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Talwandi Sabo Power Limited. v. Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission & Anr.

Appellate Tribunal For Electricity
Aug 28, 2020
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns appeals arising from the denial of claims for compensation under Change in Law provisions in Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) related to revised environmental norms introduced by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) Notification dated 07.12.2015. The appellants, TSPL and Nabha Power Limited (NPL), are Special Purpose Vehicles initially owned by Punjab State Electricity Board (PSEB), now Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL), which procured and operated thermal power plants. The dispute centers on whether the installation of Flue Gas Desulphurization (FGD) and Selective Non Catalytic Reduction (SNCR) systems, mandated by the 2015 Notification after the bid cut-off dates, constitute a Change in Law event entitling the appellants to additional costs and tariff adjustments.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the MoEF&CC Notification dated 07.12.2015 mandating installation of FGD and SNCR systems qualifies as a Change in Law event under the relevant PPAs.
  2. Whether the Environmental Clearances (ECs) issued to the appellants prior to or after the cut-off dates envisaged or mandated installation of FGD and allocation of funds towards such installation.
  3. The applicability and distinction of the JSW Energy Limited case in relation to the present appeals.
  4. The interpretation of the Ministry of Power letter dated 30.05.2018 regarding exceptions to Change in Law claims based on whether pollution control systems were mandated or envisaged prior to the 2015 Notification.
  5. Whether the appellants are entitled to carrying costs and additional capital costs for installation and operation of FGD and SNCR systems.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants contend that the 2015 MoEF&CC Notification introduced new emission norms for SO2 and NOx that were not in existence at the time of bidding and cut-off dates, thus constituting a Change in Law event under Article 13 of the PPAs.
  • The ECs granted to the appellants only required provision of space for possible future installation of FGD but did not mandate installation or earmarking of funds for FGD or SNCR systems.
  • The responsibility for obtaining ECs rested with the procurer (PSPCL/PSEB), and the appellants had no knowledge or control over the EC conditions prior to bid submission.
  • The appellants distinguished their cases from JSW Energy Limited, where EC was granted prior to cut-off date and mandated FGD installation and fund allocation.
  • The appellants argued that the letter of Ministry of Power dated 30.05.2018 must be interpreted disjunctively, and the expression “or envisaged otherwise” excludes ECs, meaning Change in Law claims apply where pollution control systems were not mandated under ECs or other documents before the 2015 Notification.
  • The appellants rely on technical feasibility reports and orders of other regulatory commissions and CERC recognizing the 2015 Notification as a Change in Law event.
  • The appellants assert entitlement to compensation for additional capital expenditure, operation and maintenance costs, and carrying costs to restore their economic position.
  • The appellants invoke the legal maxim quod approbo non reprobo, contending that PSPCL cannot accept favorable orders in other cases and oppose similar claims here.

Respondent-PSPCL's Arguments

  • PSPCL contends that the ECs issued to the appellants envisaged installation of FGD systems by requiring provision of space and earmarking of funds for environmental protection measures, thus negating Change in Law claims.
  • The letter of Ministry of Power dated 30.05.2018 supports the interpretation that pollution control systems mandated or envisaged prior to the 2015 Notification do not constitute Change in Law events.
  • PSPCL relies on the JSW Energy Limited case, asserting it is binding and applicable, where EC conditions mandated FGD installation and fund allocation.
  • PSPCL argues that the appellants were responsible for complying with EC conditions and that failure to earmark funds for FGD or SNCR is a fault of the appellants themselves.
  • PSPCL denies that the 2015 Notification mandates installation of SNCR equipment at present and asserts existing combustion technologies suffice to meet NOx norms.
  • PSPCL claims that acceptance of Change in Law claims here would disturb the sanctity of the competitive bidding process and prejudice other bidders.
  • PSPCL disputes the relevance of orders of other regulatory commissions and CERC, asserting these are not binding on this Tribunal.
  • PSPCL contends that the availability of FGD technology in the market prior to 2015 negates the appellants’ claim of inability to anticipate such requirements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ahmedabad Municipal Corp. vs. Haji Abdulgafur (1971) 1 SCC 757 Principle that law does not work on mere contemplation; factual cause of action must arise. The Court relied on this precedent to reject the appellants’ argument that prior announcement of policy negates Change in Law claim, emphasizing actual occurrence of change is necessary.
Energy Watch Dog & Ors vs. CERC 2017 (14) SCC 80 Clarification that change in law relief is available only upon actual change, not mere anticipation. The Court cited this to support that revised emission norms notified after cut-off date constitute Change in Law.
Zee Telefilms Ltd. vs. Union of India 2005 (4) SCC 638 Legal principle that factual differences affect precedential value of decisions. The Court applied this principle to distinguish the JSW case from the present appeals on facts.
P.S. Sathappan vs. Andhra Bank Ltd. 2004 (11) SCC 672 Similar to Zee Telefilms, emphasizing case-specific factual matrix in legal determinations. Used to reinforce need for case-by-case analysis in Change in Law claims.
Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale vs. Jayanthi Raghu & Anr. 2012 (4) SCC 793 Interpretation of qualifying phrases such as "if" indicating conditional obligations. The Court used this to interpret the phrase "if required" in EC conditions as non-mandatory, contingent on future developments.
State of Punjab & Ors. vs Dhanjit Singh Sandhu 2014 (15) SCC 144 Doctrine of quod approbo non reprobo (one cannot approbate and reprobate). The Court held that PSPCL cannot take inconsistent positions in similar matters before different commissions.
Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1958 SC 861 Rule of disjunctive interpretation of the word "or" in statutes. The Court applied this to interpret the Ministry of Power letter disjunctively, clarifying "or envisaged otherwise" excludes ECs.
Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Others v. Bishun Das AIR 1967 SC 643 Ordinary meaning of "or" as disjunctive in legislative interpretation. Supported the literal interpretation of the Ministry of Power letter's phrase regarding pollution control system requirements.
Transmission Corpn. of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. vs. GMR Vemagiri Power Generation Ltd. (2018) 3 SCC 716 Business efficacy test for implying terms in contracts. The Court applied this test to hold that earmarking of funds for FGD was not an implied term necessary for contract efficacy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the factual matrix of the appellants’ projects and the timing and content of the Environmental Clearances in relation to the MoEF&CC Notification of 2015. It noted that prior to the 2015 Notification, no emission norms for SO2 and NOx existed, and the ECs only mandated provision of space for potential retrofitting of FGD, without requiring earmarking of funds or installation. The Court distinguished the present cases from the JSW Energy Limited case, where ECs were issued prior to the cut-off date and mandated both installation and fund allocation for FGD due to ecological sensitivities.

The Court interpreted the phrase "if required" in the ECs as conditional and non-mandatory, supported by Supreme Court precedents on qualifying phrases. It held that the revised emission norms and consequent requirement for installation of FGD and SNCR systems introduced by the 2015 Notification constitute a Change in Law event under Article 13 of the PPAs, as these were not foreseeable or mandated at the time of bidding or EC issuance.

The Court also analyzed the Ministry of Power letter dated 30.05.2018, concluding that the exceptions to Change in Law claims apply only where pollution control systems were mandated under ECs or envisaged in other documents prior to the Notification, excluding ECs themselves. This supported the appellants' position that the 2015 Notification is a Change in Law event.

The Court considered the principle of legitimate expectations and the estoppel doctrine, holding that PSPCL, having accepted CERC orders in similar cases, cannot take an inconsistent position here. It emphasized the need for regulatory certainty and noted the divergence in regulatory commissions’ decisions on this issue.

Regarding NOx emission norms and SNCR installation, the Court found that although technology recommendations were not finalized, any future mandate for SNCR or suitable technology would also constitute a Change in Law event. The Court directed the Respondent-Commission to devise a mechanism for compensation including carrying costs to restore the appellants to their economic position as if no Change in Law had occurred.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are allowed.

The Court held that the MoEF&CC Notification dated 07.12.2015 mandating installation and operation of FGD and associated systems for SO2 emission control constitutes a Change in Law event under the PPAs in question. Consequently, the appellants are entitled to include additional capital expenditure and allied costs for FGD installation in their project costs and tariff claims.

Further, if technology for SNCR or any other suitable NOx control system is mandated in the future pursuant to the 2015 Notification, it will also qualify as a Change in Law event entitling the appellants to compensation.

The Respondent-Commission is directed to formulate a mechanism for payment of additional costs and expenses, including carrying costs, to the appellants after prudence check. This decision does not set aside the binding effect of the JSW case but distinguishes it on factual grounds, recognizing the importance of case-specific analysis in Change in Law claims.

No order as to costs. All pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of.

Show all summary ...

Ahmedabad Municipal Corp. vs. Haji Abdulgafur (1971) 1 SCC 757.

(v) PSPCLs contention that FGD condition was envisaged in the EC, if not mandated, is erroneous and contrary to the record. 86 Respondent-PSPCLs contention seeks to read an extraneous condition into the EC contrary to the language of the PPA. In this regard, the following submissions are noteworthy: - (a) In the instant case, the EC was granted after the Cut-Off date on 11.07.2008. The EC required bidders to make provision only for land to retrofit FGD, if required at a later date. Much later by virtue of the CPCB letter dated 11.12.2017 issued in pursuance to the MOEF Notification dated 07.12.2015 that FGD installation was stipulated as a requirement for the first time. (b) By no reasonable standard could TSPL have anticipated in 2008 that requirement to provide land can be to provide for Capex of FGD whose specifications were notified in 2015 and thereafter. (c) The Sub-Committee referred differentiated between 2 distinct situations (i) provision for retrofitting of FGD equipment and (ii) stipulation for FGD installation. In the event where retrofitting provision exists, stipulation for FGD 87 installation can be made only after examination of one-year post-project ambient air quality. [In the present case, Cut off Date was 16.06.2008, the EC was issued on 11.07.2008, COD was 05.07.2014 (Unit I) and 25.11.2015 (Unit II), MOEF Notification i.e. Change in Law event is of 07.12.2015] (d) Funds can be ear-marked for environmental protection measures which either existed or were certain. It would be contrary to the business efficacy test to extend the ear-marking of funds to environment protection measures on anticipation. (e) Since FGD installation and its parameters came to be stipulated 7 years after (December 2015) the Cut-Off Date, FGD installation cannot be considered as an environment protection measure in terms of Paragraph xxv of the EC.

(vi) In order to meet varied emission limits, different kind of pollution control system (FGD) at different cost levels would be needed. The EC of 2008 provides a general condition for leaving space for FGD 88 alone. The cost associated with installation of FGD is directly proportional to the level of SO2 emissions to be controlled.

(vii) TSPL contends that it is a settled position of law that plain and literal construction must be given to the contractual and statutory documents (which includes the EC). A bare perusal of the terms of the EC shows space to be kept for retrofitting of FGD but there is no specific provision in the EC mandating ear-marking of funds towards FGD installation. There are multiple environment protection measures detailed in the subsequent clauses, only those must be referred as stipulated measures.

(viii) Appellant-TSPL further contends that the EIA Report prepared by PSEB stipulated various mitigation measures to reduce adverse impact on the environment. The EIA Report did not stipulate installation of FGD. The measures contained in the EIA Report, inter alia, include: (a) Electrostatic Precipitators (ESPs) to be designed to limit the particulates emission to 100 mg/Nm3 under worst operating 89 condition, which is well below the prescribed limit of 150 mg/Nm3. (b) The entire system will be so designed as to keep the pollutant emission within specified norms under worst condition as per Punjab State Pollution Control Boards requirement. (c) Special precautions will be taken to control the fugitive dust emission within and around coal handling plant.

(ix) The Appellant-TSPL also contends that the Central Commission allowed capitalization of the FGD system even where the provision regarding FGD had been contemplated in the EC. (9(x) Reiterating that TSPLs case is distinct from JSW Case (2013 SCC OnLine APTEL 16), the Appellant-TSPL contends that PSPCLs reliance on the JSW case is devoid of reasoning and ought to be rejected.

(xi) Further, the facts of the case of TSPL are similar to the case of CGPL, wherein JSW has been distinguished. 90

(xii) The Appellant also contends that unlike TSPLs and CGPLs case where FGD requirement was not mandated and the EC was not issued before cut-off date, in JSW case, the EC dated 17.05.2007 was available to JSW prior to the submission of bid on 21.02.2008. Further, in the JSW case, obtaining Environment Clearance was the responsibility of the bidder, i.e., JSW. In contrast, TSPLs case being Case II, scenario IV under Competitive Bidding process (fuel and location is specified by the bidder) Guidelines, the responsibility for obtaining Environment Clearance is of the procurer. Also, it is a settled position of law that the ratio of any particular decision is based on the facts of that particular case and cannot be made applicable to cases having a different factual matrix. Reliance in this regard may be placed on (a) Zee Telefilms Ltd. vs. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 638 (para 254); and (b) P.S. Sathappanvs. Andhra Bank Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 672 (paras 146-147).

(xiii) Reading of EC Conditions in context of MoP letter dated 30.05.2018, the Appellant-TSPL contends that Para 5.1.b of MoP letter must be read disjunctively since it refers to two contingencies. 91 Therefore, exception to Change in Law event carved out in this para will only apply to cases where such requirement of pollutions control system was (a) either mandated under the environment clearance of the plant, or (b) Or envisaged in any other bidding document/statute EXCEPT the environmental clearance. (Envisaging cannot be under the EC). This is because use of the word or before the expression envisaged otherwise necessitates a literal interpretation of the provision.

(xiv) PSPCL stated that MOEF Notification does not mandate installation of Selective Non Catalytic Reduction (SNCR) equipment. Recommendation Report of CEA dated 16.05.2018 issued by letter no. 44/FGD/UMPP/ CEA/ 2017/ 364 (CEA Report) does not provide for any specific technology for abatement of NOx. TSPL can meet the stipulated NOx emission limits with the existing technology. PSPCLs contention is devoid of merits.

(xv) The permissible limit of NOx within 300 mg/Nm3 (6% O2, dry basis) would not be achievable at part load and full load operation with above cited existing NOx control technology alone. To 92 implement the above NOx control systems (primary control and SNCR) to achieve compliance of MOEF new emission Norms, certain CAPEX, OPEX and shutdown of plant are required and the same has been detailed in the feasibility report of TCE.

(xvi) The Report of TCE is based on a detailed and in-depth inquiry into the impact of the NOx levels and correction methods necessary.

(xvii) Consequently, the installation of SNCR, in addition to combustion tuning is a mandatory prerequisite to bring NOx levels down to comply with the standards set by the MOEF Notification.

(xviii) SNCR installation which flows out as an obligation under the MOEF Notification qualifies as a change in law event and TSPL is entitled to compensation on account of the same.

(xix) Appellant-TSPL further contends the Honble Supreme Court in PTC India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CERC (2010) 4 SCC 603 held that provisions of the CBG is a sub-ordinate legislation, and can override contractual provisions. Further, TSPL made an effort to establish that (i) the EC procurement was incumbent on PSPCL and that (ii) the Punjab State 93 Commission wrongfully expanded the imputed knowledge on TSPL of a legal position that did not exist on the Cut-off date by observing that the bidders should have foreseen conditions regarding land and consents.

(xx) They also contend that TSPL duly satisfied PSPCL with respect to its concerns through letters dated 18.03.2017, 05.05.2017, 25.05.2017 and 23.06.2017 annexed as Annexure-13 in the Appeal. Further, it was only after discussions with PSPCL on 08.05.2017 and 07.06.2017, that TSPL discussed the matter with TCE to update its draft report. Subsequently, TCE submitted its final 'Feasibility Report to meet New Emission Regulations of MOEF' ("Feasibility Report") on 15.06.2017.

(xxi) Appellant-TSPL further contends that no straight-jacket formula can be annexed to fix a uniform cost towards expenditure to be incurred for setting up FGD equipment. The estimation must instead be made on a fact-to-fact basis and this is what CEA has been doing. TCE expert body had conducted a detailed study of TSPLs Project in addition to the general standard set by Central Electricity Authority 94 (CEA). TCEs Cost estimates were based on available information on the relevant date and no specific quotes were taken in relation to TSPL plant as the same was to be done after detailed engineering.

(xxii) According to Appellant-TSPL, it is noteworthy that the Environment Impact Assessment Report (EIA Report) as prepared by PSEB/PSPCL through their consultant and shared with bidders is a pre-condition to the grant of EC in the light of Clause 8 of the MOEF Notification dated 14.09.2006 bearing S.O. No. 1533 issued under sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986. TSPL, in its Appeal, has placed reliance on Chapter 6 of the said EIA Report titled Environmental Monitoring Programme. Therefore, the document is of considerable importance cannot be ignored.

(xxiii) According to the Appellant-TSPL, the moment a government instrumentality is involved, the concept of legitimate expectations kicks in. In the instant case, TSPL had a legitimate expectation that the general industry practice as (i) followed in various decisions of the Central Commission and (ii) aimed to achieve by the MOP by its letter dated 30.05.2018, would be followed even in this case. Additionally, 95 since the necessitated installation of (i) FGD equipment and (ii) SNCR equipment are pursuant to the MOEF Notification, the same shall be construed as change in law events.

(xxiv) Obtaining the EC was the sole responsibility of PSPCL as per the RFP, PPA and the various representations made by PSPCL. TSPL only came into the possession of the EC after the project had been transferred and the PPA had been executed. TSPL had no opportunity to examine the contents of the EC before submitting its bid.

