- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ranchhod v. Ramchandra
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code was filed by the defendants challenging the judgments of the two lower Courts. The Trial Court decreed the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff for declaration, partition, possession, and mesne profit regarding ancestral properties originally belonging to Sevaram. Upon Sevaram's death, the properties were inherited by his sons Sitaram and Narayan. The respondent No. 1 is the biological son of Sitaram, while the appellants are the sons, daughters, and widow of Narayan. The respondent claimed to be the sole heir of Sitaram, who died about 40 years before the suit was filed, when the respondent was a minor. The respondent was adopted by Chunnibai but continued to cultivate the suit land jointly with Narayan. When the respondent's name was deleted from the revenue records, he filed the suit. The appellants opposed the suit, contending that the respondent had no right or title in the property and that his name was deleted with his consent. The Trial Court and the first appellate Court both decreed and affirmed the suit in favor of the respondent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the words "property which vested" used under section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 can be construed as "right which vested"?
- Whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, a child who has gone in adoption and was a member of a coparcenary with only a right in the coparcenary property by birth, continues to have a right with other coparceners after adoption?
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent claimed to be the sole heir of Sitaram and that he had a right to the ancestral properties inherited by Sitaram and Narayan.
- Despite being adopted by Chunnibai, the respondent continued to cultivate the suit land jointly with Narayan.
- His right in the ancestral property did not end upon adoption.
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants contended that the respondent was adopted 35 years prior by Chunnibai and that Sitaram was never a member of the joint family.
- They argued that due to Sitaram’s bad conduct, he was separated from the family, and after his death, the respondent was left orphaned and taken care of by Narayan.
- The respondent had no right or title in the suit property, and his name was deleted from the revenue records with his consent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (1988) 2 SCC 126 : AIR 1988 SC 845 (Dharma Shamrao Agalawe v. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe) | Clarification that 'vesting' of joint family property occurs only upon partition; adoption does not divest property rights if vested. | The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the undivided ancestral property had not vested in the respondent before adoption as no partition had taken place. |
| Y.K. Nalavade v. Ananda G. Chavan, (1987) 1 SCC 160 : AIR 1987 SC 398 | Establishes that joint family property does not vest in individual coparceners until partition. | Supported the view that the respondent’s interest was not a vested property right protected under section 12 proviso (b). |
| Vasant v. Dattu, AIR 1981 Bombay 109 | Held that no vesting of joint family property occurs on death of a coparcener without partition. | Confirmed the principle that the respondent’s right was not a vested property right. |
| Yarlagadda Nayudamma v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 A.P. 19 | Held that an adoptee has vested right in undivided property of natural father. | The Court rejected this view as incorrect and referred to subsequent authoritative decisions overruling it. |
| Devgonda Raygonda Patil v. Shamgonda Raygonda Patil, AIR 1991 Bombay 189 | Held that adoptee cannot have vested right in undivided joint family property of natural birth. | The Court followed this precedent to hold that the respondent had no vested right in ancestral property. |
| Santosh Kumar Jalan @ Kanhaya Lai Jalan v. Chandra Kishore Jalan, AIR 2001 Patna 125 | Held that proviso (b) of section 12 does not extend to community of interest in coparcenary property, only to vested property. | Reiterated the principle that the respondent’s interest was not protected under section 12 proviso (b). |
| Khidmat Singh v. Joginder Singh, 2010 (4) RCR (Civil) 252 | Confirmed that only property inherited before adoption is protected under section 12; mere coparcenary interest is not. | The Court applied this precedent to affirm that the respondent’s right was not protected after adoption. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, particularly proviso (b), which protects property vested in an adopted child before adoption. The Court noted that the respondent was a member of a coparcenary and had an undivided share in ancestral property before adoption but no partition had occurred. The Court emphasized that a coparcener’s share is fluctuating and only crystallizes upon partition, meaning the property does not vest in individual coparceners before partition. Relying on authoritative Supreme Court and High Court decisions, the Court rejected the view that the respondent’s undivided interest in the ancestral property constituted a vested property right protected under section 12 proviso (b). Consequently, the Court found that the respondent’s rights in the ancestral property did not survive adoption as vested property rights. The lower Courts erred in holding otherwise, leading to the dismissal of the suit filed by the respondent.
Holding and Implications
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower Courts, and dismissed the suit filed by the respondent.
