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Hav. V.S. Rakesh v. Union Of India & Ors.

Armed Forces Tribunal
Jul 25, 2013

1. The petitioner vide petition has prayed to declare the common retirement order dated 15.10.2008 so far as it relates to the applicant, whereby the applicant retired on 31.10.2099, as null and void and set aside the same and direct the respondents to treat the applicant in terms of his original seniority date of 23.10.1983 and direct the respondents to hold Special Promotion Board to consider the applicant's promotion as per his original seniority and give consequential benefits.

2. The petitioner was enrolled in Indian Army as Sepoy on 23.10.1983. His date of birth being 01.07.1964. He was promoted to the post of Naik in 1994 and in Havildar in 1998 with the order dated 01.09.1998 w.e.f. 01.01.1998. In 2008, after completing 44 years of age, he stood retired on 01.07.2008. He has filed the present petition challenging his retirement and his grievance, that he has not been properly considered for promotion to the post of Naik and consequently he is not been able to get his due consideration for the post of Havildar and to the post of Naib Subedar. Therefore, he has filed this present petition.

3. A reply was filed by the respondents and respondents have contested the matter and submitted that the case of petitioner was considered properly and no injustice has been done. Thereafter, this matter came before this Court number of times and orders were passed from time to time and finally an affidavit has been filed by the respondents. Respondents has pointed out in their reply that though the petitioner was promoted to the post of Naik 1994, though his juniors were promoted earlier w.e.f. 01.07.1993 but his seniority has been restored back from 01.07.1993 in the cadre of Naik. In 1998, he was considered to the post of Havildar and his seniority as of Naik, which was original has been maintained and no person junior to him was given a march in the cadre of Naik after restoring the seniority from 01.07.1993. He was promoted as Havildar in 1998 and his case for promotion to the post of Havildar was considered along with his batch during the month of August 1996, as per his batchmates in terms of promotion policy and he was not found suitable due to lacking of ACR criteria and hence, was superseded for promotion and subsequently he was promoted to the post of Havildar by the order dated 01.09.1998 but w.e.f. 01.01.1998. He was also considered for promotion to the post of Naib Subedar by 2008, but by that time, he has already become 44 of years of age, as such he could not be promoted. The original records were also placed before us for our perusal and after going through the records we are satisfied that so far as Naik is concerned a person junior to him was promoted in 1994 but that mistake has been 4 rectified and they have restored seniority of petitioner in Naik by granting him seniority from 01.07.1993. Therefore, his seniority in the rank remained intact. However, during 1998 when his case was taken up, he lacked the ACR, therefore, he could not be promoted, though, he was promoted later.

4. Learned Counsel for Petitioner submitted that he has lost one ACR and the respondents are not placing on record all the material which is relevant to the case of petitioner and they are suppressing the same, in this connection Learned counsel invited our attention to decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court (National Insurance Co. Ltd. New Delhi v. Jugal Kishore) in (1988) 1 SCC 626 : AIR 1988 Supreme Court 719). We have considered the rival submission of both the parties and we are of the opinion that there is no question of suppression of material by the respondents and they have fairly placed the relevant records so far as Naik is concerned, and there is no reason for us to doubt the affidavit filed by the respondents, in pursuance of the directions given by us and on the basis of records, in which they have detailed all the material and disclosed that why the petitioner could not be promoted in time to the post of Havildar because of the ACR criteria. Though in the petition all these grievances has not been made but we permitted the petitioner to argue all these points and we have heard both the parties are satisfied that there is no suppression of facts and no injustice has been meted out to the petitioner. Hence, we do not find any merit in the case. The petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.