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Union Of India And Others v. Krishna Kumar And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 14, 2019
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Case Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from an order dated 10-12-2013 of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Manipur. The High Court directed the authorities to consider Havaldars, including the respondents (petitioners before the High Court), for promotion to the post of Naib Subedar against vacancies that occurred prior to the restructuring of the Assam Rifles in 2011 and before enforcement of the Assam Rifles Warrant Officer (General Duty) Group ‘C’ Combatised Posts Recruitment Rules, 2012.

The respondents were appointed between 1982 and 1989 as Riflemen and were Havaldars at the relevant time. Under the earlier Rules, the promotional avenue for a Havaldar was to Naib Subedar. Following the Sixth Pay Commission, by communication dated 3-3-2011, the Ministry of Home Affairs sanctioned the introduction of an intermediate rank of Warrant Officer by abolition/upgradation of one post of Havaldar. On 16-6-2012, the Recruitment Rules, 2012 were notified, creating the Warrant Officer post to be filled by promotion from Havaldars (General Duty) with five years’ regular service and specified qualifications (Map Reading Standard One—Pass, Promotion Cadre—Pass, Technical Trade Test One—Pass), with notes concerning consideration of seniors and counting of qualifying service.

On 13-8-2012, promotion orders were issued promoting Havaldars, including the respondents, to the newly created post of Warrant Officer. The respondents challenged this in writ proceedings, asserting that their promotion should have been to Naib Subedar. The High Court allowed the writ petition, holding that vacancies prior to the restructuring and before the 2012 Rules must be governed by the earlier Rules, and directed consideration for promotion as Naib Subedar for such prior vacancies. The Union of India appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether vacancies that arose prior to the 2011 restructuring and the 2012 Recruitment Rules must be filled under the then-existing Rules (with promotion from Havaldar to Naib Subedar), or under the Rules in force at the time of consideration (post-2012, with an intermediate Warrant Officer rank).
  2. Whether creation of the intermediate post of Warrant Officer and promotion of Havaldars to that post infringed the respondents’ rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as alleged.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Union of India)

  • The High Court erred in holding that vacancies occurring prior to the amendment had to be filled under the old Rules that provided promotion from Havaldar to Naib Subedar.
  • After the 2011 restructuring and the 2012 Recruitment Rules, promotion from Havaldar lies to the post of Warrant Officer; the High Court’s direction to consider promotion to Naib Subedar based on earlier vacancies was not justified.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Promoting Havaldars to the rank of Warrant Officer would violate their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
  • Although the Recruitment Rules, 2012 were not challenged, vacancies that arose prior to 2011 should be filled by promoting eligible Havaldars to the post of Naib Subedar.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 Has been construed as applicable where the governing Rules mandate completion of the promotion/selection process within a specified timeframe. Explained as not laying a universal rule that vacancies must be filled under the Rules in force when the vacancies arose; rather, it applies where the Rules fix a time-bound process.
H.S. Grewal v. Union of India, (1997) 11 SCC 758 Creation of an intermediate post does not interfere with any vested right to promotion. Relied upon to hold that introduction of the Warrant Officer rank does not infringe a vested right of Havaldars to be promoted directly to Naib Subedar.
Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 725 A candidate’s right is to be considered under the Rules in force on the date of consideration; no absolute rule that vacancies are filled by the law existing on the date they arose. Applied to reaffirm that consideration for promotion after the amendment must proceed under the amended Rules unless a time-bound mandate like in Rangaiah exists.
B.L. Gupta v. MCD, (1998) 9 SCC 223 Reiteration of principles traceable to Rangaiah. Cited (through Deepak Agarwal) as supportive of the limited reach of Rangaiah; no separate rule added.
P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P., 1988 Supp SCC 740 Reiteration of principles traceable to Rangaiah. Cited (through Deepak Agarwal) similarly to confirm no universal right to have vacancies filled by old Rules.
N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) 3 SCC 157 Reiteration of principles traceable to Rangaiah. Cited (through Deepak Agarwal) as part of the line of authority limiting Rangaiah.
State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty, (2017) 3 SCC 646 Confirms the rule that consideration is under the Rules in force on the date of consideration; no absolute rule that vacancies are filled by the law when they arose; expansion of feeder cadre merely enlarges zone of consideration. Used to reinforce that there was no accrued right and the State could fill vacancies under amended Rules.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by reaffirming the settled principle that there is no vested right to promotion; instead, an employee has a right to be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules prevailing on the date of consideration. It emphasized that there is no universal rule mandating that vacancies must be filled under the law in force when they arose.

