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Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited And Others v. Pramod V. Sawant And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 19, 2019
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Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1 (the Security Guards Board) filed Criminal Complaint Case No. 14/S/2003 against the appellant Corporation and its officers for employing security guards who were not registered as required under the Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1981 read with the Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1981. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate issued process in 2003.

The appellants sought recall of process, which was rejected on 6 April 2004. A criminal revision succeeded on 7 September 2004, but on remand the Magistrate again declined recall on 7 June 2005. A writ petition challenging issuance of process was dismissed by the Bombay High Court on 22 December 2006. A second revision challenging the prosecution on grounds of limitation, inapplicability of the Act, and lack of sanction under Section 197 CrPC was dismissed on 5 September 2007. The High Court, relying on Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar, rejected the plea that sanction was necessary, resulting in the impugned judgment (2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1689). The present Supreme Court appeal is confined solely to the issue of sanction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Appellants 2–4, officers of a government-owned corporation, qualify as “public servants” entitled to the protection of prior sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  2. Whether, on the facts available, Appellant 2—then on deputation to the Corporation—is entitled to claim such protection.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • Appellants 2–4 are officers of the Indian Telecommunication Service, Class I, appointed and removable only by the President of India; their deputation to the Corporation does not alter that status.
  • Consequently, they are “public servants” under Section 21 of the Penal Code and Section 197 CrPC mandates prior governmental sanction before cognizance can be taken.
  • The High Court erred in distinguishing Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela v. Naresh Kumar Chandrashanker Jah, which supports the requirement of sanction when removal is controlled by the Government.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Although originally Central Civil Service officers, Appellants 3 and 4 opted for absorption in the Corporation effective 1 October 2000 and thereby ceased to be government employees; Appellant 2’s exact status at the relevant time is unclear.
  • The Corporation pays their salaries; they are not in the service or pay of the Government, hence Section 197 CrPC is inapplicable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar (1998) 5 SCC 91 Protection of sanction under Section 197 CrPC does not extend to officers of government companies or public undertakings, even if they are “State” under Article 12. Primary authority relied upon to deny sanction to Corporation officers.
N.K. Sharma v. Abhimanyu (2005) 13 SCC 213 Sanction is unnecessary where the officer’s salary is not paid by Government and he is not in State service. Reinforces that PSU employment alone does not attract Section 197.
Chandan Kumar Basu v. State of Bihar (2014) 13 SCC 70 Enumerates three mandatory requirements for Section 197: (a) public servant status; (b) non-removability without Government sanction; (c) act done in discharge of official duty. Used to assess whether Appellant 2 satisfies all three conditions; Court finds evidence insufficient at this stage.
Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. v. Bhushan Chander (2016) 13 SCC 44 Reaffirms Mohd. Hadi Raja; High Court erred in extending Section 197 protection to PSU employee. Cited to illustrate consistent judicial view denying sanction to PSU staff.
Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela v. Naresh Kumar Chandrashanker Jah (1990) 4 SCC 169 Explains that “removable from office” in Section 197 refers to the authority competent to terminate services. Distinguished on facts; Court holds it does not aid the appellants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Section 197 CrPC extends protection only to a “public servant” who is not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Government and whose alleged offence is connected to official duties.

2. After examining the record, the Court holds that Appellants 3 and 4 ceased to be government employees upon their voluntary absorption in the Corporation on 1 October 2000. Their potential pension linkage or need for ministerial approval before punitive action does not make them “public servants” for Section 197 purposes.

3. With respect to Appellant 2, the factual record regarding his exact employment status while on deputation to the Corporation is ambiguous. Applying Chandan Kumar Basu, the Court notes that all three pre-conditions for Section 197 must be proved, but sufficient evidence is presently lacking. The Magistrate may decide this issue after evidence is led at trial.

4. Relying principally on Mohd. Hadi Raja, complemented by N.K. Sharma and Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, the Court reiterates the settled principle that officers of public sector corporations, even though such corporations may be “State” under Article 12, are not covered by the protective mantle of Section 197 CrPC.

5. The decision in Lakshmansingh Vaghela was found factually distinguishable: that case involved a municipal employee temporarily assigned additional statutory functions, unlike the present appellants who are full-time employees (or, for Appellant 2, deputies) of a PSU.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed.

Consequences: (a) Prosecution against all appellants may proceed without prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC. (b) For Appellants 3 and 4, lack of sanction is final; for Appellant 2, the trial court may reconsider the issue on a fuller evidentiary record. (c) The Magistrate is directed to complete the trial within one year, and the parties must cooperate. The judgment reinforces, but does not newly establish, the principle that employees of public sector corporations are generally outside the ambit of Section 197 CrPC.