(xxv) They further contend that a change in legal position during Operation Period, which shall have an adverse financial impact on the Project of TSPL (approximately to the extent of Rs. 45-50 Lakhs/MW on CAPEX (base nos. without taxes, duties etc.) as per CEA recommendation and additionally on OPEX), qualifies as a Change in Law in terms of the PPA. Further, the financial impact has been estimated by TSPL in line with the CEA report and as per recent orders placed by NTPC Ltd. for its own plants. 96 Rejoinder by NPL to the reply of 2nd Respondent:

10. (i) In terms of the extant rules and regulations prevalent at the time of the bid submission i.e., the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (EP Act) and the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 (EP Rules), there were no norms for SO2 and NOx emissions and that such norms were introduced for the very first time by way of the MoEF&CC Notification after the cut-off date. The Appellant is compelled to incur additional expenditure towards the installation of all the requisite equipment, which will have an impact on the operational parameters such as the Station Heat Rate as well as the Auxiliary Power Consumption etc.

(ii) The Appellant-NPL also contends that the said conditions in the Environmental Clearance granted to NPL only required the Appellant to provide for adequate space for installation of the FGD systems, which was duly complied with by the Appellant in terms of the land acquired by the Respondent No.2 prior to the submission of bids, as has rightly been noted by the Respondent Commission in paragraph 97 15(vi) of the Impugned Order. The intention behind incorporation of the said provisions could not have been to factor in the capital, operation and maintenance cost associated with installation of the FGD system and/or SNCR system as well.This becomes apparent from the review of Para 7.2.1 of the Feasibility Report prepared by NPL in May 2008.

(iii) Thus, even the Feasibility Report clarifies that the only requirement was to keep adequate space for installing FGD system at a later date if warranted under environmental regulations and accordingly, necessary space provision was made in the plant layouts.

(iv) Further, in addition to and without prejudice to the above, they stated as under: (a) Had NPL been in breach of the terms and/or conditions of the Environmental Clearance, on account of not earmarking the funds for FGD as part of environmental protection measures for 98 the Project, the MoFF&CC, Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and the Punjab Pollution Control Board (PPCB) would have definitely taken punitive and harsh actions against NPL rather than extending the Environmental Clearance and renewals. (b) No separate fund was ever earmarked for the purpose of installation of FGD and/or SNCR system and this fact was reported to MoEF&CC on a regular basis by way of submission of the periodical reports. Most importantly, the MoEF&CC never raised any objections regarding NPL not earmarking funds towards installation of the aforesaid pollution control equipment; (c) The environmental clearances, which the MoEF&CC was granting insofar as the installation of FGD system is concerned, were broadly of the following two categories viz. (a) the first category covered the projects which were given environmental clearances similar to that of NPL with the condition that a space provision is to be kept for the installation of the FGD equipment, if required at a later stage by the MoEF&CC and (b) the second 99 category included environmental clearances wherein the MoEF&CC had specially mandated the installation of FGD equipment as a statutory condition. Therefore, FGD was in fact a standard clause in the environmental clearances for majority of the power projects like the Project in the instant case. (d) The Respondent No.2 ought to have brought to the notice of the Respondent Commission, the presentation dated 09.09.2008 made by NPL (when it was wholly owned by PSEB) before the Expert Appraisal Committee (on the basis of which the Environmental Clearance dated 03.10.2008 was granted for the Project), which did not stipulate any earmarking of funds towards the installation of FGD. On the other hand, a total sum of Rs. 410.10 Crore (i.e., the amount mentioned in the Environmental Clearance granted for the instant Project towards environmental protection measures) had been earmarked towards environmental protection measures (item-wise). (e) Further, the Appellant-NPL contends that it is also significant to submit that since the Respondent No.2 had undertaken all the 100 preparatory activities including submission of all the documents/reports/presentations etc. for the purpose of obtaining the Environmental Clearance for the Project, it was incumbent upon Respondent No.2 to have disclosed all such documents to the Respondent Commission.

(iv) Appellant-NPL, therefore, reiterates that the aforesaid MoEF&CC Notification, which for the first time introduced the emission norms for SO2 and NOx and thereby, necessitated installation of FGD and/or SNCR/any other suitable technology after the Cut-off Date, is a Change in Law event in terms of Article 13 of the PPA.

(v) Respondent No.2, with the sole intent to obfuscate the issue at hand, has submitted that the Environmental Clearance granted for the instant Project required NPL to monitor the emission standards, inter alia, of SO2 and NOx and ensure that the same are within the prescribed limits. The Respondent No.2 has repeatedly stated denying that there were no norms at all for SO2 and NOx respectively, however, it has not stated anywhere that the emission norms for SO2 and NOx respectively prior to the Cut-off Dates. This 101 in itself demonstrates that the Respondent No.2 has no basis at all to counter the Appellants Change in Law claim. Further, during the period prior to the Cut-off Date, only the ambient air quality standards (ground level concentration) for SO2 and NOx gases were specified by CPCB which was/is known as NAAQ and the same is completely and significantly different from emission norms which were specified for the first time for SO2 and NOx, by way of issuance of the MoEF&CC Notification dated 07.12.2015.

(vi) The only requirement that the Environment Clearance necessitated to meet the NAAQ requirements for SO2 and NOx was to build a 275 m high chimney/stack, which was duly complied by the Appellant and nothing beyond that.

(vii) The new norms require the measurement of the SO2 and NOx emission respectively at the outlet of the Chimney/Stack of a power plant/industry etc. whereas the ambient air quality is measured in the outdoor/open air and that too near ground level, so as to ascertain impact on general population. It is relevant to highlight that in the Rapid EIA Report prepared by NPL (when it was wholly owned by 102 PSEB) for the Project prior to the Cut-off Date, the reference has been made only to the NAAQ standards in the Rapid EIA conducted for the Project which in itself clearly shows that there never existed any emission norms for SO2 and NOx respectively as on the Cut-off Date. Respondent No.2 ought to appreciate that while seeking Environment Clearance for the project logically and correctly deduced that there was no such requirement and therefore, did not include any cost for construction of FGD and SNCR in funds earmarked for environment management. Respondent No.2 has vaguely stated that NPL was also not permitted to use coal with greater than 0.5% sulphur content. The said averment of the Respondent No.2 does not explain the position qua the stipulation of SO2 emission standards as on the Cut-off Date. The condition relates to the quality of the coal to be used and not the emission levels of SO2.

(viii) It is significant to reiterate that the item-wise/head-wise break- up of the aforesaid Environmental Protection Measures does not reflect any cost earmarked towards the installation of FGD and only refers to the cost towards installation of ESP in context of air pollution control measures. 103

(ix) According to Appellant-NPL, all the aforesaid preparatory documents (including especially the Feasibility Report dated May 2008 referred in para 10 above) clearly stipulated that as per the then existing environmental laws, the only requirement was to keep adequate space for installing FGD system at a later date if warranted under environmental regulations and accordingly, the necessary space provision was made in the plant layouts by NPL (which was then owned by PSEB).

(x) They further contend that Respondent No.2 has wrongly placed reliance on the order of this Tribunal in the case of M/s JSW Energy Limited vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. & Anr. dated 21.01.2013 in Appeal No. 105 of 2011 (JSW Case). The various peculiar facts of the JSW Case have also been taken into account by the Learned Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) vide various orders. The aforesaid Commissions after taking into account the peculiar facts of the JSW Case have distinguished the respective cases with the JSW Case. 104

(xi) Appellant-NPL further contends that Respondent No.2 has not challenged the findings of the CERC in cases where they have allowed the Change in Law claims of the respective generators. It is not NPLs case that the said decisions are binding on this Tribunal. Further, NPL has placed reliance on the decisions of the CERC, MERC to highlight the fact that in similar Change in Law cases filed by similarly placed generators based on the MoEF&CC Notification, the respective Commission, taking specifically into account (a) the revised parameters for, inter alia, SO2 and NOx emissions introduced by the MoEF&CC Notification after the cut-off date(s) of the respective project(s); (b) the two conditions of keeping a space provision and earmarking of funds towards environmental protection measures; and (c) the judgment of this Tribunal in the JSW Case, had unambiguously laid down that the said MoEF&CC Notification qualifies as a Change in Law event in terms of the respective PPA(s). Further, Respondent No.2 is also one of the Respondents in the CGPL Case and the Sasan Case respectively wherein CERC has allowed the Change in Law claims raised by the aforesaid generating companies based on the MoEF&CC Notification. All 105 similarly placed persons are also entitled to get similar benefit principally.

(xii) According to the Appellant-NPL, the MOEF&CC Notification has necessitated the installation of SNCR/any other suitable NOx control equipment so as to achieve the stipulated emission norm of

300 mg/Nm3 for NOx. According to the Respondent No.2, the reduction in emission level of NOx is within the control of NPL by way of the existing combustion technology. The emission norms stipulated by the MoEF&CC Notification with respect to NOx cannot be achieved by the existing combustion control technologies even after suitable combustion tuning and optimization.

(xiii) To achieve the desired limit at all loads with the given range of coal allocated for the Project, SNCR technology with a minimum designed reduction efficiency of 35% is recommended. Even otherwise, the range of 336 to 405 mg/Nm3 is non-compliant with the prescribed limit of 300 mg/Nm3. Further the value of NOx mentioned as 560 mg/Nm3 @6% O2 dry basis of flue gas is based upon 106 stoichiometric formula. On a perusal of the excerpt from the TCE Report, it becomes abundantly clear that the Respondent No.2 is reading the TCE Report selectively and in isolation. Further, the Respondent No.2 has completely failed to appreciate that the MoEF&CC has introduced stricter emission norms for the purpose of strictly implementing such norms and accordingly, NPL cannot rely only on the NOx burners to control the NOx emission when it is clear that at part load with worst coal design, the likely NOx emissions of

336 to 405 mg/Nm3 will be significantly beyond the stipulated norm of

300 mg/Nm3.

(xiv) It is stated that CERC laid down that when the environmental clearance was made available to CGPL, there was no emission norms in the EP Rules, the requirement towards meeting new emission norms for NOx prescribed in the Notification qualifies as Change in Law under the PPA. Therefore, SNCR with reduction efficiency of 35% appears to be the most feasible retrofitted technology as is recommended by TCE for NPL to reduce the NOx level for all the operating ranges. Accordingly, NPL will have to incur 107 additional expenditure towards the installation of the SNCR technology / alternate technology as may be recommended by CEA in order to comply with the emission limits of NOx, in terms with the MoEF&CC Notification. In any event, specification of a technology by the CEA is not a pre-requisite for determining as to whether the aforesaid amendment by way of the MoEF&CC Notification amounts to a Change in Law event under the PPA or not as the clauses of the PPA are required to be interpreted independently for determining the issue of Change in Law.

(xv) Appellant-NPL further contends that the directions of the CPCB vide its letter dated 11.12.2017 and the pending litigation before the Honble Supreme to bring to the notice of this that both, the CPCB and the Honble Supreme Court are monitoring the timely compliance of the new emission norms specified in the MoEF&CC Notification by the Thermal Power Plants, including, the Appellants Plant. Moreover, in any event, it is quintessential that the issue of Change in Law be decided by this Tribunal as expeditiously as possible because without there being clarity on the pass through of the 108 additional cost to be incurred by the Appellant for implementing FGD and/or SNCR under the PPA, the banks/financial institutions are not ready to fund the project specifically in view of the well-known fact that banks as well as the large financial institutions are already having huge exposure to the power sector generating companies which are in financially distressed situations. In addition, there is a much needed requirement of regulatory certainty on this issue of Change in Law based on the MoEF&CC Notification as the CERC has already allowed the 'Change in Law claims based on the said Notification for the other similarly placed generating companies. In addition, the MERC and RERC have also held the aforesaid view. It is only the Respondent Commission/PSERC which has decided against the generating companies like the Appellant and thus, there is need to have regulatory certainty on this issue.

(xvi) According to Appellant-NPL, on one hand, the Respondents are not ready to consider the various judgments of the CERC which has clearly recognized the MoEF&CC Notification as a Change in Law event in cases of similarly placed generating companies selling 109 power under competitive bidding in terms of similar PPAs (as involved in the present case) where such judgments have relied upon the aforesaid letter dated 30.05.2018, however, on another hand, the Respondents are strongly relying upon the letter of the Ministry of Power issued to the Learned CERC under Section 107 of the Electricity Act, 2003 to deny NPLs claim that too by misinterpreting the contents of the letter. No such similar letter has been issued to the Respondent Commission by the State Government under Section

108 of the Electricity Act, 2003. This clearly establishes the dual standards being adopted by the Respondents in the present case.

(xvii) According to Appellant-NPL, Respondent No.2 has gravely misunderstood the expression TPPs where such requirement of pollution control system was mandated under the environment clearance of the plant or envisaged otherwise before the notification of amended rules in the Ministry of Powers letter dated 30.05.2018. Respondent No.2 has failed to understand that the expression or envisaged otherwise before the notification of amended rules can only refer to the requirement of pollution control system being 110 envisaged in any other document/statute except the environmental clearance. Therefore, the expression envisaged otherwise in para 5.1(b) should only be interpreted to mean envisaged in any document other than the environmental clearance. Analysis & Conclusion:

11. We have heard arguments of all the counsel at length through virtual hearing and gone through the written submissions filed by them in support of their contentions.

12. The Change in Law event in both the appeals, according to the Appellants, pertains to a standard that is to be maintained for emission of Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) and Nitrogen Oxide (NOx). They further contended that the environment clearance certificates granted for the commissioning of the respective plants of the Appellants, did not mandate installation/retrofitting of FGD, except requiring the Appellants to earmark/arrange only space for installation of FGD if required at a future date. Common argument in both the Appeals is to the effect that space, if required at a later stage would mean, there was no certainty about the 111 nature/devise/mechanism i.e., what type of FGD installation would be suggested or required at a later date. They also contend that if required at a later date also denote the uncertainty of such requirement i.e., such installation may be required or not, therefore, Appellants contend that installation of FGD system and the ear marking of funds towards such FGD cannot be taken as a condition/obligatory requirement in the bid prices. They also contend that though some funds were allocated towards measures to be taken for environmental protection in the bid price, item- wise details clearly indicate that funds allocated did not include cost of the FGD equipment since there was no requirement of FGD installation at that time. It is their stand that after seven years of the cut-off date, for the first time while revising the norms for SO2 and NOx as per notification of the concerned authority, the installation of FGD became a must requirement for the project. This is clear from the letter sent by CPCB dated 11.12.2017 wherein it refers to prescription of new emission norms for SO2 and NOx.

13. Both the Appellants contend that the requirement of installation of FGD pertaining to revised emission limits is change in law in terms of Article 13 of the PPA. Since the change in consent occurs after the cut-off 112 date by virtue of statutory promulgation, it is change in law event. According to Mr. Kapoor, the Appellant-TSPLs project was set up based on the instructions of PSEB under Case II type competitive bidding guidelines. Therefore, obligation of the procurer is very clear that all initial consents including environment clearance has to be arranged by procurer. Therefore, it was obligatory on the part of PSEB to indicate cost so far as FGD prior to cut-off date or even at a later stage. This fact is substantiated from the contents of project report given by procurer to the bidders at the stage of RPF. Since PSPCL/PSEB had the obligation to procure the environment clearance for the project (TSPL was incorporated as a Special Purpose Vehicle by PSEB on 05.04.2007 to develop and to commission the project), it was the responsibility of PSPCL/PSEB to secure environment clearance. The bid was submitted by Sterlite Energy Limited only based on the specific intimation and assurances made by PSEB, presently PSPCL. Accordingly, it was selected as the successful bidder. Emission limits of SO2 requiring FGD equipment installation was not prescribed by any law at that time i.e., 2008, therefore, no one including Appellants could visualize/anticipate possibility of revised/new norms being notified much later i.e., in the year 2015. For that matter, the Environment Clearance was 113 made available to TSPL only after the execution of SPA and PPA. Hence, question of TSPL (now owned Sterlite Energy Limited) objecting so far as the conditions in EC would not arise. They further contend that if the terms of contract were in a simple language and were clear without any ambiguity, the terms must be read as reflected in the contract. They also contend that change in law provision under PPA do not refer to any possible anticipation by parties. Therefore, the Respondent-Commission could not have imputed knowledge of new emission norms so far as TSPL is concerned. The circumstances existed at the time of bid did not indicate any such possible anticipation of revised norms is the stand of the Appellant-TSPL.

14. So far as FGD condition as termed in the EC, according to the Appellant, is only space if at all required in future has to be earmarked. For the first time, in pursuance of MoEF Notification dated 07.12.2015 followed by letter of CPCB dated 11.12.2017 installation of FGD was mandated as a condition. Therefore, funds which could be earmarked for existing environmental protection measures did not include cost towards FGD while earmarking 461 Crores of rupees towards environment protection. The 114 item-wise expenses towards environmental monitoring and equipment which was required in terms of norms existed at that time i.e., 2008 do not include cost of FGD. As per the new norms, FGD equipment itself is expected to cost about 1000 Crores in terms of recommendation of CEA in its report.

15. So far as clause (XXV) of EC, according to the Appellant, it does not refer to environment protection measure of FGD system. Clause (vi) only prescribes space to be kept for retrofitting of FGD if required and none of the provisions mandate earmarking of funds for FGD including EIA Report of 2008 prepared by PSEB.

16. Then coming to the letter of Ministry of Power dated 31.05.2018, according to Appellant, Para 5.1(b) of MoP letter refers to two contingencies i.e., either mandated under the environment clearance of the plant or envisaged in any other bidding document etc., except the environmental clearance before the date of Notification in question. The expression in the letter or otherwise envisaged otherwise would only mean envisaged in any document except environment clearance. 115

17. Coming to the observation of the Respondent-Commission pertaining to Judgment in JSW Energy Limiteds case, according to the Appellants, the said judgment cannot be applied to the facts of the present appeals. The main difference pointed out is Environment Clearance was issued in favour of JSW prior to the cut-off date. Responsibility to obtain Environment Clearance was with the JSW. They also in detail refer to several distinguishing facts in both the cases. They also point out observations of MERC in its Order dated 25.05.2011 pertaining to JSW judgment and so also the judgment of the Tribunal dated 21.01.2013.

