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Shyam Kanwar And Another v. Laccha Ram And Others

Rajasthan High Court
Apr 1, 2019
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Summary of Legal Opinion (P.K. Lohra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code challenges the District Judge, Pali's order dated 29 October 2018 in Civil Misc Case No. 27/2012. The learned trial court allowed an application under Section 40 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 and declared a registered sale-deed dated 9 May 2011 executed in favour of the appellants (Narpat Singh and Shyam Kanwar) to be void ab initio for want of sanction under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1959.

Relevant factual background stated in the opinion: a dharmshala registered in the Devsthan Department as “Shah Chamnaji Hukma Ji Dharmshala” (registration No. 229, 21 February 1977) was asserted to be a public trust. Its manager, Pukhraj, executed a power of attorney in favour of Ashok Kumar Jain, and Ashok Kumar Jain purportedly sold trust property by registered sale-deed dated 9 May 2011 to the appellants. Persons interested in the trust filed applications under Section 38 of the Act of 1959 before the Assistant Commissioner (Devasthan Department, Jodhpur), and Ashok Kumar also filed a complaint/application seeking declaration that the sale-deed was void. The Assistant Commissioner registered the matter as Case No. 1/2011 under Sections 31, 38 and 49 and proceeded with investigation. The Assistant Commissioner, by order dated 30 April 2012, allowed Ashok Kumar and another to move an application before the District Judge under Section 40, and Civil Misc Case No. 27/2012 was filed in the District Court. The learned trial court framed three issues on the pleadings, heard evidence, and concluded that the property sold belonged to the public trust and the sale-deed was null and void ab initio for lack of sanction under Section 31(1).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale-deed dated 9 May 2011 is void ab initio for want of prior sanction of the Assistant Commissioner under Section 31(1) of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.
  2. Whether the respondents (who are tenants of the trust) are "persons having interest" and therefore have locus to file an application under Section 38 and to seek relief under Section 40 of the Act of 1959.
  3. Whether a registered document such as the sale-deed in question can be cancelled only by instituting a civil suit with payment of proper court fees before a competent court (as contended by the appellants).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The learned Court below erred in not properly considering the facts and material on record when passing the impugned order.
  • The respondents are not working trustees nor have any interest in the trust; consequently, they lack locus to file an application under Section 40 of the Act of 1959.
  • It is a settled principle, the appellants contend, that a registered document can be canceled only by filing a civil suit by paying proper court fees before a competent court having jurisdiction.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The findings recorded by the learned Court below represent a sound appreciation of the facts and material on record and therefore should not be interfered with on appeal.
  • The disputed property belongs to a public trust and could not have been validly sold by the manager/trustee without prior sanction; thus the sale to the appellants is invalid.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded principally from statutory text and from the factual record as found by the trial court:

  1. The court reviewed and reproduced the relevant statutory provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, notably Sections 31 (requirement of previous sanction for certain transfers), 38 (application for directions by a person having interest and powers of the Assistant Commissioner), 39 (remedy to Commissioner against refusal under Section 38) and 40 (powers of the court on application under Section 38 or 39), as set out in the opinion.
  2. The court examined the statutory definition of "person having interest" (Section 2(9) of the Act of 1959), which includes beneficiaries and, in the case of other public trusts, "any beneficiary." The court treated tenants of the public trust as beneficiaries for the purposes of this definition.
  3. On the question of locus, the court held that because the respondents are tenants (and thereby beneficiaries) of the public trust, they qualify as "persons having interest" under the statute and therefore possessed the statutory standing to invoke Section 38 and to pursue relief under Section 40. Thus, the appellants' challenge to respondents' locus was rejected as not tenable.
  4. On the question of validity of the sale-deed, the court applied Section 31(1), which makes any sale of immovable property belonging to a public trust valid only upon the previous sanction of the Assistant Commissioner. The court accepted the trial court's factual finding that no such sanction had been obtained for the sale dated 9 May 2011, and concluded that the sale, being contrary to the mandatory requirements of Section 31(1), was void ab initio.
  5. The court reviewed the trial court's handling of evidence and concluded that the trial court had "meticulously discussed the entire evidence" and reached reasoned findings in favor of the respondents, which the appellate court found to be unassailable on the record before it.
  6. The opinion also observes that because the sale-deed is null and void from inception, the Devasthan Department is required to proceed for cancellation of the sale-deed on its own initiative (this observation follows the trial court's reasoning reflected in the impugned order).
  7. Having applied the statutory definitions and provisions to the facts found by the trial court, the appellate court concluded that there was no ground to interfere with the trial court's order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the impugned order of the learned District Judge, Pali (which declared the sale-deed dated 9 May 2011 void ab initio for want of sanction under Section 31(1) of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959) is upheld.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the trial court's judgment in Civil Misc Case No. 27/2012 stands: the sale-deed in favour of the appellants is declared void ab initio for failure to obtain the mandatory prior sanction under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1959.
  • The Devasthan (Devsthan) Department is indicated as required to proceed for cancellation of the sale-deed in accordance with the observations in the trial court's order.
  • The opinion does not discuss broader doctrinal changes or declare any new legal principle beyond its application of the statutory provisions to the facts; accordingly, no new precedent is indicated to have been set by this decision beyond affirmation of the established statutory requirements and their application to the facts of the case.

