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Subhash Chandra Jha v. State Of U.P.

Allahabad High Court
Mar 6, 2020
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Judicial Opinion Summary — Application under Section 439(2) CrPC (Bail Cancellation)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for cancellation of bail granted to Yuvraj Singh (opposite party no. 2). Bail had been allowed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bareilly by order dated 29.11.2019 in Case Crime No. 629 of 2018 registered at Police Station Baradari, District Bareilly. The offences in that case were registered under Sections 420 and 406 of the Penal Code, 1860, Section 69 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Section 25 of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction, Ownership & Maintenance) Act, 2010.

The applicant (through counsel) contended that Yuvraj Singh, identified as Director of Alliance Builders and Construction Limited, Bareilly, had developed a colony called "Super City" in 2007 and that purchasers (including the first informant) paid money for flats. The applicant alleged that the accused filed a civil suit after lodging of the FIR as a mischievous act to obtain advantage in the criminal proceedings; that despite alleged delivery of possession several years earlier, sale deeds were not executed; that the accused lacked title and acted dishonestly from inception; that a petition to quash the charge-sheet had been dismissed by a co-ordinate Bench on 01.10.2019; and that after surrendering on 29.11.2019 the accused obtained bail the same day and thereafter misused bail and tampered with prosecution witnesses.

The Additional Government Advocate (A.G.A.) opposed cancellation, submitting that the court below had perused the material and correctly granted bail; that the affidavit did not make out the statutory requirements for cancellation; that there was no specific averment of misuse of bail or tampering; and that a charge-sheet had already been submitted, indicating conclusion of investigation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the bail granted to Yuvraj Singh on 29.11.2019 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bareilly (in Case Crime No. 629 of 2018) should be cancelled under Section 439(2) CrPC on the grounds alleged by the applicant (including misuse of liberty, tampering with witnesses/evidence, dishonest intention regarding property transactions, and other grounds identified in the affidavit).
  2. Whether the factual and documentary material on record (including the charge-sheet and the alleged lack of criminal antecedents) supplies specific grounds to warrant interference with the discretion exercised by the court below in granting bail.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The opposite party no. 2 (Yuvraj Singh) is Director of Alliance Builders and had developed "Super City" in Bareilly in 2007; allotments were taken and money paid by purchasers including the first informant.
  • The accused filed a civil suit after the FIR was lodged; the suit was said to be a mischievous act intended to obtain advantage in the criminal matter.
  • The court below erred in granting bail by overlooking evidence collected during investigation; the trial court must weigh statements and investigation material and should not decide bail by improperly investigating the reliability/genuineness of the FIR or the material at that stage.
  • Although possession was allegedly delivered several years ago, sale deeds were not executed; the accused purportedly lacked title and therefore could not execute sale deeds in favour of allottees.
  • The accused's dishonest intention existed from inception; a petition to quash the charge-sheet had been dismissed by a co-ordinate Bench on 01.10.2019.
  • The accused surrendered and obtained bail on the same day (29.11.2019) and, after release on bail, is allegedly misusing bail and tampering with prosecution witnesses; the case is claimed to be heinous/grievous and thus bail should be cancelled.