18. The Appellant contends that different Commissions have given findings/treated differently so far as the impact of the MoEF Notification of 2015 and they narrate different orders. According to the Appellants, change in legal position during operation period, may have serious financial impact on the project of PSPCL, since change in law in terms of PPA in the present case clearly takes within its ambit the transition during the operation period, which affects the commercial aspect of the Appellants project seriously. They also contend that the Respondent-Commission 116 totally ignored various measures, like primary NOx control and secondary NOx control if required resulting in SNCR installation. Appellant further contend that Respondent-Commission failed to take note of scientific, technical reports and other data furnished by Appellants which justifies the requirement of SNCR equipment in order to meet NOx emission limits in terms of notification of MoEF. The initial EC of 2008 did not stipulate such compliance pertaining to NOx emission control system. Now the revised norms makes it mandatory to comply with the emission limits of NOx as well. But with the existing primary NOx control system, it is not possible. Since the said requirement is on account of Notification of MoEF in 2015, it is change in law, is the stand of the Appellant.

19. Arguments of learned counsel for Appellant-Nabha Power Limited is that since the terms of extant Rules and Regulations, which existed at the time of bid submission for the Project did not specify any norms for SO2 and NOx emissions, and such norms brought in nearly after six years for the first time, that too after the cut-off date in pursuance of MoEF and CC Notification of 2015, therefore, it amounts to Change in Law event in terms of Article 13. This introduction of new norms resulted in variance in the 117 conditions of several consents and approvals that were obtained for the Project, especially EC dated 03.10.2008 and so also consent to operate. The consequence of Change in Law event in question, as stated above, also results in change of cost of the environmental protection measures since new pollution control system like FGD and SNCR/other appropriate technology are mandated, and such installation of equipment involves huge additional cost for implementing the environmental management plan.

20. Learned senior counsel Mr. Poovayya arguing for Nabha Power Ltd. further contends that there is fundamental difference between emission norms of a particular gas vis-a-vis its ambient air concentration (ground level) NAAQ. The introduction of new norms for SO2 and NOx emissions at the outlet of the Chimney requires compliance measurement of the SO2 and NOx emissions, respectively, as compared to earlier ground level concentration of NAAQ. Therefore, installation of FGD/SNCR/any other suitable technology to comply with the mandate of new emission norms requires different mechanism. Therefore, 275 meter high chimney/stack, which was envisaged at the time of construction of the project for 118 measuring extant ambient air quality, which was mentioned in the EC obtained, will not be useful or will not cover the new emission norms of SO2 and NOx. FGD and SNCR system was not at all envisaged at that point of time. Therefore, even the environmental clearance certificate specifies that only a provision for space had to be kept for FGD, if such installation/retrofitting required at a later date cannot be construed to mean that FGD installation was envisaged and the cost of such FGD was included, therefore, learned counsel contends that the approach of the Respondent-Commission is totally erroneous. He also points out that the feasibility report prepared by Nabha Power Limited way back in 2008 also substantiates the fact that only adequate space must be kept for installation of FGD system at a later date if required under the Environmental Regulations.

21. He also contends that all preparatory documents have to be read, which were prepared by PSPCL for environmental clearance and the environmental clearance obtained for the project cannot be read in isolation. The Commission ought to have looked into the legal frame work under the scheme of the present project, which was conceived as it existed 119 way back in 2008. Even the approved terms of reference indicate that even the Environment Management Plan (EMP) should delineate such environmental protection measures that were required for the project along with item-wise cost of implementation of only such measures. The Report dated 09.09.2008 prepared by Nabha Power Limited demarcate the item- wise break-up of the measures along with the cost of such measures. However, no where it refers to funds being earmarked for the installation of FGD or SNCR. Even the Expert Appraisal Committee did not point out funds being not earmarked towards FGD installation while sending its recommendation. The earmarked amount of Rs. 410.10 Crores mentioned in the EC do not cover or earmark any funds towards FGD system for the purpose of controlling SO2 emissions. Similarly, it does not refer to any funds towards SNCR/any other suitable technology so far as measures to control NOx emissions. Therefore, Appellants stand is that Respondent- PSPCL had clear idea of the real purport of the applicable laws, guidelines for obtaining EC, hence except requirement of space provision, nothing further was certain, clear or mandated. 120

22. Learned counsel further contends that for failure of not earmarking funds for FGD as part of environmental protection measure for the project, if any, different authorities like MoEF and CC, CPCB and PPCB would have taken action against the Appellant. Therefore, Commission was not justified in saying MoEF and CC wanted to know only about the expenditure made on various environmental protection measures about earmarking of funds. To substantiate this contention, the Appellant refers to specific provision in the EC, which required the Appellant not only to allocate separate funds for implementation of environmental protection measures but also to provide item-wise break-up so also to provide half yearly reports to MoEF and CC on the expenditure of these funds.

23. According to learned senior counsel Mr. Poovayya while granting EC to thermal Projects prior to 2015, MoEF and CC were specifying two categories so far as installation of FGD system is concerned. According to learned counsel for the Appellant, Nabha Power Plant falls under the first category wherein only provision of space has to be accounted for in the EC. The second category covers such projects where MoEF and CC has provided/conditioned installation of FGD as a statutory requirement in the 121 environmental clearance i.e., wherever any thermal project or any associated assets of the project fell under ecologically sensitive areas such as Echo-Sensitive Zones, Coastal Regulation zones or other related environmental risks.

24. Therefore, the Commission failed to appreciate the provision for providing space only for the installation of FGD at a later date was in fact a standard clause in the environmental clearance for majority of the thermal power projects. Since the Appellant falls under first category, there is no such mandate for installation of the FGD equipment as stipulated in the case of second category.

25. Appellant stresses upon the argument that if relevant policy was announced much prior to the effective date but until and unless actual cause of action arises, law should not work on contemplation. Therefore, unless installation of FGD was a must at that point of time, it cannot be said FGD system was envisaged at that point of time. 122

26. Then coming to the reliance placed by Respondent-Commission on the order of this Tribunal in JSWs case, according to learned senior counsel Mr. Poovayya, Appellants case is based on the promulgation of 2015 notification six years after the cut-off date, which warrants installation of FGD/SNCR or suitable technology. But in the case of JSW, the installation of FGD was referred to in the second EC since first EC was granted conditionally. The Respondent-Commission, according to learned Senior Counsel, totally failed to appreciate the issues involved in the present case and the case of JSW since both cases do not have similar material facts. The Change in Law clause of PPA pertaining to JSW is entirely different to the PPA pertaining to Change in Law clause of the Appellant. The most important and relevant difference is the change in law event happening in the case of the Appellant on account of MoEF and CC notification. Therefore, JSW case cannot be an example for comparison with the Appellants case. Therefore, Appellants counsel contend that reliance of any particular principle out of context or in isolation of the facts cannot be accepted. 123

27. Learned counsel also contend that the impugned order has resulted in uncertainty. On the issue of Change in Law so far as Regulatory Commissions are concerned, some Commissions have laid down that Notification of MoEF 2015 qualifies as Change in Law in terms of PPA and some other Commissions have opined that it does not qualify as change in law event. Details of such orders are brought on record by the Appellant.

28. Learned counsel for the Appellant further contends that in the case of CERC, as stated above, against the PSPCL opining on similar question of law, however, Respondent No.2 has not challenged the said order in the case of CGPL and SASAN case respectively, therefore, Respondent No.2 cannot approbate and reprobate. According to the Appellant, Respondent No.2 is estopped from urging a plea to the effect that installation of FGD was envisaged. Placing reliance on Clause 5.5. of the PPA Appellant contends that Appellant was not responsible for obtaining initial consents including EC since both the project in question is Case-2 type (iv) scenario where the obligation to obtain initial consents completely is with the procurer i.e., PSPCL. If PSPCL did not contemplate installation of FGD at 124 that time and did not earmark funds for the same, now it cannot find fault with the Appellant contending that FGD was envisaged in the EC.

29. Learned senior counsel with regard to installation of SNCR/any other suitable NOx control equipment contends that specification of a technology by the CEA is not a pre-requisite for determining as to whether Notification of 2015 amounts to Change in Law event since various clauses of PPA had to be judiciously interpreted for determining the issue of Change in Law event. The Commission also failed to note that the NOx emission norms stipulated in 2015 Notification cannot be achieved with the existing combustion controlling technologies in spite of best tuning and optimization. The new NOx emission parameters would require installation of SNCR/any other suitable equipment or technology amounts to Change in Law event.

30. Then coming to the binding implication of Letter of MoP dated 30.05.2018, the argument of learned counsel for the Appellant is to the effect that the aforesaid letter is not at all binding on any judicial/quasi judicial authority meant to adjudicate any Change in Law claim. The Respondent-Commission is the authority to interpret the above said 125 Notification of 2015 by applying its mind independently. In the case of CGPL, CERC did refer to the Letter dated 30.05.2018, so also in Sasans Case, the CERC has analysed the ambit of condition stipulated in Para 5.1 (b) of the MoP letter in the right context and has expressed its opinion in favour of the generating companies. Case of the Appellant is also similarly placed. So far as compliance of some other parameters of 2015 Notification like particulate matter, mercury, water consumption etc., Appellant is not claiming Change in Law claims. The Appellant further contends that the instant claim of Change in Law would not vitiate bidding process as contended by the Respondent, since Notification of 2015 was notified after six years from the cut-off date and no other bidder would have contemplated promulgation of new norms for emission of SO2 and NOx. No other bidder possibly would have included funds for such installation of FGD and SNCR. When PSPCL itself did not earmark any funds in its reports and presentations to MoEF based on which EC was granted, the possibility of any other bidder including such task is remote, therefore, interest of no other bidder is prejudiced. 126

31. The gist of the arguments of Respondent No.2-PSPCL as argued by Ms. Ranjitha Ramachandran is as follows: Apart from amendment rules of 2015 in relation to SO2 and NOx, there are other norms which are not claimed as Change in law by the Appellants. Those emission norms are suspended particulate, mercury and water consumption. They also contend that if existing Law already imposes a condition, mere introduction of new norms towards the same condition, does not amount to Change in Law. This view is supported by the Letter of MoP dated 30.05.2018. In the Appeal of GMR Kamalanga, this Tribunal while referring to another letter of the MoP pertaining to taxes and duties, the same was considered. The letter of MoP clearly mean that the pollution control system which was either mandated or otherwise envisaged prior to the Notification of Amendment Rules of 2015, there is no Change in Law. This letter refers to Pollution Control System and not Emission Standard. Therefore, even if EC does not refer to installation of FGD, it may still envisage such installation and in such cases also it cannot be Change in Law. Since, the words mandate or envisage would mean one and the same, therefore, contention of the Appellants that unless other 127 documents refer to word envisaged, it does not amount to Change in Law cannot be accepted. If interpretation leads to absurd result, then such interpretation cannot be accepted. Therefore, the only relevant consideration is whether the Pollution Control System was already envisaged prior to Amended Rules of 2015 is to be seen. The interpretation of letter of MoP by the State Commission is justified is the stand of the Respondents. So also they contend that Commission was justified in placing reliance on the judgment of the Tribunal in the case of JSW Energy Limited. Therefore, the EC issued to Appellants did envisage FGD system. Therefore, arguments of the Appellant that it envisaged only space for FGD system cannot be accepted.

32. Pertaining to argument of Appellants that EC refers to the word if required has to be understood as already envisaged, as held in JSW case, hence, the distinguishment of facts of the present appeals and case of JSW are irrelevant and inconsequential. The revised norms only confirmed subsequently the requirement of FGD. They further contend that issue is not the responsibility of who should obtain EC. But it is conditions envisaged in the EC, that are relevant. Terms and conditions have to be 128 complied with by the project developer including all consents and approvals. Therefore, Respondent No.2-PSPCL has no obligation of obtaining such approvals and consents as contended by the Appellants except the liability of paying the agreed tariff. This fact is substantiated from Clause 5.5 of PPA so also 3.1.2(i), therefore, the Appellants are responsible at all times for renewal of the initial approvals and consents including EC. The question is whether revised norms become Change in Law? Therefore, revision of environment rules resulting in FGD equipment will not take away the basis/basic principle for the decision in JSW Case. As long as the original EC already envisaged the FGD, subsequent confirmation of the same is not a Change in Law, therefore, contention of the Appellants that only if the FGD was already envisaged prior to 2015 amendment then in terms of letter of MoP, there is no Change in Law, cannot be accepted.

33. They also contend that the absence of additional safeguards in these appeals like that of JSW cannot be linked to requirement of space provision or installation of FGD. As on the cut-off date, no specific measures were provided in the case of JSW, but in the above Appeals a specific equipment 129 being FGD was recognized. In the case of JSW requirement of FGD was not referred to as additional safeguard measure due to the study being conducted regarding impact on Alphonso Mangoes and Marine Fisheries. The project in JSW undertook to comply with additional safeguarding measures if required.

34. It is further contended that like all other project proponents Appellants also agreed to comply with the conditions for the EC and the EC implied that FGD would be installed subsequently when confirmed.

35. They further refute the contention of the Appellants that since JSW project was in ecologically sensitive area, safeguard measures were undertaken after detailed study cannot be accepted, since the documents indicate activities in CRZ area but for the water intake and channel which connects CRZ power plant to the sea.

36. They further contend that if the reason for provision of FGD in JSW Case was the applicable threshold limit for Sulphur Dioxide, then there was no reason for NPL to have a similar condition for FGD. 130

37. Difference in the clause of PPA with regard to change in law in the present Appeals and JSW case, has no relevance.

38. The letter of MoP dated 30.05.2018 clearly indicate that if FGD was envisaged prior to 2015, then there is no change in law. Similar conditions of JSW case are noticed in the case of NPL, therefore EC does envisage FGD.

39. Pertaining to contention of Appellants with regard to capital cost, the 2nd Respondent contends that an amount of Rs.8000 crores for TSPL is only an estimate, since the project was not yet established, therefore, actual cost may differ. The capital cost estimate in the case of JSW and the Appellant-TSPL is comparable, is the stand of the 2nd Respondent. In fact, Rs.461 crores was for environment protection measures at the rate of Rs.4.0 crores per MW when compared to the case of JSW, which was Rs.3.75 crores per MW.

40. Similarly, in case of Appellant-NPL, total cost of Rs.5500 crores include Rs.410.10 crores towards environment protection measures i.e., Rs.4.16 crores per MW. 2nd Respondent further contends that both the 131 Appellants projects did not include cost of FGD but in the case of JSW, cost of FGD was included.

41. 2nd Respondent contends that the basis for the Tribunals opinion in the case of JSW was that the original EC required demarcation of space for FGD which include earmarking of funds, therefore EC already envisaged FGD, hence subsequent revision of emission rules do not amount to change in law. The same principle would apply to the facts of the present Appeals, even if distinguishable facts are noticed as contended by the Appellants.

42. Installation of FGD by the Appellant is part of the terms and conditions of EC, therefore any failure on the part of the Appellants not providing funds, the Appellants must be blamed for the same. Appellants cannot take advantage of their own wrong in not providing funds for FGD installation.

43. Pertaining to earmarking of funds, the obligation was on the Appellants to earmark funds for FGD installation. They are not correct in 132 contending that since environment authorities did not raise any objection for not earmarking funds, their obligation cannot be absolved. In this regard, 2nd Respondent further contends that MoEF had only sought details on expenditure and not earmarking of funds. The Appellants were to report year-wise expenditure in terms of EC conditions. This fact was also noticed by the State Commission by noting that the expenditure statements with regard to funds spent on environment protection measures did not refer to funds earmarked for FGD.

44. 2nd Respondents counsel contends that Appellants are not justified in placing reliance on the decisions of other Regulatory Commissions since those findings are not binding on this Tribunal. In these Appeals, the Tribunal has to consider the correctness of the impugned decision.

45. Pertaining to directions given by CPCB with regard to revised rules of 2015, it is the stand of the 2nd Respondent that those directions are only referred and they are not relevant, since they are all general directions. The contents of the letter from CPCB are generic in nature and such letters were addressed to many generators. Therefore, they did not refer to the EC of the generator who would have different conditions. This generic 133 letter of CPCB cannot be taken into account is the stand of the 2nd Respondent.

46. According to 2nd Respondent, since many other bidders participated in the bid for the projects in question, now the Appellants cannot take a different stand, since the same would disturb the sanctity of the bid.

47. According to 2nd Respondent, since the Appellants were required to provide space for FGD, they were well aware of the kind of space which is required based on the existing FGD in the market, since FGD was available even in 2008 and 2009 and there is nothing on record to show that such FGD is different from what is to be installed subsequent to revised norms of emission. Many other plants, in fact had installed FGD prior to 2015 norms. Power plants like Adani Power Ltd. and JSW Energy Ltd. did have this FGD installation when there were no norms or parameters and the only requirement was to install FGD. This means that those two power plants were able to install since it was available in the market and the experts knew about it. Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd. did install FGD prior to 2015 for units 7 to 9, but did not claim any change in law compensation due to 134 upgradation of FGD after 2015 norms. Therefore, FGD which was envisaged prior to 2015 and post 2015 are one and the same.

48. So far as contention of proposal during environment impact assessment, it was PSEB who made proposal, then it was only a proposal and not final decision. The final decision would be to include such conditions in the EC.

49. The presentation made on 09.09.2008 given by PSPCL to Expert Committee of MOEF was much prior to EC in favour of the Appellant-NPL dated 03.10.2008. What is required to be considered now is whether EC did envisage FGD or not, therefore, presentation is irrelevant.

50. 2nd Respondent contends that EC in the case of NPL was very much in existence as on the cut-off date i.e., 02.10.2009, therefore reference to various documents as relied upon by the Appellant-NPL is of no consequence. So far as Appellant-TSPL, the Appellant was aware as on the cut-off date that the project requires various consents and clearances and the environment authorities were entitled to impose terms and conditions for such clearance. Therefore, Appellant-TSPL did know that 135 EC is a must in terms of EIA Notification of 2006. Therefore, there is no scope for any absolute and unconditional EC, is the contention of the 2nd Respondent.

