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Shyam Madan Mohan Ruia And Others v. Messer Holdings Limited And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The litigation concerns 75,001 shares of Bombay Oxygen Investments Ltd. (“BOIL”). Multiple suits were filed over the years, the relevant one being Suit No. 2410 of 2008 (“Suit IV”) instituted by Messer Holdings Ltd. (“MHL”, Respondent 1). Suit IV seeks, inter alia, cancellation of a 5-12-2002 settlement under which Messers Giresheim GmbH (“MGG”, Respondent 3) transferred the disputed shares to the appellants (the “Ruias”) and a declaration of MHL’s ownership of those shares.
The Ruias raised a preliminary objection under Section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Maharashtra Amendment) contending that Suit IV was time-barred. A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court upheld this objection on 16-3-2017, dismissing the suit as barred by limitation. On appeal, a Division Bench (8-8-2019, corrected 19-9-2019) reversed that decision, ruling that limitation began to run only on 14-10-2005—when MHL allegedly first obtained a copy of the 2002 settlement—and that the 2008 suit was therefore timely. The Ruias sought relief in the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after the repeal of Section 9-A CPC (Maharashtra), limitation can still be tried as a standalone preliminary issue in Suit No. 2410 of 2008.
- Consequentially, whether the orders of the Single Judge (16-3-2017) and the Division Bench (8-8-2019) addressing limitation as a preliminary issue remain valid.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (Ruias)
- Suit IV is barred by limitation because the impugned settlement occurred on 5-12-2002 and MHL filed the suit only in 2008—well beyond three years.
- The Single Judge correctly treated limitation as a preliminary issue under Section 9-A CPC.
Respondent 1 (MHL)
- MHL learned of the 2002 settlement only on 14-10-2005; limitation should therefore run from that date, making the 2008 filing timely.
- After the repeal of Section 9-A, limitation can no longer be decided as a preliminary jurisdictional issue and must be tried with other issues.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, (2016) 11 SCC 484 | Rights of parties in respect of the 75,001 shares are to be adjudicated in Suit IV. | Cited to affirm that title issues regarding the shares must ultimately be resolved within Suit IV. |
| Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557 | Interprets Section 9-A CPC post-repeal; distinguishes between existence and exercise of jurisdiction; limits what may be tried as a preliminary issue. | Formed the central legal basis for holding that limitation can no longer be isolated under Section 9-A; prior High Court orders treating it as such are a nullity. |
| Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai, (2015) 6 SCC 412 | Earlier view that “jurisdiction” in Section 9-A included limitation. | Referenced (via Nusli) as having been wrongly decided. |
| Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe v. Baburav Vishnu Javalkar, (2015) 7 SCC 321 | Contrary interpretation of Section 9-A; held correct in Nusli. | Approved, reinforcing that limitation is not a pure jurisdictional question under Section 9-A. |
| Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, AIR 1966 SC 153 | Differentiates between lack of jurisdiction and errors in its exercise. | Cited (via Nusli) to clarify conceptual limits of jurisdiction. |
| Meher Singh, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 452 | Bombay High Court view that Section 9-A issues could be decided with evidence. | Overruled (via Nusli) to narrow the scope of preliminary issues under the deleted Section 9-A. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court anchored its analysis on the statutory repeal of Section 9-A CPC (Maharashtra) and the authoritative construction of that provision in Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties. The Court observed:
- Section 9-A, which once allowed courts to decide “jurisdictional” questions (including, per some earlier views, limitation) as preliminary issues, was deleted by the Maharashtra Amendment Act, 2018.
- The three-Judge Bench in Nusli clarified that limitation is not a question of inherent jurisdiction and therefore should not be singled out as a preliminary issue after the repeal.
- Section 2 of the 2018 Amendment saves only those preliminary issues that legitimately fell within Section 9-A’s parameters; limitation is not one of them post-Nusli.
