Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J.:— Heard Ms. Shreya Gupta, for the revisionist.

2. This revision has been filed against the order of Executing Court, dated 22.05.2017, rejecting the objection of the revisionist/judgment debtor under Section 47 C.P.C., filed in Execution Case No. 7 of 2016.

3. Anil Dua Alias Titu filed a suit (registered as SCC Suit No. 88 of 2013) for arrears of rent, damages and ejectment of Sanjay Sharma Alias Pintu, from house No. 123/221 (new number 123/336), situated at Gaderian Purawa, Kanpur Nagar. According to the valuation as set forth in plaint at the time of filing of the suit, it was cognizable by District Judge exercising power of Judge Small Cause Court. The suit was filed before District Judge/Judge Small Cause Court. It was transferred and tried by Special Judge (E.C. Act), Kanpur Nagar. During pendency of the suit, Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015 came into force w.e.f. 07.12.2015, by which Section 15 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 was amended and pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judge/Judge Small Cause Court was enhanced for the suit of Rs. One lakh and above. However, none of the parties made any application for transfer of the suit to Civil Judge (Senior Division). Suit was tried and after hearing the parties, it was decreed by judgment of Special Judge (E.C. Act), Kanpur Nagar dated 14.07.2016.

4. Sanjay Sharma Alias Pintu filed a revision (registered as SCC Revision No. 269 of 2016), from the aforesaid decree, which was dismissed by this Court by judgment dated 23.08.2016. Sanjay Sharma Alias Pintu filed Special Leave to Appeal Petition (Civil) No. 35776 of 2016, against aforesaid decree. Supreme Court dismissed it by judgment dated 14.12.2016.

5. Anil Dua Alias Titu (decree holder) filed an application (registered as Execution Case No. 7 of 2016) for execution of the decree dated 14.07.2016. Sanjay Sharma Alias Pintu (the revisionist) filed an objection (registered as Misc. Case No. 209/74 of 2017) under Section 47 C.P.C., alleging therein that as pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judge was enhanced by Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015 w.e.f. 07.12.2015, as such Special Judge (E.C. Act), Kanpur Nagar had no jurisdiction to try the suit under Section 15 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, thereafter and decree dated 14.07.2016 passed by him is nullity. The objection under Section 47 C.P.C. was heard by Executing Court, who by order dated 22.05.2017 rejected the objection, holding that there is no merit in objection and the objector has given an undertaking before Supreme Court for vacating the premises within three months as such he cannot be permitted to raise objection in execution. Hence this revision has been filed.

6. The counsel for the revisionist submitted that pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judge exercising power of Judge Small Cause Court was enhanced to Rs. one lakh and above, by Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015 w.e.f. 07.12.2015, as such Special Judge (E.C. Act), Kanpur Nagar had no jurisdiction to try the suit under Section 15 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, thereafter as valuation of the suit was below Rs. one lakh and decree dated 14.07.2016 passed by him in the suit is nullity and not executable. She relied upon judgments of this Court in Tejumal v. Mohd. Sartaz, 2016 (3) ARC 570 and Shobhit Nigam (Shri) v. Smt. Batulan, 2016 (3) ARC 570, in which it has been held that after coming into force of Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015 w.e.f. 07.12.2015, District Judge had no jurisdiction to try SCC suits below the valuation of Rs. One lakh and decree passed by him subsequent to 07.12.2015 is nullity. Judgment in Kwality Restaurant v. Sunil Khetrapal, 2016 (3) ARC 503, in which it has been held that after enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction, cases below the limit of pecuniary jurisdiction are liable to be transferred to the Court of competent jurisdiction. So far as direction of Supreme Court to give undertaking for vacating the premises in question within two weeks, is concerned, it does not bar statutory remedy available to the revisionist as held by Supreme Court in P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti, (1998) 6 SCC 507 : AIR 1988 SC 2979.

7. I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the revisionist and examined the record. In order to appreciate the controversy raised in this revision, relevant previsions of different statutes are quoted below:—

Section 15 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887

Section 15. Cognizance of suits by Courts of Small Causes.-(1) A Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the second schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes.

(2) Subject to the exceptions specified in that schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five hundred rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.

(3) Subject as aforesaid, the State Government may, by order in writing, direct that all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed one thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the order.

Section 15 and 21 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Section 15. Court in which suits to be instituted.- Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it.

Section 21. Objections to jurisdiction.- (1) No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.

(2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (Added by Act No. 104 of 1976 w.e.f. 01.02.1977)

(3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.

