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Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited v. Northern Coal Field Limited .

Supreme Court Of India
Nov 27, 2019
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute originates from an agreement dated 21-12-2010 under which the petitioner-contractor was to provide round-the-clock security services to the respondent-company at agreed contractual rates. Clause 13 of the contract contained an arbitration agreement providing for reference of disputes to a sole arbitrator appointed by the Director (Personnel) of NCL, with Singrauli (M.P.) as the venue.

Differences arose regarding non-payment and deduction of amounts allegedly totalling Rs 1,43,69,309/-. The petitioner served a legal notice on 29-05-2013 demanding payment. When the dispute remained unresolved, the petitioner issued a notice invoking arbitration on 09-03-2016 and a follow-up notice on 30-05-2016 proposing a retired District Judge as sole arbitrator. The respondent gave no reply.

On 20-09-2016 the petitioner moved the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) seeking appointment of an arbitrator. By order dated 11-01-2018 (AIR 2018 MP 74) the High Court refused the request, holding that the contractor’s claims were barred by limitation. The present special leave petition challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, post-2015 Amendment Act, a High Court exercising power under Section 11 of the 1996 Act can decline appointment of an arbitrator on the ground that the underlying claims are time-barred.
  2. Whether the issue of limitation is a jurisdictional question that must be decided by the arbitral tribunal under Section 16, in light of Section 11(6-A) and the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Contractor's Arguments

  • The arbitration clause is undisputed; therefore, under Section 11(6-A) the court’s inquiry is confined to confirming the existence of the agreement and appointing an arbitrator.
  • Limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and must be left to the arbitral tribunal under Section 16.

Respondent-Company's Arguments

  • The contractor’s monetary claims were time-barred; consequently, no live dispute existed to be referred to arbitration, justifying dismissal of the Section 11 application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618 Pre-amendment scope of Chief Justice’s power under Section 11 included deciding threshold issues such as limitation. Cited to show that its expansive approach has been legislatively overruled by Section 11(6-A).
National Insurance Co. v. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 267 Followed Patel Engineering; permitted courts to decide “dead claims” at Section 11 stage. Referenced as part of the line of authority curtailed by the 2015 amendment.
Master Construction Co. v. Union of India (2011) 12 SCC 349 Reiterated judicial scrutiny of limitation at pre-reference stage. Cited to illustrate the pre-amendment jurisprudence now narrowed.
Duro Felguera S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd. (2017) 9 SCC 729 Held that post-amendment courts must confine themselves to verifying existence of an arbitration agreement. Relied upon as direct authority mandating minimal scrutiny under Section 11.
ITW Signode India Ltd. v. CCE (2004) 3 SCC 48 Pronounced that limitation is a jurisdictional issue. Used to classify limitation as a matter for the arbitral tribunal’s determination under Section 16.
NTPC Ltd. v. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft (2007) 4 SCC 451 Recognised that arbitral tribunal should consider limitation. Supports referral of limitation disputes to the tribunal rather than the court.
Iffco Ltd. v. Bhadra Products (2018) 2 SCC 534 Confirmed that limitation, being jurisdictional, falls within Section 16. Strengthens the view that the High Court exceeded its remit by ruling on limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice Indu Malhotra emphasised the statutory changes introduced by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015:

  • Section 11(6-A) expressly confines the court’s role at the appointment stage to verifying only the “existence of an arbitration agreement”, notwithstanding earlier case law.
  • The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz in Section 16 empowers the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections on limitation.
  • Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and therefore a jurisdictional matter for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide.
  • The High Court’s reliance on pre-amendment authorities such as Patel Engineering and Boghara Polyfab was misplaced because those decisions were legislatively overridden.
  • Since the arbitration clause is admittedly valid and subsisting, the High Court should have appointed an arbitrator and left all other objections, including limitation, to the arbitral tribunal.

Holding and Implications

Held: The impugned order dated 11-01-2018 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is set aside. The Supreme Court appoints Mr. Justice (Retd.) A.M. Sapre as sole arbitrator; the arbitral tribunal will determine the plea of limitation and all other issues.