The Court analyzed Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao as a decision hinging on Rules that required completion of the selection process within a stipulated timeframe. Subsequent decisions have limited Rangaiah to such contexts. In contrast, H.S. Grewal held that the introduction of an intermediate promotional post does not interfere with vested rights to promotion. Deepak Agarwal further clarified that the right to be considered accrues on the date of consideration, and unless the Rules mandate a time-bound selection (as in Rangaiah), amendments effective before consideration govern promotions. State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty reaffirmed that there is no accrued right to have vacancies filled under the old Rules.

Applying these principles, the Court held that once the Assam Rifles’ structure changed—creating the intermediate post of Warrant Officer—Havaldars had to be considered for promotion to Warrant Officer under the 2012 Recruitment Rules. The High Court’s premise that vacancies arising prior to the amendment must necessarily be filled under the pre-amendment Rules was rejected as contrary to the above precedents. The High Court’s assumption of a vested right in Havaldars to be promoted to Naib Subedar was found legally untenable.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED. The appeal was allowed and the High Court’s judgment and order were SET ASIDE. There was no order as to costs.

Further, in connected civil appeals (arising out of SLP (C) No. 30337 of 2014 and SLP (C) No. 30334 of 2014), applications for impleadment were allowed, delay was condoned, leave was granted, and those appeals were DISPOSED OF in view of this judgment, with no order as to costs.

Implications: Promotions of Havaldars are to be considered under the Rules in force at the time of consideration—here, the Recruitment Rules, 2012 creating the Warrant Officer post—regardless of when vacancies arose. The decision reiterates existing jurisprudence that there is no vested right to a particular promotional post and that the creation of an intermediate post does not violate such a right. The ruling has direct effect on the parties and does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond reaffirming settled law.

Show all summary ...

Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, J.—

Civil appeal [arising out of SLP (C) No. 26451 of 2014]

1. Leave granted. This appeal arises from an order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Manipur dated 10-12-2013. The High Court, by its impugned order, has issued a direction to the appellants to consider the case of the respondents (the petitioners before the High Court) if they are eligible and within the zone of consideration for promotion to the post of Naib Subedar against vacancies which occurred prior to the changes that were made in the structure of Assam Rifles in 2011 and before the enforcement of the Recruitment Rules for Warrant Officer in 2012. The High Court directed that such an exercise be carried out in respect of other Havaldars against vacancies which had occurred prior to 2011.

2. The respondents were appointed between 1982 and 1989 on the post of Rifleman in Assam Rifles. At the relevant point of time, they were working as Havaldars. Under the Rules, as they existed earlier, the promotional avenue for a Havaldar lay to the post of Naib Subedar. Following the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission, the Union of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs conveyed its sanction on 3-3-2011 for the introduction of an intermediate rank of Warrant Officer by the abolition/upgradation of one post of Havaldar. On 16-6-2012, the Assam Rifles Warrant Officer (General Duty) Group ‘C’ Combatised Posts Recruitment Rules, 2012 were notified. In terms of the Recruitment Rules, the post of Warrant Officer was created which was required to be filled up by promotion amongst members of the Assam Rifles holding the rank of Havaldar (General Duty) with five years' regular service in the grade and possessing the requisite educational qualifications. The Rules, inter alia, stipulated the following conditions for promotion:

“Promotion amongst the members of Assam Rifles holding the rank of Havaldar (General Duty) with five years regular service in the grade and possessing the following educational qualifications, namely:
(i) Map reading standard one — Pass
(ii) Promotion cadre passed — Pass
(iii) Technical Trade Test One — Pass
Note 1.—Where juniors who have completed their qualifying or eligibility service are considered for promotion their seniors would also be considered provided they are not short of the requisite qualifying or eligibility service for more than half of such qualifying or eligibility service or two years, whichever is less, and have successfully completed their probation period for promotion to the next grade with their juniors who have already completed such qualifying or eligibility service.
Note 2.—For the purpose of counting minimum qualifying service for promotion, the service rendered on a regular basis by an officer prior to 1-1-2006 i.e. the date from which the revised pay structure band or the Sixth Central Pay Commission recommendations have been extended, shall be deemed to be service rendered in the corresponding grade pay or pay scale extended based on the recommendations of the Commission.”

3. On 13-8-2012, promotion orders were issued for Havaldars to the newly created post of Warrant Officer. The respondents were promoted as Warrant Officers.

4. Writ proceedings were instituted before the High Court with a grievance that the promotion from the post of Havaldar was to a lower and inferior rank of Warrant Officer, whereas the promotion ought to have been made to the rank of Naib Subedar.

