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Mangala Waman Karandikar (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. Prakash Damodar Ranade .
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute stems from an agreement dated 7-2-1963 by which the appellant allowed the respondent to run the existing stationery business “Karandikar Brothers” for two years on payment of a monthly royalty of Rs 90. The arrangement, periodically extended, continued until the appellant issued a notice on 20-12-1980 asking the respondent to vacate the premises by 31-1-1981 so that she could restart the family business. The respondent asserted tenancy rights under Section 15-A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (“Bombay Rent Act”).
The appellant filed Regular Civil Suit No. 764 of 1981 before the Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division), Pune. On 30-8-1988 the trial court decreed the suit, holding that the agreement transferred only the business and did not create a licence or tenancy in the premises. The respondent’s first appeal (Civil Appeal No. 979 of 1988) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Pune on 29-7-1991.
In second appeal, the Bombay High Court (Prakash Damodar Ranade v. Mangala Waman Karandikar, 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2445) reversed both courts below, treating the arrangement as a leave-and-licence covered by Section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act and holding that only the Small Causes Court had jurisdiction. The appellant thereafter approached the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the agreement dated 7-2-1963 created (a) a licence/tenancy in the shop premises or (b) a limited right to continue the appellant’s existing business.
- Whether Section 95, read with the proviso (6) to Section 92, of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permitted reliance on extrinsic evidence (e.g., receipts marked “rent”) to alter or contradict the plain terms of the written contract.
- If the arrangement fell under the Bombay Rent Act, whether the civil court lacked jurisdiction in favour of the Small Causes Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The High Court misread the contract; its language clearly shows the parties intended only a temporary transfer of the running business, not a lease or leave-and-licence of the premises.
- Because the contract is unambiguous, Section 92 of the Evidence Act bars extrinsic evidence; Section 95 is inapplicable.
- Consequently, the Bombay Rent Act does not apply, and the trial court had jurisdiction.
Respondent's Arguments
- Extrinsic evidence—particularly receipts describing payments as “rent”—demonstrates that the parties treated the arrangement as a leave-and-licence of the premises.
- As a licensee converted into a statutory tenant under Section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act, the respondent could only be sued in the Small Causes Court; therefore, the High Court’s reversal was correct.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 | Scope of Section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act converting licensees into tenants | Quoted by the trial court; Supreme Court noted that the respondent failed to prove the foundational fact of a licence in the premises, rendering Section 15-A inapplicable. |
| Case reported at (1998) 1 WLR 896 (HL) | Modern approach to contractual interpretation—courts ascertain the reasonable meaning intended by parties | Cited to explain that courts must first look to the language of the contract itself before considering external factors. |
| Case reported at (2013) 11 SCC 451 | Section 92 Evidence Act bars oral evidence that contradicts or varies the terms of a written contract | Relied upon to emphasise that admitting extrinsic evidence without ambiguity would defeat Section 92. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Plain meaning of the contract: The Court read the 1963 agreement and found it “straightforward,” expressly granting the respondent the right to conduct the business “Karandikar Brothers” while the appellant remained responsible for paying rent to the landlord. The document used the term “royalty” rather than “rent,” and carefully avoided language suggesting any interest in the premises.
2. Inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence: Under Section 92 Evidence Act, no oral or external evidence may contradict the clear written terms. Section 95 and proviso (6) to Section 92 apply only where the language is ambiguous in relation to existing facts. Because the agreement was unambiguous, the High Court erred in invoking Section 95 to look at rent receipts and other external material.
3. Effect on Bombay Rent Act: Once the agreement is characterised as a licence to continue an existing business (and not a licence or lease of premises), Section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act is irrelevant. Therefore, the civil court’s jurisdiction was not ousted.
4. Error of the High Court: By treating evidence of breach (rent receipts) as evidence of contractual ambiguity, the High Court effectively rewrote the parties’ bargain. This approach violated the settled interpretive hierarchy and nullified Section 92.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is allowed; the Bombay High Court’s judgment (2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2445) is set aside and the trial court’s decree in favour of the appellant is restored. No order as to costs.
