were subsequently added. The appellant is stated to be in custody since 29.05.2020 in the subject FIR.

2. Briefly, the appellant is a student pursuing MPhil-Ph.D. Programme in the Department Centre of Women's Historical Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, having completed her Bachelor of Arts (Honours) and Master of Arts in History from Hindu College, Delhi University.

Essence of allegations against Appellant

3. In essence, the case cited by the prosecution against the appellant is that she was involved in instigating the local population in certain Muslim dominated areas in Delhi, particularly women, to protest against the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 ('CAA', for short) passed by the Parliament and the exercise undertaken by the Central Government for creating a National Register of Citizens ('NRC', for short), by allegedly seeking to incite feelings of persecution. Other than this, the allegation is that as part of a women's rights group called 'Pinjra Tod' (which may loosely be translated as 'break-free from the cage', namely from societal shackles) and other activistic groups called the Delhi Protests Support Group ('DPSG', for short), the Jamia Coordination Committee ('JCC', for short), Warriors and 'Auraton ka Inquilab', the appellant participated in a so-called larger

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conspiracy to commit certain offences that are subject matter of the subject FIR, which also led to riots that occurred in the North-East part of Delhi between 22.02.2020 and 26.02.2020.

4. For sake of completeness, it is necessary to mention that the appellant was accused and was also arrested in two other FIRs, being FIR No. 48/2020 dated 24.02.2020 registered under section 147 / 186 / 188 / 109 / 283 / 353 / 341 / 34 IPC at P.S.: Jafrabad and FIR No. 50/2020 dated 26.02.2020 registered under section 147 / 148 / 149 /186 / 283 / 302 / 307 / 332 / 323 / 353 / 427 / 109 / 188 / 120B / 34 IPC read with section 25 / 27 Arms Act and section 3 / 4 PDPP Act at P.S.: Jafrabad. It is noteworthy that in FIR No. 48/2020 the appellant was arrested on 23.05.2020 and was admitted to bail by the learned Duty Metropolitan Magistrate vidé order dated 24.05.2020 observing inter alia that the appellant was merely protesting the passing of the CAA and the exercise undertaken by the Central Government for creating the NRC and that she did not indulge in any violence. Insofar as FIR No. 50/2020 is concerned, the appellant was arrested on 24.05.2020, that is, on the very day and from the very court which admitted her to bail in FIR No. 48/2020 on 24.05.2020; and was subsequently admitted to bail in FIR No. 50/2020 vidé order dated 17.09.2020 by the learned ASJ, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.

5. The appellant was arrested in the subject FIR i.e. FIR No. 59/2020 on 29.05.2020 while she was in judicial custody in Tihar Jail in FIR No. 50/2020. Even at the time of her formal arrest in the subject FIR on 29.05.2020, the Investigating Officer did not seek her police custody;

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which was sought 04 days later, whereupon she suffered police custody for 05 days beginning 03.06.2020.

6. It would appear therefore that 03 separate FIRs came to be registered against the appellant, albeit arising from or in connection with, the same event, namely her alleged involvement with the protests against the CAA and the NRC. It must also be noticed that though FIR No. 59/2020 was registered on 06.03.2020, the appellant came to be arrested in the subject FIR some 3 months later on 29.05.2020.

7. Upon completion of investigation in the subject FIR, the respondent/ Delhi Police has filed charge-sheet dated 16.09.2020 naming several accused persons, including the appellant. Although supplementary charge-sheets dated 22.11.2020 and 01.03.2021 have also been filed arising from the subject FIR, it is common ground that the said other charge-sheets do not relate to the appellant and are therefore not relevant for purposes of the present proceedings. Vidé order dated 17.09.2020 the learned Special Court is stated to have taken cognizance of the offences alleged in the subject charge-sheet, except offences under section 124A / 153A / 109 / 120B IPC, for which sanction for prosecution was still awaited from the State Government as of the date of the impugned order. However, charges have not yet been framed against the appellant or any of the other accused persons.

8. It may further be recorded for completeness that in Crl. M. C. No. 2119/2020, by which the State had challenged the learned trial court's direction to provide a hardcopy of the charge-sheet to all accused persons, further proceedings in the trial had been stayed by a learned Single Judge of this court vidé order dated 10.11.2020, which stay

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order has however since been vacated by order dated 23.03.2021 made by the learned Single Judge.