The direct effect of this decision is that an adopted child who was a coparcener with only an undivided share in ancestral property before adoption does not have a vested right in such property protected under section 12 proviso (b) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Court did not establish any new precedent but clarified the application of existing legal principles regarding vesting of property rights in coparcenary property upon adoption.
This appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code is at the instance of the defendants in the suit challenging the judgment of the two Courts below. Trial Court by the judgment dated 4-4-1996 had decreed the C.S. No. 70A/94 filed by the respondent-plaintiff and the first appellate Court by the judgment dated 28-11-1998 by dismissing the Civil Appeal No. 53- A/1996 has affirmed the judgment of the trial Court.
2. The respondent No. 1 had filed the suit for declaration, partition, possession and mesne profit pleading that the suit properties originally belong to Sevaram and on his death they were received by his sons Sitaram and Narayan. Respondent No. 1 is the biological son of Sitaram, whereas the appellants are sons, daughters and widow of Narayan. It was further pleaded that respondent No. 1 is the sole heir of Sitaram who had died 40 years prior to filing of the suit, when the respondent No. 1 was a minor child. Narayan had taken care of the respondent No. 1 and he was cultivating the suit land with Narayan and his name was also mutated in place of his father. Thereafter the respondent No. 1 was taken in adoption by Chunnibai in village Banediya but he had continued to jointly cultivate the suit land and when he came to know about the deletion of his name from the revenue record, he had filed the present suit.
3. The suit was opposed by the appellants by filing the written statement and taking the plea that the respondent No. 1 was taken in adoption 35 years back by Chunnibai w/o Bheraji and that Sitaram was never a member of the joint family and on account of his bad conduct, he was separated from the family and after the death of Sitaram, his wife had gone in Natra leaving the respondent No. 1 orphan, therefore, Narayan had taken care of the respondent No. 1 but the respondent No. 1 had no right or title in the suit property and with his consent on 1-3-1971 his name was deleted from the revenue record.
4. Trial Court had decreed the suit on reaching to the conclusion that the suit properties were ancestral properties of the appellant and the respondent No. 1, which were jointly cultivated by them. It was also found that the respondent No. 1 was taken in adoption at the age of 10-11 years by Chunnibai but his right on the ancestral property had not come to an end. Accordingly the suit was decreed. The first appellate Court has affirmed the judgment of the trial Court.
5. This Court vide order dated 16-11-1999 had admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law:—
“1. Whether the words property which vested* used under section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 can be construed as right which vested?
2. Whether under the facts and in the circumstances of the case, when a child gone in adoption who was a member of co-parcenery and had only a right in the co-parcenery property by birth will continue to have a right with other co-parceners even after going in adoption?”
6. The aforesaid questions of law are interrelated, therefore, they are being answered as under:—
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the two Courts below have concurrently found that the suit properties were ancestral properties and they were inherited by Sitaram and Narayan, the two sons of Sevaram. The appellants are LRs of Narayan, whereas the respondent No. 1 is the son of Sitaram. It has also been concurrently found that the respondent had gone in adoption on 4-11-1962 to Chunnibai of village Banediya and Sitaram, father of the respondent, had died somewhere around 1955-56. The first appellate Court has taken the view that on the death of Sitaram, the title had accrued to the respondent No. 1 in respect of the suit house and the agricultural land and therefore, in terms of proviso to section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for short “the Act”) his right on the suit property will remain intact even after his adoption.
8. section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act provides as under:—
“12. Effect of adoption.— An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family : Provided that—
(a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth;
(b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth;
(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption.”
9. In terms of proviso (b) to section 12 the property vested in adopted child before the adoption, continues to be vested in him subject to the obligations attached to it. In the present case admittedly no partition has taken place because the suit of the respondent itself is for partition, therefore, the pivotal question is that if undivided share in the ancestral property received by the respondent No. 1 on the death of Sitaram, amounts to vesting of property in him? The position in this regard is that the share of a co-parcener in the undivided property is fluctuating share which keeps on varying with addition and extinct of members of coparcenery. The share is crystallized only when the property is partitioned, therefore, till the partition takes place the ancestral property can not be said to have vested in the coparcener. [See: (1988) 2 SCC 126 : AIR 1988 SC 845, Dharma Shamrao Agalawe v. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe, AIR 1981 Bombay 109, Y.K. Nalavade v. Ananda G. Chavan, (1987) 1 SCC 160 : AIR 1987 SC 398, Vasant v. Dattu].
