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City Union Bank Limited v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax And Another
Concise Analytical Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is a banking company which filed its return for the assessment year (AY) 2011-12 on 30.09.2011, declaring a total income of Rs. 190,30,75,570/-. The return was processed under Section 143(1) on 08.02.2012. The case was selected for scrutiny and a notice under Section 143(2) was issued on 02.08.2012; the petitioner replied with documents. An assessment order under Section 143(3) dated 14.03.2014 assessed total income at Rs. 268,45,50,527/- (with certain additions); that assessment is under challenge before the appellate authority.
The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax issued a notice dated 26.03.2015 under Section 148 proposing reassessment for AY 2011-12; the petitioner filed a return on 01.05.2015 and objected by letter dated 06.01.2016; nevertheless, the authority passed an order dated 22.03.2016 under Section 143(3) r/w Section 147 reassessing the petitioner and that action has been appealed.
Subsequently, the petitioner received another notice dated 09.03.2018 under Section 148 proposing to initiate proceedings under Section 147 and calling for a return. The petitioner objected by letter dated 11.07.2018, contending (inter alia) that the notice was issued beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year and that there was no failure to disclose material facts. The petitioner nevertheless submitted a return in response. By order dated 08.11.2018 the first respondent rejected the objections and stated the case was reopened for proper disallowance under Section 14A; reasons were furnished on 12.11.2018. The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 seeking to quash the notice dated 09.03.2018 and the order dated 08.11.2018.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the first respondent was justified in reopening the assessment for AY 2011-12 by issuing the notice dated 09.03.2018 and passing the order dated 08.11.2018.
- Whether, because the original assessment was under Section 143(3) and the impugned notice was issued after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the first proviso to Section 147 is attracted and, if so, whether the escapement of income was occasioned by the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.
- Whether the reopening was truly founded on material showing escapement of income or impermissibly constituted a re-exercise/review (i.e., a "change of opinion") by the assessing authority.
- Whether the writ under Article 226 is maintainable in the face of alleged alternative remedies and intermediate orders (for example, the order dated 29.11.2018 rejecting objections to reasons furnished) which were not challenged.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner (Assessee) — Principal Contentions
- The notice dated 09.03.2018 was issued beyond four years from the end of the assessment year (i.e., beyond 31.03.2012), so the first proviso to Section 147 applies and the reopening is impermissible unless escapement resulted from failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts — which the petitioner denies.
- The petitioner had furnished all relevant account books, materials and documents during original proceedings; there was no failure on the part of the bank to disclose material facts.
- Issues regarding disallowance under Section 14A were discussed and decided in the original assessment; an issue once decided in the original assessment cannot be reopened by reassessment unless statutory pre-conditions are met.
- The petitioner requested reasons for reopening and objected to reopening, and also filed a return in response to the 2018 notice.
Respondents (Revenue) — Principal Contentions
- Maintainability: After furnishing of reasons on 12.11.2018, the assessee raised objections which were rejected by order dated 29.11.2018; because that order was not challenged in this writ petition, the respondents contend the petition is not maintainable and the petitioner should be non-suited for not availing appropriate remedies.
- Sufficiency of reasons: Relying on precedent (Raymond Woollen Mills), the respondents contend that sufficiency/insufficiency of reopening reasons cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition.
- Substantive/factual case: The assessee did not disclose fully and truly all material facts — specifically:
- Disallowance under Section 14A was not computed correctly in the original assessment (AO alleges incorrect method — 2% of exempt income was used instead of the method under Rule 8D).
- Disallowance under Section 36 (provision for bad debts) was not properly computed due to non-furnishing full particulars about provisioning for rural versus urban branches; the AO contends this amounts to nondisclosure of material facts.
- Limitation: The respondents argued that a six-year limitation applies in this case (i.e., reopening beyond four years is permissible where the conditions of the proviso are satisfied).