Appellant's Submissions

9. Mr. Adit S. Pujari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contends that on point of fact, the appellant was not involved with any of the acts or omissions alleged against her in the subject charge-sheet. More specifically, counsel submits as follows :

(a) It is argued that the appellant was not involved or concerned with any violent protests against the CAA, whether as part of Pinjra Tod or DPSG; and that in any case she was not even a member of the JCC, the Warriors nor of the Auraton ka Inquilab WhatsApp groups at all.

(b) While the appellant does not deny that she was part of the women-led 24x7 sit-in protest at the site near Madina Masjid, Seelampur and of the protest at the 66-foota Road at Jafrabad Metro Station, she was not at the said protest sites on the date when riots and communal violence are alleged to have broken- out there, i.e. between 22.02.2020 and 26.02.2020 as would be evident from her call detail records ('CDRs') and video- footage of CCTV cameras installed at and around the sites.

(c) It is urged that the appellant's name is being falsely dragged into several allegations, including her having participated in various meetings, having been present at the protest sites where violence and rioting occurred, supported only on the basis of statements of witnesses, most of whom are now

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protected witnesses, recorded much after the dates of the alleged incidents, whereas the 'best evidence' that ought to be produced to demonstrate the basis of these allegations, such as CDRs and relevant video-footage are intentionally not being produced.

(d) Counsel submits that the State has not cited even a single statement of any actual victim of the alleged violence, since such victim would disprove the appellant's presence during the riots and violence. Even copies of the CDRs and video- footage are not being provided to the appellant, to prevent her from showing that she was not present.

(e) It is pointed-out that there is no reference in the charge-sheet to any specifics, such as names, addresses and other particulars of actual victims who may have suffered injuries or may have died at the locations where the appellant is alleged to have been present, nor to any other evidence as to the nature of injuries sustained, nor to any MLCs to that effect, all of which would belie and show the utter falsity of the allegations levelled inter alia against the appellant. In this behalf, it is also pointed-out that applications moved by the appellant before the learned Special Court seeking copies of the contents/data of her seized cell-phone and for requisitioning her CDRs and video-footage of the sites, have all been rejected. The appellant contends that video-footage of the protests was in fact professionally recorded by a videographer engaged by the Delhi Police; but such video-

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footage has not been produced in an effort to block-out any exculpatory evidence which would show that the appellant was not even present at the place on the dates and time alleged.

(f) It is accordingly the appellant's submission that the effort of the State is to embroil the appellant in events with which she had nothing to do; and in which she did not either perpetrate or participate in, on the vague and untenable plea of a 'larger conspiracy'.

(g) It is further argued on behalf of the appellant that there is no substantive factual allegation, founded on any concrete, verifiable evidence adduced against the appellant; and in any case, the ingredients of the offences alleged under sections 15, 17 or 18 under Chapters IV or VI of the UAPA are not made- out, by reason of which section 43D(5) of the UAPA has no application to the bail application. It is accordingly contended, that the bail application must be decided only on the general principles of bail, namely the 'triple test' of flight risk, tampering with evidence and influencing witnesses and nothing more.

(h) It is pointed-out that the appellant was arrested almost 03 months after the date of registration of the FIR, without even a notice under section 41A of the Cr.P.C. having been issued to her; yet she remained available for investigation at her residence throughout; and there is no chance of her fleeing from justice. It is further submitted that all evidence that was

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required to be collected is already available with the investigating agency and no documentary or other evidence of any nature whatsoever is in the appellant's possession; nor has the appellant acted in a manner whereby it could be suspected that she would tamper with evidence. Furthermore, it is the appellant's submission, that considering her educational profile and situation in life, namely that she is a student pursuing her M.Phil-Ph.D. at JNU, she is in no position to influence any witnesses and accordingly there is no risk even on that count.

