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P. Ashok Kumar And Another v. P. Radhabai And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This batch of Civil Revision Petitions arises from a common Original Petition (O.P.) — O.P.(S.R.) No. 2211 of 2011 — in which the petitioners challenged an arbitral award. The petitioners filed the O.P. after a delay of 236 days and therefore moved I.A. No. 598 of 2011 seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 151 CPC. The learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad declined to condone the delay.
Separate revision petitions challenge additional interlocutory orders in that same proceeding: (a) orders refusing to receive or permit inspection of documents listed by the petitioners in I.A. Nos. 210/2012 and 211/2012; and (b) an order declining to summon the Sub-Registrar and related indent and sale register entries in I.A. No. 1977/2011. The present Civil Revision Petitions (C.R.P. Nos. 2151/2012, 2246/2012, 2383/2012 and 2458/2012) seek to impugn those orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has application to an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (i.e., whether the power to condone delay under Section 5 can be invoked where Section 34 prescribes its own limitation period and limited extension).
- Whether the petitioners' pleaded case of fraudulent conduct by respondents, which allegedly prevented them from filing within the prescribed period, attracts the benefit of Section 17 of the Limitation Act and thus whether Section 17 applies to petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
- Whether the lower court erred in not dealing with the petitioners' pleadings regarding fraud and concealment with reference to Section 17 of the Limitation Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners contended that they were misled by the respondents under the guise of settlement; respondents made proposals and agreed to execute Gift Settlement Deeds and a Memorandum of Understanding dated 09.04.2010, which caused delay.
- The petitioners alleged that respondents intentionally delayed execution of settlement documents to let the statutory period (90 days plus 30 days) lapse so that petitioners would be left to abide by the award and respondents gain wrongfully.
- The petitioners also pleaded personal incapacity of petitioner No.1 (serious illness for more than two months) and related family circumstances that contributed to delay.
- On these factual averments, the petitioners argued they were entitled to relief under Section 17 of the Limitation Act (effect of fraud or mistake), because the period of limitation should not run while the fraud remained undiscovered.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondents' counsel submitted that since the Limitation Act (specifically Section 5) has no application to Section 34 proceedings under the Arbitration Act, there was no necessity for the lower court to consider the petitioners' submissions based on the Limitation Act.
- Respondents contended that exclusion of Section 5 would mean the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to extend time for filing Section 34 petitions. (This position was advanced before the High Court; the Court noted the submission but did not accept it as a basis to foreclose consideration of Section 17 without remand.)
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470 | Authority relied upon for the proposition that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is a special provision prescribing the period of limitation and conferring limited discretion to extend that period (i.e., Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply). | The High Court (in the lower court's order) and the present Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to Section 34 petitions; the present Court agreed with that view. |
| Consolidated Engineering Works v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169 | Authority similarly relied upon for the inapplicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 34 arbitration proceedings, as Section 34 is governed by the Arbitration Act's own limitation regime. | The present Court endorsed the lower court's reliance on this judgment in holding that Section 5 does not apply to Section 34 proceedings and agreed with the lower court's view on that point. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in discrete analytical steps:
- It acknowledged the background: an arbitral award was assailed in O.P.(S.R.) No. 2211/2011 and the petitioners sought condonation of a 236-day delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act along with Section 151 CPC.
- The learned Chief Judge had taken the view — endorsed by the present Court — that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is a special statutory provision that prescribes the period of limitation for Section 34 petitions and allows the court discretion to extend the period only by 30 days, so Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply. The Court agreed with the lower court’s reliance on the cited Supreme Court decisions.
- However, the Court noted that the petitioners' applications contained specific factual averments of fraudulent conduct and concealment by the respondents (including allegations of inducement to delay, an MOU dated 09.04.2010, promises to execute Gift Settlement and Release/Relinquishment deeds, deliberate dragging on of time, and the illness of petitioner No.1), which were reproduced in the record and were expressly not dealt with by the Chief Judge with reference to Section 17 of the Limitation Act.
- The Court considered the text of Section 17 (effect of fraud or mistake) and observed that if the petitioners can prove they were misled by fraud so as to be prevented from filing within time, their case would fall within Section 17's scope.
- The Court recognized a discrete legal question: whether Section 17 itself applies to petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Although respondents' counsel argued that exclusion of Section 5 necessarily excluded Section 17, the Court declined to express any final view on that point at this stage.
- Because the lower court had not considered the petitioners' fraud-related pleadings with reference to Section 17, the Court found it appropriate to remit that limited issue to the Chief Judge for fresh consideration and directed the lower court to pronounce upon the applicability (or otherwise) of Section 17 after hearing both parties within two months.