Implications: The decision reinforces the post-2015 principle that courts, at the Section 11 stage, may examine only the existence of an arbitration agreement. All jurisdictional objections, including limitation, must be decided by the arbitral tribunal, thereby promoting minimal judicial intervention and party autonomy in the arbitral process.

Show all summary ...

Indu Malhotra, J.— The issue which has arisen for consideration is whether the High Court 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1173, AIR 2018 MP 74 was justified in rejecting the application filed under Section 11 for reference to arbitration, on the ground that it was barred by limitation.

2. The factual background of the case arises from an agreement dated 21-12-2010 entered into between the parties, under which the petitioner Contractor was to provide security to the respondent Company around the clock on need basis, as per the agreed contractual rates. The agreement contained an arbitration clause which reads as follows:

“13. Arbitration:
13.1. If any dispute, difference, question or disagreement shall at any time hereafter arise between the parties hereto or the respective or assigns in connection with or arising out of or in respect of contract, application of provision thereof, anything thereunder contained or arising thereunder or as to rights, liabilities or duties of the said parties hereunder or any matter whatsoever incidental to this contract shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the person appointed by Director (Pers.) of NCL. Contractor shall have no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is an employee of NCL or that he had dealt with the matter to which the contract related and that in the course of his duties as NCL employee he has expressed views on all or any of the matter of disputes or difference.
13.2. If the arbitrator to whom the matter has originally been referred dies or refused to act or resigns for any reason from the position of arbitrator, it shall be lawful, for Director (Pers.) of NCL to appoint another person to act as arbitrator. Such person shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the stage at which it was left by his predecessor or to precede de novo.
13.3. It is agreed that no person other than the person appointed by Director (Pers.) of NCL as aforesaid shall act as arbitrator.
13.4. It is term of the contract that the Contractor shall not stop the work under this contract and the work shall continue whether the arbitration proceedings were commenced or not.
13.5. It is term of this contract that the parties invoking the arbitration shall specify the dispute to be referred for arbitration.
13.6. The arbitrator shall give reasoned award in respect of each of the difference referred to him. The award as aforesaid shall be final and binding on all the parties to this contract in accordance with the law.
13.7. The venue of arbitration shall be at Singrauli in India and subject as aforesaid, the provisions of Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and rules made thereunder and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause.”
(emphasis supplied)

3. Disputes arose between the parties with respect to payment of amounts under the contract by the respondent Company, and the deduction of the security amount from the running bills. The petitioner Contractor issued a legal notice dated 29-5-2013 demanding payment of amounts to the tune of Rs 1,43,69,309 along with interest from the respondent Company.

4. On 9-3-2016, the petitioner Contractor issued a notice of arbitration calling upon the respondent Company to nominate a sole arbitrator in terms of the arbitration clause, to adjudicate the disputes between the parties. The respondent Company did not respond to the notice dated 9-3-2016. The petitioner Contractor sent a further notice on 30-5-2016 to the respondent Company proposing the name of Mr Jai Singh, a retired Additional District Judge for appointment as the sole arbitrator. The respondent Company did not respond to this notice as well.

5. The petitioner Contractor filed an application on 20-9-2016, under Section 11 invoking the default power of the High Court to make the appointment of a sole arbitrator. The High Court vide the impugned order held 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1173, AIR 2018 MP 74 that the claims of the petitioner Contractor were barred by limitation, and therefore an arbitrator could not be appointed under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.

6. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 11-1-2018 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1173, AIR 2018 MP 74, the petitioner has filed the present special leave petition before this Court.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings.

7.1. Section 21 of the 1996 Act provides that arbitral proceedings commence on the date on which a request for disputes to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent.

7.2. In the present case, the notice of arbitration was issued by the petitioner Contractor to the respondent Company on 9-3-2016. The invocation took place after Section 11 was amended by the 2015 Amendment Act, which came into force on 23-10-2015, the amended provision would be applicable to the present case.