Respondent's Submissions

10. Referring to certain portions of the subject charge-sheet, Mr. Amit Mahajan, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the Delhi Police/State, has sought to explain the alleged role of the appellant in what the prosecuting agency calls the 'larger conspiracy'. The portions of the subject charge-sheet dated 16.09.2020, which charge- sheet is stated to run into some 19000 pages, that are stated to be relevant as against the appellant, are extracted in Annexure - A to this judgment for ease of reference. Broadly, the prosecuting agency's allegations against the appellant may be summarised as follows:

(a) The principal allegation against the appellant is that as a member of the women's rights organisation called Pinjra Tod, and as part of the WhatsApp groups under the name Warriors, Auraton ka Inquilab, DPSG, and JCC, the appellant engaged in a conspiracy to plan riots and destabilise the Government in the guise of an anti-CAA and anti-NRC protest. To support

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this submission, the State draws attention to the portion of the subject charge-sheet extracted as Screenshot 1a-1b in Annexure - A attached to this judgment.

(b) Furthermore, it is alleged that on 23.01.2020, the appellant was present at the Pinjra Tod office at E-1/13 Seelampur, Delhi, where one of the principal accused in the matter advised the persons present to escalate their planned chakka jaam (which may loosely be translated as a form of protest in which protesters cause complete stoppage of vehicles and blockade of roads), saying further, that merely giving inciting speeches would not work. In this behalf, the State draws attention to the portion of the subject charge-sheet extracted as Screenshot 2, 3a-3c, 4 and 5 in Annexure-A attached to this judgment.

(c) On the intervening night of 16/17.02.2020, the appellant is also alleged to have attended a meeting in a locality called Chand Bagh, where, it is alleged, that the conspirators pledged to plan for executing a chakka jaam, including at the time that the US President was scheduled to visit New Delhi. In this regard, the State points to the portion of the subject charge- sheet extracted as Screenshot 6, 7 and 8a-8c in Annexure-A attached to this judgment.

(d) More specifically, it is the State's allegation that the appellant was amongst the leaders who organised protests at a site described as the Plot of Chaudhary Mateen in Jafrabad, Delhi and at another protest site described as Opposite Tent Wala

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School, Jafrabad, Delhi, as also at a site described as Fruit Market, Seelampur, Delhi. To support this submission, the State refers to the portion of the subject charge-sheet extracted as Screenshot 9, 10 and 11 in Annexure-A attached to this judgment.

(e) The State alleges that the appellant was inter alia one of the conspirators who organised and instigated the 24x7 sit-in protest led by some 300 women at the Madina Masjid, Seelampur; and that on 23.02.2020, a group of protesting women also occupied the 66-foota Road at Jafrabad Metro Station, thereby completely blocking traffic and creating a chakka jaam, where the appellant also engaged in sloganeering and instigating the public against the government, which is described as giving 'bhadkau bhashan', namely inciting speeches. To support this submission, the State references the portion of the subject charge-sheet extracted as Screenshot 12a-12b, 13a-13b, 14, 15a-15b, 16, 17, 18a-18b, 19a-19d and 20 in Annexure-A attached to this judgment.

(f) It is also alleged that the appellant engaged in distributing packets of chilli-powder to women protesters, with the purpose of attacking police and military with it; and also asked women and youngsters to stockpile chilli-powder, dandas (sticks), empty bottles, acid, and stones to be used when the occasion arises. In this context, the State draws attention to the portion of the subject charge-sheet extracted as

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Screenshot 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 in Annexure-A attached to this judgment.

(g) The appellant is alleged to have also been part of the group of protesting women who proceeded from the Jafrabad protest site towards the Maujpur-Babarpur Metro Station, which brought them near the pro-CAA protest site, where again it is alleged, that the appellant inter alia distributed chilli-powder, bottles and stones to women protesters, which were thrown at the pro-CAA protesters sitting at that protest site. To show this, attention of the court is invited to the portion of the subject charge-sheet extracted as Screenshot 29a-29b, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35a-35b in Annexure-A attached to this judgment.

(h) The appellant's name is also sought to be included in the commission of the actual riots that occurred in North-East Delhi, which allegedly broke-out in execution of a 'common conspiracy'. The State further alleges that as part of the protests in question, the perpetrators used fire arms, petrol bombs, acid, iron rods, swords, knives, stones, sling shots, and chilli-powder etc., to terrorise people and the society at large. To support this submission, the State references the portion of the subject charge-sheet extracted as Screenshot 36, 37a-37c, 38, 39 and 40 in Annexure-A attached to this judgment.

