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Joint Collector v. D. Narasing Rao
Factual and Procedural Background
The Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, issued a suo motu notice dated 31.12.2004 under Section 166-B of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act proposing cancellation of entries in revenue records for Survey Nos. 36 and 37, Gopanpally Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. This action was challenged in Writ Petition No. 1731 of 2005. Some petitioners had earlier filed WP No. 21719 of 1997 challenging G.O. Ms. No. 850, Revenue (ASN-III) Department, dated 24.9.1991, reserving 477 acres in those survey numbers for house sites to Government employees. By a common order dated 15.9.2009 a Single Judge allowed both writ petitions. The State appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suo motu exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 166-B after a lapse of over 50 years is barred as unreasonable or arbitrary.
- Whether a writ petition is maintainable to challenge a notice described as a show-cause notice when it indicates initiation of suo motu revisional proceedings.
- Whether G.O. Ms. No. 850 dated 24.9.1991 reserving land in the specified survey numbers without indicating subdivision numbers was sustainable in the face of revenue record entries showing private claims.
Arguments of the Parties
State's Arguments
- Section 166-B prescribes no period of limitation; hence the State's revisional power cannot be defeated by delay.
- Only a show-cause notice was issued and therefore the Single Judge should not have interfered at that stage; reliance placed on Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (2004) 3 SCC 440.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse | High Courts should generally not entertain writ petitions challenging show-cause notices unless the notice is totally non est for absolute want of jurisdiction; ordinarily parties should be directed to respond to the notice. | The Court treated the decision as guidance but held that where delay has the effect of wiping out jurisdiction to commence revisional proceedings, the notice is amenable to judicial review under Article 226; thus the State's reliance was rejected on the facts of this case. |
| State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha | Where statute prescribes no time-limit, revisional power must be exercised within a reasonable time; the reasonable period depends on facts and nature of the order. | Quoted as part of the established proposition that absence of a statutory limitation does not permit exercise of revision at any time. |
| Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim | Reinforcement of the principle that revisional powers must be exercised within a reasonable time when no statutory limit is prescribed. | Cited to support the general doctrine limiting temporal exercise of revisionary powers. |
| State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd. | Affirmation that revisional power (in absence of prescribed time) is subject to a reasonableness constraint. | Relied upon for the settled proposition restricting belated exercise of revisionary jurisdiction. |
| Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale | Where statute does not prescribe time-limit, revisional power must be exercised within a reasonable time; the Court noted that ordinarily a reasonable period (subject to exceptional circumstances) would be three years. | Applied to demonstrate that exercise of revisional power after very long periods may be unreasonable; informed the Court's view that a 50+ year delay could not be justified. |
| P. Mangamma v. Women's Co-op. Housing society Ltd., Barakatpura, Hyderabad | Exercise of revisionary jurisdiction under Section 166-B after 31 years was held irrational, unreasonable and violative of fair play in administrative action. | Used as a closer precedent of this Court applying Section 166-B to hold long-delayed revision unreasonable; supported the conclusion that the State's exercise after decades was unjustified. |
| A. Kodanda Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh | Earlier Division Bench authority enunciating limits on belated exercise of revisional jurisdiction. | Referred to as part of the body of state decisions supporting that extremely long delay in exercising revisional power is impermissible. |
| K. Venkata Reddy v. Director of Settlements, Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad | Earlier Division Bench authority similarly articulating the principle against belated revisionary action. | Relied upon to bolster the Court's view that long-delayed revision is unreasonable and violative of fair administrative action. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began from the well-settled principle that absence of a statutory limitation does not permit indefinite delay; revisional power must be exercised within a reasonable time determined by facts and nature of the order. It reviewed Supreme Court authority (including Santoshkumar) and earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court applying Section 166-B and analogous provisions, which indicate that very long delays (31 years, 17 years in cited authorities, and ordinarily three years subject to exceptions) are unreasonable.
Applying those principles, the Court observed that the State sought to upset entries dating back more than fifty years and did not produce valid reasons to render the delay reasonable. The notice of 31.12.2004 was treated as indicative of initiation of suo motu revisional proceedings rather than being a mere show-cause notice; because the excessive delay had the effect of extinguishing the revisionary authority's jurisdiction to commence the exercise, the notice was open to judicial review under Article 226 despite the general admonition in Special Director.
On the challenge to G.O. Ms. No. 850 dated 24.9.1991, the Court agreed with the Single Judge that the reservation of land without indicating subdivision numbers was unsustainable in light of revenue records showing private claims, and thus the G.O. was liable to be set aside.
Holding and Implications
Writ appeals dismissed.
