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Lakhvir Singh And Others v. State Of Punjab And Another
Supreme Court of India – Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants, aged 20 and 19 at the time, hired the complainant’s taxi on 14-2-2003. During the journey they, along with a third accused, assaulted the driver with a dagger and a knife, inflicted multiple injuries, threw him out of the vehicle and fled with the taxi. An FIR dated 15-2-2003 was registered under Sections 382 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC; the knife, dagger and taxi were recovered. The trial court framed a charge under Section 397 IPC, convicted the appellants on 8-1-2005 and sentenced each to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment (the statutory minimum).
The Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissed the appeal on 24-10-2019. In their special-leave petition to the Supreme Court the appellants produced a compromise deed in which the complainant expressed no objection to their release or acquittal. By orders dated 3-12-2020 and 18-12-2020 the Supreme Court issued notice and impleaded the complainant as Respondent 2; the State opposed reduction of the sentence. Leave was granted on 11-1-2021 and judgment was reserved after arguments and written synopses were filed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether offenders convicted under Section 397 IPC, which prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years, can nevertheless be released on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
- In determining eligibility for probation, whether the relevant age for the restriction in Section 6 of the Act is the age on the date of the offence or on the date of sentencing.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Sought the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act because they were below 21 years of age at the time of the offence and have already served roughly half of the sentence.
- Invoked the reformative objects of the Act, emphasising rehabilitation over continued incarceration.
State’s Arguments (Respondent 1)
- Placed reliance on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das (2019) 4 SCC 125 to contend that courts cannot award less than the statutory minimum sentence under Section 397 IPC.
- Submitted that, because Section 397 fixes a mandatory minimum of seven years, the appellants must serve the full remainder of their terms.
Complainant’s Position (Respondent 2)
- Confirmed the dispute had been amicably resolved and expressed no objection to the appellants’ release on bail or acquittal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das, (2019) 4 SCC 125 | Court cannot impose less than the minimum sentence prescribed by statute. | Cited by the State; the Supreme Court distinguished it, holding that the Probation of Offenders Act is not excluded by Section 397 IPC. |
| Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088 | Section 6 of the Act applies based on age at the date of sentencing; beneficial provisions must receive wide interpretation. | Approved to explain the reformative purpose of the Act and clarify the age criterion. |
| Masarullah v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1982) 3 SCC 458 | Courts ordinarily should grant probation to offenders under 21 unless reasons are recorded. | Discussed; the Court noted subsequent clarification of its age calculation. |
| Sudesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, (2008) 3 SCC 111 | Re-affirmed Ramji Missar and clarified the correct legal position on Section 6. | Relied upon to reconcile earlier conflicting views. |
| Satyabhan Kishore v. State of Bihar, (1972) 3 SCC 350 | Distinction between mandatory Section 6 and discretionary Sections 3 & 4 of the Act. | Used to explain that Section 4, though discretionary, can override other laws through its non-obstante clause. |
| Ishar Das v. State of Punjab, (1973) 2 SCC 65 | The non-obstante clause in Section 4 shows legislative intent that the Act prevails over other laws prescribing minimum sentences. | Cited with approval to justify extending probation despite Section 397’s minimum. |
| CCE v. Bahubali, (1979) 2 SCC 279 | Act may not apply where a post-1958 special law with its own non-obstante clause prescribes a mandatory minimum. | Referenced to show that Section 397 IPC, lacking such a later special statute status, does not exclude probation. |
| Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, ILR (1981) 1 P&H 172 | Benefit of the Act is not excluded by the mandatory minimum under Section 397 IPC. | Quoted to support the Court’s ultimate conclusion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the structure of the Probation of Offenders Act. Section 6, which restrains imprisonment of offenders under 21, did not strictly apply because the appellants were not under 21 on the date of sentencing. Attention therefore centred on Section 4, whose non-obstante clause allows the court to release a convict on probation “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law.” After analysing precedent, especially Ishar Das, the Bench held that the Act’s benefits are not automatically negated by mandatory minimum sentences in the IPC, unless a later special statute expressly says so.
The Court distinguished Vikram Das, noting that it dealt with the impossibility of reducing a sentence below the statutory minimum, whereas granting probation under Section 4 does not technically reduce the sentence; it suspends its execution on conditions of good conduct. The Court also found no statutory prohibition in Section 397 IPC against applying the Act.
Factually, the appellants had served about half of the seven-year term, were youthful offenders at the time of the crime, and the complainant had since forgiven them. There was no material indicating misconduct in custody. Considering the reformative objectives of the Act and the absence of adverse reports, the Court deemed it “a fit case” to extend probation under Section 4.
Holding and Implications
The appellants are released on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Each must execute a bond with two sureties to maintain peace and good behaviour for the unserved portion of the sentence; failure will revive the obligation to serve the remaining term. The appeals were otherwise disposed of with no order as to costs.
