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M.A. Abdul Rasheed And Another v. State Of Telangana, Rep. By Its Principal Secretary
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was appointed as Lower Divisional Clerk (LDC) in the Registration and Stamps Department in December 1975. In November 1976, he was asked to appear for an oral test before the District Collector, and subsequently, in December 1976, he was removed from service. The removal order was challenged before the Administrative Tribunal in 1977, which directed reinstatement of the applicants in 1978. The petitioner alleges non-compliance with these directions. Later, in October 2000, the petitioner’s request for appointment as Junior Assistant was rejected, and this writ petition challenges that rejection order after a delay of over 19 years.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the writ petition challenging the rejection of the petitioner’s appointment after a long delay is maintainable.
- The scope and applicability of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases involving delay and laches.
- The effect of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, including the limitation period for filing an Original Application before the Administrative Tribunal.
- Whether sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay in instituting the writ petition after the abolition of the Administrative Tribunal.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The petitioner contended that he is a poor person and sought Legal Aid from the High Court Legal Services Committee, which was rejected in 2017.
- The petitioner implied that financial constraints and rejection of Legal Aid justify condonation of delay in filing the writ petition.
No detailed arguments from the respondents are provided in the opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Jammu and Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri, (2015) 15 SCC 602 | Delay and laches in filing writ petitions; non-maintainability of writ petitions filed after unexplained long delay | Used to illustrate that delay and laches not satisfactorily explained render writ petition non-maintainable. |
| City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala, (2009) 1 SCC 168 | Factors to consider under Article 226 when exercising writ jurisdiction, including delay, alternative remedies, and public policy | Outlined criteria for judicial scrutiny of writ petitions involving delay and factual complexity. |
| Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 | Delay or laches as a factor in discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 | Supported the principle that courts may refuse to exercise writ jurisdiction where there is negligence and delay causing prejudice. |
| State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 | High Court’s discretion to deny relief in cases of unexplained inordinate delay and the resulting prejudice to third parties | Reiterated that unexplained delay and creation of third-party rights weigh against entertaining writ petitions. |
| Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 | Doctrine of delay and laches in writ jurisdiction; importance of bona fide and timely approach to court | Emphasized that delay is a serious impediment to equity and courts must scrutinize late claims carefully. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the petitioner’s delay in instituting the writ petition challenging the rejection order dated 09.10.2000, noting that the petitioner had a one-year limitation period under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, to file an Original Application before the Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner failed to avail this remedy within the prescribed time. After the Tribunal’s abolition, the petitioner sought to file a writ petition under Article 226, but no limitation is prescribed for such petitions. However, the Court emphasized that delay and laches remain critical factors in exercising discretionary writ jurisdiction.
The Court relied on Supreme Court precedents establishing that unexplained delay and laches, especially when no bona fide reasons are shown, justify refusal to entertain writ petitions. The Court considered the petitioner’s claim of financial constraints and rejection of Legal Aid but found the explanation insufficient to justify a delay of nearly two decades. The Court held that the writ jurisdiction is extraordinary and equitable, and delay undermines equity and causes prejudice.
Consequently, the Court declined to revive the stale claim, emphasizing that mere abolition of the Tribunal does not revive extinguished causes of action, and delay alone can bar relief even if the underlying claim has merit.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the rejection of his appointment as Junior Assistant on the grounds of delay and laches.
The direct effect is that the petitioner’s claim is barred due to inordinate delay and failure to invoke the appropriate forum within the prescribed limitation period. No new precedent was set; the decision adheres to established principles limiting writ jurisdiction in cases of unexplained delay and laches.
P. Naveen Rao, J.:— The 1 petitioner claims that he was appointed as Lower Divisional Clerk (LDC) in Registration and Stamps Department vide proceedings, dated 02.12.1975. While so, vide letter, dated 15.11.1976, he was asked to appear before the District Collector for an oral test to be held on 16.11.1976. Thereafter, by proceedings, dated 03.12.1976, he was removed from service. The order of removal was challenged before the Hon'ble Administrative Tribunal in R.P. No. 152 of 1977. The Tribunal heard R.P. No. 152 of 1977 along with R.P. No. 230 of 1976 and batch on 14.11.1978 and issued directions to the respondents therein for reinstatement of the applicants therein.