51. Coming to the letter of MoP dated 30.05.2018, since FGD was envisaged prior to 2015, there is no change in law in terms of MoP letter.

52. Coming to the objections pertaining to claims of CGPL and Sasan Power Ltd. with regard to FGD issue, the 2nd Respondent did object the claim for change in law in these two projects also. Mere fact of not filing Appeals against the orders of CERC pertaining to those two power plants cannot become an estoppel as claimed by the Appellants. It is not hit by principles of res judicata.

53. Pertaining to NOx controls, the claim of the Appellants that installation of SNCR to control NOx amounts to change in law is not correct, since the projects of the Appellant are already equipped with low NOx burners prior to 2015 norms.

54. So far as TSPL in the diagram for existing system, TSPL has failed to show the existing low NOx burners. Therefore, the TSPL is already 136 equipped with the above measures and it does not require to install any new measures in terms of the revised norms. Even the feasibility report submitted to State Commission, which is on record, states that the existing units are equipped with combustion controlling technology of low NOx burners and the claim is only for installation of SNCR.

55. Coming to the case of NPL, this power plant also has low NOx burners and the Appellant-NPL has only claimed SNCR installation. At present, there is no direction for installation of SNCR by any concerned authority. As on today, direction was for low NOx burners with Over Fire Air. Therefore, the Commission was justified in not considering the issue of SNCR at this stage. Even otherwise in terms of the letter of MoP, both the Appellants cannot claim any cost related to prudent and efficient operation of the existing equipment. Both Appellants are required to act as per prudent utility practices in terms of PPA.

56. In the case of CGPL, the CERC asked CGPL to consult CEA for finalizing technology with regard to NOx issue. The CEA report did not indicate recommendation for SNCR at this stage, therefore considering SNCR would not arise. According to 2nd Respondent both the Appellants 137 have exaggerated emissions so far as NOx. If proper coordinated operations are taken up by the Appellants, the emissions so far as NOx can be reduced, is the contention of the 2nd Respondent. Therefore, the combustion technology which already exists must be maintained in a prudent manner. Therefore, there is no impact at present and therefore, there is no change in law as on today. OUR CONCLUSIONS

57. It is not in dispute that on 19.01.2005, MoP issued competitive bidding guidelines for determination of tariff by bidding process. The relevant clauses are 3.2 and 4.7 relied upon by both the Appellants with reference to Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment and also Environment Clearance before PPA became effective. The said clauses read under:

3. Preparation for inviting bids 3.2 (I) In order to ensure timely commencement of supply of electricity being procured and to convince the bidders about the irrevocable intention of the procurer, it is necessary that various project preparatory activities are completed in time. For long-term 138 procurement for projects for which pre-identified sites are to be utilized (Case 2), the following project preparatory activities should be completed by the procurer, or authorized representative of the procurer, simultaneously with bid process adhering to the milestones as indicated below: .

(ii) Environmental clearance for the power station: Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report should be available before the publication of RFQ. Requisite proposal for the environmental clearance should have been submitted before the concerned administrative authority responsible for according final approval in the Central/ State Govt., as the case may be, before the issue of RFP. Environmental clearance should have been obtained before PPA becomes effective. "4. 7: Any Change in Law impacting cost or revenue from the business of selling electricity to procurer with respect to the law applicable on the date which is 7 days before the last date for RFP Bid submissions shall be adjusted separately. "

58. TSPL was incorporated as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) owned and controlled by PSEB to develop and establish a thermal power plant having 1800 +/- 10% MW capacity referred to as project. So also the Appellant-NPL was incorporated as Special Purpose Vehicle completely owned by PSEB.

59. Apparently, RFQs were issued in terms of the above notifications on behalf of the 2nd Respondent-PSPCL (erstwhile PSEB). Admittedly, Sterlite 139 Energy Ltd. submitted the bid on 23.06.2008 and the cut-off date is 16.06.2008. The said Sterlite Energy Ltd. became successful bidder. At that point of time, the environmental norms as protection measures so far as thermal plants were to be in terms of Rule 3 Schedule-1 of the Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986. Subsequently, the said Sterlite Energy Ltd. acquired 100% shareholding in TSPLs company at Mansa Talwandi Sabo Road in the district of Mansa.

60. It is not in dispute SPA and PPAs came into existence on 01.09.2008 between TSPL and erstwhile PSEB for sale of power from 1980 MW thermal plants.

61. The Appellant-NPL is operating 1200 thermal power project near Village Nalash in Patiala district of Punjab. Initially it was a SPV company set up by PSEB now referred to as PSPCL. Subsequently, the entire shareholding of NPL transferred to L&T Power Development Limited. This Appellant also became a successful bidder in terms of the competitive bidding guidelines. At present, the entire management of the Appellant- NPL is with L&T Power. 140

62. 2nd Respondent-PSPCL carries on the generation and distribution business of erstwhile PSEB. The case of both Appellants is Case-2 type

(iv) Scenario. Both the Appellants (SPVs) were directed by PSEB to act as its authorized representatives for carrying out pre-bid obligations, such as environment clearance, acquiring land, forest clearance etc. 2nd Respondent appointed PFC as its consultant who in turn appointed DPL as its sub-consultant to undertake the necessary activities for completing prerequisites in respect of EC for the project of NPL. In response to application of the Appellant-NPL (when it was completely owned by erstwhile PSEB) to MOEF&CC for the purpose of determination of terms of reference, a feasibility report was prepared and apparently this report only refers to requirement of keeping adequate space for installing FGD system at a later date, if warranted under environmental regulations. It seems accordingly, necessary space was provided in the lay out while preparing the plans for the projects of the Appellant. Final rapid EIA was also submitted.

63. Several correspondences seem to have been made between Expert Appraisal Committee before whom Appellant-NPL made a detailed 141 presentation for grant of EC. Aggregate fund of Rs.410.10 Crores was earmarked for environmental protection measures and so far as TSPL an amount of 460 crores was earmarked. Apparently, no separate fund was provided for installation of FGD for both the projects. The item-wise breakup only refer to Electrostatic Precipitator (ESP) for the purpose of pollution control measures. Subsequently, on the recommendation of the Expert Appraisal Committee, EC was granted on 03.10.2008 to Appellant- NPL and the total cost of the project was Rs.5500 crores. Subsequently, NPL issued the RFQ and ultimately L&T Power was declared as successful bidder. The cut-off date so far as NPL is 02.10.2009.

64. Admittedly, MOEF amended Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 in the year 2015 for thermal power plants. For different plants depending upon the date of commissioning of the projects, different norms were fixed. In terms of this revised standards of emission and the level of water consumption for all coal based thermal power plants, these revised rules would apply. In other words, the thermal power plants which are already operating and new thermal power plants are required to comply with the new environmental norms introduced through the notification dated 142 07.12.2015. It introduced new emission norms of Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) and Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx) so also Mercury. Both the Appellants are required to adhere to new/revised norms of emissions in respect of SO2 and NOx.

65. It is not in dispute that thermal power plants of both the Appellants were commenced between 2004 and 2016. In terms of the notification, thermal plants had to comply with the norms stated below.

66. In terms of this notification of 2015, the new emission limits for SO2 required installation of Flue Gas Desulphurization (FGD). It also required primary or secondary NOx control measures including Selective Non Catalytic Reduction (SNCR) equipment. According to the Appellant, the above requirements were not contemplated in law at the time of bidding by both the Appellants. As on the cut-off date, the law in terms of Rule 3, Schedule 1 of the Environment (Protection) Rules of 1986 so far as thermal power plants, did not indicate such emission limits so far as SO2 and NOx. The emission norms applicable before and after the cut-off date for all thermal power plants are tabulated as under: 143

Summary of Norms to be complied for Environment Protection Measures as per regulations applicable on various dates S. No. Parameters As on bid cut-off date (16.6.2008) As on EC date d 11.0 7.20 08. MOEF Notification No. S.O. 3305 (E) dated 7.12.2015*

1. Particulate matter(mg/Nm3)

150 (For generation capacity 210 MW or more)

50 50

2. SO2 (mg/Nm3) No limit specified in Applicable Regulation No limit speci fied in Appli cable Regu latio n

200 (500 MW and above)

3. NOx (mg/Nm3) 300 (500 MW andabove)

4. Mercury (mg/Nm3) 0.03 5 Specific water consumption (m3/MWh) 3.5

67. All the power plants were to comply with the emission norms within a time frame.

68. From the above table, it is clear that the then existing norms applicable to the Appellants power plants, so also pollution control measures as on the cut-off date got altered substantively. One has to see whether Appellants for that matter any other generator could contemplate 144 in 2007 or 2008 at the time of bid the necessity for new system and the cost for the same.

69. It is noticed that as on the cut-off date, there was no standard norm applicable so far as SO2 and NOx. After almost 7 years from the cut-off date, the requirement of FGD installation pertaining to SO2 occurred.

70. In the case of Appellant-TSPL, EC was granted to PSEB owned SPV after the cut-off date. In the case of Appellant-NPL, EC was granted again to PSEB owned Special Purpose Vehicle NPL.

71. The Appellant-TSPL contends that EC was made available to TSPL (as a subsidiary of SEL) only after signing PPA.

72. According to Appellant-NPL, the EC was already issued prior to cut- off date to SPV-NPL completely owned by PSEB.

73. In both the cases, the competitive bidding guidelines are one and the same. Both are Case-2 type (iv) scenario bidding. Relevant clauses are already mentioned above. 145

74. Since in both the Appeals, it was Case-2 type (iv) scenario bidding process, all obligations are to be procured and arranged by the distribution company. As against this, 2nd Respondent contends that no doubt, such obligations including EC is the responsibility of the procurer, but the conditions mentioned in the EC did envisage installation of FGD and the same was confirmed by notification of MOEF in 2015. On this issue whether the Appellants are justified or the 2nd Respondent is correct has to be seen.

75. In the case of Appellant-TSPL in terms of Clause 1.7 of RFQ, TSPL (then owned and controlled by PSEB) was obliged to obtain the EC before signing the Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with the successful bidder after contemplating several activities like acquiring land for the power plant, fuel linkage, tying up water linkage and also obtaining EC. All these have to be completed before signing the documents with the successful bidder. It was to enable the bidder to calculate tariff which was to be made at the stage of RFP, since the above activities require expenditure which will be included in the project cost. Thereafter, RFP would be issued to qualified bidder. In terms of Clause 1.4 of RFP, the SPV of PSEB was required to 146 submit proposal for EC to MOEF within the time prescribed. Clause 2.7.2 of the RFP requires the successful bidder to only examine the law and regulations which are prevalent at that time in India. Therefore, in terms of RFP the rights and obligations of PSEB which owned and controlled the Appellants and all decisions taken by them prior to SPA and PPA are of binding nature. Therefore, all decisions and obligations arising out of such decisions would be the responsibility of the procurer (then PSEB) now the 2nd Respondent-PSPCL.

76. Similarly, Appellant-NPL place on record details of pre-bid obligations pertaining to the project like EC, land acquisition were undertaken as authorized representative of 2nd Respondent-PSPL (erstwhile PSEB). When Appellant-NPL made application to MOEF&CC for determination of terms of reference to prepare draft environment impact assessment report which included environment management plan, it referred to three protection measures required to be undertaken to reduce impact of the power project on environment. At that point of time, NPL was completely owned by PSEB. This was brought to the notice of Expert Appraisal Committee constituted by MOEF&CC during the presentation. The said 147 presentation demonstrated that total fund of Rs.410.10 crores was earmarked for environmental protection measures which was part of the power project cost. The item-wise break-up apparently did not reflect any fund earmarked towards the installation of either FGD pertaining to SO2 or SNCR system pertaining to NOx. The item-wise breakup only reflects the cost towards installation of Electrostatic Precipitator (ESP) with reference to air pollution control measures. The break-up provided by NPL in its presentation dated 09.09.2008 demonstrates this fact as under

RAJPURA THERMAL POWER PROJECT (NABHA POWER LIMITED) S. No.- xxxiv EMP to mitigate the adverse impacts due to the project along with item wise cost of its implementation (Contd) Response: Cost of environmental protection measures (Rs. Lakhs) S. No. Aspect Recurring Cost per annum Capital Cost (in lacs)

1 Air Pollution Control (ESP) 3,300 20,000

2 Water Pollution Control 1,320 10,000

3 Noise Pollution Control - Included in equipment cost

4 Environment Monitoring and Management

50 1000

5 Reclamation borrow/mined area NA -

6 Occupational Health 26 9250

7 Greenbelt 25 500

8 Others (pl. specify) 25 260 148

77. From the above facts it is clear that the approved terms of reference upon which EMP was prepared for the project indicated only those environment protection measures required to be undertaken for the project at that time along with item-wise cost of implementation of such measures which are mentioned above. But, there was no mentioning of FGD or SNCR in these protection measures. The item-wise breakup also did not include any funds earmarked for installation of FGD or SNCR. Similarly, Expert Appraisal Committee while recommending for issuance of EC in favour of the Appellant-NPL, it did not state anything with regard to earmarking of funds towards installation of FGD system to control SO2 emission or SNCR system to control NOx emission. The amount of Rs.410.10 crores as cost to be spent for the above mentioned specific environmental protection measures is based on the report, documents etc. submitted by the PSEB owned NPL much prior to taking control of the power plant project by the present Appellant-NPL.

78. So far as Appellant-TSPL, as stated above till 01.09.2008, the obligation to obtain EC was with the SPV, which was owned by PSEB, including the details and information required for the same. Subsequent to 149 SPA dated 01.09.2008, 100% of the shares of TSPL were duly transferred to SEL. Thereafter on the very same day, PPA came to be entered into between Appellant-TSPL and PSEB (present PSPCL).

79. It is also relevant to mention that in terms of PPA pertaining to both the Appeals as defined, authorized representative shall mean TSPL and NPL the body corporate created/authorized by PSEB to carry out the bid process for the selection of the successful bidder. In terms of Article 1.1 of PPA, initial consents shall mean as listed in Schedule 2 of the PPA which includes EC. Therefore, authorized representative of PSEB i.e., the then TSPL and NPL were under the obligation to obtain initial consents which includes EC. These have to be made available to seller of the power on the effective date in terms of PPA. Therefore, in terms of Article 4.1.1(a) and 5.5 of the PPA, all consents except the initial consents, the seller is responsible. In other words, it means the seller is responsible only for maintaining/review of the initial consents and fulfilling all terms and conditions, if specified therein. Therefore, in terms of PPA, the procurer is obliged to fulfill all conditions undertaken by them. 150

80. In both the above Appeals, it is seen that SPVs were created and ECs were obtained by SPVs when they were fully owned and controlled by the erstwhile PSEB i.e., the present 2nd Respondent-PSPCL.

81. The contention of the Appellants is that in the ECs issued by MOEF&CC, none of the terms and conditions required the Appellants to earmark separate funds for installation of FGD or SNCR which are indicated in the revised norms issued in the notification of MOEF&CC in the year 2015.

82. According to Appellants, all conditions in the ECs were duly complied with which were regularly verified by Punjab Pollution Control Board so also Central Pollution Control Board. It is also noticed that even Environment Impact Assessment Report did not specify the requirement of the installation of FGD equipment or any fund to be earmarked for the said purpose.

83. The Appellant-TSPL appointed TCE as its consultant for the purpose of evaluating various aspects of compliance norms fixed by MOEF. The Appellant-TSPL intimated 2nd Respondent about the revised norms issued 151 by MOEF resulting in change in law event and requested 2nd respondent to compensate them in terms of PPA. Similar is the case of Appellant-NPL. After obtaining final feasibility report from TCE, TSPL submitted the same to the 2nd Respondent stating that a significant additional expenditure is required to achieve the revised emission norms and the expenditure approximately was Rs.2.31 crores per MW which included CAPEX and OPEX as capitalized for 20 years. Thereafter, the Appellant approached the Respondent-Commission under Section 86(1)(b) of the Act.

84. Appellant-NPL also approached the Respondent-Commission seeking a declaration that the revised emission norms by way of amended rules notified on 07.12.2015 by MOEF&CC amount to change in law and also sought approval of the additional cost for the project so as to ensure timely implementation to comply with the revised norms. Ministry of Power constituted Northern Regional Power Committee which had set a deadline as 31.12.2022 for implementing FGD and other system in the country. In terms of recommendation of CEA, the thermal plants have to comply with the directions and PSPCL was to produce yearly average SO2 and NOx data. 152

85. Meanwhile, CPCB issued a letter dated 11.12.2017 directing all the thermal units to meet emission limit of Particulate Matter and install FGD to comply with SO2 emission limits. They also directed installation of NOx burners which provide Over Fire Air to achieve progressive reduction. Meanwhile, MoP on the recommendation of CEA pertaining to installation of FGD to comply with the revised Environment Rules of 2015 issued mechanism for implementation of new environmental norms for thermal power plants supplying power to DISCOMs which were concluded by long term and medium term PPAs. According to Appellant-NPL, based on the feasibility report, they informed that they require 36 months from the date of award of contract to install the new technology solution, since the terms and conditions imposed by CPCB letter dated 11.12.2017 were extremely stringent.

86. The Respondent-Commission disallowed the claim of Appellants so far as change in law claim by opining that the revised emission norms issued by MOEF notification did not qualify as change in law event in terms of Article 13 of the PPA. 153

87. We have to now examine whether the Respondent-Commission was justified in opining that the notification in question does not qualify as a change in law event, since it opines that the EC conditions did envisage installation of FGD system and the present revised norms of 2015 and allied directions are only confirmation of the conditions already envisaged in the EC issued to the Appellants. This view of the Commission is supported by 2nd Respondent-PSPCL on various grounds which are already stated in the above paras.