7.3. The 2015 Amendment Act brought about a significant change in the appointment process under Section 11 : first, the default power of appointment shifted from the Chief Justice of the High Court in arbitrations governed by Part I of the Act, to the High Court; second, the scope of jurisdiction under sub-section (6-A) of Section 11 was confined to the examination of the existence of the arbitration agreement at the pre-reference stage.

7.4. Prior to the coming into force of the 2015 Amendment Act, much controversy had surrounded the nature of the power of appointment by the Chief Justice, or his designate under Section 11. A seven-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618 defined the scope of power of the Chief Justice under Section 11. The Court held that the scope of power exercised under Section 11 was to first decide:

(i) whether there was a valid arbitration agreement; and
(ii) whether the person who has made the request under Section 11, was a party to the arbitration agreement; and
(iii) whether the party making the motion had approached the appropriate High Court.

7.5. Further, the Chief Justice was required to decide all threshold issues with respect to jurisdiction, the existence of the agreement, whether the claim was a dead one; or a time-barred claim sought to be resurrected; or whether the parties had concluded the transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligations, and received the final payment without objection, under Section 11, at the pre-reference stage. The decision in Patel Engg. (2005) 8 SCC 618 was followed by this Court in Boghara Polyfab (2009) 1 SCC 267, Master Construction (2011) 12 SCC 349, and other decisions.

7.6. The Law Commission in the 246th Report recommended that:

“33. … the Commission has recommended amendments to Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The scope of the judicial intervention is only restricted to situations where the court/judicial authority finds that the arbitration agreement does not exist or is null and void. Insofar as the nature of intervention is concerned, it is recommended that in the event the court/judicial authority is prima facie satisfied against the argument challenging the arbitration agreement, it shall appoint the arbitrator and/or refer the parties to arbitration, as the case may be. The amendment envisages that the judicial authority shall not refer the parties to arbitration only if it finds that there does not exist an arbitration agreement or that it is null and void. If the judicial authority is of the opinion that prima facie the arbitration agreement exists, then it shall refer the dispute to arbitration, and leave the existence of the arbitration agreement to be finally determined by the Arbitral Tribunal.”
(emphasis supplied)

7.7. Based on the recommendations of the Law Commission, Section 11 was substantially amended by the 2015 Amendment Act, to overcome the effect of all previous judgments rendered on the scope of power by a non obstante clause, and to reinforce the kompetenz-kompetenz principle enshrined in Section 16 of the 1996 Act. The 2015 Amendment Act inserted sub-section (6-A) to Section 11 which provides that:

“(6-A) The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.”
(emphasis supplied)

7.8. By virtue of the non obstante clause incorporated in Section 11(6-A), previous judgments rendered in Patel Engg. (2005) 8 SCC 618 and Boghara Polyfab (2009) 1 SCC 267, were legislatively overruled. The scope of examination is now confined only to the existence of the arbitration agreement at the Section 11 stage, and nothing more.

7.9. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Duro Felguera S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd. (2017) 9 SCC 729, (2017) 8 SCC 377, wherein this Court held that :

“48. … From a reading of Section 11(6-A), the intention of the legislature is crystal clear i.e. the court should and need only look into one aspect—the existence of an arbitration agreement. What are the factors for deciding as to whether there is an arbitration agreement is the next question. The resolution to that is simple — it needs to be seen if the agreement contains a clause which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the agreement.”
(emphasis supplied)

7.10. In view of the legislative mandate contained in Section 11(6-A), the Court is now required only to examine the existence of the arbitration agreement. All other preliminary or threshold issues are left to be decided by the arbitrator under Section 16, which enshrines the kompetenz-kompetenz principle.