Implications: The judgment reaffirms that the Probation of Offenders Act can operate even where the IPC prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence, unless a subsequent special statute expressly overrides it. While confined to its facts, the decision strengthens the reformative approach toward young offenders and clarifies the interplay between Section 397 IPC and the Act.
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.— The appellants were youngsters aged 20 and 19 years when they fell afoul of the law. On 14-2-2003, at around 7.30 p.m., the appellants along with co-accused Gurpreet Singh approached the complainant, PW 1 to hire a taxi to go to a village. En route, when at their behest the car was stopped, Gurpreet Singh caught hold of the complainant and the appellant Jagdeep Singh took a dagger and inflicted 6-7 injuries on PW 1's forehead. Appellant Lakhvir Singh inflicted 2-3 injuries on his abdomen and 1 injury on his neck using a knife. The complainant was thrown out of his taxi and the three people fled with the taxi. In pursuance of the reporting of the crime by the complainant, an FIR was registered on 15-2-2003 under Sections 382 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. Knife and dagger were recovered along with the taxi, and the trial court framed charges under Section 397 IPC. Post trial, the appellants were convicted by the trial court vide judgment dated 8-1-2005 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 7 years each.
2. The appeal preferred by the appellants has been dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 24-10-2019 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 5394.
3. The appellants approached this Court by a special leave petition. Annexed thereto, the compromise deed arrived at between the complainant Amrik Singh and the appellants before us, in terms whereof the complainant has stated that he did not want to pursue any action against the appellants and has no objection to their release on bail or acquittal. The appellants have already served about 50% of their sentence while in custody.
4. On 3-12-2020, this Court while recording the aforesaid plea, issued notice 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1076 on the SLP and on the prayer for interim relief of bail while simultaneously impleading the complainant as the 2nd respondent. On 18-12-2020 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1081, the counsel for the State and Respondent 2 entered appearance and the counsel for Respondent 2 confirmed that the dispute had been amicably resolved. However, the counsel for Respondent 1 submitted that the minimum sentence provided by the statute under Section 397 IPC is 7 years and the same cannot be reduced below that period. On this submission, the learned counsel for the appellants sought benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. It is on the limited conspectus of the aforesaid aspect that on 11-1-2021, we granted 2021 SCC OnLine SC 43 leave and reserved the judgment upon conclusion of arguments and the parties having filed their respective synopsis.
The legal position
5. The plea of the learned counsel for the State, Respondent 1 is based on the judgment of this Court in State of M.P. v. Vikram Das (2019) 4 SCC 125 opining that the courts cannot impose less than the minimum sentence prescribed by the statute. He, thus, seeks continuing detention of the appellants to serve out the remaining sentence. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellants has sought the benefit under the said Act in view of the age of the appellants when the offence was committed.
6. We may notice that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act explains the rationale for the enactment and its amendments: to give the benefit of release of offenders on probation of good conduct instead of sentencing them to imprisonment. Thus, increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of offenders as useful and self-reliant members of society without subjecting them to the deleterious effects of jail life is what is sought to be subserved.
7. Section 6 of the said Act, as per its own title, provides for restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty-one years of age. The said provision reads as under:
“6. Restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty-one years of age.—(1) When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3 or Section 4, and if the court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so.
(2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under Section 3 or Section 4 with an offender referred to in sub-section (1), the court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender.”
A view was taken by a four-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 1088, (1963) 2 Cri LJ 173, while seeking to apply the said provision to offenders who were under the age of 21 years on the date of sentencing and not on the date of commission of offence.
8. In Masarullah v. State of T.N. (1982) 3 SCC 458 there are observations to the effect that:
“in case of an offender under the age of twenty-one years on the date of commission of the offence, the court is expected ordinarily to give benefit of the provisions of the Act and there is an embargo on the power of the court to award sentence unless the court considers otherwise, “having regard to the circumstances of the case including nature of the offence and the character of the offender”, and reasons for awarding sentence have to be recorded. Considerations relevant to the adjudication of this aspect are, circumstances of the case, nature of the offence and character of the offender. It is, therefore, necessary to keep in view the aforementioned three aspects while deciding whether the appellant should be granted the benefit of the provisions of the Act.”
But in the subsequent judgment in Sudesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand (2008) 3 SCC 111 the judgment of the four-Judge Bench in Ramji Missar AIR 1963 SC 1088, (1963) 2 Cri LJ 173 was noted as possibly having escaped attention. Thus, the legal position was clarified as the one being reflected in Ramji Missar AIR 1963 SC 1088, (1963) 2 Cri LJ 173. The rationale is that the underlying purpose of the provision being reformative — Section 6 being a special provision enacted to prevent the confinement of young persons under 21 years of age in jail, to protect them from the pernicious influence of hardened criminals. (1973) 2 SCC 65
9. In the facts of the present case, the appellants are stated to be below 21 years of age as on the date of offence. The sentencing order was passed by the trial court noting that the appellants committed an offence of serious nature against a poor person and were thus disentitled from the benefits under the said Act or under Section 360 CrPC.