- Consequently, both the Single Judge and Division Bench decisions—each having treated limitation as a standalone preliminary issue—were rendered without jurisdiction and are a nullity.
The Court therefore directed that Suit IV proceed de novo, with limitation to be determined alongside all other issues at trial, uninfluenced by prior observations.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The orders of the Bombay High Court dated 16-3-2017 (Single Judge) and 8-8-2019/19-9-2019 (Division Bench) are set aside. Suit No. 2410 of 2008 shall proceed afresh from the stage of framing issues; the question of limitation will be tried with the merits. The Trial Court is requested to dispose of the suit within 18 months.
Implications: The decision reinforces the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nusli Neville Wadia that, after the repeal of Section 9-A, limitation cannot be isolated as a preliminary jurisdictional issue in Maharashtra. While no new substantive rights are created, the judgment ensures that limitation and merits will be adjudicated together, affecting procedural strategy in ongoing and future commercial suits in the State.
R. Banumathi, J.— Leave granted in SLP (C) No. 25341 of 2019. Being aggrieved by the order dated 8-8-2019 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6182 as corrected by order dated 19-9-2019 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6183 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Commercial Appeal No. 148 of 2017 in Suit No. 2410 of 2008 in and by which the Division Bench has reversed the order of the learned Single Judge dated 16-3-2017 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 1806, (2017) 4 Bom CR 509 by holding that Suit No. 2410 of 2008 filed by Respondent 1 MHL is within the period of limitation, the appellants are before this Court in this appeal.
2. On the first date of hearing, Mr Fali S. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants Ruias sought permission to amend the synopsis and also grounds of appeal. By the order dated 13-11-2019 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1699, the same was permitted.
3. When the matter came up for admission, Ms Aruna Gupta, learned counsel for Respondent 1 who is the contesting respondent, has taken notice. The first respondent was represented by the learned Senior Counsel Mr Dhruv Mehta.
4. For hearing, the matter was adjourned to a number of dates and taken up on 13-12-2019. We have heard Mr Fali S. Nariman, Mr S. Ganesh and Dr A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants as well as Mr Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent 1 along with Mr Sreegesh N.K., learned counsel.
5. For convenience, the parties are referred in abbreviated form : Appellants Ruias; Respondent 1 Messer Holdings Limited (MHL); Respondent 2 Bombay Oxygen Investments Ltd. (BOIL); Respondent 3 Messers Giresheim GmbH (MGG) and Respondent 4 Goyal MG Gases Private Limited (GGL).
6. The contesting parties have had several rounds of litigations : (i) Civil Suit No. I — 1810 of 1998 filed by Respondent 4 GGL against Respondent 3 (MGG); (ii) Suit No. II — 2499 of 1999 filed by the appellants Ruias against Respondent 3 (MGG) and Respondent 4 (GGL); (iii) Suit No. III — 509 of 2001 filed by the appellants Ruias against Respondent 4 (GGL) and Respondent 3 (MGG); and (iv) Suit No. IV — 2410 of 2008 filed by Respondent 1 (MHL) with which we are concerned.
7. In Suit No. III — 509 of 2001, Ruias and MGG (Respondent 3) entered into a settlement on 5-12-2002 wherein MGG (Respondent 3) is purported to have transferred 75,001 shares of BOIL (Respondent 2) and Ruias is purported to have agreed to pay US$ 154.642, etc. for those 75,001 shares of BOIL (Respondent 2). It is stated that parties thereon viz. Ruias (appellants) and MGG (Respondent 3) have agreed that in view of the settlement, Ruias would not prosecute the proceedings against Respondent 3 (MGG); but they would pursue their proceedings against Respondent 1 (MHL) and Respondent 4 (GGL).