(i) The prosecution also alleges that the above-mentioned allegations are substantiated by statements of several witnesses, including many who have since been declared as

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protected witnesses considering their vulnerabilities. It is also the prosecution's contention that video-recordings relating to the incidents in which the appellant was involved have been seized, which show the appellant's presence.

Basis & Reasoning of the Impugned Order

11. Considering the nature of the allegations levelled against the appellant, this court also closely examined the basis and the reasoning that informed the decision of the learned Special Court to deny bail to the appellant. We find that, apart from proceeding to accept the allegations contained in the subject charge-sheet without any analysis or appreciation of the gravamen of the offences alleged, the following main aspects appear to have weighed with the learned Special Court in rejecting the appellant's bail:

(a) The learned Special Court records that since under the provisions of section 45 of the UAPA, previous sanction of the Central Government is required before a court takes cognizance of any offence under Chapters IV or VI; and that before the Central Government gives sanction for prosecution, the Central Government itself is required to consider the report of an authority to be appointed by it, which authority is required to make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of investigation and make its recommendation to the Central Government as regards grant of sanction. The learned Special Court says that "In the present case, previous sanction was taken under UAPA and thus, an independent review of the evidence gathered during

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the investigation has been done by an independent authority after its satisfaction about the evidence" (extract from para 10 of the impugned order), whereby, it is evident that the learned Special Court is persuaded to think that the purported independent review by an independent authority of the evidence gathered, leading to the grant of sanction for prosecution by the Central Government, almost obviates the need for the court to apply its own mind and consider whether or not any offence is disclosed against an accused under Chapters IV or VI of the UAPA.

(b) Furthermore, we find that a common thread that runs through the reasoning adopted by the learned Special Court when appreciating the material against the appellant, is that the appellant was a member of Pinjra Tod, DPSG, Warriors and Auraton ka Inquilab and was 'part of a multi-layered conspiracy and in regular touch and reporting to the higher conspirators', which makes her actions culpable.

(c) We may say, without the slightest hesitation, that the learned Special Court's view that merely because an independent review of the evidence gathered may have been undertaken by an independent authority, which authority may have been satisfied that offences under the UAPA are made-out; and the Central Government may have accorded sanction for prosecution for offences under the UAPA based on such review, does not in any manner imply that the court need not apply its own mind to form its own judicial view as to whether

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any offence under the UAPA is disclosed in the charge-sheet and the material placed alongwith it. The purported independent review of evidence by the purported independent authority; or the purported satisfaction of such authority, must never enter the consideration of the court while making its own assessment as to whether the ingredients of any offence under the UAPA are disclosed in the charge-sheet, not least because the offences engrafted in the UAPA are extremely serious and invite severe punishment.

Interpretation of 'terrorist act' & related provisions under UAPA

12. In its contemporaneous judgment 15.06.2021 rendered in "Asif Iqbal Tanha vs. State" being Crl.A. No. 39 of 2021, this court has analysed in detail the provisions engrafting 'terrorist act' and 'conspiracy' or 'act preparatory' to the commission of a terrorist act. Without repeating that exercise in the present judgement, it would be sufficient to recapitulate the position of law in that regard, as expatiated by this court in the said judgement.

13. As detailed by this court in Asif Iqbal Tanha (supra), the position is that though the phrase 'terrorist act' has been given a very wide and detailed definition in section 15, in our considered view, the court must be careful in employing the definitional words and phrases used in section 15 in their absolute, literal sense or use them lightly in a manner that would trivialise the extremely heinous offence of 'terrorist act', without understanding how terrorism is different even from conventional, heinous crime.

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14. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors , 1

the Hon'ble Supreme Court says that the extent and reach of a terrorist activity must travel beyond the effect of an ordinary crime and must not arise merely by causing disturbance of law and order or even public order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court says that the effect of terrorist activity must be such that it travels beyond the capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to deal with it under the ordinary penal law. The following words in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) bear careful attention :

"…'terrorism' is generally an attempt to acquire or maintain power or control by intimidation and causing fear and helplessness in the minds of the people at large or any section thereof and is a totally abnormal phenomenon …".