- The respondents relied on a number of precedents (including Coca Cola India Inc., Honda Siel, Jeans Knit) to support their stance.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court (as recorded in the opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| Raymond Woollen Mills v. ITO (2008) 14 SCC 218 | That sufficiency or insufficiency of the reasons assigned in the notice of reopening cannot ordinarily be the subject‑matter of adjudication in a writ petition. | The respondents relied on this decision to argue non-maintainability; the Court noted the reliance but held that when the issue touches on jurisdiction (i.e., absence of conditions precedent for Section 147), writ relief can be granted even if alternative remedies exist. |
| Coca Cola India Inc. v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax (2010) 15 SCC 215 | The opinion records that the respondents drew attention to this decision; the specific rule cited from this decision is not detailed in the opinion. | The Court recorded that the respondents relied on this and several other decisions; no detailed application of this specific precedent is set out beyond noting reliance. |
| Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (2012) 12 SCC 762 | The decision was cited by respondents; the opinion does not extract a specific rule from it. | The Court noted the respondents cited this decision among others; the opinion does not record a standalone application of the authority. |
| Jeans Knit (P) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Karnataka) (2014) 50 taxmann.com 319 | Cited by respondents; the opinion does not specify the particular legal proposition taken from it. | Court recorded that respondents drew attention to this decision as part of their authorities; no detailed application recorded. |
| Martech Peripherals Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Of Income-Tax (2017) 5 Mad LJ 4 | Exposition on the scope of Section 147: if reopening is within four years AO needs "reason to believe"; if reopening is after four years (original assessment under s.143(3) or s.147) the first proviso requires failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts to justify reopening. | The Court quoted and relied on this exposition to frame the threshold question: because the impugned notice was after four years and the original assessment was under s.143(3), the first proviso to s.147 applies and the Court must examine whether there was failure to disclose. |
| Income Tax Officer Ward No.16 v. TechSpan India Pvt. Ltd. (2018) 6 SCC 685 | Explains the meaning of "reason to believe" — it cannot be a mere change of opinion; reopening must be based on tangible material showing escapement of income and reasons must have a live link to formation of belief. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to hold that reassessment cannot proceed merely because the AO had a different view later; the Court used it to support the conclusion that reopening here constituted an impermissible change of opinion rather than discovery of escapement due to nondisclosure by the assessee. |
| Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC) | Part of the jurisprudence cited in TechSpan: emphasizes that "reason to believe" requires schematic interpretation to prevent arbitrary re-openings and that "change of opinion" is not a legitimate basis for reassessment. | Cited within the discussion of TechSpan; the Court referenced Kelvinator as part of settled law that precludes reopening based solely on change of opinion. |
| Naresh Kumar v. State (2019) 9 SCC 416 | Stands for the proposition that the power of review must be expressly conferred. | The Court invoked this principle in distinguishing reassessment (permitted by statute when conditions are met) from review (not permitted unless expressly conferred), to underline that the AO cannot effectively review the earlier assessment by reopening absent statutory preconditions. |
| Maxopp Investment Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2018) 15 SCC 523 | Authoritative pronouncement on the true object, scope and meaning of Section 14A. | The Court noted that Maxopp, decided on 12.02.2018, is authoritative on Section 14A; the impugned order (08.11.2018) post‑dates Maxopp and the Court observed that the assessing authority appeared not to have applied the Supreme Court's authoritative ruling when reopening the assessment. |
| Principal Commissioner of Income-tax v. State Bank of Patiala (2017) 391 ITR 218 | This decision is discussed in Maxopp and was referred to in that context in the opinion. | The Court observed that Maxopp dealt with the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in this matter; the opinion records this connection but does not separately apply the earlier High Court ruling beyond its treatment in Maxopp. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise statutory and precedent‑based manner:
- Threshold chronological and statutory test: The original assessment was under Section 143(3), and the impugned Section 148 notice was issued on 09.03.2018 — beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year (31.03.2012). Consequently, the first proviso to Section 147 is engaged and the Revenue is permitted to reopen only if escapement of income occurred by reason of the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.
- Legal import of Section 14A(2): The Court examined Section 14A(2) and observed that it imposes a duty on the Assessing Officer to determine the amount of expenditure in relation to income not includible in total income "in accordance with such method as may be prescribed" where the AO is not satisfied with the correctness of the assessee's claim. The Court parsed s.14A(2) to show the duty lies on the AO to make an appropriate determination (for example by applying Rule 8D), and that mere availability of account books to the AO does not of itself create a failure to disclose by the assessee.
- Application of TechSpan/Kelvinator jurisprudence: Relying on the Supreme Court's exposition (TechSpan and Kelvinator), the Court reiterated that "reason to believe" must be based on tangible material and not on a mere change of opinion. Reopening prompted by the AO's own failure to make an appropriate determination in the original assessment (for example, to apply Rule 8D despite having accounts before him) would amount to permitting the AO to exercise a power of review, which the statute does not confer.