10. In Satyabhan Kishore v. State of Bihar (1972) 3 SCC 350 this Court had noted the distinction between Section 6, which is in the nature of an injunction for courts to follow as distinct from Section 3 or 4 of the Act; which are discretionary in nature. The relevant provisions read as under:
“3. Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition.—When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 379 or Section 380 or Section 381 or Section 404 or Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal Code or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under Section 4, release him after due admonition.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, previous conviction against a person shall include any previous order made against him under this section or Section 4.
4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.—(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
(3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender.
(5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned.”
11. In the case of the appellants, Section 3 would have no application taking into consideration the nature of offence. However, Section 4 could come to the aid of the appellants as the offence committed, of which they have been found guilty, is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. However, the trial court opined against the appellants. We may also note that the “notwithstanding” contained in Section 4 permits, despite anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court to release a person on bond, with or without sureties, for a period of 3 years instead of sentencing him in order to ensure that he keeps peace and good behaviour. In this regard, under sub-section (2), before making any order under sub-section (1), the court is required to take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
12. We may note that the aforesaid is distinct from Section 6 as it is discretionary in nature while Section 6 provides that a court “must not” sentence a person under the age of 21 years to imprisonment unless sufficient reasons for the same are recorded, based on due consideration of the probation officer's report. The relevant aspects while giving benefit under Section 6 of the Act are: the nature of offence, the character of the offender, and the surrounding circumstances as recorded in the probation officer's report. (1982) 3 SCC 458
13. We may notice that since we are concerned with the appellants who were under 21 years of age on the date of the offence and not on the date of conviction, Section 6 would not come to their aid. In a subsequent judgment of this Court (2008) 3 SCC 111, it was noted that in Masarullah (1982) 3 SCC 458, this Court had calculated the age of the convict as on the date of commission of the offence incorrectly and there has been no discussion of the potential tension between grant of probation under the Act and the mandatory minimum sentence of 7 years under Section 397 IPC.
14. The legal position insofar as invocation of Section 4 is concerned has been analysed in Ishar Das v. State of Punjab (1973) 2 SCC 65. Ed. elucidating that non obstante clause in Section 4 of the Act reflected the legislative intent that provisions of the Act have effect notwithstanding any other law in force at that time. The observation in Ramji Missar AIR 1963 SC 1088, (1963) 2 Cri LJ 173 was cited with approval to the effect that in case of any ambiguity, the beneficial provisions of the Act should receive wide interpretation and should not be read in a restricted sense.
15. The aforesaid aspect is confirmed by the wording of the said Act which reads as under:
“18. Saving of operation of certain enactments.—Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of Section 31 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897 (8 of 1897), or sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), or of any law in force in any State relating to juvenile offenders or borstal schools.”
16. Even though, Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the PC Act”) prescribes a minimum sentence of imprisonment for not less than 1 year, an exception was carved out keeping in mind the application of the Act. In Ishar Das (1973) 2 SCC 65. Ed., this Court noted that if the object of the legislature was that the Act does not apply to all cases where a minimum sentence of imprisonment is prescribed, there was no reason to specifically provide an exception for Section 5(2) of the PC Act. The fact that Section 18 of the Act does not include any other such offences where a mandatory minimum sentence has been prescribed suggests that the Act may be invoked in such other offences. A more nuanced interpretation on this aspect was given in CCE v. Bahubali (1979) 2 SCC 279. Ed.. It was opined that the Act may not apply in cases where a specific law enacted after 1958 prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence, and the law contains a non obstante clause. Thus, the benefits of the Act did not apply in case of mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by special legislation enacted after the Act. (2004) 4 SCC 590. Ed., (1979) 2 SCC 279 It is in this context, it was observed in State of M.P. v. Vikram Das (2019) 4 SCC 125. Ed. that the court cannot award a sentence less than the mandatory sentence prescribed by the statute. We are of the view that the corollary to the aforesaid legal decisions ends with a conclusion that the benefit of probation under the said Act is not excluded by the provisions of the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 397 IPC, the offence in the present case. In fact, the observation made in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab 1980 SCC OnLine P&H 172, ILR (1981) 1 P&H 1 are in the same context.
The factual position
17. The facts of the present case are that the appellants have not served out the minimum sentence of 7 years though they have served about half the sentences. They were aged under 19 and 21 years of age as on the date of offence but not on the date of sentence. The redeeming feature in their case is that the person who suffered, appears to have forgiven them, possibly with the passage of time. There is no adverse report against them about their conduct in jail otherwise the same would have been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the State. Faced with the aforesaid legal position, this is a fit case that the benefit of probation can be extended to the appellants under the said Act in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act on completion of half the sentence.
18. We, thus, release the appellants on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the said Act on their completion of half the sentence and on their entering into a bond with two sureties each to ensure that they maintain peace and good behaviour for the remaining part of their sentence, failing which they can be called upon to serve that part of the sentence.
19. The appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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