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Sagar Balasaheb Gaikwad v. State Of Maharashtra, Through The Additional Chief Secretary And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The Petitioner, Sagar Balasaheb Gaikwad, was arraigned as an accused in Crime Report No. 189 of 2018 registered at Saswad Police Station, Pune, for offences under the Indian Penal Code and Bombay Prohibition Act. The FIR was registered against unknown persons for offences including robbery and criminal conspiracy. Investigation revealed involvement of four persons, including the Petitioner, in the crime involving forcible seizure of a truck carrying whiskey bottles and mobile phones valued at Rs. 55,33,014/-. Subsequently, the Additional Director General of Police (Law & Order), Maharashtra, granted sanction on 27.11.2018 for application of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) against the accused, including the Petitioner, who was absconding at that time. The Petitioner was arrested on 03.12.2018 and sent to judicial custody. The Petitioner filed this writ petition seeking quashing of the sanction order and the application of MCOCA provisions against him.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sanction order dated 27.11.2018 issued under MCOCA can be quashed qua the Petitioner on the ground of absence of material connecting him with the alleged organized crime?
- Whether the sanction order must specifically disclose consideration of the individual role of each accused before applying MCOCA provisions?
- At what stage can the validity or defects in the sanction order be examined—pre-trial or trial stage?
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- No material was available to connect the Petitioner with the incident or the co-accused persons.
- The Petitioner was falsely implicated.
- The sanction order did not specify the Petitioner’s individual role or demonstrate that he was part of a continuing unlawful activity or gang.
- The sanction order dated 27.11.2018 should be quashed in so far as it applies to the Petitioner.
- MCOCA provisions could not be applied against the Petitioner without clear material.
Respondent-State's Arguments
- The Petitioner’s contentions were essentially defence issues that could be addressed at trial.
- The sanction order could not be set aside casually before trial.
- Material on record was sufficient for issuing the sanction order under MCOCA against the Petitioner and others.
- Relied on precedents to support that sanction orders need not detail individual roles or be challenged before trial.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Anil Sadashiv Nanduskar Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2008 (12) LJSOFT 156 |
- Sanction orders should ideally disclose consideration of materials and application of mind. - Defects in sanction orders cannot be conclusively decided before trial. - Sanction orders under MCOCA need not specify individual roles of accused. - Cognizance is taken of offence, not offender. |
The Court held that the sanction order cannot be quashed merely because it does not detail the individual role of the Petitioner. Validity of sanction must be tested after prosecution leads evidence at trial. |
| Govind Sakharam Ubhe Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2009 ALL MR (Cri) 1903 |
- Sanction order omission of an accused's name does not vitiate prosecution. - Investigation and prosecution can continue against those later found involved. |
The Court applied this principle to hold that even if individual roles or names are not specifically mentioned, prosecution under MCOCA can proceed. |
| Farman Imran Shah @ Karu Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2014 ALL MR (Cri) 1571 |
- Prosecution must be given opportunity to lead evidence on subjective satisfaction of sanctioning authority. - Validity of sanction order is to be examined with evidence at trial. |
The Court reiterated that challenges to sanction orders must await trial, reinforcing that the Petitioner’s objections cannot be decided at this stage. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the issue by referring to binding precedents which establish that a sanction order under MCOCA need not explicitly detail the individual role of each accused. The validity of such an order is to be examined only after the prosecution is allowed to lead evidence during trial. The Court observed that the sanction order dated 27.11.2018 was issued by the competent authority who had material to form a prima facie satisfaction regarding the Petitioner’s involvement. The Court noted the Petitioner’s prior criminal antecedents connected to a similar offence, which strengthens the prima facie link to the present crime. The fact that the Petitioner was absconding at the time of issuance of the sanction order does not invalidate it, as allowing such a contention would encourage absconding accused to challenge sanction orders on that basis. The Court emphasized that objections to the sanction’s validity must be raised at trial, not pre-trial, and that the Petitioner had failed to make out a prima facie case for quashing the sanction order or the application of MCOCA provisions against him.
Holding and Implications
The writ petition is dismissed.
The Court held that the sanction order under MCOCA dated 27.11.2018 against the Petitioner could not be quashed at this stage. The Petitioner’s challenge to the sanction order must await trial where the prosecution will be given an opportunity to lead evidence. The direct consequence is that the proceedings under MCOCA against the Petitioner will continue. No new precedent was set; the decision reaffirms established legal principles regarding sanction orders under MCOCA and their challengeability prior to trial.
WP 5145-19.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Amk
WRIT PETITION NO. 5145 OF 2019
Sagar Balasaheb Gaikwad ] Age-29 years, Occ.- Business, ] R/at Survey No. 165, Pankaj Park, ] Hadapsar, Malwadi, Pune ] .. Petitioner Vs.