- Factual application to the present case: The Court found that the petitioner had placed all primary materials (books and documents) before the AO and thus there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The inadequacy, if any, lay in the assessing officer's failure to properly determine the disallowance under Section 14A (by applying Rule 8D) during the original assessment — a shortcoming of the Revenue and not a ground to reopen under s.147 after four years.
- On the census / provisioning point: The Court also found the second ground invoked by the AO (relating to use of 2011 census figures for classification of rural branches and consequent provisioning differences) to be untenable because those census figures were not available at the relevant time; the assessee could not have used future information. The Court invoked the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia to stress that a taxpayer is not expected to disclose what was then impossible to disclose.
- Maintainability / alternative remedies: The respondents argued the petition was not maintainable because an order dated 29.11.2018 rejecting objections to reasons was not challenged. The Court rejected this objection because the challenge was to jurisdictional defect (absence of conditions precedent to exercise jurisdiction under Section 147), and where a writ touches jurisdiction, availability of alternative remedies is not a bar to granting relief.
- On awareness of binding precedent: The Court observed that the Supreme Court's ruling in Maxopp (12.02.2018) — authoritative on Section 14A — predated the impugned order (08.11.2018) and that the first respondent appeared not to have been aware of that ruling. The Court commented on systemic difficulties of information overload but used this observation only descriptively.
Holding and Implications
Holding: For the reasons stated, the Court held that the impugned proceedings were not justified and therefore quashed them.
Core Ruling: The impugned notice dated 09.03.2018 and the order dated 08.11.2018 are quashed; the writ petition is allowed.
Direct consequences and immediate implications:
- The reopening proceedings initiated by the first respondent for AY 2011-12 (notice dated 09.03.2018 and order dated 08.11.2018) are quashed and set aside.
- The writ petition is allowed with no costs, and the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
Broader precedent implications: The Court applied and reiterated established principles from Supreme Court and High Court authorities concerning the scope of Section 147 (notably the requirement that reopening after four years must be founded on failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, and that a mere change of opinion by the AO is insufficient). The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle; it applies existing authorities to the facts of the case.
End of summary.
Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to call for records relating to the impugned order dated 08.11.2018 passed by the first respondent and the impugned notice dated 09.03.2018 issued by the first respondent under Section 148 read with Section 147 of the Income Tax Act for the assessment year 2011-12 (PAN No. AAACC1287E) and quash both the order and notice.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
G.R. Swaminathan, J.:— The petitioner-assessee is a banking company. It filed its return of income on 30.09.2011 for the assessment year 2011-12 admitting a total income of Rs. 190,30,75,570/-. The return was processed under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on 08.02.2012. The case was taken up for scrutiny and notice under Section 143(2) was issued on 02.08.2012. In response to the said notice, the assessee filed the necessary documents. Thereafter, the order dated 14.03.2014 was passed under Section 143(3) of the Act assessing the total income at Rs. 268,45,50,527/-. Certain additions were made. The assessment order is now under challenge before the appellate authority.
2. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax issued notice dated 26.03.2015 under Section 148 of the Act proposing to reassess the petitioner for the assessment year 2011-12. The assessee/petitioner after addressing a letter dated 09.04.2015 calling upon the authority to furnish a copy of the reasons recorded for initiating proceedings under Section 147 of the Act, filed its return of income on 01.05.2015. The petitioner also submitted a letter dated 06.01.2016 objecting to the initiation of the proceedings and requesting the Assessing Officer to drop the same. According to the petitioner, without responding to the requests made earlier, the authority passed an order dated 22.03.2016 under Section 143(3) r/w. Section 147 of the Act reassessing the petitioner for the assessment year 2011-12. Questioning the same, the petitioner has filed an appeal.
3. While so, the petitioner received another notice dated 09.03.2018 from the first respondent under Section 148 of the Act proposing to initiate proceedings under Section 147 and calling upon the petitioner to file its return of income in response to the said notice. The petitioner submitted a letter dated 11.07.2018 raising their objections for reopening of assessment under Section 147 of the Act. It was contended by the petitioner that the notice was issued beyond four years from the end of the assessment year ie., 31.03.2012. The petitioner also pointed out that there has been no failure on the part of the bank in submitting the material facts for assessment. The petitioner had orally gathered information that the reasons for initiating the proceedings under Section 147 was that the disallowance made under Section 14 A of the Act was not computed as per the method prescribed under the Income Tax Rules, 1962. Therefore, in their letter dated 11.07.2018, the petitioner pointed out that even in the order of original assessment, the issue of disallowance has been discussed and disallowance was made as per the method adopted in the previous year. An issue once decided in the regular assignment cannot be reopened by way of reassessing. The petitioner, however submitted the return of income in response to the notice dated 09.03.2018. They also sought information on the reasons for reopening the assessment for the said year.