88. Then coming to the opinion of the Respondent-Commission pertaining to each issue, we proceed to analyse in the paragraphs below. The relevant controversy pertaining to ECs issued to Appellants dated 11.07.2008 and 03.10.2008 and relevant conditions are as under: vi) Space provision shall be kept for retrofitting of FGD, if required at a later date.

(xxv) Separate funds shall be allocated for implementation of environmental protection measures along with item-wise breakup. These cost shall be included as part of the project cost. The funds earmarked for the environment protection measures shall not be diverted for other purposes and year-wise expenditure should be 154 reported to the Ministry.

89. It is seen that the revised emission norms of 2015 requiring compliance of new mechanism/new system for the purpose of pollution control i.e., like FGD or SNCR is altogether different from what was in existence as on the cut-off date, which is clear from the table referred to above. As on the cut-off date, as pointed out by the Appellant - NPL only the ambient air quality standard at ground level concentration both for SO2 and NOx gases as indicated by CPCB was in existence. In order to maintain the required concentration in ambient air quality for SO2 in terms of required standard, it was 80 ug/m3 (annual average) and 120 ug/m3 (24 hrs average). This was required to be maintained as on the cut-off date. So also the concentration for NOx was 80 ug/m3 (annual average) and 120 ug/m3 (24 hrs average). To maintain this, NPL was required to build 275 meters high chimney/stack and this was stipulated in the environment clearance and there is no dispute that this was not complied with.

90. The new norms for SO2 and NOx emissions are introduced at the outlet of the chimney while existing norms required emission of a particular 155 gas vis--vis its ambient air concentration/ground level concentration. Therefore, there is vast difference between what was in existence at the time of cut-off date and the revised norms. Whether this change or difference between the two norms/standards would become Change in Law event has to be seen. From the documents mentioned above, definitely environmental clearance issued for the project did not envisage installation of the FGD or SNCR system and/or any other suitable technology. The same became a requirement to be complied with on account of promulgation of Notification in question, six years after the cut-off date in both the Appeals. The environmental clearance granted to the Appellants, as stated above, in terms of condition (vi) space provision had to be kept for FGD if such installation/retrofitting is required at a later date. This condition is read along with the feasibility report and other initial documents, the installation of FGD at a later date becomes mandatory requirement only if new norms are brought in as environmental regulations. The new norms in question which general in nature becomes statutory mandate for the Appellants when notification came into existence. Condition (xxv) as stated above required earmarking of funds item-wise in respect of those environmental protection measures on the basis of which 156 environmental clearance was granted and the same would be part of the project cost. It is relevant to point out that unlike condition (vi) for space provision for FGD installation/retrofitting if required at a later date, several other measures are required to be complied with. Therefore, condition (xxv) with reference to funds means such other protection measures other than FGD installation or SNCR. Apparently, Respondent-Commission failed to consider the environmental clearance conditions in the right perspective. This is substantiated by the contents of feasibility report at 7.2.1, which was prepared by the then NPL in 2008 (when it was completely owned by PSEB), which says the only requirement in respect of FGD was to keep adequate space for installing/retrofitting FGD system at a later date, if warranted under environmental Regulations. From this we presume that the then PSEB understood that the then existing laws at the time of submitting various reports prior to cut-off date required only adequate space for FGD, which is complied with by the Appellants.

91. The Condition (xxv) of the environmental clearance cannot be read in isolation or one has to read it in the context of the entire process, 157 preparatory documents and other reports, which were the basis for issuance of environmental clearance.

92. As stated above, Respondent No.2 - procurer intended to develop the projects in question under Case 2 type scenario bidding.

93. The amounts earmarked by both the Appellants for implementing environmental protection measures had to be spent only for such measures as contained in the ECs or other documents prior to notification in question. It was not possible for the Appellants, for that matter, any other generator, in the absence of any standard norms for SO2, to imagine the installation of FGD system so as to include cost towards the same. In the absence of any certainty about the required system for such emission norms, one cannot demarcate funds with certainty. If such funds are demarcated in the absence of norms, then also it is quite likely that such cost would be rejected on the ground that there is no requirement for such mechanism at that point of time.

94. Respondent No.2-PSPCL (the then PSEB procurer) did not propose requirement of installation of FGD and/or SNCR system or any other 158 suitable technology for SO2 and NOx respectively. Therefore, the presumption is that Respondent No.2 knew the real purport of the then existing laws for obtaining environmental clearance, hence, in the preparatory documents it did not earmark any funds towards FGD. In such a situation, Respondent No.2 is estopped from taking altogether a different stand now.

95. MoEF & CC from time to time would promulgate several environmental protection measures. These norms/standards have to be complied with by all the thermal power projects. The Central Pollution Control Board and the Punjab Pollution Control Board are the monitoring agencies to verify such compliance of the conditions mentioned in the environmental clearances. When revised norms were brought in by MoEF & CC in the year 2015, almost after two years i.e, in the year 2017, CPCB directed the Appellants to comply with the revised norms, mentioned above, in terms of Notification of 2015.

96. After issuance of environmental clearance, the CPCB and PPCB had to monitor whether the Appellants have complied with the conditions mentioned therein or not. Apparently, at no point of time, Appellants were 159 found fault with for not installing FGD so also for not earmarking of funds for FGD. Admittedly, both the Appellants did provide space for FGD installation. In all the six to seven years, these two authorities, who consistently and periodically monitored the power plants of the Appellants did not point out either non-installation of FGD or not earmarking of any funds for the same. There is no dispute that periodically the Appellants are submitting the reports to MoEF & CC. None of these reports refer to expenditure towards FGD and/or SNCR. No objection by any authority was raised on this aspect. This would support the case of the Appellants that there was no need to earmark cost of installation of FGD or SNCR except providing space for FGD. If Appellants committed any default of the conditions, the environmental clearance would not be renewed from time to time. Similarly, the Pollution Control Board would not renew the consent to operate the power plants. Therefore, it is clear that none of the concerned authorities ever pointed out any breach of the conditions.

97. It is also seen that the environmental clearance granted by MoEF & CC for thermal power projects prior to revised norms of 2015 with reference to installation of FGD system broadly categorized into two types. One 160 category covers the projects which were given environmental clearances similar to that of the Appellants envisaging a condition that a space provision is to be kept for the installation of the FGD equipment if required at a later stage in terms of environmental Regulations. The other category of environmental clearance is where MoEF & CC specifically mandated installation of FGD equipment as a statutory requirement.

98. Apart from the Appellants, between 2007 and 2008 two other power projects i.e., Corporate Ispat Alloys Limited in Jharkhand and Rayalseema Thermal Project were also required to keep only space provision for retrofitting of FGD unit if required at a later stage or at a later date. Pertaining to second category, installation of FGD was a statutory mandate, if such thermal power projects or any associated assets thereof fell under environmentally sensitive areas. The Appellants have provided two illustrations of such ECs where FGDs were mandated pertaining to thermal power plants in Assam and Chettinad Power Corporation Private Limited which are as under: 161 BongaigaonsEnvironmental Clearance FGD system with 90% sulphur removal efficiency shall be installed, Gypsum generated from FGD plant shall not be disposed in the ash pond. .... [refer pg. no. 1594 of Annexure A-52(Colly) of Volume VI of Appeal Paper Book] Chettinads Environmental Clearance

A. Specific Conditions: CRZ clearance for permissible activities in CRZ area (as may be applicable) shall be obtained before starting construction activity.

(viii), Sulphur and ash contents in the coal to be used in the project should not exceed 0.6% and 34% respectively at any given time. In case of variation of coal quality at any point of time, fresh reference shall be made to MOEF for suitable amendments to environmental clearance condition wherever necessary. FGD shall be installed as committed by the project proponent before commissioning of the plant.

99. Therefore, in all those thermal power projects where there was requirement of only space provision, it is difficult to accept the contention of the Respondents that in spite of absence of specification and design for FGD, the Appellants were still required to estimate the cost and earmark funds anticipating revised norms after six years or so from the cut-off date. To substantiate their contention, Respondent No.2 submits that some 162 thermal plants did install the FGD system, therefore FGD system was available in the market. It is nobodys case that FGD was not available in the market. Depending upon the requirement in terms of conditions of EC recommended by relevant authority some thermal plants like JSW, Adani etc., might have installed FGD system. But one has to see what were the existing norms, conditions imposed in EC or other allied documents before notification in question and not the availability of FGD system in the market. As already stated, anticipating such change, substantial cost cannot be included as capital cost of the project at the time of bidding itself. If such requirement of FGD did not occur during the entire term of the Project, the consumer would be burdened with higher tariff. As a matter of fact, such substantial and significant cost as part of capital cost of the project would not have been approved at all.

100. Whether the new emission norms for SO2 and NOx notified in the 2015 amounts to Change in Law event or not?

101. What amounts to Change in Law and how parties are required to act in respect of Change in Law event, so also how the generator must be put back to same economic position as if no Change in Law event has 163 occurred are all spelt in the terms of PPA. Article 13 of PPA in both the appeals deal with this aspect. The relevant provisions of the PPA with respect to Change in Law are extracted as under:- "1. ARTICLE 1: DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION 1.1 Definitions ''Indian Government Instrumentality" - means the GOI, Government of Punjab, and any ministry or, department or board or agency other regulatory or quasi judicial authority controlled by GOI or Government of the State where the Procurer and Project are located and includes the Appropriate Commission, "Law" means, in relation to this Agreement, all laws including Electricity Laws in force in India and any status, ordinance, regulation, notification or code, rule, or any interpretation of any of them by an Indian Governmental Instrumentality and having force of law and shall further include all applicable rules, regulations, orders notifications by an Indian Governmental Instrumentality pursuant to or under any of them and shall include all rules, regulations, decisions and orders of the Appropriate Commission." " Operating Period in relation to the Unit means the period from its COD and in relation to the Power Station the date by which all the Units achieve COD, until the expiry or earlier termination of this Agreement in accordance with Article 2 of this Agreement; '' 13. ARTICLE 13 CHANGE IN LAW Definitions In this Article 13, the following terms shall have the following meanings: 13.1.1 "Change in Law " means the occurrence of any of the following events after the date, which 7 ys prior to the Bid Deadline:

(i) the enactment, bringing into effect, adoption, promulgation, amendment, modification or repeal, of any Law or (ii) a change in 164 interpretation of Law by a Competent Court of law, tribunal or Indian Governmental Instrumentality provided such Court of law, tribunal Governmental Instrumentality Is final authority under law for such interpretation or (iii) change in any consents approvals or licenses available or obtained for the Project, otherwise than for default of the Seller, which results in any change in any cost of or revenue from the business of selling electricity by the Seller to the Procurer under the terms of this Agreement, or (iv) any change in the (a) Declared Price of Land for the Project or (b) the cost of implementation of the resettlement any rehabilitation package of the land for the Project mentioned in the RJP or (c) the cost of implementing Environmental Management Plan for the Power Station (d) Deleted but shall not include (i) any change in any withholding tax on income or dividends distributed to the shareholders of the Seller, or (ii) change in respect of UI charges or frequency intervals by an Appropriate Commission. 13.1.2 "Competent Court" means: The Supreme Court or any High Court, or any tribunal or any similar judicial or quasi-judicial body in India that has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon issues relating to the Project. 13.2 Application and Principles for computing impact of Change in Law While determining the consequence of Change in Law under this Article 13, the Parties shall have due regard to the principle that the purpose of compensating the Party affected by such Change in Law, is to restore through Monthly Tariff payments, to the extent contemplated in this Article 13, the affected Party to the same economic as if such Change in Law has not occurred. (a)Construction Period As a result of any Change in Law, the impact of increase/decrease of Capital Cost of the Project in the Tariff shall be governed by the formula given below: For every cumulative increase/decrease of each Rs. 25,00,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Crore) in the Capital Cost over the term of this Agreement, the increase/decrease in Non Escalable Capacity Charges shall be an amount equal to 0.267% (percentage zero point two six seven) of the Non Escalable Capacity Charges. Provided that the Seller provides to the Procurer 165 documentary proof of such increase/decrease in Capital Cost for establishing the impact of such Change in Law. In case of Dispute, Article 17 shall apply. It is clarified that the above mentioned compensation shall be payable to either Party, only with effect from the date on which the total increase/decrease exceeds amount of Rs. 25,00,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Crore). (b) Operation Period As a result of Change in Law, the compensation for any increase/decrease in revenues or cost to the Seller shall be determined and effective from such date, as decided by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission whose decision shall be final and binding on both the Parties, subject to rights of appeal provided under applicable Law. Provided that the above mentioned compensation shall be payable only if and for increase/decrease in revenues or cost to the Seller is in excess of an amount equivalent to 1% of the Letter of Credit in aggregate for a Contract Year. 13.3 Notification of Change in Law 13.3.1 If the Seller is affected by a Change in Law in accordance with Article 13.2 and wishes to claim a Change in Law under this Article, it shall give notice to the Procurer of such Change in Law as soon as reasonably practicably after becoming aware of the same or should reasonably have known of the Change in Law. 13.3.2 Notwithstanding Article 13.1.1, the Seller shall be obliged to serve a notice to the Procurer under this Article, if it is beneficially affected by a Change in Law. Without prejudice to the factor of materiality or other provisions contained in this Agreement, the obligation to inform the Procurer contained herein shall be material. Provided that in case the Seller has not provided such notice, the Procurer shall have the right to issue such notice to the Seller. 13.3.3 Any notice served pursuant to this Article 13.3.2 shall provide, amongst other things, precise details of (a) the Change in Law; and 166 (b) the effects on the Seller of the matters referred to in Article 13.2. 13.4 Tariff Adjustment Payment on account of Change in Law 13.4.1 Subject to Article 13.2, the adjustment in Monthly Tariff Payment shall be effective from:

(i) the date of adoption, promulgation, amendment, re enactment or repeal of the Law or Change in Law; or

(ii) the date of order/judgment of the Competent Court or tribunal or Indian Governmental Instrumental, if the Change in Law is on account of a change in interpretation of Law. 13.4.2 The payment for Changes in Law shall be through Supplementary Bill as mentioned in Article 11.8. However, in case of any change in Tariff by reason of Change in Law, as determined in accordance with this Agreement, the Monthly Invoice to be raised by the Seller after such change in Tariff shall appropriately reflect the changed Tariff.

102. The Respondent-Commission opined that requirement for installation of FGD equipment was already envisaged as part of environmental clearance for the project, therefore, it does not amount to Change in Law event. We note from the records and the documents relied upon by the Appellants that a standard clause was introduced in the ECs for many of the thermal power projects i.e., only the provision for space for the installation of FGD. As discussed above, there was no clarity on any of the norms for SO2 and NOx emission, which required specific FGD system and/or SNCR or any other suitable technology for achieving efficiency level 167 as existed at the time of granting ECs. One cannot find fault with the Appellants or any other project of similar nature with similar facts that they did not estimate and earmark funds for the installation of such mechanism as stated above. Therefore, we are of the opinion that installation of FGD and funds for the same was not contemplated or envisaged in the ECs, which were issued six year prior to the Notification in question.

103. It is pertinent to mention Para 58 of Energy Watch Dog & Ors vs. CERC (2017 (14) SCC 80) on this issue. The Honble Supreme Court Categorically rejected the submissions advanced by the Appellants before the Apex Court that the relevant policy (controversy pertaining to Change in Law event in Energy Watch Dogs case) was announced much prior to the effective date, therefore, it has to be presumed that Generators were aware of such policy much prior to the effective date or promulgation of the revised norms. Para 58 of the said Judgment reads as under:

58. However, Shri Ramachandran, learned senior counsel for the appellants, argued that the policy dated 18th October, 2007 was announced even before the effective date of the PPAs, and made it clear to all generators that coal may not be given to the extent of the entire quantity allocated. We are afraid that we cannot accede to this argument for the reason that the change in law has only taken place only in 2013, which modifies the 2007 policy and to the extent that it does so, relief is available under the PPA itself to persons who source supply of coal from 168 indigenous sources. It is to this limited extent that change in law is held in favour of the respondents. Certain other minor contentions that are raised on behalf of both sides are not being addressed by us for the reason that we find it unnecessary to go into the same. The Appellate Tribunals judgment and the Commissions orders following the said judgment are set aside. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission will, as a result of this judgment, go into the matter afresh and determine what relief should be granted to those power generators who fall within clause 13 of the PPA as has been held by us in this judgment.

104. It is clear from the above opinion of the Apex Court that Law does not work on contemplations unless an action factually takes place i.e., cause of action for such action. We also place reliance on the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corp. vs. Haji Abdulgafur (1971) 1 SCC 757. Therefore, we have no hesitation to opine that installation of FGD became mandatory only after the issuance of Notification in December 2015 and the strict compliance came to be implemented when directions of CPCB came to be issued in this regard.

105. According to the Respondents, the judgment of this Tribunal in JSWs case is binding on this Tribunal as settled position. Even otherwise, one has to see whether facts and circumstances in the instant appeals and facts and circumstances in JSWs case are one and the same. Based on 169 the judgment of JSWs case, the Respondent-Commission denied the claim of Appellants pertaining to Change in Law event.