5. The High Court allowed the writ petition by holding that despite the changes which were brought about in the structure of Assam Rifles in 2011, rights which accrued prior to the enforcement of the changed structure in favour of Havaldars for being considered for promotion as Naib Subedars, were required to be enforced. The High Court observed that:

“It is now well settled that vacancies occurring prior to amendment or creation of the Recruitment Rules, are to be governed by the Rules which existed at the time of occurrence of the vacancy.”

6. On this basis, the High Court directed the appellants to consider the case of the respondents and other Havaldars for promotion to the post of Naib Subedars against vacancies which had occurred prior to the changes which were carried out in 2011 and before the enforcement of the Recruitment Rules, 2012.

7. Assailing the judgment, the Union of India is in appeal.

8. Ms Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellants, submits that the High Court has proceeded on the erroneous basis that vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment of the Recruitment Rules were required to be governed by the erstwhile provisions under which the promotion from the post of Havaldar would lie to the post of Naib Subedar. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that once there was a change in the structure of Assam Rifles in 2011 and the Recruitment Rules of 2012 prescribe that promotion from the post of Havaldar would lie to the post of Warrant Officer, the High Court was not justified in issuing the above directions.

9. On the other hand, it has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that if Havaldars are to be promoted as the Warrant Officers, that would violate their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The learned counsel submits that under the Rules, as they prevailed prior to the restructuring of Assam Rifles, promotion for Havaldars lay to the post of Warrant Officer. While the respondents have not challenged the Recruitment Rules, as noted by the High Court, they urge that vacancies which have arisen prior to 2011 must be filled up by promoting Havaldars eligible for promotion to the post of Naib Subedars.

10. In considering the rival submissions, it must, at the outset, be noted that it is well settled that there is no vested right to promotion, but a right be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which consideration for promotion takes place. This Court has held that there is no rule of universal application to the effect that vacancies must necessarily be filled in on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose. The decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao (1983) 3 SCC 284 has been construed in subsequent decisions as a case where the applicable Rules required the process of promotion or selection to be completed within a stipulated time-frame. Hence, it has been held in H.S. Grewal v. Union of India (1997) 11 SCC 758 that the creation of an intermediate post would not amount to an interference with the vested right to promotion. A two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus: (H.S. Grewal case (1997) 11 SCC 758)

“13. … Such an introduction of an intermediate post does not, in our opinion, amount to interfering with any vested rights cannot be interfered with, is to be accepted as correct. What all has happened here is that an intermediate post has been created prospectively for future promotions from Group B Class II to Group A Class I. If, before these Rules of 1981 came into force, these officers were eligible to be directly promoted as Commandants under the 1974 Rules but before they got any such promotions, the 1981 Rules came in obliging them to go through an intermediate post, this does not amount to interfering with any vested rights.”

11. In Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P. (2011) 6 SCC 725, this Court observed thus:

“26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the “Rules in force” on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah case (1983) 3 SCC 284 lays down any particular time-frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants has been taken away by the amendment.
27. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellants, namely, B.L. Gupta v. MCD (1998) 9 SCC 223, P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P. 1988 Supp SCC 740 and N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission (1990) 3 SCC 157 are reiterations of a principle laid down in Y.V. Rangaiah case (1983) 3 SCC 284.”

12. Recently, in State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty (2017) 3 SCC 646, another two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus:

“9. The law is thus clear that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, namely, “rules in force on the date” the consideration takes place and that there is no rule of absolute application that vacancies must invariably be filled by the law existing on the date when they arose. As against the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as in Deepak Agarwal (2011) 6 SCC 725, in the instant case certain additional posts have been included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend the Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated 24-11-2011.”

13. In view of this statement of the law, it is evident that once the structure of Assam Rifles underwent a change following the creation of the intermediate post of Warrant Officer, persons holding the post of Havaldar would be considered for promotion to the post of Warrant Officer. The intermediate post of Warrant Officer was created as a result of the restructuring exercise. The High Court was, in our view, in error in postulating that vacancies which arose prior to the amendment of the Recruitment Rules would necessarily be governed by the Rules which existed at the time of the occurrence of the vacancies. As the decided cases noted earlier indicate, there is no such rule of absolute or universal application. The entire basis of the decision of the High Court was that those who were recruited prior to the restructuring exercise and were holding the post of Havaldars had acquired a vested right of promotion to the post of Naib Subedar. This does not reflect the correct position in law. The right is to be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules as they exist when the exercise is carried out for promotion.

14. Hence, we see merit in the appeal. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

Civil appeals [arising out of SLP (C) No. 30337 of 2014 and SLP (C) No. 30334 of 2014]

15. Applications for impleadment are allowed. Delay condoned. Leave granted.

16. In view of the judgment delivered today in Union of India v. Krishna Kumar [civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 26451 of 2014], these appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs.