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L. Sankar Rao v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh & Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Dec 20, 2016
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition under Article 226 challenges the State Government order G.O.Ms.No.29, Social Welfare (CV.2) Department, dated 23.02.2008, which rejected the petitioner’s statutory appeal against the District Collector, Vizianagaram’s proceedings dated 08.11.1999 cancelling the petitioner’s Konda Kapu (Scheduled Tribe) caste certificate issued on 12.04.1967.

The factual matrix in the opinion states that the petitioner joined Bharat Heavy Plates and Vessels, Visakhapatnam in 1972 and retired voluntarily on 31.12.2001. Enquiries into the petitioner’s caste status began on a complaint by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Association. A Mandal Revenue Officer (respondent No.3) submitted reports in 1981 (D.Dis.1757/81 dated 12.06.1981) and in 1988 (proceedings No.93/88D dated 19.08.1988) stating the petitioner belonged to the Konda Kapu community. A show cause notice dated 17.03.1994 led to W.P.No.12239 of 1994 which was dismissed on 29.10.1997 but kept open to authorities to proceed with enquiries.

After the Andhra Pradesh (SC, ST & BCs) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 ("the Act"), the District Collector referred the matter to the District Level Scrutiny Committee; relying on the Committee’s report the Collector cancelled the caste certificate by order dated 08.11.1999 under Section 5 of the Act. The petitioner filed a statutory appeal on 06.12.1999; respondent No.1 (State) dismissed it by G.O.Ms.No.39 dated 30.03.2001. The petitioner then filed W.P.No.8703 of 2001; this Court set aside G.O.Ms.No.39 by order dated 30.06.2006 and remanded for fresh decision. On remand respondent No.1 again rejected the appeal by G.O.Ms.No.29 dated 23.02.2008. The present writ petition challenges those decisions. The Court issued Rule nisi on 22.04.2008 and passed an interim direction (in WPMP No.11801 of 2008) protecting the petitioner from prosecution pending determination.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents were justified in holding repeated and successive enquiries and whether that action is sustainable and tenable?
  2. Whether the reports dated 03.07.1989, 13.06.1990, 23.09.1992 and 06.09.1993, relied upon by respondent No.2 and the Committee, could be relied upon to reach the impugned conclusion?
  3. Whether the impugned orders are in accordance with the Act and the Rules made thereunder and thus tenable?
  4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as placed by learned Senior Counsel)

  • The impugned orders are illegal, arbitrary, violative of Article 14 and contrary to the spirit and object of the Act and Rules.
  • The respondents erred in conducting repeated enquiries; such repetition violates Article 14.
  • Respondents failed to furnish the reports of respondent No.3 on which they relied; this failure vitiates proceedings and violates principles of natural justice.
  • The impugned orders reflect non-application of mind and are untenable.
  • The findings of the primary and appellate authorities are contrary to the Rules.
  • Criminal prosecution C.C.No.498 of 1992 (Sections 471, 418 and 420 IPC) resulted in acquittal.
  • Reliance was placed on this Court’s decision in Govt. of A.P. v. R.K. Ragala, 1994 (2) ALT 28 (D.B.) and on the order dated 10.06.2016 in W.P.No.8033 of 2007 to support the objection to repeated enquiries and harassment.

Respondents' Arguments (as placed by learned Government Pleader)