4. The first respondent by order dated 08.11.2018, rejected the objections of the assessee and informed them that the case stood reopened for proper disallowance under Section 14 A of the Act. Vide letter dated 12.11.2018, the first respondent also furnished a copy of the reasons recorded for initiating proceedings under Section 147 of the Act. Aggrieved by these developments, the petitioner has moved this Court by invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned notice dated 09.03.2018 and the order dated 08.11.2018 passed by the first respondent.
5. The respondents filed a detailed counter affidavit opposing the prayer made in the writ petition. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Standing counsel have filed elaborate written submissions. They also placed reliance on a host of case-laws to buttress their respective positions.
6. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents questions the very maintainability of this writ petition. He points out that after the furnishing of reasons by the Revenue on 12.11.2018, the assessee raised objections to the reopening in respect of all the reasons adduced and that the same was rejected vide order dated 29.11.2018. But, the petitioner has not chosen to challenge the same in this writ petition. The challenge is confined only to the notice dated 09.03.2018 and the order dated 08.11.2018. In as much as the order dated 29.11.2018 has not been put to challenge, this writ petition is not maintainable. He also wanted this Court to non suit the petitioner for straightaway availing the writ remedy. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2008) 14 SCC 218 (Raymond Woollen Mills v. ITO), he contended that sufficiency or insufficiency of the reasons assigned in the notice of reopening of assessment cannot be the subject matter of an adjudication in a writ petition.
7. The pointed contention of the learned standing counsel for the respondents is that the assessee did not disclose fully and truly all material facts in respect of the expenditure towards earning the income which does not form part of the total income. Disallowance under Section 14 A of the Act could not be correctly computed as a result. Even though the statutory provision clearly states that the method for determining the amount of expenditure in relation to income not includable in total income must be done in accordance with Rule 8 D of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, in the assessment order dated 14.03.2014, the disallowance was calculated at 2% of the exempted income. Likewise, disallowance under Section 36 could not be properly computed in the original order of assessment due to non furnishing of full and true particulars concerning the bad debt provisioning for Rural Branches vis-a-vis Urban Branches. The action taken by the Revenue are based on facts and not on “change of opinion”. Drawing the court's attention to Explanation 1 to Section 147 of the Act, the learned standing counsel submitted that mere production of account books before the assessing officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure. He would also refute the stand of the petitioner that the time limit for notice to be issued under Section 148 is 4 years. According to him, the limitation is 6 years in this case.
8. The learned standing counsel for the respondents drew my attention to a number of decisions including the ones reported in (2010) 15 SCC 215 (Coca Cola India Inc. v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax), (2012) 12 SCC 762 (Honda Siel Power Products Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax) and (2014) 50 taxmann.com 319 (Karnataka) (Jeans Knit (P) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 11(5), Bangalore).
9. The point for consideration is whether the first respondent is justified in reopening the assessment in respect of the assessment year 2011-12 vide notice dated 09.03.2018 r/w. order dated 08.11.2018. It is not in dispute that the reasons for reopening the subject assessment are two fold. During the scrutiny assessment, disallowance to the tune of Rs. 1,57,674/- being 2% of exemption income was made under Section 14 A instead of determining under clause (ii) of Rule 8 D. Secondly, the assessee did not follow the 2011 census figure to determine the status of rural branches to work out 10% of aggregate average advances made by the rural branches to arrive at the provision for bad and doubtful debts.
10. The assessing authority has invoked the power available under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The said provision reads as under:
“147.Income escaping assessment.
If the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in this section and in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year):
Provided that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 14 or section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year:
Provided further that nothing contained in the first proviso shall apply in a case where any income in relation to any asset (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India, chargeable to tax, has escaped assessment for any assessment year:
Provided also that the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess such income, other than the income involving matters which are the subject matters of any appeal, reference or revision, which is chargeable to tax and has escaped assessment.
Explanation 1 …
Explanation 2 …
Explanation 3 …
Explanation 4.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the provisions of this section, as amended by the Finance Act, 2012, shall also be applicable for any assessment year beginning on or before the 1 day of April, 2012.”
11. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Shakdher during his brief but beautiful sojourn at the Madras High Court dealt with the scope of the above provision in the decision reported in (2017) 5 Mad LJ 4 (Martech Peripherals Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Of Income-Tax) and held as follows:
“18. A perusal of the aforesaid extract of Section 147 of the Act would show that, if, the Revenue makes an attempt to reopen the assessment, within a period of four (4) years from the date, when, the relevant assessment year ends, then, all that the Assessing Officer has to show is that, he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for the concerned assessment year and while doing so, he is also empowered to assess any other income, which has escaped assessment and, which comes to his notice, subsequently, albeit, during the course of the assessment proceedings.
18.1. It is, only if, the original assessment is made under Section 143(3) or under Section 147 and, an attempt to reopen the assessment is made after the expiry of the four (4) years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the first proviso to Section 147 of the Act kicks in, which mandates, that no reassessment proceedings can be initiated, unless the escapement of income is occasioned by either the reason of failure on the part of the assessee to file a return under Section 139 or, in response to notice issued under Section 142(1) or Section 148 or, on account of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for carrying out the assessment for the relevant assessment year.”
12. It is not in dispute that the original assessment was made under Section 143(3) of the Act. The impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued on 09.03.2018. It is thus obviously beyond 4 years from the end of the assessment year i.e., 31.03.2012. Since an attempt to reopen the assessment is made after the expiry of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the first Proviso to Section 147 of the Act kicks in. It must therefore be seen whether the escapement of income was occasioned by failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for carrying out the assessment.
13. In my view, the key to the problem lies in a proper reading of Section 14 A(2) of the Act. Section 14 A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 reads as under:
“Expenditure incurred in relation to income not includible in total income.
14A.(1) For the purposes of computing the total income under this Chapter, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act.
(2) The Assessing Officer shall determine the amount of expenditure incurred in relation to such income which does not form part of the total income under this Act in accordance with such method as may be prescribed, if the Assessing Officer, having regard to the accounts of the assessee, is not satisfied with the correctness of the claim of the assessee in respect of such expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (2) shall also apply in relation to a case where an assessee claims that no expenditure has been incurred by him in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act.”
14. If sub-section (2) is parsed, it can be divided into two component parts. Let me put the second part first. The provision will then read as under:
“If the Assessing Officer, having regard to the accounts of the assessee, is not satisfied with the correctness of the claim of the assessee in respect of such expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act,
the Assessing Officer shall determine the amount of expenditure incurred in relation to such income which does not form part of the total income under this Act in accordance with such method as may be prescribed”.
15. Therefore, the duty to appropriately determine the amount of expenditure lies on the Assessing Officer. In this case, the assessee had made available all the relevant account books, materials and documents. Nothing more can be expected from the assessee. He had placed on the table all the primary materials. The assessee can make any claim, even wrong or fanciful, regarding disallowance. If the assessing officer is not satisfied, it is for him to apply Rule 8 D of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 and appropriately determine the amount of expenditure filed for the purpose of disallowance. If the assessing officer failed to properly determine the amount of expenditure, it cannot furnish a reason for reopening the concluded assessment.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2018) 6 SCC 685 (Income Tax Officer Ward No. 16 v. TechSpan India Private Ltd.,) held as follows:
“14. The language of Section 147 makes it clear that the assessing officer certainly has the power to re-assess any income which escaped assessment for any assessment year subject to the provisions of Sections 148 to 153. However, the use of this power is conditional upon the fact that the assessing officer has some reason to believe that the income has escaped assessment. The use of the words ‘reason to believe’ in Section 147 has to be interpreted schematically as the liberal interpretation of the word would have the consequence of conferring arbitrary powers on the assessing officer who may even initiate such re-assessment proceedings merely on his change of opinion on the basis of same facts and circumstances which has already been considered by him during the original assessment proceedings. Such could not be the intention of the legislature. The said provision was incorporated in the scheme of the IT Act so as to empower the Assessing Authorities to re-assess any income on the ground which was not brought on record during the original proceedings and escaped his knowledge; and the said fact would have material bearing on the outcome of the relevant assessment order.
15. Section 147 of the IT Act does not allow the reassessment of an income merely because of the fact that the assessing officer has a change of opinion with regard to the interpretation of law differently on the facts that were well within his knowledge even at the time of assessment. Doing so would have the effect of giving the assessing officer the power of review and Section 147 confers the power to re-assess and not the power to review.
16. To check whether it is a case of change of opinion or not one has to see its meaning in literal as well as legal terms. The word change of opinion implies formulation of opinion and then a change thereof. In terms of assessment proceedings, it means formulation of belief by an assessing officer resulting from what he thinks on a particular question. It is a result of understanding, experience and reflection.
