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Bharat v. State Of Chhattisgarh And Others

Chhattisgarh High Court
Feb 10, 2015
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged the legality and validity of orders (Annexures P-11 and P-12) whereby the Governor of Chhattisgarh pardoned Respondents 5 and 6, directing their release from jail under Article 161 of the Constitution of India. Respondents 5 and 6 were convicted for offences under Sections 147 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC related to the murder of the deceased Hanua on 11-7-1975. Their conviction was affirmed by the High Court but partially set aside by the Supreme Court, leaving only four accused, including Respondents 5 and 6, convicted. While serving their sentences, Respondents 5 and 6 applied for pardon, which was granted by the Governor through the impugned orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Governor’s exercise of the power of pardon under Article 161 of the Constitution can override the provisions of Section 433-A CrPC regarding remission of life imprisonment.
  2. Whether the impugned orders granting pardon and consequent release of Respondents 5 and 6 were legal and valid.
  3. The extent of judicial review permissible over the Governor’s exercise of the clemency power under Article 161.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner, son of the deceased, contended that life imprisonment implies incarceration for the convict’s entire life, and release by remission or pardon contradicts settled legal principles.
  • Relied on Section 433-A CrPC and Supreme Court judgments in Maru Ram v. Union of India, Kehar Singh v. Union of India, and Swaran Singh v. State of U.P. to argue that remission cannot be granted before serving at least 14 years.
  • Asserted that the impugned orders are illegal as they contravene the statutory provisions governing remission.

Respondents’ Arguments (State Counsel)

  • Submitted that the Governor’s power of pardon under Article 161 is distinct from remission of sentence under Section 433-A CrPC and thus the latter does not apply.
  • Referred to Supreme Court judgments in State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh and Ram Deo Chauhan v. Bani Kanta Das to support the plenary and overriding nature of the Governor’s clemency power.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maru Ram v. Union of India Clarification that the Governor’s power of pardon under Article 161 is plenary and not circumscribed by CrPC provisions like Section 433-A; limited judicial interference except in rare, perverse cases. Cited to establish that the Governor’s clemency power overrides Section 433-A CrPC and is subject to minimal judicial review.
Kehar Singh v. Union of India Reaffirmed the exclusive clemency power of the President and Governor; limited scope for judicial review unless exercise of power is arbitrary or mala fide. Used to support the presumption of bona fide exercise of clemency power and rejection of interference absent evident perversity.
Ram Deo Chauhan v. Bani Kanta Das Outlined the extent of judicial review over the Governor’s exercise of clemency power under Article 161. Reiterated that courts should not interfere unless the power is exercised arbitrarily or mala fide.
G. Krishta Goud v. State of A.P. Judicial review over clemency power is limited; presumption in favor of bona fide exercise by executive authority. Referred to emphasize the heavy presumption of good faith in the Governor’s exercise of power.
Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. Judicial caution against arbitrary or vindictive exercise of clemency power; however, Kehar Singh’s principles take precedence. Distinguished and found vitiated as it conflicted with the binding principles in Kehar Singh and Maru Ram cases.
State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh Supporting principle that Governor’s clemency power under Article 161 is plenary and not subject to CrPC restrictions. Relied upon by State counsel to defend legality of pardon granted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the impugned orders and the original clemency records, noting that the Governor exercised power under Article 161, which is plenary and not limited by Section 433-A CrPC. The Court observed that the Governor’s power overrides statutory provisions related to remission of sentence, as affirmed in the Supreme Court’s Maru Ram decision.

The Court further analyzed the extent of judicial review permissible over such clemency powers, relying on authoritative Supreme Court pronouncements in Ram Deo Chauhan, Kehar Singh, and G. Krishta Goud cases. These establish a strong presumption in favor of bona fide exercise of clemency by the Governor, with judicial interference only warranted in cases of perversity, arbitrariness, mala fide intent, or rule-of-thumb decisions.

The Court found no material or pleading to suggest that the Governor’s exercise of power was arbitrary, mala fide, or influenced by political pressure. The clemency process included departmental recommendations, reports of good conduct and age considerations, and approval by the Chief Minister before the Governor’s order. In absence of any evidence to rebut the presumption of bona fide exercise, the Court upheld the validity of the impugned orders.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is dismissed.

The Court’s decision directly upholds the Governor’s exercise of clemency power under Article 161, confirming that such power overrides statutory remission provisions and is subject to minimal judicial scrutiny. The ruling affirms the principle that courts should not interfere with pardons unless there is clear evidence of arbitrariness or mala fide conduct. No new precedent was created; rather, established Supreme Court jurisprudence was applied to the facts of the case.

Show all summary ...

Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.— In this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the legality and validity of the orders Annexures P-11 and P-12 whereby the Hon'ble Governor of Chhattisgarh has pardoned Respondents 5 and 6 in exercise of powers under Article 161 of the Constitution of India and has directed their release from jail.

2. Facts of the case, briefly stated, are that Respondents 5 and 6 along with several other accused persons were tried for committing offences under Sections 147 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC for committing murder of deceased Hanua at 8.30 a.m. on 11-7-1975. The trial Court acquitted Arjun, Bhikham, Nanku and Parethan. Respondents 5 and 6 along with some other accused persons were convicted by the trial Court and the said conviction was affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court, by judgment dated 5-10-1990 in CrA No. 168 of 1979, allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of all other accused except Respondents 5 and 6, Baran and Karan. Thus, out of 19 accused persons only 4 stood convicted. When Respondents 5 and 6 were undergoing the jail sentence, an application for pardon was moved before the Hon'ble Governor and the same has been allowed by the impugned order.