(emphasis supplied)

1 5. Furthermore, in the same judgment that the Hon'ble Supreme Court says: "...it is not the intention of the Legislature that every criminal should be tried under TADA, where the fall out of his activity does not extend beyond the normal frontiers of the ordinary criminal activity. Every 'terrorist' may be a criminal but every criminal cannot be given the label of a 'terrorist' only to set in motion the more stringent provisions of TADA …" (emphasis supplied)

1 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further explained the concept of terrorism in People's Union For Civil Liberties & Anr. vs. Union of (1994) 4 SCC 602.1 CRL.A.82/2021 Page ! of !15 72

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India ('PUCL', for short) in which decision, quoting Mohd. Iqbal M. 2 Shaikh & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra , the Hon'ble Supreme3

Court says:

"…it may be possible to describe it as use of violence when its most important result is not merely the physical and mental damage of the victim but the prolonged psychological effect it produces or has the potential of producing on the society as a whole …" (emphasis supplied)

17. In PUCL (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court also observes that:

"... Terrorist acts are meant to destabilise the nation by challenging its sovereignty and integrity, to raze the constitutional principles that we hold dear, to create a psyche of fear and anarchism among common people, to tear apart the secular fabric, to overthrow democratically elected government, to promote prejudice and bigotry, to demoralise the security forces, to thwart the economic progress and development and so on. This cannot be equated with a usual law and order problem within a State. On the other hand, it is inter-State, international or cross-border in character. Fight against the overt and covert acts of terrorism is not a regular criminal justice endeavour. Rather, it is defence of our nation and its citizens. It is a challenge to the whole nation and invisible force of Indianness that binds this great nation together ..."

(emphasis supplied)

18. More recently, in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs State of Maharashtra through CBI, Bombay , the Hon'ble Supreme Court4

refers to acts of terrorism in the following words:

(2004) 9 SCC 580.2

(1998) 4 SCC 494.3

(2013) 13 SCC 1.4

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"... Acts of terrorism can range from threats to actual assassinations, kidnappings, airline hijackings, bomb scares, car bombs, building explosions, mailing of dangerous materials, computer based attacks and the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons—weapons of mass destruction (WMD)" (emphasis supplied)

19. As this court held in Asif Iqbal Tanha (supra) therefore, in our view, although the definition of 'terrorist act' in section 15 UAPA is wide and even somewhat vague, the definition must partake of the essential character of terrorism and the phrase 'terrorist act' cannot be permitted to be applied in a cavalier manner to criminal acts or omissions that fall squarely within the definition of conventional offences as defined inter alia under the IPC. We must not forget the principle laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.K. Roy vs. Union of India and Ors. where it5

says that the requirement that crimes must be defined with an appropriate definitiveness is a fundamental concept of criminal law and must be regarded as a pervading theme of our Constitution since the decision in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India ; and that6

the underlying principle is that every person is entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or permits and the life and liberty of the person cannot be put on peril of an ambiguity. The Constitution Bench further says that to stand true to this principle, what is expected is that the language of the law must contain adequate warning of the conduct which may fall within the proscribed area 'when measured

(1982) 1 SCC 271.5

1978 (1) SCC 2486

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17

by common understanding'. Most importantly, the Constitution Bench says:

"... These expressions, though they are difficult to define, do not elude a just application to practical situations. The use of language carries with it the inconvenience of the imperfections of language...".

"...We must, however, utter a word of caution that since the concepts are not defined, undoubtedly because they are not capable of a precise definition, courts must strive to give to those concepts a narrower construction than what the literal words suggest ...". (emphasis supplied)

20. We must also carefully note the words of another Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Dutt vs. State through CBI

(II) to the effect that when law visits a person with serious penal7

consequences, courts must take extra care to ensure that those to whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute "are not roped in by stretching the law".

21. Our jurisprudence therefore dictates that where a provision of law which contains serious penal consequences is vague or widely worded, such provision must be construed narrowly to bring it within the constitutional framework; and most importantly, must be applied in a just and fair way, lest it unjustly sucks within its ambit persons whom the Legislature never intended to punish. Where the court finds that an act or omission is adequately addressed and dealt with by the ordinary penal law of the land, the court must not countenance a State agency 'crying wolf'.

(1994) 5 SCC 410.7

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18

22. Upon a careful consideration of the aforesaid verdicts of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in our opinion, the intent and purpose of Parliament in enacting the UAPA and in amending it in 2004 and 2008 to bring terrorist activity within its scope, was and could only have been, to deal with matters of profound impact on the 'Defence of India', nothing more and nothing less. Had that not been the case, UAPA could not have been enacted by Parliament since the only entries in List-I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution that would bring the statute within the legislative competence of Parliament are Entry 1 read with Entry 93 relating to the Defence of India and offences with respect to the Defence of India. It was not the intent, nor purpose of enacting UAPA that other offences of the usual and ordinary kind, however grave, egregious or heinous in their nature and extent, should also be covered by UAPA, since such conventional matters would have fallen within Entry 1 of List-II (State List) and/or Entry 1 of List-III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule of our Constitution. This is the only possible view that can be taken if we are to lean in favour of constitutionality of the provisions of section 15, 17 and 18 of the UAPA, as we must.

Right to Protest

23. As in Asif Iqbal Tanha (supra), since this matter also emanates from protests organised by certain persons against the CAA and the NRC; and since the State alleges that these were not ordinary protests but were of a kind that have shaken, or are 'likely' to have shaken, the entire foundations of our Nation, we must discuss what the law

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considers as permissible contours of a protest that would not threaten our Nation.

24. In this context, we are required to examine, as to when the constitutionally guaranteed right to protest flowing from the right under Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution to "assemble peaceably and without arms", turns into a cognizable offence under the ordinary penal law; and when the right to protest gets further vitiated and becomes a terrorist act, or a conspiracy or an act preparatory, to commission of a terrorist act under the UAPA.

25. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan vs Union of India and Anr give the most lucid8

answer, explaining the contours of legitimate protest. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court says that legitimate dissent is a distinguishable feature of any democracy and the question is not whether the issue raised by the protestors is right or wrong or whether it is justified or unjustified, since people have the right to express their views; and a particular cause, which in the first instance, may appear to be insignificant or irrelevant may gain momentum and acceptability when it is duly voiced and debated. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further says that a demonstration may take various forms : it may be noisy, disorderly and even violent, in which case it would not fall within the permissible limits of Article 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b) and in such case the Government has the power to regulate, including prohibit, such protest or demonstration. The Government may even prohibit public meetings, demonstrations or protests on

(2018) 17 SCC 324.8

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streets or highways to avoid nuisance or disturbance of traffic but the Government cannot close all streets or open areas for public meetings thereby defeating the fundamental right that flows from Article 19(1)

(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution.

26. In the present case, we are not deciding if the protests, in organising which the appellant is alleged to have been involved, were within the constitutionally guaranteed right to assembly, or whether they crossed the limit of what is permissible under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) and became non-peaceful protests. However, what we find is that, for one there is nothing to say that the Government had prohibited the protest in the first instance. What we know is that offences, if any, that are alleged to have been committed by reason of the protests having been turned non-peaceful, are subject matter of FIR Nos. 48/2020 and 50/2020, in which the appellant is one of the accused and in which the appellant has been admitted to bail and will face trial in due course. There is absolutely nothing in the subject charge-sheet, by way of any specific or particularised allegation, that would show the possible commission of a 'terrorist act' within the meaning of section

15 UAPA; or an act of 'raising funds' to commit a terrorist act under section 17; or an act of 'conspiracy' to commit or an 'act preparatory' to commit, a terrorist act within the meaning of section 18 UAPA. Accordingly, prima-facie we are unable to discern in the subject charge-sheet the elemental factual ingredients that are a must to found any of the offences defined under section 15, 17 or 18 UAPA.

27. In our view, the subject charge-sheet and the material filed therewith does not contain any specific, particularised, factual allegations that

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21

would make-out the ingredients of the offences under sections 15, 17 or 18 UAPA. As we have observed in Asif Iqbal Tanha (supra), alleging extremely grave and serious penal offences under sections 15, 17 and 18 UAPA against people frivolously, would undermine the intent and purpose of the Parliament in enacting a law that is meant to address threats to the very existence of our Nation. Wanton use of serious penal provisions would only trivialise them. Whatever other offence(s) the appellant may or may not have committed, at least on a prima facie view, the State has been unable to persuade us that the accusations against the appellant show commission of offences under sections 15, 17 or 18 UAPA.