106. On perusal of records and documents, we note that there were two ECs in the case of JSW. Appellants stand is that apart from requirement of space provision for installation of FGD, if required at a later stage, it also conditioned installation of FGD and earmarking of funds for environmental protection measures i.e., FGD system. The Appellant-NPL brings on record the distinguishing facts of their appeal with JSW case, which reads as under: TABLE DISTINGUISHING THE JSW CASE WITH THE APPELLANTS CASE Sr. No. JSW Case NPL/ Appellants Case Responsibility of obtaining Environment Clearance (EC)

1. Responsibility of obtaining the EC was that of the Generator,

i.e. JSW The project was awarded under Case 1 route of the Competitive Bidding Guidelines, wherein obtaining EC was the responsibility of the bidder, i.e. JSW. Responsibility of obtaining the EC was that of the Procurer, i.e. PSPCL The present Project has been conceived and awarded to NPL under Case 2 Scenario 4 (fuel and location is specified by the bidder) of the Competitive Bidding Guidelines, where the responsibility the Initial Consents (including EC) is of the procurer i.e. the 170 Clause 5.4 of the JSW PPA provided that responsibility to obtain consents (including EC) was that of the seller. (refer JSW PPA, Annexure-50 @ pg. 1520, Vol. VI) Respondent No.2/PSPCL. (refer NPL RFP, Annexure-13 @ pg. 610, Vol. III) Clause 5.5 of the NPL PPA read with Schedule 2, inter alia, provided that NPL being the procurer (when it was wholly owned by Punjab State Electricity Board (now PSPCL)) was responsible for obtaining Initial Consents (including EC) for the Project. While undertaking the actions for obtaining the EC,NPL (when it was wholly owned by PSEB) made the application and presentation dated 09.09.2008 before the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) (on the basis of which the EC was granted for the Project) and the said presentation did not stipulate any earmarking of funds towards the installation of FGD. In the aforesaid presentation dated 09.09.2009, it wasdemonstrated that a fund of total Rs. 410.10 Crore had been earmarked towards environmental protection measures. The item-wise break-up of the aforesaid only refers to the cost towards installation of Electrostatic Precipitator (ESP) in context of air pollution control measures. (refer NPL Presentation, Annexure-9 @, pg. 380, Vol. II) Number of EC(s)

2. There were two ECs in the JSW Case, i.e. the 1st EC dated There is only one EC dated 03.10.2008 issued by MoEF&CC which dealt with 171 17.05.2007 and the 2nd EC dated 16.10.2010 issued by the MOEF&CC which dealt with the issue of FGD. (refer JSW ECs, Annexure/A @ pg. 33, Rejoinder dated 12.06.2019) the issue of FGD in NPLs Case. (refer NPL EC, Annexure-10 @ pg. 385, Vol. II) Relevant conditions in the EC(s)

3. Condition (ii) in the 1st EC in JSW Case made the said EC conditional: The 1st EC in JSW Case was subject to the condition that a detailed study regarding the impact of the project on the alphonso mango plantation and marine fisheriesshall be carried out at the cost of the project proponent and based on the study, the additional safeguards as may be required would be implemented by the project proponent i.e., JSW. Relevant conditions are set out below:

(ii)The detailed study regarding the impact on Alphonso mango and marine fisheries as recommended in the report of Dr. B.S. Konkan Krishi Vidyapith shall be undertaken. Based on the same, additional safeguard measures as may be required will be taken by the proponent.A copy of the report will be No additional conditions The EC granted to the Petitioner was not contingent on any anticipated or likely safeguard measures to be adopted to control the emission levels of SO2 and NOx. Relevant conditions are set out below:

(vi) Space provision shall be kept for retrofitting of FGD, if required, at later date.

(xxv) Separate funds shall be allocated for implementation of environmental protection measures along with item-wise break-up. These cost shall be included as part of the project cost. The funds earmarked for the environment protection measures shall not be diverted for other purposes and year-wise expenditure should be reported to 172 submitted to the Ministry. The cost towards undertaking the study and implementation of safeguard measures, if any, will be borne by the project.

(iii) Space provision shall be made for installation of FGD of requisite efficiency of removal of SO2, if required at later stage.

(xx) Separate funds should be allocated for implementation of Environmental protection measures along with item wise break up. These cost should be included as part of the project cost. The funds earmarked for the environment protection measures should not be diverted for other purposes and year-wise expenditure should be reported to the Ministry. The 2nd EC mandated the installation of FGD and the relevant condition is set out below:

Flue Gas Desulphurization System (FGD) shall be installed before commissioning of the project and action in this regard shall be submitted within three/ months to the Ministry
the Ministry There is only one EC in the case of NPL and it does not mandate installation of FGD. Undertaking given in the JSW Case

4. Undertaking given: The above stipulated condition (ii) in the 1st EC required an undertaking to be given by the project proponent, i.e., JSW to implement the additional No such undertaking given in NPLs Case 173 safeguards, as maybe required, set out by the Konkan Krishi Vidyapith, Dapoli (KKVD), based on the detailed study regarding the impact of the project on the alphonso mango plantation and marine fisheries. Different Questions of Law

5. JSWs claim was premised on the plea that imposition of additional conditions in the 2nd EC shall entitle the party to Change in Law relief. Plea was rejected since the PPA does not recognize additional conditions being imposed to the 2nd EC as a Change in Law event. NPLs claim pertains to the Change in Law relief on account of promulgation of strict emission standards by means of the MoEF&CC Notification having force of law. This Change in Law event claimed by the Appellant, i.e. a notification falls under the definition of Change in Law in terms of Article 13.1.1 of the PPA. Challenge to the 1st EC (pending litigation)

6. The EC had to be re-examined on account of the likelihood of the Project causing damage to the ecology of alphonso mangoes and marine fisheries.

(i) The 1st EC was challenged before National Environment Appellate Authority (NEAA), which dismissed the challenge in Order dated 12.09.2008.

(ii) Subsequently, a Writ Petition namely Balachandra Bhikaji Nalwade vs. Union of India & Ors. 2009 SCC Online Del 2990, was filed before the Honble Delhi High Court challenging the NEAAs Order claiming that the 1st EC EC for NPL was not challenged at any stage before any authority. 174 granted to JSW was (i) illegal;

(ii)contrary to statutory provisions and precautionary principle; and

(iii) based on unconfirmed data and assumptions. The Honble Delhi High Court by its Order dated 18.09.2009, directed EAC to re-examine the 1st EC, considering the likelihood of the Project causing damage to the ecology of alphonso mangoes and marine fisheries. Therefore, the 1st EC had to be re-examined on the directions of the Honble Delhi High Court. (Refer HC Order dated 18.09.2009, Annexure 49(Colly) @ pg. 1513, Vol. VI) Re-examination of EC

7. Re-examination of EC was undertaken On 11.01.2010, the EAC conducted a meeting and re- examined the EC conditions, based on the directions of the Honble Delhi High Court. On 16.4.2010, the MoEF&CC issued a letter to JSW imposing additional conditions including condition to install FGD prior to the commissioning of the project. No re-examination of EC in NPLs case Timeline for installation of FGD

8. Prior to Commissioning Post Commissioning 175 The FGD was required to be installed prior to the commissioning of the power project in terms of the 2nd EC dated 16.04.2010. This meant that during the construction period of the power project, FGD was to be installed. The FGD is now required to be retrofitted post commissioning of the power project in terms of the MoEF&CC Notification dated 07.12.2015. This means that FGD is to be installed during the operation period of the power project. Change in Law Clause under the respective PPAs

9. JSW PPA does not include any change in the consents/ approvals/ licenses obtained for the project and any change inthe cost of implementing Environmental Management Plan for the Power Station. The relevant excerpts of the JSW PPA are as under: 13.1.1 "Change in law" means the occurrence of any of the following events after the date, which is seven (7) days, prior, to the Bid Deadline: (i.) the enactment, bringing into effect, adoption, promulgation, amendment, modification or repeal, of Law or (ii) a change in interpretation of any law by a competent court of law, tribunal or Indian Governmental Instrumentality provided such court of law, tribunal or Indian The Change in Law provision includes change in consents etc. and the cost of implementing Environment Management Plan under Article 13.1.1(i)(iii) and 13.1.1(i)(iv)(c) respectively, inter alia in terms of which Change in Law claim has been claimed by the Appellant in the present case. The relevant excerpts of the NPL PPA are as under:

13.1.1 "Change in law" means the occurrence of any of the following events after the date, which is seven (7) days prior to the Bid Deadline:

(i) the enactment, bringing into effect, adoption, promulgation, amendment, modification or repeal, of Law or (ii) a change in interpretation of any Law by a Competent Court of law, tribunal or Indian Governmental Instrumentality provided such Court of law, tribunal or Indian Governmental Instrumentality is final authority under law for such 176 Governmental Instrumentality is final authority under law for such interpretation. but shall not include (i) any change in any withholding tax or income or dividends distributed to the shareholders of the Seller or

(ii) change in respect of UI charges or frequency intervals by an appropriate commission. (refer JSW PPA, Annexure 50 @ pg. 1515, Vol. VI and @ pg. 79 of PSPCLs Reply dated 25.05.2019) interpretation or (iii) change in any consent, approvals or licenses available or obtained for the Project, otherwise than for default of the Seller, which results in any change in any cost of or revenue from the business of selling electricity by the Seller to the Procurer under the terms of this Agreement, or (iv) any change in the (a) Declared Price of Land for the Project or (b) cost of implementation of the resettlement and rehabilitation package of the land for the Project mentioned in the RfP or (c) cost of implementing Environmental Management Plan for the Power Station(d) Deleted. but shall not include (i) any change in any withholding tax or income or dividends distributed to the shareholders of the Seller or (ii) change in respect of UI charges or frequency intervals by an Appropriate Commission. (refer NPL PPA, Annexure 17 @ pg. 692, Vol. III)

107. The Appellant-TSPL has also placed on record the differences between their appeal and JSW case, which is as under: JSWs case (APTEL) TSPLs case 177 JSWs case (APTEL) TSPLs case

1. Date of EC EC for JSW was issued prior to the cut- off date: 17.05.2007 i.e. before the cut- off date (14.02.2008) EC for TSPL was issued after the cut-off date: 11.07.2008 i.e. after the cut-off date (16.06.2008)

2. Responsibility of obtaining EC EC was the responsibility was of the generator i.e. JSW PPA pertained to an Independent Power Plant signed pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, wherein obtaining Environment Clearance was the responsibility of the bidder i.e. JSW. Clause 5.4 of JSW PPA provided that responsibility to obtain consents was of the seller. EC was the responsibility was of the procurer i.e. PSPCL To the contrary, the present case is covered by Case II, scenario IV under Competitive Bidding (fuel and location is specified by the bidder) and therefore in terms of the Bid Guidelines, the responsibility for obtaining Environment Clearance is of the procurer. As per Clause 5.5 of the PPA read with read with Schedule 2 of the PPA, initial consent (including EC) was responsibility of the Procurer.(For detailed submissions, please refer to paragraphs 22 to 24 above)

3. Different Questions of law JSWs claim was premised on the plea that imposition of additional conditions in the EC shall entitle the party to Change in Law relief. Plea was TSPLs claim pertains to the Change in Law relief on account of promulgation of strict emission standards by means of an MoEF Notification having force of 178 JSWs case (APTEL) TSPLs case rejected since the PPA does not recognize additional conditions being imposed to the EC as a Change in Law event. law. This Change in Law event claimed by TSPL, i.e. a notification falls under the definition of Change in Law under Art. 13.1.1 of the PPA.

4. Conditions under the EC (a)Initial EC Conditions (17.05.2007) -The EC issued for JSW initially, was subject toadditional safeguard measures as may be required. The measures were to be met by the project proponent at its own cost. This was in addition to the space requirement. Relevant conditions:-

(ii) The detailed study regarding the impact on Alphonso mango and marine fisheries as recommended in the report of Dr. B.S. Konkan Krishi Vidyapith shall be undertaken. Based on the same, additional safeguard measures as may be required will be taken by the proponent. A copy of the report will be submitted to the Ministry. The cost towards undertaking the study and implementation of safeguard measures, if any, will be borne by the project.

(iii) Space provision shall be made for installation of FGD of requisite efficiency of removal of SO2, if required at later stage. (a) EC Conditions (11.07.2008) - The EC granted to TSPL was not contingent on any anticipated or likely safeguard measures to be adopted to control the emission levels of SO2 and NOx. Relevant conditions:-

(vi) Space provision shall be kept for retrofitting of FGD, if required at later stage.

(xxv) Separate funds shall be allocated for implementation of environmental protection measures along with item- wise break up. Thesecost shall be included as part of the project cost. The funds earmarked for the environment protection measures shall not be diverted for other purposes and year- wise expenditure should be reported to the Ministry 179 JSWs case (APTEL) TSPLs case

(xx) Separate funds should be allocated for implementation of Environmental protection measures along with item wise break up. These cost should be included as part of the project cost. The funds earmarked for the environment protection measures should not be diverted for other purposes and year-wise expenditure should be reported to the Ministry. (b)Challenge to EC The EC had to be re-examined on account of the likelihood of the Project causing damage to the ecology of alphonso mangoes and marine fisheries (in line with the principles of sustainable development and precautionary approach).

(i) The initial EC was challenged before National Environment Appellate Authority (NEAA), which dismissed the challenge inOrder dated 12.09.2008.

(ii) Subsequently, a Writ Petition [Balachandra Bhikaji Nalwade vs. Union of India &Ors. 2009 SCC Online Del 2990] was filed before the Honble Delhi High Court challenging the NEAAs Order claiming that the EC granted to JSW was (i) illegal;

(ii)contrary to statutory provisions and precautionary principle; and (iii) based on unconfirmed data and assumptions. The Honble Delhi High Court by its Order 18.09.2009, directed Expert Appraisal Committee to re-examine the (b)Challenge to EC - EC for TSPL was not challenged at any stage before any authority and was not subject to any re- examination. In fact, while granting the EC to TSPL, MoEF specified that no ecologically sensitive area is located within 10 km radius of TSPLs project. (@pg. 363, Vol I, Appeal) 180 JSWs case (APTEL) TSPLs case Initial EC, considering the likelihood of the Project causing damage to the ecology of alphonso mangoes and marine fisheries. (Para 32).

(iii) Therefore, Initial EC had to be re- examined. (c) Re-examination

(i) On 11.01.2010, the EAC conducted a meeting and re-examined the EC conditions, based on the directions of the Honble Delhi High Court.

(ii) On 16.04.2010, the MoEF issued a letter to JSW imposing additional conditions including conditionto install FGD prior to the commissioning of the project.

(iii) Initial EC read with the additional conditions imposed by letter dated 16.04.2010 is the amended EC. (c) NO re-examination. (d) Amendment dated 16.04.2010

(i) Amended EC imposed the FGD Condition

Flue Gas Desulphurization System (FGD) shall be installed before commissioning of the project and action in this regard shall be submitted within three months to the Ministry

(ii) Mandate to install FGD was in the nature of additional conditions being imposed in the EC dated 17.05.2007 issued prior to cut off date (14.02.2008) not pursuant to any (d)Amendments

(i) FGD condition was not imposed in any of the amendments to the ECs dated25.03.2010, 17.06.2010 and 30.09.2013 (@Pgs. 368-373, Vol II, Appeal)

(ii) Mandate to install FGD is on account 181 JSWs case (APTEL) TSPLs case Change in Lawevent.1

(iii) MOEF letter imposing additional conditions in the EC confirmed the Initial EC to the extent of specifying the stage of FGD installation. of a Change in Law regarding permissible emission standards from the thermal power plants (pursuant to MOEFs Notification dated 07.12.2015), and subsequent direction by CPCB dated 11.12.2017.

(iii) MOEF Notification, 2015 was the first time, FGD installation was mandated.

108. The opinion of the MERC and this Tribunal pertaining to JSW Energy case are seen from the following extracts.

MERC Observations: -12 (iv) As per the Environmental Clearance dated 17.05.2007, the direction was given to keep the space for installation of the FGD if required and also for allocation of separate funds for that purpose .The letter dated 16.04.2010 issued by the GOI MoEF binds the Petitioner to install the FGD before commissioning of the project. The Petitioner contended that this subsequent imposition of the condition is a change in law. As per the above quoted provision of change in law, the contention of the Petitioner is nowhere sustained in the definition. 182

(vi) The Petitioner has made positive assertion/warranties in consonance with Condition 2.5 of Schedule 9 that no litigation was pending or threatened against the Petitioner. By such positive assertion the Petitioner suppressed the pendency of litigation regarding Environmental Clearance. While the Commission records the above contention of Respondents and notes that the Petitioner has not disputed the same, this matter cannot be taken up in the present proceedings of the Petitioner. APTELs findings: -

30. As mentioned above, Environmental clearance dated 17.5.2007 provided for installation of the FGD at a later stage and further mandated that separate funds must be allocated for installation of the said FGD as well as for making such Environmental protection measures which are to be included in the project cost. Admittedly, this has not been complied with by the Appellant after getting the Environmental clearance. The letter dated 16.4.2010 issued by the Central Government merely confirms the requirement of installation of the FGD intimated earlier. It merely informs the Appellant the stage of installation. Therefore, there was no Change in Law which has been occasioned as claimed by the Appellant.

31. The contention of the Appellant regarding the status of it Environmental clearance and the connected claim of change in law has also to be appreciated in view of the observations made by Delhi High Court in the order dates 16.9.2009 regarding the Environmental clearance as under:

20. After noticing the report of the KKVD and considering the recommendation made, the project was approved subject to conditions as under:-

(i) No activities in CRZ area will be taken up without requisite clearance under the provisions of the CRZ Notification, 1991.

(ii) The detailed study regarding the impact on Alphonso mango and marine fisheries as recommended in the report of Dr. B.S. Konkan Krishi Vidyapith shall be undertaken. Based on the same, additional safeguard 183 measures as may be required will be taken by the proponent. A copy of the report will be submitted to the Ministry. The cost towards undertaking the study and implementation of safeguard measures, if any, will be borne by the project.

(iii) Space provision for FGD will be kept, if required at a later date.