7.11. The doctrine of “kompetenz-kompetenz”, also referred to as “compétence-compétence”, or “compétence de la recognized”, implies that the Arbitral Tribunal is empowered and has the competence to rule on its own jurisdiction, including determining all jurisdictional issues, and the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. This doctrine is intended to minimise judicial intervention, so that the arbitral process is not thwarted at the threshold, when a preliminary objection is raised by one of the parties. The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz is, however, subject to the exception i.e. when the arbitration agreement itself is impeached as being procured by fraud or deception. This exception would also apply to cases where the parties in the process of negotiation, may have entered into a draft agreement as an antecedent step prior to executing the final contract. The draft agreement would be a mere proposal to arbitrate, and not an unequivocal acceptance of the terms of the agreement. Section 7 of the Contract Act, 1872 requires the acceptance of a contract to be absolute and unqualified (2010) 5 SCC 213, (2018) 10 SCC 525. If an arbitration agreement is not valid or non-existent, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the disputes. Appointment of an arbitrator may be refused if the arbitration agreement is not in writing, or the disputes are beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement. Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention states that recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused if the arbitration agreement “is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made”.

7.12. The legislative intent underlying the 1996 Act is party autonomy and minimal judicial intervention in the arbitral process. Under this regime, once the arbitrator is appointed, or the tribunal is constituted, all issues and objections are to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal.

7.13. In view of the provisions of Section 16, and the legislative policy to restrict judicial intervention at the pre-reference stage, the issue of limitation would require to be decided by the arbitrator. Sub-section (1) of Section 16 provides that the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, “including any objections” with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. Section 16 is as an inclusive provision, which would comprehend all preliminary issues touching upon the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. The issue of limitation is a jurisdictional issue, which would be required to be decided by the arbitrator under Section 16, and not the High Court at the pre-reference stage under Section 11 of the Act. Once the existence of the arbitration agreement is not disputed, all issues, including jurisdictional objections are to be decided by the arbitrator.

7.14. In the present case, the issue of limitation was raised by the respondent Company to oppose the appointment of the arbitrator under Section 11 before the High Court. Limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. In ITW Signode (India) Ltd. v. CCE (2004) 3 SCC 48 a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that the question of limitation involves a question of jurisdiction. The findings on the issue of limitation would be a jurisdictional issue. Such a jurisdictional issue is to be determined having regard to the facts and the law. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in NTPC Ltd. v. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft (2007) 4 SCC 451, wherein it was held that the Arbitral Tribunal would deal with limitation under Section 16 of the 1996 Act. If the tribunal finds that the claim is a dead one, or that the claim was barred by limitation, the adjudication of these issues would be on the merits of the claim. Under sub-section (5) of Section 16, the tribunal has the obligation to decide the plea; and if it rejects the plea, the arbitral proceedings would continue, and the tribunal would make the award. Under sub-section (6) a party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may challenge the award under Section 34. In Iffco Ltd. v. Bhadra Products (2018) 2 SCC 534 this Court held that the issue of limitation being a jurisdictional issue, the same has to be decided by the tribunal under Section 16, which is based on Article 16 of the Uncitral Model Law which enshrines the kompetenz principle.

8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 11-1-2018 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1173, AIR 2018 MP 74 passed by the High Court, and direct that the issue of limitation be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal.

9. With the consent of the counsel for the parties, we appoint Mr Justice (Retd.) A.M. Sapre, former Judge of this Court, as the sole arbitrator, subject to the declarations being made under Section 12 of the 1996 Act (as amended) with respect to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator, and the ability to devote sufficient time to complete the arbitration within the period specified by Section 29-A of the 1996 Act.

10. The arbitration agreement states that the arbitration will be at Singrauli, Madhya Pradesh. Consequently, the seat of arbitration is at Singrauli, subject to any modification that may be made by consent of the parties. The arbitrator is, however, at liberty to conduct the proceedings at a convenient venue as per the convenience of the arbitrator and the parties if so required. The arbitrator will be paid fees in accordance with the Fourth Schedule of the 1996 Act. Both parties will share the costs of the arbitration equally.

11. The Registry is directed to dispatch a copy of this order to Mr Justice (Retd.) A.M. Sapre, former Judge, Supreme Court of India at the following address:

“Mr Justice (Retd.) A.M. Sapre,
Former Judge, Supreme Court of India,
C-203, Second Floor
Sarvodaya Enclave
New Delhi - 110 017
Tel No. : 011-40254823
Mob. No. : 7042955488”

12. The parties are directed to appear before the learned arbitrator on 2-12-2019 at 2 p.m. The matter is disposed of accordingly.