10. The Supreme Court in the matter of Dharma Shamrao (supra) while approving the earlier judgment in the Vasant's case, it has been held that:—
“10. The decision of the High Court of Bombay in Y.K. Nalavade's case (supra) which was followed by the High Court in dismissing the appeal, out of which the present appeal arises, has been rightly given. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court of Bombay in that decision for taking the view that clause (c) to proviso of section 12 of the Act would not be attracted to a case of this nature since as observed by this Court in Vasant's case (supra) there was no ‘vesting’ of joint family property in Dharma-the appellant took place on the death of Miragu and no ‘divesting’ or property took place when Pandurang-the first respondent was adopted. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Narra Hanumantha Rao's case (supra) which takes a contrary view is not approved by us. It, therefore, stands overruled.”
11. Initially Andhra Pradesh High Court in the matte of Yarlagadda Nayudamma v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1981 A.P. 19 had taken the view that under proviso (b) of section 12 of the Act, a coparcener given in adoption has vested right in the undivided property of his natural father but subsequently Bombay High Court in the matter of Devgonda Raygonda Patil v. Shamgonda Raygonda Patil, reported in AIR 1991 Bombay 189 after taking note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vasant (supra) and Dharma Shamrao Agalawe (supra) has held that the adoptee cannot have vested right in the undivided joint family property of his natural birth. The view of the Bombay High Court in the case of Devgonda Raygonda Patil (supra) is that:—
“16. The same view came to be reiterated by the Supreme Court in (1988) 2 SCC 126 : AIR 1988 SC 845, Dharmu Shamrao Agalawe v. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe. The Supreme Court also approved the decision of this Court in AIR 1981 page 109. Therefore, in my view, if there is coparcenary or joint family in existence in the family of birth on date of adoption, then the adoptee cannot be said to have any vested properly. The property does not vest and therefore provision of section 12 proviso (b) is not attracted. In the context of section 12 proviso (b) ‘vested property’ means where indefeasible right is created i.e. on no contingency it can be defeated in respect of particular property. In other words where full ownership is conferred in respect of a particular property. But this is not the position in case of coparcenary properly. The coparcenary property is not owned by a coparcener and never any particular property. All the properties vest in the joint family and are held by it. I therefore reject the contention of Mr. Ingale.”
12. The same issue came up before the Patna High Court, wherein the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the matter of Santosh Kumar Jalan @ Kanhaya Lai Jalan v. Chandra Kishore Jalan, reported in AIR 2001 Patna 125 while dissenting with the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the matter of Yarlagadda Nayudamma (supra), has held that:—
“12. I regret my inability to accept this as the correct legal position. I have already stated above that though a coparcener has vested right of joint possession and enjoyment of the estate of his natural family, Proviso (b) refers to “any property which vested”. As there is no vesting of “any property” and there is vesting of only community of interest with other coparceners, the proviso cannot be extended to cover such interest.”
13. The Punjab and Haryana High Court also in the matter of Khidmat Singh v. Joginder Singh by the judgment dated 12-3-2010 in RSA No. 1234/1985 reported in 2010 (4) RCR (Civil) 252 has considered the similar question of law in the appeal which has been formulated in the present case and has taken note of the judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Devgonda Raygonda Patil (supra) and Supreme Court in the case of Dharma Shamrao Agalawe (supra) and has held that the property inherited by a person before adoption only is protected under section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and not mere interest in coparcenary property.
14. Having considered the aforesaid factual and legal position, I am of the opinion that only the property which stands vested in the adopted child before the adoption continues to be vested in him under proviso (b) to section 12 of the Act and the respondent No. 1 being a member of coparcenery having undivided share in the coparcenery before the adoption, the properties of the coparcenery of the natural father did not vest in him and are not protected under proviso (b) to section 12 of the Act. Hence the respondent No. 1 is not entitled to the partition of the said ancestral property after his adoption. The Courts below have committed an error in appreciating the effect of proviso (b) of section 12 of the Act while decreeing the suit of the respondent by holding that the undivided ancestral properties of the family of natural father of the respondent had vested in him. Such a conclusion of the Courts below cannot be sustained in view of the legal position noted above.
15. Hence, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below is set aside and the suit filed by the respondent is dismissed.
Appeal allowed.
Alert