(iv) Cooling water blow down will be discharge from the cold water side and not from the hot water. (emphasis supplied)

21. There is contradiction between the minutes of the meeting of the Expert Appraisal Committee held on 9-10th January, 2007 and 12-14th March, 2007. On 9th-10th January, 2007, the application was decided to be kept in abeyance to await the report of KKVD which as per the said minutes would take six months. What was before the Committee on 12-14th March, 2007 was a preliminary report prepared within 2-3 months? The minutes dated 12- 14th March, 2007 record that as per the report submitted by KKVD it would take about four years of detailed study to effectively evaluate the impact of the proposed plant. KKVD on the basis of the existing material, in form of assessment studies conducted by EQMS India Pvt. Ltd., and predictions on the level of pollutants made by MPCB and Central Pollution Control Board, Delhi, had stated that it was likely that there would not be any adverse impact on horticulture, mango plantations or marine life, subject to the condition that the respondent no.3 strictly maintained adherence to their commitments. The so called report submitted by KKVD is extremely guarded and cautious. It was not based on their data and studies. It was not conclusive and does not give approval but qualified statements were made. Further KKVD in clear terms had stated that any final 184 assessment would require a detailed study for a period of four years to evaluate the impact on mango plantations and the marine life/fisheries. This was noted by the expert committee themselves in their minutes dated 12-14th March, 2007 quoted above. Further the issue of provision of FGD has been left to be decided at a later stage. Position before NEAA remained the same

32. The observation of Delhi High Court particularly at paragraph-21 quoted above, clarifies the status of requirement of the installation of the FGD in the project. The High Court has clearly stated that what the expert appraisal committee considered in its earlier meeting dated 14.3.2007 was only a preliminary report which was extremely guarded.

33. In fact, the High Court has stated clearly in its order Further the issue of provision of FGD has been left to be decided at a later stage. Position before NEAA remained the same.

34. This observation of the Delhi High Court read along with the mandate that the funds were to be separately allocated for the same which was to be included in the project cost clearly mandates that the situation as projected by the Appellant does not fall within Change of Law. It is in this light that the Environmental clearance granted on 17.5.2007 has to be seen. .

38. Let us again refer to the conditions in the Environmental clearance dated 17.5.2007:

(ii) the detailed study regarding the impact of the project, if any, on Alphanso mango and marine fisheries as recommended in the report of Dr. B.S. Konkan Krishi Vidyapith shall be undertaken. Based on the same, additional safeguard measures as may be required will be taken by the proponent with prior approval of the Ministry of Environment and Forests. A copy of the report will be submitted to the Ministry. The cost towards undertaking the study and implementation of safeguard measures if any, will be borne by the project. 185

(iii) Space provision shall be made for installation of FGD of requisite efficiency of removal of SO2, if required at later stage. .

(xx) Separate funds should be allocated for implementation of Environmental protection measures along with item wise break up. These cost should be included as part of the project cost. The funds earmarked for the environment protection measures should not be diverted for other purposes and year wise expenditure should be reported to the Ministry

39. So, the reading of the conditions in entirety referred to in the Environmental clearance would make it clear that there was a mandate with regard to the requirement of earmarking of funds for FGD as well. The study to be carried out was specific to the case of the Appellant's plant as it is recorded that the study is to be carried out in terms and the recommendations in the report of KKVD. This has been referred to in the order of the Delhi High Court while reference was made to the minutes of the 42nd Meeting of the Expert Appraise Committee.

46. .We find that prior Environmental Clearance granted was conditional and that the entire bid of the Appellant was on the basis of representation of the Appellant is indicative of the fact that the FGD was required to be installed by the Appellant and the Appellant was well aware of the terms.

109. It is well settled legal principle that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd. vs. Union of India (2005 (4) SCC

638 (para 254); P.S. Sathappan vs. Andhra Bank Ltd. (2004 (11) SCC 186 672) Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. (2003 (2) SCC 111) and KTMTM Abdul Kayoom & Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras (AIR 1962 SC 680).

110. Therefore, one significant factual difference can change the determination of a legal principle. It is also a well settled legal principle that each case has to be considered and disposed of in the factual matrix pertaining to the said case.

111. Before issuing ECs pertaining to the Appellants there must have been environment study of the area of the projects and also allied assets of the projects. In JSW case because of existence of marine life i.e., fisheries and Alphanso Orchids, Krishi Vidyapith was requested to make a study of environmental impact on the surroundings situated within 10 kms radius from the project and allied assets of the project. This study led to requirement of installation of FGD system and accordingly second EC incorporating above condition including earmarking of funds was mandated. JSW itself undertook to comply with the conditions recommended in the report of Krishi Vidyapith if necessary for controlling the impact of the power plant on the surrounding environment. Contrary to 187 this position, in the case of projects in question, there is no such ecologically sensitive area within 10 kms radius of the projects in question. As stated above, such conditions were imposed for the power projects of Assam and Chittinad. Therefore, we agree with the contention of the Appellants that though a standard condition of provision for space demarcation for FGD was mentioned in all the ECs, but depending upon facts and circumstances pertaining to each project, ECs were granted with condition of installation of FGD and the funds required for the same to be earmarked.

112. The ECs of the projects of the Appellants, no doubt, at condition (vi) only refer to provision of space if required at a later stage was made, but there was no specific condition mandating earmarking of funds for FGD installation for SO2 or SNCR or any other suitable mechanism for NOx.

113. One has to see in the above circumstances the actual purport, relevance and meaning of the word if mentioned in the condition (vi) of the Environmental Clearances. The Honble Supreme Court in Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale vs. Jayanthi Raghu & Anr. (2012) 4 SCC 188 793, on the interpretation of a qualifying phrase, a word like if made the following observations : -

34. It is worth noting that the use of the word if has its own significance

36. In State of T.N. v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd. [(1986) 3 SCC 91 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 461] the Court, while interpreting the words if the offence had not been committed as used in Section 10-A(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, expressed the view as follows: (SCC p. 101, para 19)

19. In our opinion the use of the expression if simpliciter, was meant to indicate a condition, the condition being that at the time of assessing the penalty, that situation should be visualized wherein there was no scope of committing any offence. Such a situation could arise only if the tax liability fell under sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act.

37. Bearing in mind the aforesaid conceptual meaning, when the language employed under Rule 4.9 is scrutinized, it can safely be concluded that the entitlement to continue till the age of superannuation i.e. 55 years, is not absolute. The power and right to remove is not obliterated. The status of confirmation has to be earned and conferred.

38. Had the rule-making authority intended that there would be automatic confirmation, Rule 4.9 would have been couched in a different language. That being not so, the wider interpretation cannot be placed on the Rule to infer that the probationer gets the status of a deemed confirmed employee after expiry of three years of probationary period as that would defeat the basic purpose and intent of the Rule which clearly postulates if confirmed.A confirmation, as is demonstrable from the language employed in the Rule, does not occur with efflux of time. As it is hedged by a condition, an affirmative or positive act is the requisite by 189 the employer. In our considered opinion, an order of confirmation is required to be passed.

39. The Division Bench has clearly flawed by associating the words if confirmed with the entitlement of the age of superannuation without appreciating that theuse of the said words as a fundamental qualifier negatives deemed confirmation. Thus, the irresistible conclusion is that the present case would squarely fall in the last line of cases as has been enumerated in para 11 of Satya Narayan Jhavar [(2001) 7 SCC 161 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1087 : AIR 2001 SC 3234] and, therefore, the principle of deemed confirmation is not attracted. In GS Ramaswamy vs. Inspector General of Police (AIR 1966 SC 175) the Honble Supreme Court held that qualifying terms/phrases do not contemplate automatic confirmation of the conditions so stipulated. The relevant extract is as under: -

8. It is true that the words used in the sentence set out above are not that promoted officers will be eligible or qualified for promotion at the end of their probationary period which are the words to be often found in the Rules in such cases; even so, though this part of Rule

486 says that promoted officers will be confirmed at the end of their probationary period, it is qualified by the words if they have given satisfaction.Clearly therefore the Rule does not contemplate automatic confirmation after the probationary period of two years, for a promoted officer can only be confirmed under this Rule if he has given satisfaction.

114. On the present controversy pertaining to Change in Law event based on the MoEF & CC Notification of 2015, there are different opinions of 190 different State Commissions and so also CERC. Some State Commissions opined this as Change in Law event and some other State Commissions have rejected it as Change in Law event. CERC has opined this revised norms as Change in Law event. Respondents contend that none of the decisions of either CERC or State Commissions are of binding nature on this Tribunal and therefore, the reliance placed by the Appellants on various orders of CERC and other State Commissions are of no relevance. What we note is on the issue of regulatory certainty on the controversy in question, Appellants have pointed out how different Commissions have dealt with the said issue. There should not be regulatory uncertainty on the same Notification of 2015, otherwise it leads to chaos in the energy sector. Similarly placed generators in the country will have to face different orders of Regulatory Commissions on this issue. The objective of National Tariff Policy of 2016 is towards promotion of consistency and predictability in regulatory approaches across jurisdictions. As contended by the Appellants, the uncertainty has disturbed the energy sector pertaining to FGD installation. Such uncertainty is against the very spirit of the Electricity Act. The National Tariff Policy is a statutory document under Section 3 of the Electricity Act. 191

115. The Respondent-Commission has failed to appreciate the orders dated 28.03.2018 and 17.09.2018 of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission in the case of Adani Power Limited vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited& Anr. (Petition No. 104/MP/2017) and Coastal Gujarat Private Limited vs. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited & Ors. (Petition No. 77/MP/2016) respectively, wherein it had been laid down by the CERC that the findings of the JSW case are not applicable to the aforesaid cases. The relevant paragraphs read as under: Adani Power Limiteds case

32. It is evident from the above that the Petitioner had not earmarked funds for installation of FGD in the year-wise expenditure submitted to MOE&F on environmental protection measures in compliance with the ECs dated 13.8.2007 and 21.10.2008. It is pertinent to mention that MOE&F had also not raised any objections for not earmarking funds towards installation of FGD in terms of the ECs dated 13.8.2007 and 21.10.2008 respectively. In this background, we are of the view that the installation of FGD in Phases I & II of the project was not mandatory, except for space provisions for FGD and the Petitioner could have reasonably assumed that similar condition would only be imposed for Phase III of the project. Accordingly, the Petitioner could not have been expected to factor the cost of installation of FGD in the bid for Phase III. We therefore conclude that the installation of FGD was not a mandatory requirement as on the cut-off date (19.11.2007)and was made 192 mandatory post the cut-off date vide the EC dated 20.5.2010 granted to the Petitioner for PhaseIII (units 7 to 9) of Mundra UMPP 36..The findings of the Tribunal in the case of JSW is that the EC dated 16.4.2010 is a mere confirmation of the earlier EC dated 17.5.2007 which is apparently based on the fact that the EC granted by MOE&F to JSW on 16.4.2010 makes reference of the EC granted by letter dated 17.5.2007 where there was a direction to make provisions for space for FGD. In the present case of the Petitioner, the EC granted by MOE&F on 20.5.2010 for Phase III was independent of the ECs granted by MOE&F on 13.8.2007 and 21.10.2008 respectively for Phases I and II of the project. However, in case of Phase III, there was no prior EC as in case of JSW and EC dated 20.5.2010 was granted by MOE&F at the first instance mandating the installation of FGD. The case of JSW is therefore distinguishable from the present case of the Petitioner and hence the judgment of the Tribunal dated 21.1.2013 cannot be made applicable in case of the Petitioner as contended by the Respondents/M/s Prayas.
(Emphasis Supplied) CGPL CASE
30. In our view, requirement of compliance of new SO2 norms in terms of MoEFCC Notification, 2015 through installation of FGD in case of Mundra UMPP is covered under Change in Law since the Petitioner had no occasion to factor in the cost of FGD at the time of submission of the bid as it was the obligation of the Procurers to obtain environmental clearance. 193

32. In case of the Petitioner, the project was conceived as a UMPP. As per the RFP, it was the responsibility of the Procurers to obtain the initial consent which included environment clearance and provide the same to the successful bidder before the issue of LoI. On the contrary, JSW was an independent power producer which was required to obtain all clearances including the environment clearance on its own from MoEF. Further, condition in para 3(xxx) of the Environment Clearance dated 2.3.2007 provides for separate funds for environmental protection measures and reporting of year-wise expenditure to MoEF. The Petitioner has submitted that an amount of Rs.200 crore had been earmarked by the Petitioner for environment protection measures for a period of 25 years. The Petitioner has filed the copies of the letters under which the Petitioner has submitted the compliance reports regarding environment protection measures in terms of condition 3(xxx) of the EC dated 2.3.2007 for the years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17. Perusal of the said letters shows that the expenditure on FGD does not form part of the environment protection measures. The fact that no objection has been raised by MoEF&CC with regard to the expenditure earmarked/incurred for environment protection measures shows that FGD is not included in the expenditure under condition 3(xxx) of the EC. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Petitioner was required to include the expenditure on FGD to be incurred in future if required at a later stage in terms of condition 3(ii) of the EC dated 2.3.2007. In view of the above reasons, we hold that the judgement of the Appellate Tribunal in JSW case is not applicable in the case of the Petitioner (Emphasis Supplied) 194

116. Further, in Sasan Power Limited vs. MP Power Management Company Limited & Ors. (Petition No. 133/MP/2016), CERC vide its order dated 08.10.2018 has once again distinguished the JSW Case from the Sasan Case. The relevant paragraphs in the said case read as under:

36. In case of the Petitioner, the project was conceived as a UMPP. As per the RFP, it was the responsibility of the Procurers to obtain the initial consent which included environment clearance and provide the same to the successful bidder before the issue of LoI. On the contrary, JSW was an independent power producer which was required to obtain all clearances including the environment clearance on its own from MoEFCC The Petitioner has submitted that an amount of Rs.865 crore had been earmarked by the Petitioner for environment protection measures as per the EIA study which includes only provision for space, if required in future and not actual installation of FGD. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Petitioner was required to include the expenditure on FGD to be incurred in future if required at a later stage in terms of condition 3 (xii) of the EC dated 23.11.2006. In view of the above reasons, we hold that the judgement of the Appellate Tribunal in JSW case is not applicable in the case of the Petitioner. The requirement of installation of FGD for compliance with the revised norms for Sulphur Dioxide in terms of the MoEFCC Notification, 2015 is covered under Change in Law in terms of the PPA dated 7.8.2007.

38. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that as on the cut-off date there was no requirement for installation of FGD for 195 Sasan UMPP. The Environment Clearance dated 23.11.2006 only provided for making provision for space for FGD if required at a later stage. Even the Environmental Clearance dated 23.11.2006 was made available to the Petitioner on the date of signing of the PPA and the Petitioner could not have been expected to factor the cost of FGD in its bid. MoEFCC Notification, 2015 prescribed a limit for SO2 below 200 mg/ Nm3 for thermal power plants which require installation of FGD. Accordingly, we hold that the case of the Petitioner for installation of FGD at Sasan UMPP is covered under Change in Law in terms of the PPA dated 7.8.2007. (Emphasis Supplied)

117. Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission vide its orders dated 06.02.2019 in the case of Adani Power Maharashtra Limited vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (Case No. 300 of 2018), while concluding observes that the MoEF&CC Notification qualifies as a Change in Law event, and has appreciated the factual differences between the JSW Case and the Adani Power Maharashtra case and has laid down as under:

13. As regards to Order in the matter of JSW, APML stated that the facts of the JSW case are different from the present case. .Further from perusal of Order in Case of JSW, the Commission observed that factual aspect of the JSW matter was also different which are summarized below: 196 a. The Environmental Clearance granted to the JSW, inter-alia, had many conditions, few of them were as follows:

3. . ii) The detailed study regarding the impact of the project, if any, on Alphanso mango and marine fisheries as recommended in the report of Dr. B. S. Konkan Krishi Vidyapith shall be undertaken. Based on the same, additional safeguard measures as may be required will be taken by the proponent with prior approval of the MoEF. A copy of the report will be submitted to the Ministry. The cost towards undertaking the study and implementation of safeguard measures, if any, will be borne by the project. iii) Space provisions shall be made for installation of FGD of requisite efficiency of removal of SO2, if required at later stage.
b. The Expert Appraisal Committee imposed additional conditions, which included that, in the event of any evidence of damage to the mango, cashew and fisheries, adequate mitigation measures including FGD should be adopted by the JSW. c. After considering the recommendations of Expert Appraisal Committee, the Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India, imposed a condition that the FGD plants should be installed by the JSW prior to the commissioning of the Power Project. Thus, requirement of installation of FGD by JSW was on account of the possibilities of any damage to the mango, cashew and fisheries in that area. Also, FGD was to be installed prior to commissioning of the project. As Environmental Clearance obtained by JSW was prior to bid cut-off date and also includes mandatory requirement of taking measures for avoiding impact on mangos and fisheries, JSW was aware of requirement of installing FGD before 197 bid deadline and hence the Commission has not allowed installation of FGD as Change in Law event for JSW. Whereas, in the present matter requirement of installation of FGD is on account of MoEF&CC Notification dated 7 December, 2015 which is applicable to all Thermal Power Stations and not on account of any specific issues related to APMLs plant at Tiroda. Also, APMLs plant is operational since 2012 without FGD as against JSWs plant which was mandated to commission with FGD only. In view of these factual differences in operating circumstances of these plants, the Commission is of the opinion that JSW case related to FGD cannot be relied upon in the present matter (Emphasis Supplied)

118. It is important to mention that vide order dated 25.05.2011, MERC by taking into consideration the facts of Adanis case and additional conditions in 1st EC of JSW case, held that JSW Case is different and cannot be relied upon to deny the claim of Change in Law in Adanis case before MERC, which was upheld by this Tribunal by its order dated 21.01.2013.

119. Further, Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission in the case of Adani Power Rajasthan Limited vs. Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited & Ors. (Petition No. RERC-1394/18) by its order dated 25.01.2019 clarified that the MoEF&CC Notification dated 07.12.2015 198 qualifies as a Change in Law event even after taking into consideration the JSW Case . The relevant paras of the said order read as under:

9. Commission observes that the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change notified the revised parameters vide its Notification dated 07.12.2015 which provided for revised parameters for water consumption, particulate matters, Sulphur Dioxide, Oxides of Nitrogen and Mercury in respect of thermal power plants. The cut-off date of the Petitioner is 30.07.2009 which is seven days prior to the bid deadline.