Show all summary ...

Navin Sinha, J.— The appellants are aggrieved by the dismissal 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1689 of their writ application, rejecting the challenge to their prosecution for lack of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as “CrPC”).

2. Criminal Complaint Case No. 14/S/2003 was filed by Respondent 1 before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Clauses 26(2)(3) and 39 read with Clause 27 of the Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1981 read with Section 3(3) of the Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1981 (hereinafter called as “the Act”). The complaint stated that the appellant Corporation was registered with the respondent Security Guards Board. The Corporation was under obligation to engage security guards registered with Respondent 1 only. An inspection revealed engagement of unregistered guards. The Magistrate issued process against the appellants in 2003. The appellants prayed for recall of the process, which was rejected on 6-4-2004. A criminal revision preferred against the rejection was allowed on 7-9-2004. The matter was remanded for reconsideration, which was again rejected by the Magistrate on 7-6-2005. The writ petition preferred by the appellants against the issuance of process was also rejected on 22-12-2006 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1545. The fresh revision against order dated 7-6-2005 assailed the prosecution on grounds of being barred by limitation, that the Act was not applicable to the appellants' establishment, and that the issuance of process was bad in absence of sanction under Section 197 CrPC, Appellants 2 to 4 being “public servants”. The revision application was again dismissed on 5-9-2007 leading to the impugned order 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1689 assailed in the present appeal. In the writ petition, the appellants gave up their challenge on grounds of limitation and inapplicability of the Act which has therefore attained finality. The challenge in the writ petition is confined to the question of sanction only.

3. The High Court relying on Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar (1998) 5 SCC 91, held that the protection of sanction under Section 197 CrPC was not available to officers of government companies or public undertakings even if it fell within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution.

4. Shri R.D. Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, submitted that Appellants 2 to 4 fell within the definition of “public servant” as they were discharging public duty in pursuance of the policy of the Central Government. Appellants 2 to 4, belonged to the Central Civil Service, Class I, having been appointed by Hon'ble the President of India to the Indian Telecommunication Service, were removable by orders of the President only. The fact that they may have been sent on deputation to the appellant Corporation is inconsequential mandating sanction under Section 197 CrPC before their prosecution. The High Court erred in distinguishing Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela v. Naresh Kumar Chandrashanker Jah (1990) 4 SCC 169, considering that Appellants 2 to 4 were removable by orders of the President of India only.

5. The learned counsel for the respondents acknowledged the original appointment of Appellants 2 to 4 in Central Civil Services, Class-1. It was however submitted that the appellant Corporation was established on 1-10-2000. Appellants 2 to 4 were sent on deputation initially. Option was given for absorption in the appellant Corporation. Appellants 3 and 4 opted for absorption and thus became employees of the appellant Corporation with effect from 1-10-2000 and ceased to be government employees in the Central Civil Services Class-1. Appellant 2 appears to have retired from the appellant Corporation while on deputation, but his status is not clear.

6. The appeal raises a short and pure question of law for consideration with regard to the protection under Section 197 CrPC available to employees of public sector corporation claiming the status of a “public servant”. The relevant extract of Section 197 CrPC reads as follows:

“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.—(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction—
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government.”

7. The term “public servant” has been defined in Section 21 of the Penal Code, 1860 the relevant portion for the present case reads as follows:

“21. “Public servant”.—The words “public servant” denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely—
***
Twelfth.—Every person—
(a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government;
(b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).”

8. At the very outset, we are of the opinion that the question for grant of sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC on the ground of being a “public servant” is not available to Appellants 3 and 4 on account of their ceasing to be employees of the Indian Telecommunication Service after their absorption in the appellant Corporation on 1-10-2000, prior to the complaint. The fact that their past service may count for purposes of pension in case of removal or dismissal by the Corporation or that administrative approval of the Ministry concerned may be formally required before any punitive action will not confer on them the status of “public servant” under CrPC.

9. The necessary facts with regard to status of Appellant 2 are not very clear from the pleadings. It appears that at the relevant point of time before superannuation he was on deputation to the Corporation. The allegations related to discharge of his duties in the appellant Corporation. We are therefore required to consider if sanction under Section 197 CrPC was a prerequisite with regard to him in a status as a “public servant”. The question is no more res integra and stands authoritatively settled that employees of public sector corporations are not entitled to the protection under Section 197 CrPC as “public servant”.