  • The impugned orders comply with the Act and Rules and do not suffer from any error; hence not amenable to judicial review under Article 226.
  • Respondent No.2 considered the material on record meticulously before passing the cancellation order; respondent No.1 confirmed the same on appeal.
  • Complete opportunity was afforded to the petitioner; thus there was no violation of natural justice.
  • The enquiry in question cannot be described as a repeated enquiry in view of the Court’s order in W.P.No.12239 of 1994.
  • Since the petitioner’s relatives belong to forward castes, the petitioner cannot claim Scheduled Tribe status.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Govt. of A.P. by its Secretary, GAD (Special) Department, Hyderabad v. R.K. Ragala, Deputy Inspector General of Police (CID) PCR Cell, Hyderabad, 1994 (2) ALT 28 (Division Bench) Principle that repeated or successive enquiries into a citizen’s status, where earlier competent enquiries have concluded the matter, amount to harassment and are not permissible; courts will protect citizens from constant harassment by repeated enquiries (discussion of Article 21 and Article 14 implications). The Court relied on this decision to hold that the third enquiry into the petitioner’s caste status was unjustified and amounted to impermissible repetition in the face of earlier enquiries that had found in the petitioner’s favour.
W.P.No.8033 of 2007 (order dated 10.06.2016) Applied the reasoning in the Ragala judgment to restrain repeated enquiries and to prevent harassment by successive enquiries (referenced as follow-on authority applying the same principles). The Court followed the order in W.P.No.8033 of 2007 and treated it as supportive precedent for preventing the initiation of a further enquiry after earlier favourable enquiries; this helped lead to the conclusion that an additional enquiry was unsustainable.
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (reported authorities cited in the opinion) Demonstrates the expansive scope of Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty) and supports protection from constant harassment by repeated enquiries. The Court cited Kharak Singh for the proposition that Article 21 protects personal liberty broadly and includes protection from being subjected to repeated harassment by successive enquiries.
Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. (Constitution Bench) Article 21 has both negative and affirmative dimensions; the decision elaborates the scope of Article 21 and its capacity to protect rights that flow from life and personal liberty. The Court invoked Unni Krishnan in explaining the expansive and protective reach of Article 21, reinforcing that repeated enquiries causing harassment can fall foul of Article 21 protections.
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (referenced) Referenced as the narrower interpretation of Article 21 which was departed from by subsequent decisions; used in the narrative tracing doctrinal development. The Court cited A. K. Gopalan to contrast its narrow view with later expansive interpretations and to show doctrinal evolution relevant to the protection against harassment.
Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 SC 597 Held that Article 21 carries an expansive meaning and has given rise to a large body of human rights jurisprudence; supports broader protections under Article 21. The Court relied on Menaka Gandhi to underscore that Article 21’s content is broad and that it safeguards citizens from deprivations including harassment arising from repeated enquiries.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the case by reference to the four points framed. The analysis is set out point-wise as reflected in the opinion.

Point No.1 (Repeated enquiries)

The Court reviewed the chronology of earlier enquiries (1981 and 1987) in which the Mandal Revenue Officer had recorded reports in favour of the petitioner. The Court held that, in view of the legal principles enunciated in the cited Division Bench decision (1994 (2) ALT 28) and subsequent application in W.P.No.8033 of 2007, there was no justification for initiating a third enquiry. The Court rejected the Government Pleader’s contention that the earlier dismissal of W.P.No.12239 of 1994 precluded the petitioner from raising the challenge to repetition; the Court found that dismissal of that petition did not bar the present challenge to the successive enquiries. Conclusion: the third enquiry was unsustainable and untenable.

Point No.2 (Reliance on certain reports and natural justice)

The petitioner alleged that some enquiry reports (03.07.1989, 13.06.1990 and 06.09.1993) were produced without his knowledge ("behind the back" of the petitioner). The respondents did not deny this averment in their counter-affidavit. The District Collector’s order indicated reliance on those reports. The Court therefore accepted the petitioner’s uncontested averment and held that reliance on such undisclosed reports constituted a patent violation of principles of natural justice and vitiated the proceedings.

Point No.3 (Compliance with the Act and Rules)

The Court noted specific procedural and substantive defects: respondent No.2’s order disregarded school records despite Rule 8(d)(5) of the Rules (1997) which mandates consideration of school records during enquiry; respondent No.2 did not provide the petitioner an opportunity to make a representation after receipt of the Committee’s report as required by Section 5 of the Act; and the appellate order by respondent No.1 failed to address points urged by the petitioner and lacked adequate reasons. The Court emphasised that quasi-judicial orders must be supported by valid reasons. On these bases the Court found the impugned orders contrary to the Act and Rules and violative of Article 14 and principles of natural justice.

Point No.4 (Relief under Article 226)

In view of the conclusions on Points 1–3, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to relief under Article 226. The Court also noted that a criminal prosecution arising from the impugned administrative action (C.C.No.498 of 1992) ended in acquittal by judgment dated 26.03.1997, a fact taken into account in the overall assessment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: For the reasons set out, the writ petition is allowed. The Court set aside both:

  • G.O.Ms.No.29, Social Welfare (CV.2) Department, dated 23.02.2008 (respondent No.1’s appellate order rejecting the petitioner’s appeal); and
  • The proceedings of Respondent No.2 (District Collector, Vizianagaram) dated 08.11.1999 (order cancelling the petitioner’s caste certificate).

There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the writ petition stand disposed of.