Respondent / State (A.G.A.) Arguments

  • The court below examined the material and correctly granted bail; there is no basis for cancellation because the affidavit does not specify the required grounds for cancellation.
  • No misuse of bail or tampering with evidence was specifically alleged in the affidavit; the charge-sheet has been submitted, indicating the investigation is complete.
  • The order granting bail noted that, as per the charge-sheet, the accused had no reported criminal antecedents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 SCC 481 Grounds on which bail can be cancelled, including: misuse of liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity; interference with investigation; tampering with evidence or witnesses; threatening witnesses; likelihood of fleeing; going underground; placing oneself beyond reach of surety, etc. The court reproduced the list of grounds from Raghubir Singh and used these categories as part of the framework to assess whether the applicant had shown specific grounds for cancelling bail in the present case.
Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. (2018) 3 SCC 22 Emphasis on presumption of innocence; grant of bail as general rule; factors to consider when deciding custody and bail (humane approach, dignity, overcrowding of prisons); need to introspect whether denying bail is appropriate. The court relied on Dataram Singh to reiterate the presumption of innocence and the principle that grant of bail is the general rule, thereby signaling caution before interfering with an order granting bail.
Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2012) 1 SCC 40 Bail's object is to secure attendance at trial (not punitive or preventive); deprivation of liberty is punishment unless necessary to ensure trial; extraordinary circumstances required to deny bail merely on apprehension of witness tampering. The court cited Sanjay Chandra to underline that bail is not punitive, and that mere apprehension of tampering is insufficient without extraordinary circumstances—supporting the position that cancellation should not be lightly ordered.
Manoranjana Sinh Alias Gupta v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2017) 5 SCC 218 Reiterates that the object of bail is not punitive; judicial discretion in bail must balance liberty of the accused and interest of society; seriousness of charge is a relevant but not sole consideration; detention for indefinite period may violate Article 21. The court used this authority to emphasize careful exercise of discretion and that seriousness of charge alone does not mandate denial or cancellation of bail; it forms part of the balancing exercise.
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr. (2010) 14 SCC 496 Enumerated factors to consider when deciding bail, including: prima facie grounds of commission; nature and gravity of accusation; severity of punishment; danger of absconding; character and standing of accused; likelihood of repetition; apprehension of influencing witnesses; danger of justice being thwarted. The court set out these factors and applied them to the facts, observing that available material (e.g., charge-sheet, absence of prior antecedents, no arrest during investigation) did not supply specific grounds required under these considerations to cancel bail.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by identifying established parameters for cancellation of bail and for grant/denial of bail, drawing from the authorities cited above. Key aspects of its analytical approach as reflected in the opinion were:

  1. The court recalled the Raghubir Singh criteria that specify circumstances in which bail may be cancelled (e.g., misuse of liberty, interference with investigation, tampering with evidence/witnesses, threat to witnesses, likelihood of fleeing, going underground, or attempting to place oneself beyond surety's reach).
  2. The court emphasized that cancellation of bail is a harsh step because it interferes with individual liberty; rejection of bail and cancellation of bail are different, and cancellation should not be lightly resorted to.
  3. The court noted that cancellation is appropriate where an earlier bail order suffers from serious infirmities which could result in miscarriage of justice, or where the court granting bail ignored relevant material showing prima facie involvement or took into account irrelevant material.
  4. The court reiterated the principles from Dataram Singh, Sanjay Chandra and Manoranjana Sinh that the presumption of innocence and the general rule in favour of bail require a humane and circumspect approach; gravity of the offence is relevant but not decisive; bail is neither punitive nor preventative.
  5. The court set out the Prasanta Kumar Sarkar factors (prima facie involvement, gravity, severity of punishment, danger of absconding, character, likelihood of repetition, apprehension of influencing witnesses, and danger of justice being thwarted) as the checklist for assessing bail-related applications.
  6. Applying the above framework to the facts of the instant petition, the court recorded factual points from the record: the order granting bail explicitly noted absence of reported criminal antecedents in the charge-sheet; the accused was not arrested during investigation and had been served a notice under Section 41(1) CrPC; a charge-sheet had been submitted; and the affidavit's allegations asserting misuse of bail and tampering (paras 19 and 20) were vague and uncorroborated. The court quoted paras 19 and 20 of the affidavit verbatim to show the nature of the allegations.
  7. The court observed that there was no specific allegation that irrelevant considerations were taken into account by the court below when granting bail. Nor was there any averment that the accused tampered with or was tampering with evidence while investigation was pending.
  8. On this basis, the court concluded that there were no specific grounds which would warrant interference by cancelling the bail; the discretion exercised by the trial court (order dated 29.11.2019) was described as just and proper and not requiring interference.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The bail cancellation application is dismissed; the court declined to cancel the bail granted to opposite party no. 2 (Yuvraj Singh).

Implications:

  • The immediate, direct effect is that the bail previously granted to the accused remains undisturbed; the cancellation application has no merit and is dismissed.
  • The court expressly found no specific or corroborated grounds (such as established misuse of liberty, tampering with evidence/witnesses, or other Raghubir Singh grounds) in the material before it to justify cancelling bail.
  • The opinion does not state or declare any novel legal principle or new precedent; it applies established precedents and principles to the facts and declines to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower court.

Outcome in short: The application under Section 439(2) CrPC for cancellation of bail is dismissed; the bail order dated 29.11.2019 remains operative.

Show all summary ...

Samit Gopal, J.:— Heard Sri. Santosh Kumar Giri, learned counsel for the applicant, the learned A.G.A. and perused the record.