17. It is well settled and held by this Court in a catena of judgments and it would be sufficient to refer Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC) wherein this Court has held as under:
5….where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to re-open the assessment. Therefore, post-1st April, 1989, power to re-open is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason to believe”…..
Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to re-open assessments on the basis of “mere change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to re-open.
6. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess. But re-assessment has to be based on fulfillment of certain pre-condition and if the concept of “change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of re-opening the assessment, review would take place.
7. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, Assessing Officer has power to re-open, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief.
18. Before interfering with the proposed re-opening of the assessment on the ground that the same is based only on a change in opinion, the court ought to verify whether the assessment earlier made has either expressly or by necessary implication expressed an opinion on a matter which is the basis of the alleged escapement of income that was taxable. If the assessment order is non-speaking, cryptic or perfunctory in nature, it may be difficult to attribute to the assessing officer any opinion on the questions that are raised in the proposed re-assessment proceedings. Every attempt to bring to tax, income that has escaped assessment, cannot be absorbed by judicial intervention on an assumed change of opinion even in cases where the order of assessment does not address itself to a given aspect sought to be examined in the reassessment proceedings.”
17. In a recent decision pertaining to land acquisition proceedings, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the power of review must be expressly conferred (2019) 9 SCC 416 (Naresh Kumar v. State).
18. In this case, there is no failure on the part of the assessee. On the other hand, there appears to be a failure on the part of the assessing officer to make an appropriate determination of the amount of expenditure in terms of Section 14 A of the Income Tax Act. In such a case, the remedy for the Revenue is elsewhere and not in assuming jurisdiction under Section 147 of the Act. That would amount to exercising the power of review which the statute has not conferred on the authority. This is particularly because the attempt to reopen is made after the expiry of 4 years from the end of the assessment year and the original assessment was made under Section 143(3). The authority cannot take advantage of their own wrong. If they failed to perform their statutory duty, the consequence of default cannot fall on the assessee.
19. The other reason cited by the authority is also not sufficient. It is beyond dispute that the census figures for the year 2011 were made available only a few years later. The assessee could not have peeped into the future while submitting its return of income. One can have the benefit of hindsight but nature has not endowed the assessees with prophetic abilities. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia (Law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform) is a well known legal maxim.
20. There is also no substance in the contention that writ remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not available for the petitioner. The petitioner has demonstrated that the conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 147 of the Act did not exist and the first respondent had therefore no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice in respect of the assessment year 2011-12 after the expiry of 4 years. When the issue touches on the jurisdiction of the authority, the existence of alternative remedy is no ground to deny relief to the petitioner.
21. I cannot help remarking on one other aspect occurring in this case. The divergent stand of the parties revolves around Section 14 A of the Act. The true object, scope and meaning of Section 14 A of the Income Tax Act has been authoritatively laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2018) 15 SCC 523 (Maxopp Investment Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax). This judgment also deals with the decision reported in (2017) 391 ITR 218 (Principal Commissioner of Income-tax v. State Bank of Patiala). The decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was affirmed but for different reasons. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was rendered on 12.02.2018. The order impugned in this writ petition was passed on 08.11.2018, ie., after a gap of more than nine months. The assessee was placing reliance on the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in their letter dated 11.07.2018. The first respondent has labored to distinguish the same in the impugned order. It is obvious that the first respondent was not aware of the authoritative ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in Maxopp Investment Limited case.
22. I can hardly blame the first respondent. There is an explosion in the matter of law reporting. There are too many law journals. We have web editions and e-libraries. In the deluge of decisions, pearls get lost in the heap of pebbles. Lord Neuberger in his talk while commemorating the ICLR's 150 Anniversary remarked that in the legal world, just as in most other fields, a significant present day problem is information overload. As early as in 1863, Lindley identified the four criteria for reporting a case. They are 1.it must introduce a new principle, 2.modify an existing principle, 3.settle a disputed or uncertain issue, 4.or particularly instructive.
23. T.S. Eliot asked “where is the knowledge we have lost in information?”. This pitfall can be avoided if the law officers of the various departments bring it to the notice of their respective heads of the departments the rulings that meet the aforesaid criteria laid down by Lindley. The same could then percolate down the line. Such a sharing of knowledge will definitely go a long way in improving the quality of adjudication.
24. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed. They are accordingly quashed. This writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
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