28. Since, in our opinion, no offence under sections 15, 17 or 18 UAPA is made-out against the appellant on a prima facie appreciation of the subject charge-sheet and the material collected and cited by the prosecution, the additional conditions, limitations and restrictions on grant of bail under section 43D(5) UAPA do not apply; and the court must therefore apply the usual and ordinary considerations for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C.

General Principles of Bail

29. The general principles of grant or refusal of bail are well settled. Since a detailed discussion of such principles has recently been made by us in our judgment in Asif Iqbal Tanha (supra), only a brief reiteration of the principles would suffice in the present case, since both cases arise from the same subject FIR.

30. Though grant of bail involves exercise of discretionary power by the court, as always, the exercise of discretion must be judicious and not

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perfunctory or as a matter of course. In granting bail the court must keep in mind not only the nature of accusations but also the severity of the punishment and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations. Apart from being prima facie satisfied as regards the charges levelled; the court must also reasonably assess the apprehension of flight risk, evidence tampering and witness intimidation; with careful regard to the genuineness of the prosecution. The court must also consider the character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused and the likelihood of the offence being repeated.9

31. Furthermore, we remind ourselves that the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative but is principally to secure the presence of the accused at the trial; and that punishment begins only after conviction and that everyone is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and found guilty. It is well settled that detention in custody pending completion of trial can cause great hardship to an accused; that it is improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of the past conduct or to refuse bail to a person yet to be convicted only to give him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson. "Necessity" to secure the attendance of an accused at the trial, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, is the operative test. It also requires to be understood that10 though the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar considerations are also relevant, there is no hard and fast rule and cf. Ash Mohammad vs Shiv Raj Singh & Anr., (2012) 9 SCC 446 : para 8 and 11.9

cf. Sanjay Chandra vs CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : para 21-23.10 CRL.A.82/2021 Page ! of !23 72

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each case has to be considered on its own facts, circumstances and merits.11

32. Since courts often tend to fall into this error, it is extremely important to bear in mind the words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that grant of bail cannot be thwarted merely by asserting that an offence is grave, since the gravity of the offence can only beget the length of the sentence, which may be awarded upon conclusion of the trial.12

33. We must also never forget the profound insight of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., when he said that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave; that by being kept in custody, an undertrial accused, though presumed innocent, is subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail life; that the accused is also prevented from contributing to the preparation of the defence; and that the burden of pre-trial detention frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of the family.13

Discussion & Conclusions

34. In the present case, a closer reading of the allegations made against the appellant shows that no specific, particularised or definite act is attributed to the appellant, apart from the admitted fact that she engaged herself in organising anti-CAA and anti-NRC protests around the time when violence and rioting broke-out in the certain parts of North-East Delhi. Infact, on a reading of the portions of the subject charge-sheet to which attention has been drawn by the State and cf. P. Chidambaram vs. CBI, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1380 : para 22.11

cf. P. Chidambaram vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1549 : para 12.12

cf. Moti Ram vs. State of M.P., (1978) 4 SCC 47 : para 14.13 CRL.A.82/2021 Page ! of !24 72

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which have been extracted in the screenshots in Annexure- A to this judgment, it is seen that invariably the appellant's name appears alongwith that of several other alleged co-conspirators and even the instructions and directions issued by the main accused persons are not directed towards the appellant. In our reading of the subject charge- sheet and the material included in it, therefore, the allegations made against the appellant are not even borne-out from the material on which they are based. The State cannot thwart grant of bail merely by confusing issues.

35. Allegations relating to inflammatory speeches, organising of chakka jaam, instigating women to protest and to stock-pile various articles and other similar allegations, in our view, at worst, are evidence that the appellant participated in organising protests, but we can discern no specific or particularised allegation, much less any material to bear- out the allegation, that the appellant incited violence, what to talk of committing a terrorist act or a conspiracy or act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act as understood in the UAPA.

36. We are constrained to express, that it seems, that in its anxiety to suppress dissent, in the mind of the State, the line between the constitutionally guaranteed right to protest and terrorist activity seems to be getting somewhat blurred. If this mindset gains traction, it would be a sad day for democracy.

37. In our view therefore, after carefully considering the allegations in charge-sheet dated 16.09.2020 alongwith the material adduced therewith, we are not persuaded to think that prima-facie the accusations made against the appellant make-out any offence under

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sections 15, 17 and /or 18 of the UAPA; and therefore the stringent conditionalities contained in section 43D(5) of the UAPA would not apply and the appellant's bail plea would need to be considered on the general principles of bail enunciated above.