Section 11 of Suit Valuation Act, 1887

Section 11. Procedure where objection is taken on appeal or revision that a suit or appeal was not properly valued for jurisdictional purposes. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882), an objection that by reason of the over-valuation or undervaluation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court which had not jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an Appellate Court unless-

(a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower Appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that Court, or

(b) the Appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was over-valued or under-valued, and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits.

(2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1), but the Appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in clause (b) of that sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall dispose of the appeal as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court.

(3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the Appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suit or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal.

(4) The provisions of this section with respect to an Appellate Court shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure or other enactment for the time being in force.

8. Section 15 C.P.C. provides that every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. The word ‘competent’ used in this Section has reference to the jurisdiction of a Court. Jurisdiction means extent of authority of a Court to administer justice not only with reference to the subject matter of the suit but also to the pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction. A Court cannot try a suit of higher valuation than his pecuniary jurisdiction. However, Section 15 C.P.C. enacts a rule of procedure with an object to avoid overcrowding in the Court of higher grade. It does not oust the jurisdiction of Court of higher grade. The competency of the Court of higher grade to try a suit, below the valuation of his pecuniary jurisdiction has not been affected either by Section 15 C.P.C. or by any other provision as held by Ratan Sen v. Bhau, AIR 1944 All 1, Ramamirtham v. Ram Film Service, (1951) I.L.R. Mad. 93 (FB) and Venkateshwarlu v. Satyanarayana, AIR 1957 AP 49 (FB).

9. On the basis of Section 21 C.P.C. and Section 11 Suit Valuation Act, 1887, a distinction, has been made between a jurisdiction with regard to the subject-matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be. So far as pecuniary jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction is concerned, Section 21 C.P.C., and Section 11 of Suit Valuation Act, 1887 have laid down procedures for raising objection in this respect at the earliest opportunity to contest. Prior to insertion of Section 21 (2) C.P.C. w.e.f. 01.02.1977, a bench of four Hon'ble Judges of Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340, read the provisions of Section 11 of Suit Valuation Act, 1887 in Section 21 C.P.C. and held Section 99 C.P.C. therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with a view to avoid this result that Section 11 Suit Valuation Act was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or Revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.

10. Supreme Court again in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F. Universal Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 791, held that the jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity. In Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 244, held that a distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction with regard to the subject-matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be.

11. In Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas, (2007) 13 SCC 650, held that the Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied.

12. It may be noted that Section 21 provided that no objection as to place of the suing can be allowed by even an appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. In 1976, the existing section was numbered as sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) was added relating to pecuniary jurisdiction by providing that no objection as to competence of a court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection had been taken in the first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there had been a consequent failure of justice. Section 21-A also was introduced in 1976 with effect from 1-2-1977 creating a bar to the institution of any suit challenging the validity of a decree passed in a former suit between the same parties on any ground based on an objection as to the place of suing. The amendment by Act 104 of 1976 came into force only on 1-2-1977 when OS No. 4 of 1972 was pending. By virtue of Section 97(2)(c) of the Amendment Act, 1976, the said suit had to be tried and disposed of as if Section 21 of the Code had not been amended by adding sub-section (2) thereto.

13. This Court made no distinction between Section 15 on the one hand and Sections 16 to 20 on the other, in the context of Section 21 of the Code. Even otherwise, considering the interpretation placed by this Court on Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and treating it as equivalent in effect to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it existed prior to the amendment in 1976, it is possible to say, especially in the context of the amendment brought about in Section 21 of the Code by Amendment Act 104 of 1976, that Section 21-A was intended to cover a challenge to a prior decree as regards lack of jurisdiction, both territorial and pecuniary, with reference to the place of suing, meaning thereby the court in which the suit was instituted.

14. As can be seen, Amendment Act 104 of 1976 introduced sub-section (2) relating to pecuniary jurisdiction and put it on a par with the objection to territorial jurisdiction and the competence to raise an objection in that regard even in an appeal from the very decree. This was obviously done in the light of the interpretation placed on Section 21 of the Code as it existed and Section 11 of the Suits.

15. Unfortunately relevant portion of judgment of Supreme Court in Kiran Singh's case (supra) and Section 21 (2) C.P.C. was not brought to the notice of Hon'ble Single Judge in Tejumal's case due to which a view contrary to view of Hon'ble Supreme Court has been taken. This judgment is per incurium and has no binding precedent. A Bench of seven Hon'ble Judges of Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, held that “Per incuriam” are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. It is a settled rule that if a decision has been given per incuriam the court can ignore it.

16. There is nothing in Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015 that after enhancement of valuation, the suit pending before Court will be automatically transferred. It is admitted that none of the parties filed any application for transferring the suit.

17. The revision has no merit and it is dismissed.