Implications: The direct effect is the setting aside of the relevant administrative orders and the removal of the cancellation of the petitioner’s caste certificate as effected by those orders. The opinion does not elaborate broader policy or precedential consequences beyond applying and following existing case law addressing harassment by repeated enquiries and enforcing procedural safeguards (Section 5 of the Act; Rule 8(d)(5) of the Rules). Accordingly, the immediate consequence is relief to the petitioner and disposal of pending incidental petitions.

Show all summary ...

This writ petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assails the order passed by respondent No.1-State Government vide G.O.Ms.No.29, Social Welfare (CV.2) Department, dated 23.02.2008, rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner against the proceedings of Respondent No.2-District Collector, Vizianagaram, dated 08.11.1999.

Heard Smt.M.Bhaskara Lakshmi, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare for the respondents, apart from perusing the material available before the Court.

According to the petitioner, he joined the services of Bharat Heavy Plates and Vessels, Visakhapatnam in the year 1972 and he retired from service on voluntary basis on 31.12.2001. Earlier, on the complaint made by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Association, enquiry was initiated against the petitioner and on the directions issued by respondent No.2, respondent No.3-Mandal Revenue Officer, Salur submitted a report vide D.Dis.1757/81, dated 12.06.1981, stating that the petitioner herein belongs to ‘Konda Kapu’ community, a Scheduled Tribe. Subsequently, in the year 1987, once again, the enquiry was initiated by the respondent-authorities and on 19.08.1988, respondent No.3 submitted a report vide proceedings No.93/88D, stating that the petitioner belongs to ‘Konda Kapu’ community. Thereafter, respondent No.2 issued a notice on 08.03.1991, asking the petitioner to appear for enquiry with regard to the verification of his caste status. According to the petitioner, he submitted all the details. Subsequently, on 17.03.1994, respondent No.2 issued a show cause notice, asking the petitioner to show cause as to why the caste certificate issued to him on 12.04.1967 should not be cancelled. Questioning the validity of the said show cause notice, dated 17.03.1994, the petitioner filed W.P.No.12239 of 1994 before this Court. The said writ petition was dismissed on 29.10.1997, keeping it open to the authorities to proceed with the enquiry by duly giving opportunity to the petitioner. Thereafter, respondent No.2 referred the matter for enquiry to the District Level Scrutiny Committee (hereinafter called as ‘the Committee’) under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (SC, ST & BCs) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 (hereinafter called as ‘the Act’) and the Rules made thereunder. In pursuance of the same, the Committee conducted enquiry and submitted a report. Subsequently, respondent No.2 passed an order, dated 08.11.1999, under Section 5 of the Act, cancelling the Konda Kapu-ST caste certificate issued earlier in favour of the petitioner by respondent No.3 on 12.04.1967. Assailing the said order, the petitioner preferred a statutory appeal before respondent No.1 under Section 7 of the Act on 06.12.1999. Subsequently, respondent No.1 vide G.O.Ms.No.39, Social Welfare (VC.2) Department, dated 30.03.2001, dismissed the said appeal, confirming the order passed by respondent No.2 on 08.11.1999. Challenging the validity of the said order passed by respondent No.1, the petitioner approached this Court by way of W.P.No.8703 of 2001. This Court by way of an order, dated 30.06.2006, disposed of the said writ petition, setting aside the order passed by respondent No.1 vide G.O.Ms.No.39, dated 30.03.2001, and directing respondent No.1 to pass orders afresh.

After the above said remand, respondent No.1 vide G.O.Ms.No.29, dated 23.02.2008, rejected the appeal once again, thereby upholding the orders passed earlier vide G.O.Ms.No.39, dated 30.03.2001, and the orders of respondent No.2, dated 08.11.1999, cancelling the caste certificate of the petitioner. In the above backdrop, challenging the validity and the legal sustainability of the orders passed by respondent No.1 vide G.O.Ms.No.29, dated 23.02.2008, and the orders of respondent No.2, dated 08.11.1999, the present writ petition came to be filed. This Court, while ordering Rule nisi on 22.04.2008, passed interim order in WPMP No.11801 of 2008 and while noting the retirement of the petitioner in 2001 itself, directed that the petitioner shall not be subjected to the prosecution pursuant to the impugned order.

Responding to the Rule nisi issued by this Court, a counter-affidavit, deposed by respondent No.2 is filed, denying the averments and the allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and in the direction of justifying the impugned action.

Submissions/contentions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner:

(1) The orders under challenge are highly illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and opposed to the very spirit and object of the Act and the Rules made thereunder.

(2) The respondents grossly erred in holding repeated enquiries and the same is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

(3) Failure on the part of the respondents in furnishing the reports of respondent No.3, on which they placed reliance, is fatal and vitiates the entire proceedings and is a clear violation of the principles of natural justice.