38. The subject charge-sheet has been filed before the learned Special Court; cognizance of some of the offences has been taken; but charges are yet to be framed. Some 740 prosecution witnesses, including public witnesses, protected witnesses and police witnesses are stated to have been cited in the subject charge-sheet but deposition of the witnesses is yet to commence. Considering the prevailing situation, namely the havoc created by the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is hardly likely that trial will proceed, much less conclude anytime soon.

39. Moreover, the appellant has already been granted regular bail by the learned ASJ vidé order dated 17.09.2020 in FIR No. 50/2020; and by the learned Duty Metropolitan Magistrate vidé order dated 24.05.2020 in FIR No. 48/2020, in which (latter) order, the court has in fact recorded that the appellant was only protesting the passage of the CAA and the conducting of the NRC and had not indulged in any violence. There is bound to be some overlap between what the appellant is alleged to have done in the said two other FIRs and in the subject FIR from which this appeal arises, since the offences alleged against the appellant are in the context of the violence and rioting that occurred in the North-East part of Delhi within the span of a few days in February 2020.

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40. In our considered opinion, keeping in view the background, profile and position of the appellant, there is no reasonably discernible basis to suspect, nor do we entertain any reasonable apprehension, that the appellant will either flee from justice; or that she will tamper with evidence; or that she will intimidate witnesses or otherwise attempt to frustrate trial. Due notice is also taken of the fact that the appellant was not arrested in the subject FIR for nearly 3 months after the date of its registration.

41. As a sequitur to the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be enlarged on regular bail. We accordingly set-aside impugned order dated 28.01.2021 made by the learned Special Court in case arising from FIR No. 59/2020 dated 06.03.2020 registered at P.S.: Special Cell, Delhi; and admit the appellant to regular bail until conclusion of trial, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The appellant shall furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rs. Fifty Thousand Only) with 02 local sureties in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the learned trial court;

(b) The appellant shall furnish to the Investigating Officer/SHO a cellphone number on which the appellant may be contacted at any time and shall ensure that the number is kept active and switched-on at all times;

(c) The appellant shall ordinarily reside at her place of residence as per trial court record and shall inform the Investigating Officer if she changes her usual place of residence;

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(d) If the appellant has a passport, she shall surrender the same to the learned trial court and shall not travel out of the country without prior permission of the learned trial court;

(e) The appellant shall not contact, nor visit, nor offer any inducement, threat or promise to any of the prosecution witnesses or other persons acquainted with the facts of case. The appellant shall not tamper with evidence nor otherwise indulge in any act or omission that is unlawful or that would prejudice the proceedings in the pending trial.

42. Nothing in this order shall be construed as an expression on the merits of the pending trial.

43. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent.

44. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms.

45. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.

SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J

JUNE 15, 2021

ds

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ANNEXURE-A

RELEVANT SCREENSHOTS EXTRACTED

FROM THE SUBJECT CHARGE-SHEET The names and other identifying details of persons other than the appellant and co-accused Devangana Kalita have been redacted by this court.

Screenshot 1a

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30

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31

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32

Screenshot 3b CRL.A.82/2021 Page ! of !33 72

33

Screenshot 3c Screenshot 4 CRL.A.82/2021 Page ! of !34 72

1955

1956

Screenshot 5 CRL.A.82/2021 Page ! of !35 72

2509

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1518

Screenshot 7
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37

Screenshot 8a
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38

Screenshot 8b 
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2205

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2206

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1433

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1560

Screenshot 11 Screenshot 12a Screenshot 12b 
 CRL.A.82/2021 Page ! of !43 72

1424

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1426

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1435

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46

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1556

Screenshot 16 Screenshot 17 CRL.A.82/2021 Page ! of !48 72

1562

1956

Screenshot 18a Screenshot 18b




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1957

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50

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51

Screenshot 19c
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52

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53

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2544

Screenshot 21 Screenshot 22




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1425

1434

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1516

1517

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1519

1555

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1965

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2531

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1520

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1520

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1966

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2537

2540

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2543

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2545

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2546

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1561

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2521

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2522

Screenshot 37c

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2523

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2524

2526

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2539