10. In Mohd. Hadi Raja (1998) 5 SCC 91, the Court was considering the need for sanction for prosecuting officers of public sector undertakings or government companies falling within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution and who were removable from office save by sanction of the Government. Holding that protection under Section 197 CrPC was not available to such persons, it was held as follows :

“27. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the protection by way of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to the officers of government companies or the public undertakings even when such public undertakings are “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution on account of deep and pervasive control of the Government.”

11. In N.K. Sharma v. Abhimanyu (2005) 13 SCC 213, rejecting the challenge for requirement of sanction under Section 197 CrPC, it was observed as follows :

“13. Admittedly the salary of the appellant is not paid by the Government. He at the relevant time was not in the service of the State. Prosecution against an officer of a government company or a public undertaking would not require any sanction under Section 197 CrPC.”

12. The question again fell for consideration in Chandan Kumar Basu v. State of Bihar (2014) 13 SCC 70, involving an officer of an Indian Administrative Service serving on deputation as Administrator-cum-Managing Director of Bihar State Housing Cooperative Federation Ltd. Elucidating the requirements to be fulfilled for the applicability of the protection under Section 197 CrPC, it was observed as follows :

“8. A reading of the provisions of Section 197(1) of the Code reveals that there are three mandatory requirements under Section 197(1) of the Code, namely:
(a) that the accused is a public servant;
(b) that the public servant can be removed from the post by or with the sanction either of the Central or the State Government, as the case may be;
(c) the act(s) giving rise to the alleged offence had been committed by the public servant in the actual or purported discharge of his official duties.”

13. We are of the opinion that sufficient evidence is not available on record at this stage with regard to the status of Appellant 2 in all aspects for us to unhesitatingly hold that the protection under Section 197 CrPC shall be available to him. These are matters to be considered by the Magistrate on the basis of the evidence that may be placed before him during the course of trial.

14. Mohd. Hadi Raja (1998) 5 SCC 91 has been noticed more recently in Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. v. Bhushan Chander (2016) 13 SCC 44, holding that the High Court erred 2011 SCC OnLine P&H 5393 in providing the protection under Section 197 CrPC to an employee of the appellant Corporation which was fully government owned and financed by the State Government, and therefore, the respondent fell within the definition of a “public servant”. Setting aside the orders of the High Court, this Court observed as follows : (Bhushan Chander case (2016) 13 SCC 44)

“23. In Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar (1998) 5 SCC 91 the question arose whether Section 197 CrPC was applicable for prosecuting officers of the public sector undertakings or the government companies which can be treated as State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Court referred to Section 197 CrPC, noted the submissions and eventually held that the protection by way of sanction under Section 197 CrPC is not applicable to the officers of government companies or the public undertakings even when such public undertakings are “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution on account of deep and pervasive control of the Government.
24. The High Court has not accepted the submission of the Corporation in this regard. We are constrained to note that the decision in Mohd. Hadi Raja (1998) 5 SCC 91 has been referred to in the grounds in this appeal. There is nothing on record to suggest that the said decision was cited before the High Court.”

15. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela (1990) 4 SCC 169, on which the appellants have placed reliance, is completely distinguishable on its own facts. The appellant was employed in the Municipal Corporation as a Laboratory Officer. He was only entrusted with discharge of duties as a public analyst. His remuneration was not paid by the Government, but by the Corporation. The observations in para 5 have to be understood in that context :

“5. Section 197 CrPC clearly intends to draw a line between public servants and to provide that only in the case of the higher ranks should the sanction of the Government to their prosecution be necessary. While a public servant holding an office of the kind mentioned in the section is as such public servant appointed to another office, his official acts in connection with the latter office will also relate to the former office. The words “removable from office” occurring in Section 197 signify removal from the office he is holding. The authority mentioned in the section is the authority under which the officer is serving and competent to terminate his services. If the accused is under the service and pay of the local authority, the appointment to an office for exercising functions under a particular statute will not alter his status as an employee of the local authority.”

16. It is, therefore, held that the question of sanction under Section 197 CrPC with regard to Appellants 3 and 4 treating them to be “public servant” simply does not arise because of their absorption in the Corporation. With regard to Appellant 2, considering his status as on deputation to the appellant Corporation at the relevant point of time and in the absence of necessary evidence with regard to his status in the appellant Corporation throughout the litigation being ambiguous, we leave that question open for consideration in the trial after necessary evidence is available.

17. The trial has turned out to be stillborn since 2003, with the appellants filing one application after another. We are of the considered opinion that the trial needs to be expedited and concluded at an early date. It is ordered accordingly. The Magistrate shall endeavour to conclude the trial within a period of one year. The parties are directed to cooperate for its early disposal.

18. The appeal is dismissed.