2. This is an application preferred under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for cancelling the bail of Yuvraj Singh, the opposite party no. 2 which has been allowed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bareilly vide order dated 29.11.2019 in Case Crime No. 629 of 2018 under Sections 420, 406 of the Penal Code, 1860 under Section 69 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 & under Section 25 of Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction, Ownership & Maintenance) Act, 2010 registered at Police Station Baradari, District Bareilly.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the opposite party no. 2 is the Director of Alliance Builders and Construction Limited, Bareilly. He had developed a colony in the year 2007 in the name of Super City in Bareilly in which the first informant and others took flats and paid money for it. It is further argued that in the present matter a suit has been filed by the accused himself which was after lodging of the F.I.R. The filing of the said suit was a mischievous act of the accused just in order to take benefit of the same in the present matter. It is further argued that the court below erred in allowing the bail application of the accused by overlooking the fact that during investigation sufficient evidence has been collected against the accused and as per the law laid down by the Apex Court it is for the trial court to weigh the statement and the evidence collected during investigation and arrive at its own conclusion. To make an enquiry into reliability and genuineness of the allegations made in the First Information Report and the material collected during investigation on the basis of which charge-sheet is submitted at the time of deciding a bail application is not a proper appreciation by the court below and the court below overstepped its jurisdiction. It is further argued on the basis of averments in para 10 of the affidavit that though the opposite party no. 2/accused has delivered the possession of the land/house in dispute several years back, but sale deed has not been executed by him. Further on the pleading in para 11 of the affidavit it is argued that the opposite party no. 2 did not have title of the said property and hence he could not have executed any sale deed in favour of the allottees. It is then argued as per para 12 of the affidavit that the intention of the opposite party no. 2/accused was dishonest from the very inception itself. The petition for quashing of charge-sheet dated 24.12.2018 in the matter has been dismissed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 01.10.2019, the copy of which is annexed as Annexure-2 to the affidavit. It is then argued that on the basis of para 15 of the affidavit that opposite party no. 2/accused surrendered on the same day i.e. on 29.11.2019, moved his bail application on the same day which has been allowed on the same day itself. It is further argued that the opposite party no. 2/accused after being released on bail is misusing the liberty of bail and is also tampering with the prosecution witnesses. It is thus argued that the present matter is a heinous and a grievous criminal case and as such the bail granted to opposite party no. 2 is liable to be cancelled.

4. The parameters for cancellation of bail have been laid down by the Apex Court in large number of cases. In Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 SCC 481 the Apex Court held that bail can be cancelled where:—

(i) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity,

(ii) interferes with the course of investigation,

(iii) attempts to tamper with evidence or witnesses,

(iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation,

(v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country,

(vi) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency,

(vii) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc.

5. Apart from the above grounds for cancellation of bail it is to be kept in mind that rejection of bail and cancellation of bail are two different things wherein the cancellation of bail is a harsh step as it interferes with the liberty of an individual and thus the same should not be resorted to lightly.

6. Cancellation of bail can be done in cases where bail has been granted and the order suffers from serious infirmities which would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court while granting bail ignores relevant material showing prima facie involvement of the accused or it takes into account irrelevant material which has no relevance to the question of grant of bail to an accused.

7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. (2018) 3 SCC 22 held that freedom of an individual can not be curtailed for indefinite period, especially when his/her guilt is yet to be proved. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment that a person is believed to be innocent until found guilty. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

“2. A fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence is the presumption of innocence, meaning thereby that a person is believed to be innocent until found guilty. However, there are instances in our criminal law where a reverse onus has been placed on an accused with regard to some specific offences but that is another matter and does not detract from the fundamental postulate in respect of other offences. Yet another important facet of our criminal jurisprudence is that the grant of bail is the general rule and putting a person in jail or in a prison or in a correction home (whichever expression one may wish to use) is an exception. Unfortunately, some of these basic principles appear to have been lost sight of with the result that more and more persons are being incarcerated and for longer periods. This does not do any good to our criminal jurisprudence or to our society.

3. There is no doubt that the grant or denial of bail is entirely the discretion of the judge considering a case but even so, the exercise of judicial discretion has been circumscribed by a large number of decisions rendered by this Court and by every High Court in the country. Yet, occasionally there is a necessity to introspect whether denying bail to an accused person is the right thing to do on the facts and in the circumstances of a case.

4. While so introspecting, among the factors that need to be considered is whether the accused was arrested during investigations when that person perhaps has the best opportunity to tamper with the evidence or influence witnesses. If the investigating officer does not find it necessary to arrest an accused person during investigations, a strong case should be made out for placing that person in judicial custody after a charge sheet is filed. Similarly, it is important to ascertain whether the accused was participating in the investigations to the satisfaction of the investigating officer and was not absconding or not appearing when required by the investigating officer. Surely, if an accused is not hiding from the investigating officer or is hiding due to some genuine and expressed fear of being victimised, it would be a factor that a judge would need to consider in an appropriate case. It is also necessary for the judge to consider whether the accused is a first-time offender or has been accused of other offences and if so, the nature of such offences and his or her general conduct. The poverty or the deemed indigent status of an accused is also an extremely important factor and even Parliament has taken notice of it by incorporating an Explanation to Section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. An equally soft approach to incarceration has been taken by Parliament by inserting Section 436A in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

5. To put it shortly, a humane attitude is required to be adopted by a judge, while dealing with an application for remanding a suspect or an accused person to police custody or judicial custody. There are several reasons for this including maintaining the dignity of an accused person, howsoever poor that person might be, the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that there is enormous overcrowding in prisons, leading to social and other problems as noticed by this Court in In Re-Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons.”

8. It is well settled that gravity alone cannot be a decisive ground to deny bail, rather competing factors are required to be balanced by the court while exercising its discretion. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2012) 1 SCC 40 has been held as under:—

“The object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The Courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. Detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In India, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the propose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”

9. In Manoranjana Sinh Alias Gupta v. Central Bureau Of Investigation ., (2017) 5 SCC 218, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

“This Court in Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2012) 1 SCC 40, also involving an economic offence of formidable magnitude, while dealing with the issue of grant of bail, had observed that deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment unless it is required to ensure that an accused person would stand his trial when called upon and that the courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and found guilty. It was underlined that the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive. This Court sounded a caveat that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of a conduct whether an accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson. It was enunciated that since the jurisdiction to grant bail to an accused pending trial or in appeal against conviction is discretionary in nature, it has to be exercised with care and caution by balancing the valuable right of liberty of an individual and the interest of the society in general. It was elucidated that the seriousness of the charge, is no doubt one of the relevant considerations while examining the application of bail but it was not only the test or the factor and that grant or denial of such privilege, is regulated to a large extent by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. That detention in custody of under-trial prisoners for an indefinite period would amount to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution was highlighted.”

10. The Apex Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (S) v. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr. (S) (2010) 14 SCC 496, has laid down the following principles, while deciding petition for bail:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if r released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

11. The object of granting of bail is to secure the attendance of an accused in trial. The normal rule is of bail and not jail. The Court has to keep in mind the nature of acquisitions, nature of evidence in support thereof, severity of punishment, character of the accused and the circumstances which are peculiar to the accused involved in the matter.

12. Per contra learned A.G.A. opposed the prayer for cancellation of bail on the ground that the court below after perusing the entire material came to a correct and a just decision of allowing the bail application and granting bail to the opposite party no. 2. It is further argued that the requirement for cancellation of bail is not made out and spelled out in any of the paragraphs of the affidavit. No misuse of bail has been alleged and even there is no averment regarding the accused tampering with evidence. Since charge-sheet has been submitted the investigation has concluded.

13. In the case in hand it is not the case of the first informant that irrelevant considerations have been taken into account while granting bail to the opposite party no. 2/accused. The order granting bail specifically mentions therein that as per the charge-sheet there is no reported criminal antecedent of the accused. There is no averment whatsoever that while the investigation was continuing the accused has tampered or was tampering with evidence. The charge-sheet has been submitted against the opposite party no. 2/accused. The accused was not arrested during investigation and a notice under Section 41(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was served upon him. The allegations as referred to in paragraph 19 and 20 of the affidavit are vague and without any corroboration whatsoever. The same are extracted herein below:—

“19. That accused i.e. (opposite party no. 02) after having being released on bail is misusing the liberty of bail and is also tampering prosecution witnesses.

20. That intention of grant of bail is not to misuse liberty of bail, while in the present case accused i.e. (opposite party no. 02) after being released on bail is tampering First Informant/Applicant to prosecute the Criminal Case against accused i.e. (opposite party no. 02).”

14. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material on record, in my opinion there is no specific ground which would warrant interference by way of cancelling the bail of the opposite party no. 2 granted by the court below. The discretion as exercised vide order dated 29.11.2019 is just and proper and not demanding any interference whatsoever.

15. The present bail cancellation application is thus devoid of any merit and is hereby, dismissed.