- The Court made clear that its remand was limited to the Section 17-related pleadings; other aspects of the lower court's orders were confirmed.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
All the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed.
The specific directives and immediate consequences were:
- The Court affirmed the lower court's view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to Section 34 petitions under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, relying on established Supreme Court authorities.
- The matter was remanded to the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for a fresh determination solely on whether the petitioners' pleaded allegations of fraud/ concealment attract the benefit of Section 17 of the Limitation Act in relation to their Section 34 petitions; the Chief Judge is directed to hear both parties and pass a fresh order on this limited issue within two months from receipt of the order.
- The orders of the lower court on other aspects were confirmed.
- Because the lower court must consider the petitioners' allegations on merits, I.A. Nos. 598 of 2011, 1977 of 2011, 210 of 2012 and 211 of 2012 were held to deserve allowance and accordingly are allowed.
- As a consequence, C.R.P.M.P. No. 2892 of 2012 (an interim application in C.R.P. No. 2151/2012) was disposed of as infructuous.
Implications:
The decision confirms the settled position (as applied in this case) that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not operate to extend the limitation period for Section 34 petitions under the Arbitration Act. However, the Court did not decide whether Section 17 of the Limitation Act is excluded in like manner; that discrete question is left to the lower court to determine after hearing the parties on the petitioners' fraud allegations. No broader precedent was settled on the applicability of Section 17 by this opinion; the remand preserves the parties' right to have the fraud plea considered in the first instance by the trial court.
Note: This summary is confined strictly to the material and rulings contained in the provided opinion. Sections of the original order not addressed by the Court on the merits were expressly left undisturbed.
C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, J.:— This batch of Civil Revision Petitions arose out of a common O.P. wherein the parties are also common.
2. C.R.P. No. 2151 of 2012 is filed against order dated 21.02.2012 in I.A. No. 598 of 2011 in O.P. (S.R.) No. 2211 of 2011 whereby the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad has declined to condone the delay of 236 days in filing the O.P. against an award passed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
3. C.R.P. No. 2246 of 2012 arises out of order in I.A. No. 210 of 2012 in I.A. No. 598 of 2011 whereunder the lower Court has dismissed the I.A. filed by the petitioners requesting to receive documents listed in the petition for the purpose of enquiry in I.A. No. 598 of 2011.
4. C.R.P. No. 2383 of 2012 is filed against order in I.A. No. 1977 of 2011 in I.A. No. 598 of 2011 whereby the lower Court declined the request of the petitioners to summon the Sub-Registrar, Charminar, Hyderabad along with the indent dated 09.04.2010 relating to sale of three non-judicial stamp papers in the name of respondent No. 2 together with the sale register of the stamp papers for the purpose of enquiry in I.A. No. 598 of 2011.
5. C.R.P. No. 2458 of 2012 arises out of order in I.A. No. 211 of 2012 in I.A. No. 1977 of 2011 whereunder the lower Court has rejected the petitioners' request to receive documents as per the list enclosed to the petition for the purpose of enquiry in I.A. No. 1977 of 2011.
6. An arbitral award was passed in an arbitration proceeding to which the petitioners and the respondents in these revision petitions are parties. The petitioners felt aggrieved by the arbitral award and, accordingly, they have filed O.P.(S.R.) No. 2211 of 2011 assailing the same. As there was a delay of 236 days in filing the O.P., they filed I.A. No. 598 of 2011 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short “the Act”) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for condonation of the same. The learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad by a detailed order has taken the view, which in my opinion is very correct, that Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short “the Arbitration Act”) being the provision of a special statute, which prescribed period of limitation and conferred discretion on the Court to extend the period of limitation by 30 days only, the provisions of Section 5 of the Act have no application. The lower appellate Court has rightly placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union Of India v. Popular Construction Co.. (2001) 8 SCC 470 and in Consolidated Engineering Works v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department (2008) 7 SCC 169 in holding to this view. After a detailed hearing on this aspect, I have no reason to differ with the view taken by the lower Court. Accordingly, to this extent, the order of the lower Court cannot be found fault with.
7. However, at the hearing, Mr. Murlinarayan Bung, learned counsel for the petitioners argued, which I find force therein, that the lower Court has failed to deal with the pleadings of the petitioners that on account of the fraudulent act of the respondents, they could not file the O.P. within the period of limitation and that, therefore, they are entitled to the benefit of Section 17 of the Act.
8. Mr. K. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that when the provisions of the Limitation Act have no application, there was no necessity for the lower Court to consider this submission.
