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Aarifaben Yunusbhai Patel And Others v. Mukul Thakorebhai Amin And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Mar 17, 2020
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Factual and Procedural Background

M/s Abhilasha Construction (Respondent 3) obtained a loan from Shree Mahalaxmi Mercantile Cooperative Bank Ltd. (Respondent 2) which was not repaid. Respondent 2 instituted summary proceedings against Respondent 3 and its partner, Mukul Thakorebhai Amin (Respondent 1). After the defendants failed to comply with interim deposit directions, a money decree for Rs 1,89,94,105.50 was passed on 14-9-2004.

No stay was granted in the appeal filed before the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal. Respondent 2 commenced execution on 1-11-2007; a Receiver was appointed the next day and the attached property (12 flats and 2 penthouses) was auctioned on 26-11-2007. The appellants were highest bidders and deposited 25 % of the consideration; the executing court confirmed the sale and issued a sale certificate on 29-2-2008.

Respondent 1 challenged the auction by a writ petition on 26-12-2007 and later withdrew an SLP on 21-4-2008. Eventually, on 20-6-2008, Respondent 1 filed objections under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC alleging want of notice and inadequacy of price. The executing court dismissed those objections on 23-2-2010. The High Court, by order dated 7-11-2012/8-11-2012, set aside the auction-sale without deciding limitation. The present civil appeals challenge that High Court order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the objections filed by Respondents 1 and 3 under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC were within the sixty-day limitation prescribed by Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  2. Consequent to the answer on limitation, whether the auction-sale could be set aside on grounds of lack of notice, irregularity or fraud.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The application under Order 21 Rule 90 was filed beyond the statutory sixty-day period and is therefore barred; Section 5 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to such proceedings.
  • Respondents cannot invoke Section 14 for exclusion of time because the writ and SLP were not prosecuted in good faith after 21-4-2008.
  • The High Court acted contrary to the Supreme Court’s earlier direction that limitation must be determined before merits.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The auction was fraudulent and conducted without mandatory notice to the judgment-debtors; property was sold for a grossly inadequate price.
  • Time spent in prosecuting the writ petition and SLP should be excluded under Section 14, rendering the application within limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Aarifa Ben case (2009 SCC OnLine SC 69) Directed executing court to determine both limitation and allegations of fraud, and to consider Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court ignored this earlier directive when it failed to decide limitation, and used the precedent to underline the mandatory necessity of addressing limitation first.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed that its earlier order in Aarifa Ben mandated determination of limitation alongside merits; the High Court’s omission to decide limitation was therefore erroneous.

Analyzing Article 127, the Court held that an application to set aside a sale must be filed within 60 days. Section 5 of the Limitation Act expressly excludes applications under Order 21, hence delay cannot be condoned on that basis.

Regarding Section 14, exclusion of time is available only when earlier proceedings were prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith before a forum lacking jurisdiction. Even giving Respondent 1 the benefit of exclusion from 26-12-2007 to 21-4-2008, the application filed on 20-6-2008 exceeded the permissible period by six days. Because there is no statutory power to condone such delay under Order 21 Rule 90, the objections were time-barred, obviating examination of allegations of fraud or irregularity.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; High Court judgment dated 7-11-2012/8-11-2012 set aside; executing court order dated 23-2-2010 upheld.

Direct consequences include restoration of the auction-sale in favour of the appellants and disposal of the connected contempt petition. The decision affirms the strict sixty-day limitation for applications under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC, clarifies that Section 5 does not apply to execution-sale challenges, and restricts use of Section 14 to genuinely diligent and good-faith proceedings. No new doctrinal precedent was created beyond reiteration of these established principles.

Show all summary ...

Deepak Gupta, J.— M/s Abhilasha Construction, Respondent 3 herein (hereinafter referred to as “R-3”), obtained a loan from Shree Mahalaxmi Mercantile Cooperative Bank Ltd., Respondent 2 herein (hereinafter referred to as “R-2”), but failed to repay the loan and R-2 filed summary proceedings for recovery of the amount due to it from R-3 and Mukul Thakorebhai Amin, Respondent 1 herein (hereinafter referred to as “R-1”), who was a partner in the said firm. During the pendency of the suit, R-3 applied for release of 12 flats and 2 penthouses which were permitted to be released on the said respondents depositing Rs 65 lakhs. However, Respondents 1 and 3 failed to deposit the said amount. On 12-8-2004, the adjudicating authority granted leave to the defendants to contest the suit on the condition that they would deposit 33% of the amount claimed by R-2. This amount was also not deposited. Thereafter, a decree for a sum of Rs 1,89,94,105.50, was passed on 14-9-2004 in favour of R-2 and against the defendants which included Respondents 1 and 3. We have given the facts of Civil Appeals Nos. 1643-44 of 2020. As far as Civil Appeal No. 1647 of 2020 is concerned, that relates to advertisement for sale of a bungalow which was issued on 13-1-2008, and sale was made on 3-3-2008.