(4) The impugned orders are the result of total non-application of mind, as such, they are untenable.

(5) The findings of the primary and appellate authorities are contrary to the Rules.

(6) The prosecution launched against the petitioner vide C.C.No.498 of 1992 on the file of II Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 471, 418 and 420 I.P.C. ended in acquittal.

To bolster her submissions and contentions, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of this Court in Govt. of A.P. by its Secretary, GAD (Special) Department, Hyderabad Vs. R.K.Ragala, Deputy Inspector General of Police (CID) PCR Cell, Hyderabad (1994 (2) ALT 28 (D.B.)and the order, dated 10.06.2016, passed in W.P.No.8033 of 2007.

Submissions/contentions of the learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare for the respondents:

(1) The orders under challenge are in accordance with the Act and the Rules made thereunder and the same do not suffer from any error or infirmity, and in the absence of the same, the impugned orders are not amenable for any judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(2) Only after meticulously and thoroughly considering the entire material available on record, respondent No.2 passed the impugned orders and respondent No.1 confirmed the same in appeal.

(3) The respondents afforded complete opportunity to the petitioner, as such, the complaint of violation of principles of natural justice is untenable.

(4) The enquiry initiated in the instant case cannot be described as a repeated enquiry in view of the orders passed by this Court in W.P.No.12239 of 1994.

(5) Since all the relatives of the petitioner belong to forward caste, the petitioner cannot claim the status of Scheduled Tribe.

In the above backdrop, now the points that boil down for consideration in the present writ petition are:

(1) Whether the respondents are justified in holding repeated and successive enquiries and whether the said action is sustainable and tenable?

(2) Whether the reports, dated 03.07.1989, 13.06.1990, 23.09.1992 and 06.09.1993, which form the basis for respondent No.2 and the Committee to resort to the impugned action, can be relied upon by the respondents for coming to the impugned conclusion?

(3) Whether the orders impugned are in accordance with the Act and the Rules made thereunder and whether the same are tenable? and

(4) Whether the petitioner is entitled for any relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

Point No.1: The information available before this Court manifestly reveals that earlier in the year 1981, the respondent-authorities initiated enquiry on the basis of a complaint made by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Association and pursuant to the directions of respondent No.2, respondent No.3 submitted a report vide D.Dis.1757/81, dated 12.06.1981, stating that the petitioner herein belongs to ‘Konda Kapu’ community, a Scheduled Tribe. Subsequently, in the year 1987, once again, the enquiry was initiated and respondent No.3 vide proceedings No.93/88D, dated 19.08.1988, submitted a report to respondent No.2 stating that the petitioner belongs to ‘Konda Kapu’ community. A perusal of the said report, dated 19.08.1988, shows that respondent No.3 recorded statements of various persons including the Village Sarpanch and Munsif.

After the advent of the present Legislation in the year 1993, once again, the authorities initiated enquiry and respondent No.2 referred the matter to the Committee and basing on the report of the Committee, respondent No.2 cancelled the caste certificate of the petitioner without adhering to the mandatory requirements of Section 5 of the Act, which mandates that if the District Collector is of the opinion that a person fraudulently obtained the certificate, opportunity of making a representation should be given. While referring to the previous enquiries, which went in favour of the petitioner, it is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the action of holding repeated and successive enquiries is unsustainable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the judgment referred to supra and the order, dated 10.06.2016, passed in W.P.No.8033 of 2007.

Therefore, it would be appropriate to refer to the said judgments. In the judgment reported in 1994 (2) ALT 28, at paragraphs 9, 15, 16 and 17, the Division Bench held as under:

