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O.S.K. David v. L. Rethinam
PRAYER: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of C.P.C., against the judgment and decree, dated 16.02.2015, made in A.S. No. 9 of 2012 on the file of the Sub Court, Ramanathapuram, reversing the judgment and decree, dated 17.02.2010, made in O.S. No. 32 of 2008 on the file of the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Rameswaram.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Pushpa Sathyanarayana, J.:— The plaintiff is the appellant in the above second appeal. The suit was filed for injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the usufructs by the plaintiff from the suit property.
2. According to the plaintiff, the suit property is a portion of the Government promboke land situated in Survey No. 693/20. One A.M. Raman was given permission by the Tahsildar, Ramnad, vide “B” memo order No. 637/78, to rear the coconut trees and to enjoy the usufructs of the same with respect to 2 acres and 50 cents. The said Raman sold the property to one Victor Boopalaroyar by way of two registered sale deeds dated 23.04.1975 and 08.10.1975. According to the plaintiff, though in the said sale deeds the land on which the coconut trees were standing also included, what was actually transferred was only the right of enjoyment of the usufructs as the land belongs to the Government. The said Victor Boopalaroyar sold the suit property to one S. Karuppaiah on 07.02.1985. Thereafter, the said Karuppaiah sold the same on 21.10.1988 to the defendant. The defendant, in turn, sold the suit property including the coconut trees, coconut saplings along with 5 HP diesel motor, to the father of the plaintiff through an unregistered sale deed, dated 07.11.1990. The sale gave only the right to enjoy the usufructs of the coconut trees and hence, it is stated that the registration was not done. The father of the plaintiff had put up a hut in the middle of the suit property and obtained electricity supply and was paying the charges till his death. After his death, the plaintiff, being a legal heir, succeeded to enjoy the usufructs of the suit coconut trees and has been paying the “B” memo charges to the Government. As the defendant has been trying to interfere with the peaceful possession, the suit has been filed.
3. Denying all the averments stated in the plaint, a written statement was filed by the defendant. It is the case of the defendant that the unregistered sale deed will not confer any right on the plaintiff over the suit property. In fact, the defendant had appointed the wife of the plaintiff as his Power of Attorney with respect to the suit property on 27.03.2002. The said Power of Attorney was, later, cancelled on 06.09.2007. Thus, the defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit.
4. Before the trial Court, on the side of the plaintiff, the plaintiff himself was examined as PW1 and other witnesses were examined as PW2 to PW5 and Exs.A.1 to A13 were marked, and on the side of the defendant, the defendant himself was examined DW.1 and Exs.B1 and B2 were marked. After considering the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court decreed the suit. But, on appeal, the first appellate Court has reversed the finding of the trial Court and thus, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff.
5. At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration:
“a) Whether the right to collect usufructs of the trees alone shall be a transfer of immovable property which requires registration or a mere license which does not require any registration?
b) Whether the Lower Appellate Court was right in holding that the plaintiff by exhibiting Ex. A5 and Ex. A6 effected a valid transfer of the property described in the plaint schedule?
c) Whether the Lower Appellate Court is correct in dismissing the suit for injunction without rending a finding regarding possession when both the plaintiff and the defendant have made rival claims, simply on the ground that the Government was not made as a party to the suit?”
6. Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
7. As per Ex. A4, dated 21.10.1988, which is a sale deed executed by Karuppaiah Konar in favour of the defendant, the said Karuppaiah had purchased the coconut trees and saplings in 2 acres and 50 cents of lands from one Victor Boopalaroyar and the same was sold by the said Karuppaiah to Rathinam/defendant. In the said sale deed, it is specifically stated as follows:
Text in vernacular
8. As per the above, the vendor of the defendant had admitted that he has no right over the land, as the land belongs only to the Government. The defendant had sold the same to the plaintiff's father under Exs.A5 & A6. In both the said documents, the above recitals have been repeated. Therefore, what is purchased by the plaintiff's father under Exs.A5 and A6 are the coconut trees standing in the land and the land was not conveyed as the same belongs to the Government.
9. It is the specific contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff that since what was purchased was only the right to pluck coconut trees, the document did not require registration and the character of the plaintiff is that of licensee. In this regard, a reliance was placed on 2000 (I) CTC 616 (S. Srinivasa Iyer v. Dakshinamurthi), wherein it has been held that the person, who has only a right to collect the usufructs from the coconut thope, is neither cultivating tenant nor is the lessee of the land, nor any right conferred on the soil, nor any interest conferred on the land. The transaction is only a licence to collect usufructs. The first appellate Court had misconstrued and misread the entire transaction and proceeded as if it is a lease and not a licence.