2. The 1 petitioner alleges that those directions are yet to be complied. Subsequently, orders were passed on 09.10.2000 rejecting the request of the 1 petitioner for appointment as Junior Assistant. In this Writ Petition, the 1 petitioner challenges the said decision.
3. In other words, this Writ Petition is instituted challenging the order of rejection of claim of the 1 petitioner for appointment as Junior Assistant after more than 19 years. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, except narrating the factual background and earlier litigation, there is no pleading as to why the 1 petitioner could not institute O.A. before the then Hon'ble Administrative Tribunal challenging the order of rejection. By the time the order was passed, the Hon'ble A.P. Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, ‘the Act’) was vested with exclusive jurisdiction to deal with service matters. As per Section 21 of the Act, the aggrieved person has to avail the remedy provided by Section 19 of the Act within one year from the date of decision, by which he is aggrieved. Thus, the petitioner had one year time from the date of rejection order, dated 09.10.2000 to institute an O.A. challenging the said order. The petitioner did not avail the said remedy. The Tribunal is since abolished and an aggrieved person can institute Writ Petition before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4. In the following decisions, Supreme Court succinctly put the scope of exercise of power of judicial review when there is delay in knocking the doors of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
5. In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri (2015) 15 SCC 602, the very issue of delay in instituting the writ petition after long lapse of time was considered. It was a case of dismissal and challenge was on the ground of violation of procedural safeguards incorporated into the Jammu & Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Disciplinary action resulted in imposing punishment of dismissal from service by order dated 06.09.1999. This was challenged by filing writ petition in the High Court on 18.02.2006. There was a delay of 7 years in filing writ petition.
6. The State Government raised objection on maintainability of writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. Without accepting this plea, punishment was set aside holding that Rule 34 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules was not complied. Even in appeal the Division Bench has not considered objection on delay in filing writ petition. Hence, appeal before Supreme Court. Supreme Court held that the delay and laches were not satisfactorily explained and, therefore, Writ Petition was not maintainable.
7. Supreme Court reviewed the precedent decisions and held:
“20. Having stated thus, it is useful to refer to a passage from City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala [City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala, (2009) 1 SCC 168], wherein this Court while dwelling upon jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 175, para 30)
“30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether:
(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;
(b) the petition reveals all material facts;
(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;
(d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;
(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;
(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. In this regard reference to a passage from Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan (2006) 4 SCC 322 would be apposite:
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. After so stating, the Supreme Court, by referring to the authority in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566, restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements to the following effect:
“9…. the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108, it is ruled thus:
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant--a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, ‘procrastination is the greatest thief of time’ and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” (emphasis supplied)
11. Supreme Court further held,
“26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Though there is no limitation prescribed to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court certainly would look into the bona fides of agitating the claim and the reasons for not invoking the Administrative Tribunal within a reasonable time, to entertain the Writ Petition instituted after long lapse of arising cause of action. In this case, more particularly, at the relevant time the jurisdiction was vested with A.P. Administrative Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which prescribed limitation as one year. As no case was filed within one year, the cause to avail legal remedy extinguished. Merely because subsequently Tribunal is abolished and no limitation is prescribed to file writ petition is not a ground to revive the cause of action. Further, independently also unless satisfactory explanation is offered on delay to institute the writ petition challenging the order of rejection of employment dated 09.10.2000, the Court would not entertain writ petition as a matter of course.
13. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners sought to contend that the 1 petitioner is a poor person and due to financial constraints, he sought for Legal Aid for filing petition before the High Court Legal Services Committee, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, but, the request to provide Legal Aid was rejected and on appeal filed before the Chairman, High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, the same was also rejected in the year 2017. It is seen that for the first time request to grant Legal Aid was made in the year 2014 and request was rejected on 30.11.2017. This writ petition is filed three years later to the rejection of the Legal Aid. No reasons are stated why he kept quiet till 2014 and merely because Legal Aid was sought is no ground to condone the laches otherwise palpable. No sufficient cause is shown to file writ petition after 19 years from the date of decision of the competent authority. On a stale claim, Court is not inclined to go into merits. Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches even assuming what is claimed is valid.
14. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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