“9. It is well-established principle that a mere show cause notice will not be interfered with by the Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The contention of the learned Government Pleader in this respect is not disputed; but the question which falls for consideration is, whether a citizen can be subjected to repeated enquiries. The enquiry reports of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapuram dated 20-5-1957 and the Inspector-General of Police, CID dated 31-5-1988, which were produced before the learned single Judge, are not disputed by the appellants. The learned Government Pleader relied on GO Ms. No. 147 dated 27-4-1977 laying down that social status certificate can be issued by Officer not below the rank of a Tahsildar or Revenue Divisional Officer, Sub-Collector etc. All the certificates which were issued in favour of the first respondent were issued by the Officers not below the rank of a Tahsildar and therefore, there is no violation of the said GO. The learned Government Pleader referred to GO Ms. No. 289 dated 28-11-1986, according to which, all Gazetted Officers were competent to issue caste certificates. It is not disputed that the certificates issued in favour of the first respondent were by Gazetted Officers. The learned Government Pleader next placed reliance on GO Ms. No. 282 dated 19-12-1988 empowering the District Magistrates etc., to cancel false certificates. He also relied on GO Ms. No. 117 dated 1-1-1989 under which the Collectors, Inspector-Generals of Police, CID etc., are the competent authorities to enquire into the allegations with regard to false caste certificates. In case of conflict of reports of different authorities, a High-level Committee constituted under GO Ms. No. 3 dated 8-11-1989 has to go into the same and resolve the conflict. The first enquiry was held on the direction of the Court in the year 1956 culminating in the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapurarn dated 30-5-1957. It was held in the said report that the first respondent belongs to Konda-Kapu Community. A second enquiry was conducted by the Inspector-General of Police, CID, and in the report dated 31-5-1988 it was held that the first respondent belongs to konda kapu community. These enquiries are in conformity with the Government Orders which were in force at the relevant time. Holding of yet another enquiry, in the face of the above two enquiries, in our view, would amount to holding of repeated enquiries. It is pertinent to note that there is no reference to the report of the Inspector-General of Police dated 31-5-1988 in the impugned show cause notice. Obviously, neither the Government of Andhra Pradesh, nor the District Collector, East Godavari, have taken into consideration the report of the Inspector-General of Police, before initiating the present proceedings. It is also to be noted that there was no allegation of any fraud played by the first respondent in obtaining the social status certificates or in the issuance of enquiry reports of the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Inspector-General of Police.

15. The learned Counsel for the first respondent contended that the right conferred on a citizen by Article 21 of the Constitution is an ever expanding concept and is capable of protecting a citizen from constant harassment by holding successive enquiries into matters which were concluded and set at rest by enquiries conducted by competent authorities. He referred to Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P. The Supreme Court, explaining the scope of Article 21, held as follows:

"Now let us consider the scope of Article 21. The expression 'life' used in that Article cannot be confined only to the taking away of life; i.e., causing death.".....

"We shall now proceed with the examination of the width, scope and content of the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21. We feel unable to hold that the term was intended to bear only this narrow interpretation but on the other hand consider that 'personal liberty' is used in the Article as a compendious term to include within itself all the verities of rights which go to make up the 'personal liberties' of man other than those dealt with in the several clauses of Art.

19(1). In other words, while Art. 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes of that freedom, 'personal liberty' in Art. 21 takes in and comprises the residue".

16. In Unni Krishnan vs. State of A.P., the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had this to say dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution.

"Article 21 declares that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. It is true that the Article is worded in negative terms but it is now well-settled that Article 21 has both a negative and an affirmative dimension".

The observations of Rajgopala Ayyangar, J. in Kharak Singh case (6 supra) were quoted with approval. It was further observed "from Article 21 has sprung up the whole lot of human rights, jurisprudence, viz., right to legal aid and speedy trial and so on....."

Article 21 of the Constitution reads as follows:

"Protection of life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

Though Article 21 is couched in negative language, it is obvious that it confers a fundamental right to life and personal liberty. By a catena of decisions the scope of the words "personal liberty", as used in Article 21, is interpreted by the Supreme Court in wide terms. The narrow interpretation placed on the words "personal liberty" in A. K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras (1950 SCR 88) was departed from in Menaka Gandhi vs. Union of India (1978 SC 597). It is now clear that from Art. 21 had sprung up a whole lot of human rights jurisprudence and it is now well-settled that 'Art. 21 has both negative and affirmative dimensions. In this expanding scenario of the scope of Art. 21, we have no hesitation in holding that a citizen is entitled to live with dignity and without being harassed by repealed enquiries. This, of course, is subject to the condition that the earlier enquiries were conducted in accordance with law.