Direct effects: the Single Judge's order allowing the writ petitions and setting aside the Notice dated 31.12.2004 and G.O. Ms. No. 850 (to the extent indicated) is affirmed; the appeals are dismissed without costs. The Court reiterated that the State remains at liberty to pursue remedies in accordance with law. The decision does not purport to create a novel principle beyond applying established precedents limiting belated exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.:— Suo motu exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 166-B of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli (for brevity, ‘the Land Revenue Act’) by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, under Notice dated 31.12.2004 proposing cancellation of entries in the revenue records in respect of the land bearing Survey Nos. 36 and 37, Gopanpally Village of Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, was called in question in Writ Petition No. 1731 of 2005.
2. Earlier, WP No. 21719 of 1997 was filed by some of the petitioners in WP No. 1731 of 2005 and others challenging G.O. Ms. No. 850, Revenue (ASN-III) Department, dated 24.9.1991 reserving an extent of 477 acres in survey Nos. 36 and 37, Gopanpally Village in Ranga Reddy District for provision of house sites to Government employees.
3. By common order dated 15.9.2009, a learned Single Judge allowed both the writ petitions. Hence, these appeals by the State. Perusal of the order under appeal demonstrates that the learned Single Judge opined that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation, was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of the rule of law. The learned Judge further held that the summary remedy of a revisional enquiry for cancellation of entries in the revenue records dating back to more than 50 years was not proper.
4. The State contends that when Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act does not prescribe any limitation, its power of revision cannot be stalled on the ground of delay. Further contention is that only a show-cause notice was issued and therefore the learned Judge ought to have refused interference in the matter. Reliance is placed on Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440 in this regard.
5. Fairly well settled is the proposition of law that even if no period of limitation is prescribed, the power of revision must be exercised within a reasonable time which must be determined by the facts of each case and the nature of the order being revision (State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha, (1969) 2 SCC 187 : AIR 1969 SC 1297, Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim, (1997) 6 SCC 71 and State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd.), (2007) 11 SCC 363. In Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale, (2009) 9 SCC 352 the Supreme Court observed:
“11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the Legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein”.
6. It is relevant to note that Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code which was under consideration before the Supreme Court in the above case was similar in its wording to Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act. Construing this provision, the Supreme Court held that ordinarily reasonable period for exercising the power of revision under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, subject to exceptional circumstances, would be 3 years. The exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years was therefore found to be unreasonable.
7. Closer home, a Division Bench of this Court while considering Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act in P. Mangamma v. Women's Co-op. Housing society Ltd., Barakatpura, Hyderabad, 1995 (3) ALD 594 : 1995 (3) ALT 330 (DB), held that exercise of revisionary jurisdiction thereunder after a lapse of 31 years was totally irrational, unreasonable and violative of fair play in administrative action. Reference was made therein to the earlier Division Bench Judgments of this Court in A. Kodanda Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1981 (2) ALT 280 (DB) and K. Venkata Reddy v. Director of Settlements, Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad, 1975 (2) An.WR 43 : 1975 (1) APLJ 11 (DB) enunciating the same principle.
8. Viewed thus, the contention of the State that the exercise of revisional power under Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act is temporally unbounded must necessarily fail. In the present case, admittedly, the State proposes to exercise its revisionary jurisdiction to upset entries dating back to more than half a century. No valid reasons are forthcoming to justify the delay so as to make this exercise ‘reasonable’.
9. Apropos the contention that a writ petition was not maintainable against a show-cause notice, the notice dated 31.12.2004 was not merely a show-cause notice but was indicative of the initiation of suo motu revisional power. The exercise of such revisional power after a lapse of over 50 years being moot, the very jurisdiction to commence such exercise fell for examination. In this regard, the observations of the Supreme Court in Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (supra), relied upon by the State are of guidance:
“5. This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show-cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show-cause notice was totally non est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show-cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition”.
10. As the delay in the present case had the effect of wiping out the very jurisdiction of the revisionary authority to initiate such exercise suo motu, the Notice dated 31.12.2004 was amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The contention of the State in this regard is therefore rejected.
11. So far as G.O. Ms. No. 850 dated 24.9.1991 is concerned, we are in complete agreement with the learned Judge that the reservation of land in the subject survey numbers without even indicating the subdivision numbers was clearly unsustainable in the light of the entries in the revenue records demonstrating the claims of the respondents over their extents of land in those survey numbers.
12. To that extent, the G.O. was liable to be set aside and we find no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Judge doing so.
13. It is to be noticed that the learned Judge made it clear that the State was at liberty to work out its remedies in accordance with law. We reiterate the same.
14. The writ appeals are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.
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