2. The said decree dated 14-9-2004 was challenged in appeal before the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal. It appears that no stay was granted. In the meantime, R-2 filed an application for execution of the decree before the Civil Judge, Vadodara on 1-11-2007. On the very next day i.e. 2-11-2007, an application was filed for appointment of Receiver for execution of decree. The court allowed the said application on 2-11-2007 itself and the Court Receiver was permitted to sell the property and report to the court within 15 days. R-2 also filed an application for attachment of property on which orders were also passed on 2-11-2007. Advertisement for the auction of the said property was published in the newspaper on 21-11-2007. The upset price was not mentioned in the said advertisement. Pursuant to the public notice for sale, the auction of the attached property was conducted on 26-11-2007, wherein the appellants offered Rs 78,25,251. There were only two bidders and the appellants were the highest bidders and they deposited 25% of the sale consideration on the spot. Thereafter, on 10-12-2007 R-2 applied for permission to confirm the sale and vide the order dated 10-12-2007, the executing court accepted the report of the Court Receiver and permitted him to execute the same. Thereafter, the Receiver filed some application for clarification and on 18-12-2007, the counsel appearing on behalf of R-3 sought time to file the objections.

3. Instead of filing the objections, R-1 filed a writ petition before the High Court of Gujarat challenging the sale of 12 flats and 2 penthouses pursuant to the court auction. This petition was filed on 26-12-2007. It also appears that R-1 kept appearing before the executing court and requested the executing court to stay further proceedings. Initially, the proceedings were stayed but when R-1 did not file any objections under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”, for short), sale certificate in respect of 12 flats and 2 penthouses was issued in favour of the appellants by the executing court on 29-2-2008.

4. On 5-3-2008, a statement was issued by R-1 that a buyer is ready and willing to purchase the properties for Rs 1.7 crores. The learned Single Judge of the High Court permitted 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 648 the proposed buyer to deposit a sum of Rs 50 lakhs and status quo was granted. This amount of Rs 50 lakhs was deposited. Aggrieved, the appellants preferred a letters patent appeal (“LPA”, for short) and the order dated 5-3-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 648 was stayed by the order dated 1-4-2008. Aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench, R-1 filed SLP in this Court. It appears that in the meantime, R-2 had filed an application before the executing court on the ground that it had not authorised its officer to get the property sold. Therefore, on 21-4-2008 on the statement of the learned counsel for R-1, permission was given 2008 SCC OnLine SC 45 to withdraw SLP in view of the application filed by R-2 before the executing court. Thereafter, on 20-6-2008, R-1 filed an application under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC and the main grievance in this application was that no notice had been sent to R-1 or R-3, either of the execution petition or of the attachment of the property or before settling the terms of the proclamation of sale. In addition to this, another grievance was that the property had been sold for a price much less than the mortgaged price.

5. On 17-7-2008, R-1 made a submission before the High Court that it had filed an application under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC, before the executing court and the High Court recorded 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 649 the following observation : (Mukul Thakorebhai case 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 649, SCC OnLine Guj para 2)

“2. Mr Majumdar, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that even the question with respect to limitation in preferring the application for setting aside the sale might arise. Mr Sanjanwala, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Ms Sonal Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting Respondents 7 and 8 and Mr M.M. Saiyed, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting Respondent 9, have submitted that let the application for setting aside the sale be decided on merits and they will not raise the objection with respect to limitation. Mr Sanjanwala, learned Senior Counsel with Ms Sonal Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of Respondents 7 and 8 and Mr Saiyed, learned advocate appearing on behalf of Respondent 9 have submitted for a period of one week from today, the parties will maintain status quo.”

6. On 25-7-2008, LPA filed earlier was dismissed 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 647 as infructuous. On 7-10-2008, the appellants herein filed an application to recall the concession not to raise the issue of limitation recorded in the order dated 17-7-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 649. The High Court dismissed this application. Thereafter, the appellants approached this Court by filing SLPs (C) Nos. 26745-746 of 2008. These petitions were disposed of on 23-3-2009 2009 SCC OnLine SC 69, and the relevant portion of the order reads as follows : (Aarifa Ben case 2009 SCC OnLine SC 69, SCC OnLine SC)

“… In these cases, what is sought to be argued on behalf of the petitioner is that the execution petition in which there is an allegation of fraud, in the holding of the auction-sale, was time barred. This question needs to be decided by the executing court. But even if it comes to the conclusion that the application for execution was time barred, we direct the executing court to give its findings as to whether there was a fraud in conducting the sale. While deciding the question of limitation, the executing court will also decide the scope and applicability of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act.”