17. Having said so, we have to consider whether the earlier enquiries conducted against the first respondent were valid. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapuram, who conducted enquiry in the year 1956 and submitted his report in 1957 holding that the first respondent belongs to a Scheduled Tribe, was competent to hold the enquiry. The subsequent enquiry conducted in the year 1988 by the Inspector General of Police, CID, Hyderabad in which also it is held that the first respondent belongs to the community of Konda Kapu, was validly held. The Government Orders relied on by the learned Government Pleader support the view that those enquiries were validly conducted and are legal. There is no suggestion in the impugned proceedings that the earlier enquiries were conducted invalidly. The mere fact that some new evidence is gathered subsequently will not invalidate the earlier enquiries and the findings thereon, which were legally held and which were based on evidence. The first respondent's father was recorded to be konda kapu and he was born in the year 1889. The birth certificate of the first respondent dated 15-7-37 perused by the Inspector General of Police CID which was taken from the Mandal Revenue Officer, Peddapuram, also revealed that the first respondent is a konda kapu. We are considering these facts not for the purpose of finding out whether the first respondent belongs to the community of konda kapu, but only to test whether the earlier enquiries were based on proper material. It is to be noted that the first respondent is at the fag end of his career and it is not proper to subject him to further harassment by holding repeated enquiries in the face of the reports of the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Inspector General of Police. “

Following the above said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, this Court allowed W.P.No.8033 of 2007 on 10.06.2016. In the instant case also, as mentioned in the preceding portions of this order, the respondent-authorities caused enquiries into the social status of the petitioner twice earlier, one in the year 1981 and another in the year 1987, and the respondent-authorities, after holding the enquiries, categorically found in favour of the petitioner.

In view of the law laid down in the judgments referred to above, this Court finds absolutely no justification on the part of the respondents in initiating enquiry once again.

The contention of the learned Government Pleader that in view of the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.12239 of 1994, the enquiry in the instant case cannot be said to be a successive enquiry, in the considered opinion of this Court, is unsustainable and untenable and dismissal of the said writ petition would not debar the petitioner from raising the contention, touching the aspect of holding repeated and successive enquiries as the said writ petition was filed against a show cause notice issued against the petitioner.

Therefore, Point No.1 is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents, holding that the very enquiry held against the petitioner for the third time is unsustainable and untenable in the eye of law.

Point No.2: Though it is the categoric case of the petitioner in the writ affidavit as ground No.9(m) that the enquiry culminated in the reports, dated 03.07.1989, 13.06.1990 and 06.09.1993, was conduced behind the back of the petitioner, the same is not denied by the respondents in their counter-affidavit. A perusal of the order of respondent No.2-District Collector shows that he placed reliance on the above reports of respondent No.3-Mandal Revenue Officer, Salur. In the absence of any denial of such statement made in the writ affidavit, the said averments are required to be taken as correct. If that being so, the said action on the part of the respondents is, undoubtedly, fatal to the case of the respondents. The said action, in the considered opinion of this Court, is un-hesitatingly a patent violation of the principles of natural justice and the same vitiates the entire proceedings.

Therefore, Point No.2 is also answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents, holding that the impugned action is violative of the principles of natural justice.

Point No.3: Respondent No.2 in the impugned orders of cancellation observed that the school records need not be considered and the said finding is contrary to Rule 8(d)(5) of the Rules framed under the Act in the year 1997, which mandates the consideration of the school records also during the course of enquiry.

Another significant aspect, which needs mention in this context, is that the order of respondent No.2 does not show that he, after submission of the report by the Committee, has afforded opportunity of making representation to the petitioner, as mandated under Section 5 of the Act. Respondent No.2, in fact, ought to have given notice after receipt of the report of the Committee, calling for objections of the petitioner on the report by supplying the same to the petitioner. The order of respondent No.2 does not disclose any sort of exercise in the said direction.

A reading of the appellate order passed by respondent No.1 also shows that the appellate authority did not consider any of the points urged by the petitioner. It is a settled and well established proposition of law that orders of the quasi judicial authorities are required to be supported by valid reasons and in the instant case, the said principle is followed in breach.

In view of these aspects and the infirmities pointed out above, this point is also answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents, holding that the impugned orders are not in accordance with the Act and the Rules made thereunder and on the other hand, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the principles of natural justice.

Point No.4: In view of the findings on Point Nos.1 to 3, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner is certainly entitled for indulgence of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

It is also significant to note that as a consequence of the orders of respondent No.2, criminal prosecution was launched against the petitioner vide C.C.No.498 of 1992 on the file of II Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam and by way of judgment, dated 26.03.1997, the learned Magistrate acquitted the petitioner of the alleged offences punishable under Sections 471, 418 and 420 I.P.C.

For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed, setting aside the orders passed by respondent No.1-State Government vide G.O.Ms.No.29, Social Welfare (CV.2) Department, dated 23.02.2008, and the proceedings of Respondent No.2-District Collector, Vizianagaram, dated 08.11.1999. There shall be no order as to costs.

Consequently, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending in this writ petition shall stand disposed of.