8. Respondent 1 MHL filed Suit No. IV — 2410 of 2008 to cancel the said settlement agreement dated 5-12-2002 under which 75,001 shares of Respondent 2 (BOIL) has been transferred to the appellant(s) Ruias by Respondent 3 (MGG). In Suit No. IV, MHL (Respondent 1), inter alia, prayed for injunction against the development agreement dated 4-2-2008 granting development rights to one Company by name HDIL and for declaration of MHL Respondent 1's ownership of 75,001 shares of BOIL (Respondent 2) and other reliefs.
9. The dispute between the parties had also travelled up to the Supreme Court and this Court decided the matter in Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia (2016) 11 SCC 484. Considering the contentions of the parties, and observing that rights of parties are to be established in Suit No. IV, in paras 38, 44 and 45, the Supreme Court held as under :( & 506)
“38. The existence of title in MGG in the said 75,001 shares cannot be disputed by either GGL or MHL, at least, till the date of the consent award i.e. 21-9-2000 because GGL and MHL's claim for title over the said shares flows from MGG's prior title and the subsequent alleged transfer pursuant to the consent award. In such a case, because of MGG's purported transfer of the title in the 75,001 shares to the Ruias under the settlement dated 5-12-2002, the Ruias should normally be entitled to have their names entered into the records of BOCL as holders of the said shares by following appropriate procedure. If either GGL or MHL is objecting to the right of MGG to effect the said transfer in favour of the Ruias, they must establish a superior title (to MGG) in the said shares. It goes without saying that it can be done only in some legal action initiated by either GGL or MHL or both jointly. But they cannot seek a declaration of their title in Suits II and III filed by the Ruias. In a bid to establish their title MHL filed Suit IV (2016) 11 SCC 484]. The right of MHL, if any, will have to be decided in the said suit. Until the said suit is decided, we do not see any ground in law on which either GGL or MHL can object to the transfer of the shares in favour of the Ruias pursuant to the settlement dated 5-12-2002.
***
44. However, in the absence of any legally established title as on today to the abovementioned shares in any party other than MGG, whether the Ruias would be entitled, pursuant to the settlement dated 5-12-2002, to have their names entered into the registers of BOCL as holders of the said shares is a matter for the Ruias to explore. However, such an entitlement, if any, should be subject to the result of Suit IV.
45. We make it clear that we are not deciding by this order, the existence or otherwise of any right or its enforceability in the 75,001 shares of BOCL in favour of either MHL or GGL. It is open to them to establish their right in Suit IV. The defendants in Suit IV are at liberty to raise every defence available in law and fact to them.”
10. In Suit No. IV — 2410 of 2008 filed by Respondent 1 (MHL), the appellants filed affidavit under Section 9-A CPC (Maharashtra Amendment) raising preliminary issue of limitation by contending that the Suit Prayers (q), (r), (s), (t), (u) and (v) in respect of claiming ownership over the 75,001 shares of BOIL (Respondent 2) by MHL (Respondent 1) is barred by limitation as the settlement agreement between the appellants Ruias was entered into on 5-12-2002 and Suit No. IV — 2410 of 2008 filed by Respondent 1 (MHL) has been filed in the year 2008 which is clearly barred by limitation. Respondent 1 (MHL) contested the said affidavit by contending that MHL (Respondent 1) was kept in dark about the settlement dated 5-12-2002 between the Ruias and MGG (Respondent 3) and that the same came to their knowledge only on 14-10-2005 when they were handed over the copy of the settlement agreement dated 5-12-2002. Respondent 1 further contended that the suit filed by Respondent 1 was within the period of limitation as they came to know about the settlement only on 14-10-2005.