3. The petitioner happens to be the son of the deceased. It is argued on his behalf that the sentence of life imprisonment would mean that the convict shall remain in jail for his entire life, therefore, his release by granting remission or pardon is contrary to the settled legal position. Learned counsel would refer to the provisions contained in Section 433-A CrPC and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India, Kehar Singh v. Union of India, Swaran Singh v. State of U.P.

4. Per contra, learned State counsel would submit that Hon'ble Governor has exercised the power of pardon under Article 161 of the Constitution and it is not a case of remission of sentence, therefore, Section 433-A CrPC has no application in the case. He would refer to the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh and Ram Deo Chauhan v. Bani Kanta Das.

5. The petitioner has referred to the provisions contained in Section 433-A CrPC to argue that a person convicted for life cannot be released from jail without serving at least 14 years of imprisonment. Therefore, the impugned orders are illegal.

6. Perusal of the impugned orders would indicate that the same are based on the order passed by the Hon'ble Governor on 17-7-2004 (in Annexure P-11) and 26-6-2004 (in Annexure P-12) by the Hon'ble Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution.

7. The power of clemency or pardon conferred on the Hon'ble Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution is a plenary power and is not circumscribed by any fetter imposed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It overrides Section 433-A CrPC, as is settled by the Supreme Court in Maru Ram case.

8. Though not argued that the impugned orders do not satisfy the requirement for exercise of powers under Article 161 of the Constitution and the said exercise is perverse, this Court proceeded to peruse the original record wherein clemency has been granted, the same having been supplied to the Court by learned State counsel.

9. A perusal of the record would indicate that an application for commuting the sentence was earlier moved in the year 2002 which was considered and rejected by the State Government. In May 2004, an application was directly sent to the Hon'ble Governor, on which a report was summoned from the concerned department. On this occasion, the department recommended for pardon which was also approved by the Hon'ble Chief Minister. Report of the jail authorities is also available on record wherein on account of their good conduct and age, their applications for pardon were recommended for acceptance.

10. In Ram Deo Chauhan case, the Supreme Court considered the extent of judicial review in respect of exercise of power by the Hon'ble Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution and held in paras 65 to 69 thus:

“65. However, on the extent of judicial review in respect of exercise of power by the Governor under Article 161, or by the President under Article 72, there are authoritative pronouncements by this Court and the matter is no longer res integra. 66. In G. Krishta Goud v. State of A.P.8 this Court while construing the extent of judicial review in connection with exercise of clemency power by the President or the Governor respectively under Articles 72 and 161 held that even though the power granted to the highest executive authority is not totally immune from judicial review, but the Court makes an almost extreme presumption in favour of bona fide exercise of such power (SCC para 8). However, in SCC para 9 the Court sounded a note of caution that where the exercise of power is just by way of a rule of thumb and totally arbitrarily or out of personal vendetta, the Court is not helpless (see SCC para 9). 67. This question again came up for detailed consideration before the Constitution Bench in Maru Ram v. Union of India9. In SCC para 72 at p. 153 of the Report, this Court was summarising its conclusions and in sub-para 9 it was held that only in rare cases the Court would examine the exercise of power by the appropriate authority. Subsequently, in Kehar Singh v. Union of India10, again by a Constitution Bench of this Court, the extent of exercise of this power of clemency was considered. 68. In SCC para 13 of Kehar Singh case11, Pathak, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, held: (SCC pp. 216-17) “13. … Nor do we dispute that the power to pardon belongs exclusively to the President and the Governor under the Constitution. There is also no question involved in this case of asking for the reasons for the President's Order. And none of the cases cited for the respondents beginning with Mohinder Singh (Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab12) advance the case of the respondent any further.” It also appears from para 11 of Kehar Singh case13 that it relies on the formulations of principles in Maru Ram case14. SCC paras 7 and 15 of Kehar Singh case15 would also show that Maru Ram case16 ratio was followed in Kehar Singh case17. 69. In view of such consistent view of the two Constitution Benches of this Court clearly stating that unless the exercise of power by the Governor under Article 161, is ex facie perverse or is based on a rule of thumb, the Court should not interfere for mere non-disclosure of reason, the finding to the contrary in the judgment under review, by relying on a two-Judge Bench decision in (Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P.18) is vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. Even in SCC para 37 in Epuru case19, the observation of Kehar Singh case20, underlined hereinabove was noted.”

11. In the case at hand, the record would indicate that an application for clemency/pardon was processed in the department and report was called from the jail authorities. Based on the report, their cases were recommended by the department as also by the Hon'ble Chief Minister and thereafter Hon'ble Governor exercised the power under Article 161 of the Constitution. No material has been placed before this Court as to how exercise of power is vitiated on account of being mala fide, perverse or in excess of power conferred under Article 161. There is absolutely no pleading or material even to allege that what kind of political influence was exerted by Respondents 5 and 6 or their relatives to secure their release. Therefore, it is not a case where power has been exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Since there exists presumption in favour of bona fide exercise of power under Article 161 of the Constitution, as observed by the Supreme Court in G. Krishta Goud case and reiterated in Ram Deo Chauhan case and in the absence of any material to rebut the said presumption or to compel this Court to take view that exercise of power is vitiated for any good or sound reason, this Court does not find any infirmity in the impugned orders.

12. The writ petition being bereft of any substance deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.