10. Since the MoEFCC Notification dated 07.12.2015 which seeks to revise the environmental norms prescribed in the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 has been issued after the cut-off date, the revised environmental norms qualify as events under Change in Law in terms of the PPA dated 28.01.2010.

11. The Commission directs office to seek advice from the Central Electricity Authority on suitability of technology and specifications for implementation of revised environmental norms.

120. CERC, in Adani Power (Mundra) Limited v. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. & Ors. (Petition No. 332/MP/2018) (Adani Case II) once again distinguished the JSW Case from the Adani Case II, while allowing the Change in Law claim of the Petitioners by its Order dated 28.10.2019. The relevant paras read as follows: 199

36. As per the above judgement, JSW Energy Ltd. had a conditional environmental clearance wherein environmental clearance mandated detailed study regarding the impact of the project, if any, on Alphanso mango and marine fisheries as recommended in the report of Dr. B.S. Konkan Krishi Vidyapith, whereas there was no such condition in environmental clearance granted to the Petitioner. Further, the present case is similar to the Gujarat Bid 01 PPA and Haryana PPAs, in terms of non-availability of environmental clearance(s) as on cut-off date, whereas JSW Energy Ltd had environmental clearance as on bid date with certain conditions stipulated therein. Thus, the environmental clearance granted to the Petitioner was not conditional and was independent of any specific study. Accordingly, in terms of the above decision of the Commission and order of APTEL, the case of JSW Energy Ltd., is distinguishable from the present case of the Petitioner. Therefore, the judgment of APTEL dated 21.1.2013cannot be made applicable to Gujarat Bid 01 PPAs. The need for installation of FGD has arisen on account of the 2015 MoEF&CC notification dated 7.12.2015 vide which the Ministry has notified stringent norms to be complied by the thermal power generating stations within two years. The Petitioner has achieved COD and has been supplying power to GUVNL till date without FGD. While there were no norms specified for NOx emission by Thermal Power generating stations as on cut-off date, the Nox norms as per MoEF&CC notification is 600 mg / Nm3 for unit size less than 500 MW

43. In view of the above discussion, we conclude that on account of the 2015MoEF&CC Notification, the Petitioner is affected by Change in Law in terms of Article 13of respective PPAs due to change in norms for 1) Particulate Matter (Units 1 and 2 of Mundra Power Project) for GUVNL Bid-01 PPA; 2) Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) for GUVNLBid-01 PPA; and 3) Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx) for both the PPAs i.e. GUVNL Bid-01 PPA and Haryana PPAs.

121. According to Appellants, Respondent No.2 is taking different stands on the very same disputed issue before different Commissions. Therefore, 200 Respondent No.2 cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate. Appellants brought to the notice of the Tribunal two judgments pertaining to CERC on similar Change in Law event where similar factual matrix existed. In those matters there were identical conditions pertaining to ECs and the claim of the generators was that the revised norms amounts to Change in Law event. Respondent No.2 herein was the Discom opposing the claims of the generators. It is noticed from the orders of the CERC that in those matters CERC allowed claims of Change in Law event, which occurred on account of the very same MoEF & CC Notification of 2015. Surprisingly, and strangely Respondent No.2-PSPCL has not challenged those orders of CERC in the following cases. Is it proper now on the part of Respondent No.2-PSPCL to agitate against the claims of the Appellants in these appeals since it has accepted the verdict of CERC in the following cases in similar facts and circumstances? Sr. No. Details of the Petition Forum PSPCL as Respondent

1. Coastal Gujarat Private Limited vs. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited & Ors.(CGPL Case) CERC Respondent No. 6 201 [Petition No. 77/MP/2016]

2. Sasan Power Limited vs. MP Power Management Company Limited & Ors.(Sasan Case) [Petition No. 133/MP/2016] CERC Respondent No. 12

122. We accept the argument of the Appellants that it is in violation of the settled principles of law arising out of legal maxim quod approbo non reprobo (reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab & Ors. vs Dhanjit Singh Sandhu (2014 (15) SCC 144).

123. If Respondent No.2 accepts the orders of CERC, mentioned above, in similar factual matrix pertaining to installation of FGD and/or SNCR or any other suitable technology, which qualifies as Change in Law event, it is estopped from taking a contrary view/stand in respect of the projects in the instant cases.

124. It is seen that based on the Expert Appraisal Committee report, ECs were granted. In both the reports Expert Appraisal Committee while granting recommendation for ECs did not state anything with regard to 202 earmarking of funds towards installation of FGD for SO2 and any suitable system to control NOx emissions. Out of total cost of the project of Rs.8000 Crores, a sum of Rs. 461 Crores was earmarked for the existing environmental protection measures so far as Appellant-TSPLs project is concerned. As far as the Appellant-NPL is concerned, the total cost of the project was about Rs.5500 Crores, which included Rs. 410.10 Crores for environment protection measures. In none of the documents, based on which ECs were provided, there is no mandate for installation of FGD and no separate fund was directed to be earmarked for FGD installation and/or SNCR system.

125. The contention of Respondent No.2 that it was the responsibility of the Appellants to include such costs towards FGD and SNCR, and if the Appellants fail to include such cost, they must blame themselves, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the EC pertaining to Nabha Power was obtained much prior to cut-off date. In terms of RFP and RFQ and other documents, the procurer had to undertake the responsibility of obtaining several consents and clearances including ECs. So also in the case of TSPL except for the fact that EC was issued after cut-off date, the 203 same responsibility of obtaining several consents and clearances including EC was that of the procurer. If Respondent No.2 authorises the Special Purpose Vehicles completely owned and controlled by the then PSEB, the work done by authorized representative (SPVs) of PSEB has to be treated as the work done by the PSEB. If any rights and obligations arise out of discharging such duties by the authorized representatives, the principal

i.e., erstwhile PSEB (Respondent No.2-PSPCL) has not only enjoys the fruits of rights accrued but also has to bear the consequences of default. Therefore, the inference that could be drawn is that the then PSEB was well aware of the then existing laws, guidelines and other formalities to obtain ECs and it knew very well that the only requirement pertaining to FGD was provision for space and no requirement of installation of FGD or funds being demarcated existed. Accordingly, Respondent No.2 did not earmark any such fund in all the preparatory documents/ reports and presentations. In terms of all the agreements between the parties including PPA, the initial consent/clearance included environmental clearance. The procurer was under obligation to comply with these requirements. The seller of power has to only maintain and seek renewal of such consents and clearances. The relevant authorities while renewing consents and 204 clearances never pointed out any default of the seller pertaining to installation of FGD.

126. Coming to prescription of new NOx emission limits, on account of Notification of 2015, the Respondent-Commission denied the said claim as Change in Law event, like FGD for SO2 to achieve the stipulated NOx norms i.e., 300 mg/Nm3 for NOx. The Respondent-Commission rejected the same on the ground that as on today no particular technology for meeting the NOx emission standards was indicated in the CEA report. Primary control measures, and if required secondary NOx control measures become mandatory if NOx levels in terms of MoEF Notification has to be maintained.

127. It is relevant to mention that so far as FGD installation is concerned, right from 2015 the litigation battle before various Commissions is still going on i.e., whether it is Change in Law event or not. One should not have such uncertainty on these issues. We are of the opinion that another prolonged litigation battle should be discouraged if revised NOx control measures are introduced and it becomes imperative for thermal plants to implement such mechanism to control NOx levels to the standards 205 approved by MoEF Notification of 2015. At this stage, may be, there is no definite recommended technology which has to be implemented. The Appellants seems to be having primary NOx control measures as on today. They are not claiming any amount as Change in Law event for this. In case installation of SNCR/any other suitable technology for NOx levels control system is brought in, it would amount to Change in Law. Apparently, in ECs pertaining to the instant appeals there is no condition of earmarking of funds for SNCR/any other suitable technology for controlling NOx emissions. It is not in dispute that the existing low NOx burners with over fire assembly installed may not ultimately achieve the prescribed NOx levels. This is clearly mentioned in the feasibility reports prepared by Tata Consulting Engineers Limited. In terms of PPA, change in legal position during operation period, which has an adverse financial impact on the projects of the Appellants, would definitely quality as a Change In Law event.

128. Then coming to the letter of Ministry of Power dated 30.05.2018, the contents of this letter were relied upon by both the parties. However, both 206 Appellants and Respondent interpret same clauses differently. The relevant portions of the said letter are as under:

5.1 The MoEFCC Notification requiring compliance of Environment (Protection) Amendment Rules, 2015 dated 7th December 2015 is of the nature of Change in Law event except in following cases: . (b) TPPs where such requirement of pollutions control system was mandated under the environment clearance of the plant or envisaged otherwise before the notification of amendment rules.

129. According to the Respondents, this letter refers to two situations (a) where the pollution control system is mandated and (b) where it is envisaged. Respondents contend that the word mandate or otherwise envisaged would mean one and the same. Therefore, according to them, the condition in the EC to provide space for installing FGD at a later stage would mean it is mandated and therefore it does not amount to Change in Law event.

130. It is needless to say that the opinion expressed in this letter is not having any binding effect on any judicial/quasi judicial authority meant to adjudicate the dispute pertaining to Change in Law claim arising out of 207 MoEF & CC Notification. No one can deny the fact that it was within the domain of Respondent-Commission to adjudicate the same initially when dispute was raised before it. In view of hierarchy of authorities, this Tribunal as Appellate Authority has the jurisdiction to interpret whether Commissions interpretation was right or wrong and further express opinion whether the revised norms amounts to Change in Law event or not. However, one cannot find fault with the issuance of such letter by MoP since it has to coordinate with various departments including MoEF and then discharge its functions on various issues pertaining to environment. Under such circumstances, this letter has come into existence.

131. As already stated above, in the case of similarly placed generating companies, who were successful bidders under competitive bidding process having similar terms of PPA, the Respondent-DISCOM has not challenged the orders passed by Respondent-Commission where the very same letter of MoP was relied upon.

132. One of the above contents of MoP letter dated 30.05.2018 reads as follows: 208 TPPs where such requirement of pollution control system was mandated under the environment clearance of the plant or envisaged otherwise before the notification of amended rules.

133. This letter refers to two situations. First one is where thermal power projects have requirement of pollution control system like FGD as a mandate under the environmental clearance of the plant. It would mean that it must be a requirement which has to be mandatorily complied with in terms of environmental clearance of the plant. That means it should be one of the conditions in the EC. The second situation refers to requirement of pollution control system envisaged otherwise before the Notification of amended rules. The expression used is or envisaged otherwise before the Notification in question. There has to be a literal interpretation of the word or envisaged otherwise. The expression or envisaged otherwise in para 5.1 (b) is to be interpreted to mean envisaged in any document but the Environment Clearances. Honble Supreme Court had occasion to opine on the rule of disjunctive interpretation in cases of the use of the word or in LIC vs. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315. The relevant extract is mentioned herein below: 209

148. In order to steer clear of the above interpretation of Section 11(2) learned counsel for the employees put forward the argument that the word or
occurring in the section should not be read as a disjunctive and should be given the meaning and so that the two clauses forming the conditions about which the Central Government has to be satisfied before it can act under the section are taken to be one single whole; but we do not see any reason why the plain meaning of the word should be distorted to suit the convenience or the cause of the employees. It is no doubt true that the word or may be interpreted as and in certain extraordinary circumstances such as in a situation where its use as a disjunctive could obviously not have been intended (see Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax [AIR 1958 SC

861 : 1959 SCR 848] ). Where no compelling reason for the adoption of such a course is, however, available, the word or must be given its ordinary meaning, that is, as a disjunctive. This rule was thus applied to the interpretation of clause (c) of Section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1974 in Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Others v. Bishun Das . [AIR 1967 SC 643 : (1967) 1 SCR 836] by Shelat, J.:

The clause is couched in single and unambiguous language and in its plain meaning provides that it would be a good ground enabling a landlord to sue for eviction without the permission of the District Magistrate if the tenant has made or has permitted to be made without the landlord's consent in writing such construction which materially alters the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value. The language of the clause makes it clear that the legislature wanted to lay down two alternatives which would furnish a ground to the landlord to sue without the District Magistrate's permission, that is, where the tenant has made such construction which would materially alter the accommodation or which would be likely to substantially diminish its value. The ordinary rule of construction is that a provision of a statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons, such as where a literal construction would reduce the provision to absurdity or prevent the manifest intention of the legislature from being carried out. There is no reason why the word or should be construed otherwise than in its ordinary meaning.
[Emphasis Supplied] 210

134. The context, under which the expression or envisaged otherwise before the Notification in question, if compared with the first situation, certainly would mean that such condition of pollution control system was indicated in any other document other than the environmental clearance that must have come into existence before the Notification in question. Therefore, we entirely agree with the arguments of Appellants that the scope of condition at para 5.1(b) of the aforesaid letter would actually mean that a party is not entitled to seek Change in Law claim in respect of any control system, which is already installed in terms of environmental clearance or otherwise required by any other document other than EC. For example, both the Appellants have already complied with some of the parameters envisaged i.e., particulate matter, mercury, specific water consumption, but Appellants have not sought Change in Law claim for these parameters.

135. Pertaining to the stand of Respondent No.2 that if installation of FGD is opined as Change in Law event in compliance of conditions of Notification in question, it would vitiate bidding process since it would prejudice other bidders, on this point, we accept the arguments of the 211 Appellants. The Change in Law event in question has occurred six years after cut-off date. Having regard to the wording of the condition (vi) in the ECs in question, if read with other preparatory documents including competitive bidding guidelines, we are of the opinion that no other bidder could have anticipated/contemplated emerging of new emission norms for SO2 and NOx of the present nature.

136. In short, from the above analysis, what is noticed is a presentation was made before issuance of ECs and said presentation could be only on the basis of prevailing environmental norms. The mechanism required for the control of emissions in terms of the procedure and norms are quite different from what is required so far as the projects of the Appellants is concerned in terms of Notification of the MoEF & CC in 2015. Therefore, in the absence of circumstances requiring FGD installation for these plants at the time of issuing ECs, one cannot opine that such installation was mandatory or envisaged as a statutory requirement in other documents before the notification in question. Condition (vi) in the ECs definitely and certainly refers to installation of FGD if required in future as a mandate, therefore, the general/standard condition at (vi) would mean provision of 212 space for FGD system alone was the requirement. This would mean the necessity may arise or may not arise in future since it depends upon environmental protection measures from time to time which may be statutorily mandated by MoEF & CC and other concerned authorities.

137. Then coming to Clause xxv condition of ECs it has to be read to understand under what context what was mandated as measures or conditions. In other words, Clause xxv should be read to include only the stipulated measures and not anticipated or potential measures. Such an interpretation of Clause xxv of the EC confirms to the business efficacy test laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Transmission Corpn. of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. vs. GMR Vemagiri Power Generation Ltd., (2018)

3 SCC 716 in the following terms:

26. A commercial document cannot be interpreted in a manner to arrive at a complete variance with what may originally have been the intendment of the parties. Such a situation can only be contemplated when the implied term can be considered necessary to lend efficacy to the terms of the contract. If the contract is capable of interpretation on its plain meaning with regard to the true intention of the parties it will not be prudent to read implied terms on the understanding of a party, or by the court, with regard to business efficacy as observed in Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie... 213

34. An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if the court finds that the parties must have intended that term to form part of their contract: it is not enough for the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the parties as reasonable men if it had been suggested to them: it must have been a term that went without saying, a term necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, a term which, although tacit, formed part of the contract which the parties made for themselves....

35. The business efficacy test, therefore, should be applied only in cases where the term that is sought to be read as implied is such which could have been clearly intended by the parties at the time of making of the agreement (Emphasis Supplied)

138. Additional cost for installation of FGD in terms of recommendations obtained from CEA should become part of capital cost. The capital cost already approved and being paid in the form of tariff does not include the cost towards installation of FGD. This additional cost again has to be invested by the generators. We are of the opinion that the Appellants are entitled for carrying cost also. Appellants are justified to claim carrying cost and they have rightly substantiated their claim as under:

As per the settled principle of law (Honble Supreme Court Judgment dated 25.02.2019 in Civil Appeal No. 5865 of 2018. UHBVNL &Anr. vs. CERC &Ors.), the affected party has to be compensated for a Change in Law event along with carrying cost from the effective date till the date of approval
214

139. It is also seen additional funds including debt funds, which will not be sanctioned by lenders (as amount involved is significantly high) in the absence of regulatory certainty for the methodology/mechanism of arriving at compensation to mitigate the impact of Change in Law event.

140. In the light of our discussion and reasoning, we are of the opinion that the impugned Orders, dated 21.12.2018 and 09.01.2019 challenged in both the appeals deserve to be set aside and accordingly set aside by allowing the appeals.

a) The MoEF & CC Notification dated 07.12.2015 is a Change in Law event under PPAs in question having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case of the Appellants.

b) The installation and operation of the FGD and associated system to comply with emission levels of SO2 is Change in Law and additional expenditure for the same including all allied cost like taxes, duties etc., has to be included as Additional Capital Cost to be incurred by the Appellants. 215

c) In case technology for installing and operating SNCR and/or any other appropriate technology is mandated in future for complying with the emission levels of NOx in terms of Notification of 2015, it also amounts to Change in Law event.

d) The Respondent-Commission is directed to devise a mechanism for payment of above amounts by the procurers to both the Appellants towards additional cost and other expenses in relation to procurement, installation, commissioning, operation and maintenance of FGD for SO2 as approved by the concerned authority, after prudence check.

e) Appellants are entitled for carrying cost in terms of provisions of the PPAs to bring the seller-Appellants to the same economic position as if such Change in Law event has not occurred. 216

141. All the Pending IAs, if any shall stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.