11. By the order dated 16-3-2017 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 1806, (2017) 4 Bom CR 509, the learned Single Judge allowed the petition filed by the appellants Ruias by holding that Respondent 1 (MHL) is a stranger to the settlement dated 5-12-2002. The learned Single Judge held that the cause of action arose to Respondent 1 (MHL) way back on 24-8-2002 when Respondent 1 MHL was impleaded as defendant in Suit No. 2499 of 1999 in which MHL came to be impleaded as the defendant as per Chamber Summons No. 455 of 2002 dated 4-10-2002. The learned Single Judge held that by virtue of Chamber Summons an order passed thereon, Respondent 1 had knowledge that the appellants are claiming title of the shares in dispute even in the year 2002 and the receipt of copy of the settlement agreement dated 5-12-2002 on 14-10-2015 was immaterial. It was held that Respondent 1 (MHL) approached the Court only in the year 2008 by filing Suit No. 2410 of 2008 and therefore, the suit filed by Respondent 1 (MHL) is barred by limitation.
12. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, Respondent 1 (MHL) filed commercial appeal before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. The Division Bench vide its impugned order 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6182 set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge by holding that the right to sue occurred to Respondent 1 on 14-10-2005 when the copy of the settlement agreement dated 5-12-2002 between Respondent 3 (MGG) and the appellants Ruias was supplied to Respondent 1 (MHL). The Division Bench held that since Respondent 1 had knowledge of the settlement only on 14-10-2005, the suit filed by MHL Respondent 1 in the year 2008 is well within the period of three years from the date of knowledge of the agreement and, therefore, the suit is within the period of limitation. The Division Bench directed the suit to proceed in respect of all other prayers made in the suit. Being aggrieved, the appellants Ruias have preferred this appeal.
13. We have heard the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent. We have considered the impugned judgment 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6182 and perused the materials on record.
14. Though, various contentions have been raised on the merits of the matter, in view of the change in the law and deletion of Section 9-A of the Code (in its application to the State of Maharashtra) and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties (2020) 6 SCC 557, (2019) 13 Scale 620, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to consider the merits of the contentions. Suffice to refer to the change in the law and the interpretation given by this Court.
15. The State of Maharashtra inserted Section 9-A to the Code of Civil Procedure vide Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1977. Section 9-A provided that where an application has been made for granting or setting aside an order granting interim relief in a suit, if either of the party challenged the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit, the court would have to decide the preliminary issue of jurisdiction before deciding the aforesaid application. The amended Section 9-A came to be repealed by the CPC Maharashtra (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018 with effect from 27-6-2018 and Section 9-A of the Code (in its application to the State of Maharashtra) was deleted by Section 3 of the Ordinance. The above Ordinance was replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act,2018 on 29-10-2018. It was provided that the preliminary issues framed under Section 9-A shall be treated as an issue under Order 14 CPC and be decided by the courts with other issues as the court may deem fit. On 15-12-2018, the State of Maharashtra enacted the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 2018 which provided for a saving clause. Section 2 of the Amendment Act provided that if the court has ordered to decide an issue as a preliminary issue before the date of deletion of Section 9-A, it shall be decided by the court as a preliminary issue.
16. After repeal of Section 9-A, because of divergent views, in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai (2015) 6 SCC 412 and Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe v. Baburav Vishnu Javalkar (2015) 7 SCC 321, Section 9-A as it stood came up for consideration before the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties (2020) 6 SCC 557, (2019) 13 Scale 620. The divergent views which led to consideration by the larger Bench is as under : (Nusli Neville case (2020) 6 SCC 557, (2019) 13 Scale 620)
“1. The reference has been made by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 17-8-2015 (2020) 6 SCC 616, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1835, doubting the correctness of the decision of this Court in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai (2015) 6 SCC 412 with respect to the interpretation provisions contained in Section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) as inserted by the Maharashtra Amendment Act, 1977. It has been opined that the word “jurisdiction” under Section 9-A is wide enough to include the issue of limitation as the expression has been used in the broader sense and is not restricted to conventional definition under pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction, the decision in Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe v. Baburav Vishnu Javalkar (2015) 7 SCC 321, taking contrary view, is per incuriam in view of the larger Bench decision in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav AIR 1966 SC 153 as well as other larger Bench decisions.”