10. At this juncture, it is relevant to see whether the purchase made by the father of the plaintiff from the defendant of the right to pluck coconut trees is a valid transfer. Where a document grants to the plaintiff the right to enjoy the yield from the trees and the right to enter upon the land for the said purpose, the plaintiff cannot be said to obtain any right in and to the land, his possession being only that of a licensee with the right to enter upon the land and to use the land so long as he has the right to enjoy the usufructs from the trees. However, the right to pluck the coconuts from the trees is that of a lessee of an immovable property, because it contemplates that the plaintiff should derive a benefit from the further growth of the trees. There cannot be trees without land and there cannot be coconuts without trees. Therefore, plucking of coconuts is a continuous process from the growth of the trees.
11. On a plain reading of Exs.A5 and A6, it is clear that the rights, which the plaintiff obtained thereunder, are (a) the right to enjoy the yield from the trees and (a) the right to enter upon the land for the said purpose. So far as the land is concerned, the plaintiff was only a licensee and his right to enter upon the land to use the land was only so long as he had the right to enjoy the yield from the coconut trees.
12. According to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. Excepting the above exclusive definition, the immovable property is not defined in the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, a reference can be made to the definition in Section 3(25) of the General Clauses Act, which defines that “immovable property” shall include land, benefits to arise out of the land and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Considering the above definition, whether the right to pluck coconuts can be said to be a benefit to arise out of land?. If the answer is “yes”, then the right which the plaintiff obtained under Exs.A5 and A6 would be immovable property.
13. At this juncture, it will be useful to refer to Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882.
“52. “Licence” defined.- Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence.”
14. Whether a document creates licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form and the real test is the intention of the parties, whether they intended to create a lease or licence. Licence as defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, as a right to do or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property. However, a lease, on the other hand, is a transfer of right to enjoy an immovable property and is thus an interest in immovable property. As per Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, an easementary right cannot be transferred. Therefore, it can be easily held that the right conferred under Exs.A5 & A6 is a right to an interest in immovable property and hence, that documents required registration.
15. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent argued that the unregistered document granting permission to the plaintiff to plug the coconuts required registration. The documents, being unregistered, had passed no title or interest and therefore, the plaintiff had no fundamental right to enforce upon. Reliance was placed on AIR 1958 Supreme Court 532 (V 45 C 79) (Shantabai v. State of Bombay), wherein it has been held in paragraph Nos. 27 and 28 as follows:
“27. Under Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act, it would be regarded as “immovable property” because it is a benefit that arisies out of the land and also because trees are attached to the earth. On the other hand, the Transfer of Property Act says in Section 3 that standing timber is not immovable property for the purposes of that Act and so does Section 2(6) of the Registration Act. The question is which of these two definitions is to prevail.
28. Now it will be observed that “trees” are regarded as immovable property because they are attached to or rooted in the earth. Section 2(6) of the Registration Act, expressly says so and, though the Transfer of Property Act, does not define immovable property beyond saying that it does not include “standing timber, growing crops or grass”, trees attached to earth (except standing timber) are immovable property, even under the Transfer of Property Act, because of Section 3 (26 of the General Clauses Act. In the absence of a special definition, the general definition must prevail. Therefore, trees (except standing timber) are immovable property.”
16. The plaintiff/appellant is claiming his right based on Exs.A5 and A6. As discussed above, without registration of the documents, a conveyance in the immovable property will not confer any right to the purchaser. Besides legal impediment, the learned counsel for the defendant/respondent also pointed out that if really the property was intended to be sold to the plaintiff, Exs.B1 and B2 would not have come into existence. Ex. B1 is the registration copy of the Power of Attorney, dated 27.03.2002, executed by the defendant in favour of the wife of the plaintiff. The said deed was executed due to the fact that the defendant had to travel on and off to outside and was not able to maintain the suit property. The wife of the plaintiff was appointed as a Power Agent only for the purpose of managing the same. Later, the defendant learnt that she was acting against the interest of the defendant and hence, the said Power of Attorney was cancelled as per Ex. B2 on 06.09.2007.
17. It is the contention of the learned counsel, if the defendant had already conveyed his right in the suit property as early as on 07.11.1990 under Exs.A5 and A6, there is no necessity for him to execute the Power of Attorney, that too in the name of wife of the plaintiff and that too for the maintenance of the same land. The Power of Attorney, being a registered document, must be within the knowledge of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had never raised any objection at the time of execution or even cancellation. The Power of Attorney was accepted and acted upon acknowledging the right of the defendant in the suit property. Therefore, the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit seeking the relief of injunction.
18. Yet another aspect that is to be seen is the factum of possession. The plaintiff had produced Ex. A9 which are “B” memo receipts, Ex. A8 - Electricity Bills and Ex. A10” House Tax Receipts. On the strength of “B” memo charges being paid by the plaintiff, the plaintiff wanted to establish the possession of the suit property. No doubt, it is true that a person in possession can resist the whole world but exception is true owner. As the plaintiff has got no title over the suit property, he cannot seek for any relief against the person, who has got a better title. Hence, even the relief of injunction cannot be granted to the plaintiff. In the light of the above facts, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court. Thus, the questions of law are answered in the negative.
19. In the result, this second appeal fails and the same is, accordingly, dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.
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