1. The State of Maharashtra ] Through the Additional Chief ] Secretary (Home Department), ] Mantralaya, Mumbai. ]
2. Director General of Police ] Maharashtra State, having address ] at Maharashtra Police Headquarters, ] Opp. : Regal Cinema, Colaba, ] Mumbai. ]
3. Additional Director General of ] Police (Law & Order), ]
Maharashtra State, having address ] at Maharashtra Police Headquarters, ] Opp. : Regal Cinema, Colaba, ] Mumbai. ]
4. Special Inspector General of Police, ] Kolhapur Police Range, having ] address at Office of the Special ] Inspector General of Police, ] Kasba Bawda, Kolhapur. ]
5. Sub Divisional Police Officer, ] Bhor Sub Division, Pune Rural, ] Dist. Pune. ]
6. Police Inspector, ] Saswad Police Station, ] Dist. Pune. ]
7. Shri Annasaheb Jadhav ] Sub Divisional Police Officer, ] Bhor Sub Division, Bhor, ] Dist. Pune. ] .. Respondents
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Mr. Satyavrat Joshi i/b Mr. Sunil S. Kamble for the Petitioner. Mr. J. P. Yagnik, APP for the Respondent-State.
CORAM : S. S. SHINDE & MANISH PITALE, JJ. Judgment reserved on : 24 th FEBRUARY, 2021 . Judgment pronounced on : 24 th MARCH, 2021 .
JUDGMENT (Per Manish Pitale, J.)
1. By this Writ Petition, the Petitioner has sought quashing of provisions of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) being applied to C.R. No. 189 of 2018, wherein the Petitioner has been arraigned as accused along with other persons for offences under the Indian Penal Code as well as Bombay Prohibition Act. The Petitioner claims that the sanction order issued under the MCOCA deserves to be quashed qua the Petitioner.
2. The aforesaid crime was registered as per FIR registered at the Saswad Police Station, District Pune against unknown persons for offences under Sections 395, 341, 412 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code as also provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act. Upon investigation, it was found that four persons including the Petitioner were involved in the said crime. A proposal was moved for seeking sanction for applying the provisions of MCOCA against the accused persons in the aforesaid crime. By order dated 27.11.2018, the Additional Director General of Police (L & O), Maharashtra i.e. Respondent No.3 herein passed an order granting sanction for applying MCOCA against the accused persons including the Petitioner who was at that stage absconding accused.
3. Later the Petitioner was arrested on 03.12.2018 and he was sent to
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judicial custody. The incident leading to registration of FIR occurred on 22.05.2018 when the Complainant, who was working as a driver with the transport company, driving a truck containing bottles of whiskey, was forced to stop the truck due to obstruction by four persons riding motorcycles. The said persons assaulted the Complainant, tied his mouth and forcibly took away the truck thereby committing the said offence. The articles stolen in the process included bottles of whiskey and mobile phones worth Rs.55,33,014/-. Pursuant to registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken.
4. Mr. Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that in the present case there was no material to connect the Petitioner with the aforesaid incident and that he had been falsely roped in. It was further submitted that MCOCA could not have been applied in the present case, at least in so far as the Petitioner was concerned and that the sanction order dated 27.11.2018 passed by Respondent No.3 deserves to be quashed. It was submitted that in the said order individual role of the Petitioner was not specified and there was nothing to show that material was available with Respondent No.3 to come to a conclusion that the Petitioner was part of continuing unlawful activity or that he could be set to be part of a gang. There was no material to connect the Petitioner with the co-accused persons and that therefore the sanction order deserved to be quashed and the provisions of MCOCA could not be applied as against the Petitioner.
5. On the other hand Mr. Yagnik, learned APP submitted that the contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner were more in the nature of his
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defence and same could be raised at the time of trial. It was submitted that the alleged defects in the sanction order could be demonstrated at the stage of trial and that the sanction order could not be set aside in a casual manner. The material available on record was sufficient for Respondent No.3 to have issued the sanction order to apply provisions of MCOCA to the aforesaid crime and the accused therein including the Petitioner. The learned APP placed reliance upon Judgments of this Court in the case of (1) Anil Sadashiv Nanduskar Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2008 (12) LJSOFT 156,
(2) Govind Sakharam Ubhe Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2009 ALL MR (Cri) 1903 and (3) Farman Imran Shah @ Karu Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2014 ALL MR (Cri) 1571.
6. We have heard the learned Counsel for rival parties and perused the material on record. Before considering the contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be appropriate to refer to the position of law that emerges from the aforesaid Judgments on which learned APP has placed reliance.
7. In the case of Anil Sadashiv Nanduskar Vs. State of Maharashtra
(supra) a Division Bench of this Court noticed the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in connection with the stage at which validity of sancton order could be examined. After taking note of the said Judgments, it was held in the said Judgment as follows:
"13. The settled law by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court is to the effect that it is desirable that every order whether the approval or sanction it should speak for itself, i.e. ex-facie it should disclose consideration of the materials placed before it and application of mind thereto. However, failure to reproduce or refer those recitals in the resolution or order itself would not render the order of
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approval or sanction to be invalid unless the prosecution fails to establish by leading evidence that all the materials necessary for the grant of approval or sanction were placed before the concerned authority for due application of mind by such authority before the grant of approval and or sanction. It apparently discloses that question of validity of approval or sanction cannot be decided unless the prosecution is afforded opportunity to lead evidence in that regard. Undoubtedly, an accused desiring to raise objection regarding the defects in such approval or sanction, or grant, he can raise such objection; however, for conclusive decision on the said point the accused has to wait till the trial is complete and on that ground he cannot insist for discharge unless the objection relates to inherent lack of jurisdiction to the concerned authority to grant sanction or approval and such issue can be decided on undisputed facts. The law being well settled to the effect that the prosecution in a case where sanction or the approval order does not ex-facie show consideration of all the materials and/or application of mind, is entitled to establish the same by leading necessary evidence regarding production of materials before the concerned authority, the question of discharge of accused merely on the basis of such objection being raised cannot arise. The decision on the point of defect, if any, in the order of approval or sanction will have to be at the conclusion of the trial."