9. A perusal of the pleadings of the petitioners would show that in the affidavit filed in I.A. No. 598 of 2011 they have averred as under:
“7. It is further submitted that dissatisfied with the award, the petitioners herein raised the objections before the learned arbitrators for which the learned arbitrators called for conciliation in between the petitioners and respondent Nos. 1 to 7.
8. It is further submitted that under the guise of settlement, respondent Nos. 1 to 7 intentionally started misguiding the petitioners herein by giving one proposal or the other.
9. It is further submitted that after due efforts, it was agreed in between that two more properties out of the items mentioned in the award shall be given to the petitioners herein and respondent Nos. 1 to 7 agreed to execute a Gift Settlement Deed and Release Deed (Relinquishment Deeds) in favour of petitioner No. 1.
10. It is further submitted that accordingly, a Memorandum of Understanding dated 09.04.2010 was prepared in which terms were reduced into writing by respondent Nos. 1 to 7 and the petitioners herein also prepared Gift Settlement Deeds in order to settle the dispute one for all. A copy of Memorandum of Understanding and Gift Settlement Deed and Release Deed are filed herewith for kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court.
11. It is further submitted that thereupon respondent Nos. 1 to 7 intentionally started to drag on time on one pretext or the other for executing the Memorandum of Understanding and having good faith, the petitioners trusted upon respondent Nos. 1 to 7.
12. It is further submitted that the respondents were preplanned to trap the petitioners herein to keep them in dark so that the mandatory period of 90 (Ninety) days as well as 30 (Thirty) days for filing the present O.P. shall lapse and the petitioners shall be left with no other go but to abide the award and the respondents shall have wrongful gain.
13. It is further submitted that as the saying goes unfortunate does not come alone, petitioner No. 1 fell sick and suffered from viral fever-typhoid and his condition was such critical that he was not in position to move from the bed for more than two months and petitioner No. 2 is a household lady and as the family was divided, there was no other person to look after petitioner No. 1 except petitioner No. 2.
14. It is further submitted that respondent Nos. 1 to 7 by suppressing all the above stated facts filed E.P.(SR) No. 2945 of 2010 before the Hon'ble Court against the petitioners herein to get the award executed, but the same was rejected by the Hon'ble Court as there was no direction.”
10. The learned Chief Judge has also extracted these averments in paragraph 2 of his order. However, these averments were not dealt with by the learned Chief Judge with reference to the provisions of Section 17 of the Act.
11. It is useful to consider Section 17 of the Act which reads as under:
“Effect of fraud or mistake:—
(1) Where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act-
(a) the suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent or his agent; or
(b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or
(c) the suit or application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; or
(d) where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently concealed from him;
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production.
Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any suit to be instituted or application to be made to recover or enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which-
(i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know, or have reason to believe, that any fraud had been committed, or
(ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made, by a person who did not know, or have reason to believe, that the mistake had been made, or
(iii) in the case of a concealed document, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party 588 to the concealment and, did not at the time of purchase know, or have reason to believe, that the document had been concealed.
(2) Where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of a decree or order within the period of limitation, the court may, on the application of the judgment-creditor made after the expiry of the said period extend the period for execution of the decree or order.
Provided that such application is made within one year from the date of the discovery of the fraud or the cessation of force, as the case may be.”
12. If the petitioners are able to prove that they were mislead into not filing the petitions within the period of limitation due to the fraud committed by the respondents as alleged by them in their applications, their cases fall under Section 17 of the Act. But the question then is whether Section 17 itself applies to the petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act?.
13. Even though Mr. K. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the respondents sought to argue that when Section 5 of the Act is excluded, automatically Section 17 of the Act also gets excluded, I refrain from expressing any opinion on this aspect, because this is required to be considered by the lower Court at the first instance before this Court examines the same at an appropriate stage. On this short ground, I feel that it is just and appropriate to remand the matter back to the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for considering the above-mentioned pleadings of the petitioners and pronouncing upon the same with reference to the applicability or otherwise of the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on these aspects, the learned Chief Judge is directed to reconsider the case only to this limited extent and pass a fresh order after hearing both parties, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order. It is made clear that the orders of the lower Court in respect of other aspects stand confirmed.
14. Accordingly, all the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed. Since the lower Court has to consider the allegations of the petitioners on merits, I am of the opinion that I.A. Nos. 598 of 2011, 1977 of 2011, 210 of 2012 and 211 of 2012 deserve to be allowed and, accordingly, they are allowed.
15. As a sequel, C.R.P.M.P. No. 2892 of 2012 in C.R.P. No. 2151 of 2012 filed by the petitioners for interim relief is disposed of as infructuous.
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