Judge: P.K. Lohra, J.

Show all summary ...

P.K. Lohra, J.:— By the instant appeal under Section 96 CPC, appellants have challenged order dated 29 of October, 2018, passed by District Judge, Pali (for short, ‘learned Court below’) in Civil Misc Case No. 27/2012. Learned trial Court, by the impugned order, has allowed application under Section 40 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (for short, Act of 1959’) filed by respondents and declared disputed sale-deed dated 9 of May, 2011, executed in favour of the appellants, as void ab-initio in want of Section 31(1) of the Act of 1959.

2. The facts, apposite for the purpose of this appeal, are that some persons interested in the public trust filed an application under Section 38 of the Act of 1959 before Assistant Collector, Devasthan Department Jodhpur stating therein that one Dharmshala at Station Road, Sumerpur (Undri) was registered with the Devsthan Department, in the name of “Shah Chamnaji Hukma Ji Dharmshala” on 21 of February 1977 bearing registration No. 229. It is also averred that the Dharmshala is a public trust and its trustees have no right to sale or gift its property despite that its Manager Pukhraj executed a power of attorney in favour of Ashok Kumar Jain for selling property and Ashok Kumar Jain by registered sale-deed dated 9 of May, 2011 sold property of the trust to the appellants Narpat Singh and Shyam Kanwar. Another application/complaint was filed by respondent No. 2 Ashok Kumar before Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department, Jodhpur with the prayer to declare the sale-deed void. The applications/complaints were registered by the Assistant Commissioner as Case No. 1/2011 under Sections 31, 38 and 49 of the Act of 1959 and investigation started. During the course of investigation, appellants submitted their reply stating that the complainants are tenant and thus have no right to file such application/complaints. The Assistant Commissioner, vide order dated 30 of April 2012 accepted the application and granted permission to Ashok Kumar and Sesaram to move application before the District Judge under Section 40 of the Act of 1959 and also to seek guidance/direction from the Court below in this matter. Thereafter, they filed an application before the learned Court below which was registered as Civil Misc. case No. 27/2012. Upon receiving notices, non-applicants filed reply thereto.

3. Learned Court below, on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, settled three issues for determination and the parties led their evidence.

4. Learned trial Court, thereafter, heard final arguments and after discussing the evidence threadbare arrived at the conclusion that the shops which were sold by registered sale-deed dated 9 of May 2011 to the appellants are property of the Public Trust. It is also observed by the learned Court below that since sale-deed dated 09.05.2011 is null and void right from very inception, the Devasthan Department on its own is required to proceed for cancellation of sale-deed.

5. Mr. C.R. Jakhar, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the learned Court below has erred in not considering the facts and material available on record while passing the impugned order. It is contended by learned counsel that the respondents are not working trustees nor having any interest in the trust, as such, they have no right or locus to file application under Section 40 the Act of 1959. It is also contended by learned counsel that it is a settled principle of law that a registered document can be canceled only by filing a civil suit by paying proper court fees before a competent court having jurisdiction.

6. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjay Nahar, learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the findings recorded by learned Court below are based on sound appreciation of facts and material available on record and thus the same are not liable to be interfered with. It is also submitted by learned counsel that the disputed property belongs to a Public Trust and the same could not be sold by the manager/trustee of the Trust to the appellants.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment as well as record of the case. It would be appropriate to first go through provisions of relevant Sections 31, 38, 39 and 40 of the Act of 1959, which are reproduced hereunder:—

“31. - Previous sanction to be obtained for certain transfers:

(1). Subject to the directions in the instrument of trust or any directions given under this Act or any other law by any court:

(a) no sale, exchange or gift of any immovable property or of movable property exceeding five thousand rupees in value, and

(b) no lease, for a period exceeding five years in the case of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building.

belonging to a public trust shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Assistant Commissioner.