Implications: The ruling re-affirms that clear contractual language cannot be altered by extrinsic evidence absent genuine ambiguity, and that Section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act cannot be invoked unless a licence in the premises is first established. The decision resolves the dispute between the parties but does not announce a new legal principle beyond reinforcing established evidentiary and interpretive rules.
N.V. Ramana, C.J.— This appeal is filed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court, in Prakash Damodar Ranade v. Mangala Waman Karandikar 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2445, wherein the second appeal was allowed in favour of the respondent and the decree in favour of the appellant herein was set aside.
2. This case arises out of a contract entered into between the appellant (since deceased, represented through legal heirs) and the respondent. Initially the appellant's husband was running a business of stationery in the name of “Karandikar Brothers” before his untimely demise in the year 1962. After his demise, she continued the business for some time. After a while, she was unable to run the business and accordingly decided to let the respondent run the same for some time. She entered into an agreement dated 7-2-1963, wherein the following terms were reduced in writing:
“2. For the last about 24 to 25 years, a stationery shop by the name Karandikar Brothers belonging to you of the stationery, notebooks and books is being run in the premises situated in City Survey No. 196/66 (New House No. 1643) at Sadashiv Peth, Pune. I request to you to give the said shop to me for running the same. Accordingly, you agreed for the same. Accordingly, an agreement was reached between us. The terms and conditions whereof are as follows:
A. The stationery shop by name “Karandikar Brothers” belonging to you of the stationery materials which is situated in the premises described in Para 1 (a) above and in which the furniture, etc. as described in Para 1 (b) above belonging to you is existing is being taken by me for conducting by an agreement for a period of two years beginning from 1-2-1963 to 31-1-1965.
B. The rent of the shop described in Para 1 (a) above is to be given by you only to the owner and I am not responsible therefor. I am to pay a royalty amount of Rs 90 (Rupees ninety only) for taking the said shop for conducting, for every month which is to be paid before the 5th day of every month.”
3. Time after time, the contract was duly extended. In 1980s, desiring to start her husband's business again, the appellant herein issued Notice dated 20-12-1980 requesting the respondent herein to vacate the suit premises by 31-1-1981. The respondent replied to the aforesaid notice claiming that the sale of business was incidental rather the contract was a rent agreement stricto sensu. Aggrieved by the respondent's reply, the appellant herein filed a civil suit being RCS No. 764 of 1981 before the Court of Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pune. During the course of the trial, one of the important questions that the trial court framed, which is relevant for our purpose can be observed hereunder:
“Does the defendant prove that from the year 1963 he is licensee in the said suit premises as contended in Para 7 of the plaint? And thereby on the date of suit he became tenant of the suit premises under Section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act?”
4. The trial court by judgment dated 30-8-1988, decreed the suit in favour of the appellant herein and held that the purport of the agreement was to create a transaction for sale of business rather than to rent the aforesaid premises to the respondent herein. The court while negating the contention of the respondent, that the shop premises was given to him on licence basis held as under:
“8. The defendant does not deny the fact that originally the husband of deceased Mangala Karandikar, namely, Waman Karandikar used to conduct the business of the suit shop. The business of stationery, books and notebooks was being run by him. Same business has been handed over to him. … The suit shop and the said business came to the deceased Mangala Karandikar after the death of her husband. It has come in the evidence that because of death of her husband and after the death of her husband, she was unable to continue the business. In the meantime, the defendant approached her. Thereupon she agreed to hand over the running business to the defendant. This fact has been denied by the defendant. The defendant raises the contention that the plaintiff never had the shop of stationery, but she had the grocery shop. After the death of her husband, it was lying closed for years together. In the year 1963 the defendant approached the plaintiff and thereupon the plaintiff agreed to give the suit shop on licence basis to him. This plea of the defendant is negatived by the terms and conditions of the agreement deed itself. The heavy burden was lying on the defendant to prove that there was licence agreement. He has not discharged the same. Therefore, the document became much relevant, and it has got material importance. If the conditions as enumerated in this document Ext. 33 are carefully scrutinised, it will become significant that the deceased plaintiff had the sole intention to hand over the running business of the suit shop to the defendant. There had been no intention to create the leave and licence in respect of the suit premises. The deceased plaintiff had very specifically and by taking utmost care and precaution excluded the word “premises” of shop in the agreement. But all the while the word “shop” was used with reference to business only. Next she has also excluded the word “rent” to be used. She had specifically made the recital of imposing the royalty on the defendant. The word “licence”, for the purpose of the Bombay Rent Act always refers to premises. The defendant has to seek the benefit under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Here the plaintiff had never intended to create the leave and licence in respect of the suit shop. The defendant has relied upon the receipt Ext. 40. This is the document produced by the plaintiff. It discloses that the word “rent” has been shown in this respect. The defendant is taking benefit of this fact and alleging that the rent was being recovered and not the royalty. Here it is worth to be noted that the plaintiff had at all no intention to recover the rent. All the while, it has been the case of the plaintiff that the royalty was being recovered. Therefore, I am unable to hold that the rent was being recovered by the plaintiff. …
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14. Issues 5 and 6 — The defendant has alleged that he is the tenant in the suit shop. Initially, the premises were given to him on licence basis but by virtue of amendment to the Bombay Rent Act and by virtue of insertion of Section 15(A) all the licensees have become the tenants. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant places his reliance on case law reported in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram (1986) 4 SCC 447. No doubt there can be no dispute regarding the principles of law. In the instant suit, the defendant has utterly failed to prove that the shop premises were given to him on licence basis. Therefore, no question of his tenancy can arise at any time. …”
(emphasis supplied)
5. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the respondent to hand over the suit property to the appellant herein including the furniture and other articles.
6. Aggrieved by the trial court judgment, the respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Additional District Judge, Pune in Civil Appeal No. 979 of 1988. On 29-7-1991, the Additional District Judge rendered a judgment dismissing the appeal filed by the respondent herein. Aggrieved by the dismissal the respondent herein filed a second appeal before the High Court of Bombay in Prakash Damodar Ranade v. Mangala Waman Karandikar 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2445.
7. By impugned order dated 7-11-2009 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2445 the High Court of Bombay allowed the second appeal and set aside the trial court's order as well as the first appellate court's order and held that the respondent had entered into a licence agreement which is covered under Section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act. Further the Court held that the trial court did not have the jurisdiction to try the cases under the Bombay Rent Act, the appropriate court should have been the Small Cause Court established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The second appellate court also observed on the merits of the case and held as under:
“22. Thus, considering the entirety of the case, in my view, both the courts below have incorrectly interpreted the document and the surrounding circumstances which, in my view, indicate that the parties had in fact agreed that the premises were transferred to the appellant on a leave and licence basis.”
8. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein filed this appeal.
9. The counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned order 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2445 of the High Court erred in appreciating the language of the contract, which clearly points towards the intention of the parties to create a licence for continuing existing business, which was run by late husband of the appellant. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent has supported the judgment by stating that there is extrinsic evidence which shows that the contract entered into between the parties was a licence to use the shop, which is covered under the Bombay Rent Act. In this light, he supports the impugned order 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2445 to state that the trial court did not have jurisdiction in the first place.
10. Having heard both the parties at some length, at the outset before we analyse this case, we need to observe some principles on contractual interpretation. Unlike a statutory interpretation, which is even more difficult due to assimilation of individual intention of lawmakers, contractual interpretation depends on the intentions expressed by the parties and dredging out the true meaning is an “iterative process” for the courts. In any case, the first tool for interpreting, whether it be a law or contract is to read the same.