Thereafter, the matter went back to the executing court which by a very detailed order rejected the application of R-1 filed under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC. Thereafter, R-1 challenged the order of the executing court by filing a petition in the High Court which was allowed vide the impugned order 2012 SCC OnLine Guj 6480. The objections to the execution petition filed by R-1 were accepted and sale in favour of the appellants was set aside. The High Court went into the merits of the petition but did not decide the issue of limitation. Though the High Court noticed that the appellants had raised the plea of limitation, it did not decide the same and the observation of the High Court in this regard is as follows : (Mukul Thakorebhai case 2012 SCC OnLine Guj 6480, SCC OnLine Guj para 30)

“30. The Court has come to the conclusion that the auction of both the properties were vitiated on account of lack of notice to the judgment-debtor, and that being an error fatal to the validity of auction-sale, in light of the decision 2009 SCC OnLine SC 69 of the Supreme Court, the auction-sale cannot be permitted to remain and they have to be quashed. Other submissions of the counsel for the auction-purchasers, therefore need not be elaborately dealt with, but suffice it to say that the Court is quashing the auction-sale on ground of non-compliance with the mandatory provision of notice to the judgment-debtor.”

We are constrained to observe that the High Court totally ignored the order of this Court quoted hereinabove. This Court had specifically directed the executing court to decide both, the issue of limitation and objections on merits. This was obviously done with the purpose that in case later if the issue of limitation is decided in favour of the objectors, R-1 and R-3, then the matter again should not be remanded for decision on merits of the case. The issue of limitation could not have been ignored and should have been decided by the High Court.

7. We may note that it has been strenuously urged by Mr Nikhil Goel, learned counsel for the respondents that the sale is fraudulent without following the procedure prescribed by law, but we are clearly of the view that first we have to decide whether the objections filed by the respondents were filed within time or not. In case the petition is filed beyond the period of limitation it is not necessary for the court to go into other issues.

8. Order 21 Rule 90 CPC reads as follows:

“90. Application to set aside sale on ground of irregularity or fraud.—(1) Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decree-holder, or the purchaser, or any other person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it.
(2) No sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud.
(3) No application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up.”

9. The limitation for filing an application to set aside a sale in execution of decree is 60 days in terms of Article 127 of the Third Division, Part 1 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short “the Act”). Reference may also be made to Section 5 of the Act, which reads as follows:

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

A bare reading of this provision clearly shows that Section 5 of the Act which deals with extension of time or condonation of delay is not applicable to proceedings under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC. Therefore, the delay, if any, cannot be condoned under Section 5 of the Act.

10. That takes us to Section 14 of the Act, which reads as follows:

“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under Rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”

In terms of this section, the time spent by the applicant for prosecuting with due diligence other civil proceedings may be excluded if such proceedings are prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause, is unable to entertain it.

11. As far as the present case is concerned, it is not even disputed by R-1 that it had knowledge about the sales on 18-12-2007 when the counsel appearing for R-3, had sought permission to file the objection application under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC. The writ petition was filed on 26-12-2007. On 21-4-2008 2008 SCC OnLine SC 45, R-1 withdrew the SLP before this Court on the ground that an application has been filed by R-2 before the executing court on 18-3-2008. The writ petition itself was dismissed on 17-7-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 649. On behalf of R-1, it is urged that since the writ petition was disposed of on 17-7-2008 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 649 and the objection to the execution petition was filed on 20-6-2008, the same is within limitation.

12. We are unable to accept this proposition. Any person claiming benefit of Section 14 of the Act can only claim exclusion of time of that period for which it had been prosecuting another remedy with due diligence and in good faith. We are prima facie of the view that it cannot be said that the writ petition was filed in good faith or by due diligence because on 18-12-2007 the counsel for R-3 had made a statement that he would file objections to the execution petition. However, assuming that these proceedings were filed in good faith, after a statement was made before this court on 21-4-2008, R-1 should have immediately filed the application before the executing court. The continuance of the proceedings before the High Court can neither be said to have been done in good faith nor in exercise of due diligence.

13. Even if we accept the case of R-1, at best, the period from 26-12-2007 to 21-4-2008 can be excluded. If we exclude that period then we have 7 days in December, 9 days in April, 31 days in May and 19 days in June. Thus, by giving benefit of all days of passing of the orders then also R-1 and R-3, would be barred by limitation for filing the application under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC by 6 days. Since there is no power to condone such delay, the petitions had to be dismissed as being time barred. Therefore, the appeals have to be allowed on this short ground.

14. Accordingly, we allow the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 7-11-2012/8-11-2012 in Mukul Thakorebhai Amin v. Shree Mahalaxmi Mercantile Coop. Bank Ltd. 2012 SCC OnLine Guj 6480 and uphold the order of the executing court dated 23-2-2010 in Special Petition No. 81 of 2007. In view of this judgment, Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 63 of 2020, is also disposed of. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.