8. It was further specifically held in paragraph 24 of the said Judgment as follows:
"24. The contention that the order of approval or order of sanction should disclose consideration of material qua each of the accused sought to be prosecuted is devoid of substance. That is not the import of section 23 of MCOC Act. Section 23(1)(a) as well as section 23(2) with reference to approval and sanction speaks of commission of offence and cognizance of the offence. In fact the law on this aspect is also well settled and reiterated by the Apex Court in Dilawar Singh's case (supra) itself. It was held therein that, court takes cognizance of offence and not of an offender when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, under Section 190 Cr.P.C. Undoubtedly, it was also held that it was necessary for the Sanctioning Authority to take note of the persons against whom the sanction is sought to be granted. However, those were the requirement under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The said section specifically requires sanction with reference to a particular person. That is not the case under section 23 either in relation to the approval or in relation to the sanction. As already
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seen above section 23(1)(a) of MCOC Act speaks of approval for recording of information about commission of offence of organized crime under MCOC Act, whereas sanction is for initiating proceeding for the offence under MCOC Act. The sanction order or the approval order on the face of it need not speak of the individual role of each of the accused. Being so, contention that the order of approval or sanction should reveal consideration of the overt acts or otherwise of each of the accused while granting approval or sanction is totally devoid of substance. Of course, the involvement in organized crime of each of the persons sought to be prosecuted should necessarily be considered by the concerned authority before the grant of approval or sanction, but need not be specifically stated in the order and the consideration thereof can be established in the course of trial."
9. In the case of Govind Sakharam Ubhe Vs. State of Maharashtra
(supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that even where name of an accused was not mentioned in the sanction order issued under the MCOCA, prosecution against such an accused could not be said to be vitiated. It was specifically held that once such a sanction order was issued, investigation commenced and those who are subsequently found to be involved in commission of an organized crime could very well be proceeded against.
10. In the case of Farman Imran Shah @ Karu Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) another Division Bench of this Court while relying upon the aforementioned Judgment in the case of Anil Sadashiv Nanduskar Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) held that the prosecution has to be offered an opportunity to lead evidence with regard to subjective satisfaction recorded by the Competent Authority while issuing the sanction order.
11. The position of law that emerges from the aforesaid Judgments of this Court is that a sanction order cannot be held to be bad merely because the
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material considered by the Competent Authority while issuing the sanction order is not specifically stated in detail in the order. The question as to whether a sanction order can be said to be defective has to be answered after giving an opportunity to the prosecution to lead evidence and therefore, it must await trial. A sanction order concerns initiation of proceedings for offence under MCOCA and such an order on the face of it need not speak of the individual role of each of the accused.
12. In the present case, a perusal of the material placed on record by the Petitioner himself shows that he was an accused in an earlier FIR bearing C.R. No. 131 of 2018, under the provisions of Bombay Prohibition Act and that he was also arrested in connection with same. This indicates that the Petitioner does have criminal antecedents. As regards emphasis placed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner on the alleged absence of material to show his involvement in the present crime bearing No. 189 of 2018, we are of the opinion that such findings can be rendered only after prosecution is granted an opportunity to lead evidence. The material placed on record is, prima facie, sufficient to connect the Petitioner with the crime in question.
13. The Petitioner can also not take any advantage of the fact that he was absconding when the sanction order dated 27.11.2018 was issued by Respondent No.3. If the contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner is accepted, then every absconding accused would claim that the sanction order was vitiated while he was avoiding the process of law. Such cannot be the interpretation of the position of law in so far as the application of MCOCA is concerned. As noted above, it has already been held in the
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aforementioned Judgments of this Court that individual role of an accused need not be stated in the sanction order and that as long as there is material with the Competent Authority while issuing the sanction order, such an order cannot be set aside, unless the matter goes to trial and the prosecution is granted opportunity to lead evidence in that regard.
14. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the available material on record, prima facie, indicates that there is a link between the Petitioner and the crime in question. The matter needs to go to trial even on the question of alleged defect in the sanction order issued by Respondent No.3 for applying MCOCA. At this stage, the Petitioner has not been able to make out a case for setting aside the sanction order and seeking quashing of application of the provisions of MCOCA to C.R. No. 189 of 2018, qua the Petitioner.
15. Since we have found that there is no merit in the present Writ Petition, it deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed.
[MANISH PITALE, J.] [S. S. SHINDE J.]
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