17. After considering the various judgments and the submissions, the Supreme Court summarised the conclusion and held as under : (Nusli Neville case (2020) 6 SCC 557, (2019) 13 Scale 620)
“88. Given the discussion above, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction to entertain has different connotation from the jurisdictional error committed in exercise thereof. There is a difference between the existence of jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. The expression jurisdiction has been used in CPC at several places in different contexts and takes colour from the context in which it has been used. The existence of jurisdiction is reflected by the fact of amenability of the judgment to attack in the collateral proceedings. If the court has an inherent lack of jurisdiction, its decision is open to attack as a nullity. While deciding the issues of the bar created by the law of limitation, res judicata, the court must have jurisdiction to decide these issues. Under the provisions of Section 9-A and Order 14 Rule 2, it is open to decide preliminary issues if it is purely a question of law not a mixed question of law and fact by recording evidence. The decision in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. (2015) 6 SCC 412 cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly. We have considered the decisions referred to therein, they are in different contexts. The decision of the two-Judge Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Meher Singh 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 452, (1998) 3 Mah LJ 940 holding that under Section 9-A the issue to try a suit/jurisdiction can be decided by recording evidence if required and by proper adjudication, is overruled. We hold that the decision in Kamalakar Eknath (2015) 7 SCC 321 has been correctly decided and cannot be said to be per incuriam, as held in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. (2015) 6 SCC 412
89. Section 2 of Maharashtra Second Amendment Act, 2018 which provides that where consideration of preliminary issue framed under Section 9-A is pending on the date of commencement of CPC, the said issue shall be decided and disposed of by the court under Section 9-A as if the provision under Section 9-A has not been deleted, does not change the legal scenario as to what can be decided as a preliminary issue under Section 9-A CPC, as applicable in Maharashtra. The saving created by the provision of Section 2 where consideration of preliminary issue framed under Section 9-A is pending on the date of commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 2018, can be decided only if it comes within the parameters as found by us on the interpretation of Section 9-A. We reiterate that no issue can be decided only under the guise of the provision that it has been framed under Section 9-A and was pending consideration on the date of commencement of the (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 2018. The reference is answered accordingly.
90. Let the matters be placed before an appropriate Bench for consideration on merits.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. In view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble three-Judge Bench reported in Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties (2020) 6 SCC 557, (2019) 13 Scale 620, the question of limitation will have to be considered along with other issues that would arise for adjudication in Suit No. 2410 of 2008 filed by Respondent 1 (MHL). Certain observations have been made by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench on the merits of the matter and the contention of the parties. In our view, the trial in Suit No. IV — 2410 of 2008 has to be proceeded independently on its own merits. In view of the judgment (2020) 6 SCC 557, (2019) 13 Scale 620 by the three-Judge Bench, the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench on the issue of limitation by considering that as preliminary issue would become nullity and the matter would have to proceed afresh.
19. The appeal is disposed of with the following directions and observations:
19.1. The order dated 16-3-2017 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 1806, (2017) 4 Bom CR 509 passed by the learned Single Judge in Suit No. 2410 of 2008 and the order dated 8-8-2019 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6182 (corrected on 19-9-2019 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6183) passed by the Division Bench in Commercial Appeal No. 148 of 2017 arising out of Suit No. 2410 of 2008 are set aside.
19.2. Suit No. 2410 of 2008 filed by Respondent 1 shall proceed afresh from the stage of framing of the issues. The question of limitation to be determined along with other issues arising for consideration. The suit shall be proceeded without being influenced by any of the views expressed by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6182.
19.3. Respondent 1 is at liberty to request the court to take up their pending applications and the learned court shall consider them on their own merits.
19.4. We request the learned Single Judge to take up Suit No. 2410 of 2008 filed by Respondent 1 (MHL) and proceed with the same expeditiously and dispose the same preferably within a period of 18 months.
19.5. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 26642 of 2019
20. Consequently, in view of the order passed in civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 25341 of 2019, this special leave petition is also disposed of.
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