(2). An application for the sanction of the Assistant Commissioner, under sub-section (1) shall be made in the prescribed manner and form.

(3). Where, on the application duly made for sanction in respect of any transaction specified in subsection(1), the Assistant Commissioner does not, within two months of the receipt thereof, pass final orders, it shall be presumed that he has accorded sanction in respect of that transaction, provided that the application described the transaction, with sufficient accuracy.

(4). The Assistant Commissioner shall not refuse to accord sanction in respect of any transaction specified in sub-section (1) unless such transaction is, in this opinion, likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the public trust, and no order refusing to accord sanction shall be passed unless the working trustee of such public trust has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

38 - Application for directions: (1). If the Assistant Commissioner, on the application of any person having interest in a public trust or otherwise, is satisfied after making such inquiry as he thinks necessary that-

(a) the original object of the public trust has failed.

(b) the trust property is not being properly managed or administered or

(c) the direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the public trust;

he may, after giving the working trustee an opportunity of being heard, direct such working trustee or any other trustee or person having interest in the trust to apply to the court for directions, within such time not exceeding thirty days as may be specified by the Assistant Commissioner.

(2). If the working trustee or any other trustee or person having interest in the trust so directed fails to make an application as required, or if there is no trustee of the public trust, or if, for any other person, the Assistant Commissioner considers it expedient to do so, he shall himself make an application to the court.

39. Application to Commissioner against refusal to apply under Section 38.- (1) Where the Assistant Commissioner rejects an application under Sub-section (1) of section 38 or fails or refuses to make an application to the court himself under sub-section (2) of that section, the Commissioner may, on an application made to him within ninety days of such rejection, failure or refusal or upon the facts otherwise coming to his knowledge and after giving the working trustee a reasonable opportunity of being heard, set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner, if any, and require him to apply to the court himself for directions.

(2). Subject to the orders of the Commissioner under sub-section (1) all orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner under section 38 shall be final.

40. Powers of the court on application under section 38 or section 39. (1) On receipt of an application made under or in pursuance of section 38 or section 39 the court shall make or cause to be made such inquiry into the case as it deems necessary and pass such orders thereon as it may consider appropriate.

(2). While exercising the powers under sub-section (1) the court shall, besides other powers, have power to make an order for-

(a) removing any trustee;

(b) appointing a new trustee;

(c) declaring what portion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;

(d) providing a scheme of management of the trust property;

(e) directing how the funds of a public trust whose original object has failed shall be spent, having due regard to the object for which the trust was created;

(f) issuing such other directions as the nature of the case may require.

(3). Any order passed by the court under sub-section (2) shall be deemed to be a decree of such court and an appeal shall lie there from to the High Court.”

8. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants to question locus of the respondent is per se not tenable. A bare perusal of Section 38 of the Act of 1959, it is abundantly clear that application in this behalf can be filed by any person having interest in a public trust. The Legislature has given very expensive definition of “person having interest” under Section 2(9) of the Act of 1959 which reads as under:—

“Person having interest” or any expression signifying a person having interest in a public trust includes-

(a) in the case of a temple, a person who is entitled to attend or is in the habit of attending the performance of worship or service in the temple or who is entitled to partaking or is in the habit of partaking in the distribution of gifts thereof;

(b) in the case of math, a disciple of the math or a person of the religious persuasion to which the math belongs;

(c) in the case of society registered or deemed to be registered under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958 (Rajasthan Act 28 of 1958) or under any other analogous law in force in any part of the State, any member of such society; and

(d) in the case of any, other public trust, any beneficiary;

9. Therefore, being tenants of a public trust respondents are beneficiaries of the Trust they are undeniably “person having interest” and as such their locus is unquestionable. On merits also, when sanction for sale of trust property is not obtained by the authorized person on behalf of public trust from the Assistant Commissioner, such sale being contrary to mandatory requirements under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1959 is void abinito. Thus, the findings and conclusions of the learned of the learned court below are just and proper in the best interest of public trust warrants no interference.

10. In totality, upon objective analysis of the evidence, unhesitatingly, in my opinion, the learned trial Court has meticulously discussed the entire evidence for recording its affirmative finding in favour of respondents. The findings and conclusion are based on sound reasonings and therefore cannot be faulted.

11. In view of foregoing discussion, I feel disinclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by learned Court below.

12. Resultantly, the appeal fails and same is hereby dismissed.