11. It is usual that businessmen often do not sit over nitty-gritty in a contract. In a document the language used by the parties may have more than one meaning. It is ultimately the responsibility of the courts to decipher the meaning of the words used in a contract, having regard to a meaning reasonable in the line of trade as understood by parties. (1998) 1 WLR 896 (HL) It may not be out of context to state that the development of rules of contractual interpretation has been gradual and has taken place over a century. Without going into extensive study of precedents, in short, we may only state that the path and development of law of interpretation has been a progress from a stiff formulism to a strict rationalism. (1915) 25 The Yale Law Journal 163
12. It is clear from the reading of the contract that the parties had intended to transfer business from the appellant to the respondent during the contractual period. This agreement was not meant as a lease or licence for the respondent to conduct business. However, the respondent contends that the meaning of the document should not be culled solely with reference to the language used in the document, rather extrinsic evidence needs to be utilised before adducing proper meaning to the contract. In this regard he submits that on consideration of all the extrinsic evidence, the contract should be read as a leave and licence agreement, which is covered under the Bombay Rent Act. He draws his support from Section 95 of the Evidence Act to state that the document needs to be interpreted having regard to external evidence such as receipts of payment under the contract addressed as rent receipts, etc.
13. It may be noticed that the High Court had appropriately identified the question of law in the following manner: (Prakash Damodar Ranade case 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2445, SCC OnLine Bom para 18)
“18. The debate therefore revolves around the question as to whether the agreement of 7-2-1963 was a licence to conduct a business in the premises or was a licence to run the existing business which was being run by the respondents in the suit premises. Does the document create an interest in the premises or in the business?”
14. The High Court in order to answer the question utilised Section 95 of the Evidence Act, which reads as under:
“95. Evidence as to document unmeaning in reference to existing facts.—When language used in a document is plain in itself, but is unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may be given to show that it was used in a peculiar sense.
Illustration
A sells to B, by deed, “my house in Calcutta”.
A had no house in Calcutta, but it appears that he had a house at Howrah, of which B had been in possession since the execution of the deed.
These facts may be proved to show that the deed related to the house of Howrah.”
Aforesaid section is part of Chapter VI, which deals with “Of the exclusion of oral by documentary evidence” containing Sections 91 to 100. Section 92 reads as under:
“92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.—When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms:
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Proviso (6).—Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.”
15. It is manifest from these two sections that it is only in cases where the terms of the document leave the question in doubt, then resort could be had to the proviso. But when a document is a straightforward one and presents no difficulty in construing it, the proviso does not apply. In this regard, we may state that Section 95 only builds on Proviso (6) of Section 92.
16. If the contrary view is adopted as correct it would render Section 92 of the Evidence Act, otiose and also enlarge the ambit of Proviso (6) beyond the main section itself. Such interpretation, provided by the High Court violates basic tenets of legal interpretation. (2013) 11 SCC 451 at p. 459 Section 92 specifically prohibits evidence of any oral agreement or statement which would contradict, vary, add to or subtract from its terms. If, as stated by the learned Judge, oral evidence could be received to show that the terms of the document were really different from those expressed therein, it would amount to according permission to give evidence to contradict or vary those terms and as such it comes within the inhibitions of Section 92. It could not be postulated that the legislature intended to nullify the object of Section 92 by enacting exceptions to that section.
17. In line with the law laid down, it is clear that the contract mandated continuation of the business in the name of “Karandikar Brothers” by paying royalties of Rs 90 per month. Once the parties have accepted the recitals and the contract, the respondent could not have adduced contrary extrinsic parole evidence, unless he portrayed ambiguity in the language. It may not be out of context to note that the extension of the contract was on same conditions.
18. On consideration of the matter, the High Court erred in appreciating the ambit of Section 95, which led to consideration of evidence which only indicates breach rather than ambiguity in the language of contract. The evidence also points that the licence was created for continuation of existing business, rather than licence/lease of shop premises. If the meaning provided by the High Court is accepted, then it would amount to courts substituting the bargain by the parties. The counsel for the respondent has emphasised much on the receipt of payment, which mentions the term “rent received”. However, in line with the clear unambiguous language of the contract, such evidence cannot be considered in the eye of the law.
19. Moreover, the contention that the aforesaid situation is covered by the Bombay Rent Act is misplaced. Once we have determined that the impugned agreement was a licence for continuing existing business, the Bombay Rent Act does not cover such arrangements. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the trial court is accordingly not ousted.
20. In light of the above, the impugned order 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2445 of the High Court cannot be sustained, and is accordingly, set aside. The decree of the trial court is restored. The appeal is allowed in the above terms and there shall be no order as to costs.
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